



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STUDIES IN

CANADIAN PARTY FINANCE

Contributing Authors

Khayyam Z. Paltiel
Research Director

John Meisel and Richard Van Loon
J. L. Granatstein

Michael Stein
Committee Research Staff

Publication of these studies by the Advisory Committee on Election Expenses does not necessarily involve acceptance by the Committee Members of all the statements contained therein. The opinions expressed are, in each case, those of the respective authors.

Alphonse Barbeau, Chairman
Hon. M. J. Coldwell, Gordon R. Dryden, Arthur Smith, Norman Ward.
Raoul P. Barbe, John S. McEachran, Co-Secretaries.

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FOREWORD

The Report of the Committee on Election Expenses signed by the members of the Committee was tabled in the House of Commons on October 11, 1966. It was divided into three parts: the Report proper, eleven studies and three appendices. The Introduction to Part II referred to a supplementary volume which would include detailed studies on Canadian party finance and the attitudes of the electorate and candidates toward election expenses. This volume is the finished product.

These studies are a consequence of the research undertaken and made available to the members of the Committee during the course of their investigation and while the signed Report of the Committee was being prepared. A number of these studies were revised and polished for publication. Although this volume was designed along lines laid down by the members of the Committee, the opinions expressed herein are not those of the Committee but of the respective authors of these studies and the responsibility is theirs alone.


The original studies were conducted by the research staff of the Committee either individually or collectively. Three papers were written for the Committee by academic researchers under contract. The texts were prepared for publication by Mrs. Florence Rosenfeld, Mr. Jean-Marc

Poliquin and Mr. Kenneth Kirkwood under the direction of the co-secretary, Raoul P. Barbe and the Research Director and acting secretary, Professor Khayyam Z. Paltiel.

The acknowledgments which appear at the beginning of the Committee's Report specified the respective contributions which the research, editorial and administrative staff made to the fulfilment of the Committee's task.

We wish to express our gratitude to the authors of these studies: Professors John Meisel, J. L. Granatstein, Michael Stein and Raoul P. Barbe as well as to Mrs. Jean Brown Van Loon, Mrs. Jill McCalla Vickers, Mr. Howat P. Noble, Mr. Richard Van Loon and Mr. Reginald A. Whitaker. It is fitting to note the signal contribution of Professor Khayyam Z. Paltiel both as author and director of this research program.

Finally we wish to thank Mr. Carol Gauthier and Mr. E. Wesley Richardson as well as the administrative staff: Mmes. Joan Archambault, Margo Dupuis, Denise McLaughlin, Margo Morency and Colleen Nicholls.


Alphonse Barbeau,
Chairman.

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PREFACE

This volume is a compilation of investigations which with one exception were carried out for the members of the Committee on Election Expenses. Each study was prepared separately, but all have a theme in common: namely, the elucidation of the role that money plays in the Canadian political process. Four studies examine the fund-raising and expenditure patterns of Canadian parties and their relationship to the respective party structures. Two studies survey the behaviour and attitudes of the Canadian electorate and candidates for federal office. The opening paper, presented originally to a learned society, attempts to assess the influence of party finance on Canadian federalism.

The authors are deeply aware of the remaining lacunae in this area of knowledge. Little beyond gossip is known about the provincial arena and the monetary aspects of constituency politics. Much must yet be done in order to establish the impact of national and regional political cultures and attitudes on the financial practices of parties and candidates.

Despite these gaps, this volume marks a significant enrichment of our knowledge and understanding of Canadian politics. It is hoped that the general public as well as academic students and active politicians will find the material reproduced here an effective guide to further study.

Ottawa, December 1966.

Khayyam Z. Paltiel

CONTRIBUTORS

RAOUL P. BARBE, LL.L., D.E.S.D. (Ottawa) is Associate Professor of Public Law at the University of Ottawa. He is the author of numerous articles; most recently of "Aspects juridiques des nationalisations au Canada" in Travaux du Troisième Colloque international de Droit comparé, Tome VI, pp. 134-152, and "Le Tribunal minier du Québec", Canadian Bar Journal, 1966, pp. 227-234. He is at present Co-Secretary of the Committee on Election Expenses.

J.L. GRANATSTEIN, Ph.D., (Duke), is Assistant Professor of History at York University, Toronto. He has been associated with the Army-Historical Section.

JOHN MEISEL, Ph.D. (London) is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University, Kingston.

HOWAT P. NOBLE, B.A. (R.M.C.), M.A. (Carleton), is a doctoral student in Political Science at Queen's University and was a member of the Research Staff of the Committee on Election Expenses.

KHAYYAM Z. PALTIEL, Ph.D. (Jerusalem) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa. He is at present Research Director and Acting Secretary of the Committee on Election Expenses.

MICHAEL STEIN, Ph.D. (Princeton) is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Carleton University. He has done studies on Social Credit and on Ethnicity in Canada for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

JEAN BROWN VAN LOON, B.A. (Carleton) is on the Staff of the Institute of Municipal Government, Queen's University. She is a former member of the Research Staff of the Committee on Election Expenses.

RICHARD J. VAN LOON, M.A. (Carleton) is a doctoral student in Political Science, Queen's University. He was formerly a member of the Research Staff of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

JILL McCALLA VICKERS, B.A. (Carleton) is a graduate student at the London School of Economics. She was a member of the Research Staff of the Committee on Election Expenses.

REGINALD A. WHITAKER, B.A. (Carleton) is now with the Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa. He is a former member of the Research Staff of the Committee on Election Expenses.

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1

FEDERALISM AND PARTY FINANCE: A PRELIMINARY SOUNDING *

by

Khayyam Z. Paltiel

Political finance has always been enveloped in an aura of mystery. Its first students like the "muck-rakers" were so often moved by the piquancies of what they discovered and by a proneness to moralize that they often neglected to relate their findings about what some of them called the "money power" to an understanding of the political system as a whole. Their sole monuments are scattered across the legislative landscape of the United States in the pages of the abortive and still-born election expense laws which the Progressive Era was prone to produce.

* The original version of this paper was prepared for delivery at the 38th Annual Meeting of The Canadian Political Science Association, June 8-10, 1966, University of Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, Quebec. Professor Paltiel has agreed to its inclusion in this volume at the request of the members of the Committee on Election Expenses.

It was not until the pioneering books of Pollock and Overacker^{2/} appeared that the study of political finance entered the modern era; and with Alexander Heard's magisterial study^{3/} the subject may be said to have reached full scholarly maturity. Today a host of scholars, like Theodor Eschenburg in Germany, Jean Meynaud in Switzerland, and Herbert Alexander and Arnold Heidenheimer in the United States, are building a body of knowledge and theory which promises to be an important part of the study of politics in the contemporary period.

In Canada until very recently the subject has remained all but abandoned. Apart from recondite and somewhat shame-faced references to the more questionable activities of their subjects by the official biographers of our political worthies and the "tut-tuts" of our journalists as they turned from the more sulphurous of our long procession of election fund scandals, little has been done to clarify political finance in this country. What outcries there were, have occasioned even more ineffectual legislation, if that were possible, than some laws in the United States. Only one Canadian study deserves mention and has rightly received it, and that is by Professor R. A. MacKay "After Beauharnois — What?", published 35 years ago in Maclean's Magazine in its issue of October 15, 1931. But here too^{4/} the focus was on the reform of election expense laws, not the political system. It should perhaps be a matter for shame that the only study of party financing in Canada that

even remotely attempts to relate the problem to our party system in general was prepared by Ernest Eugene Harrill^{5/} as a doctoral dissertation for Alexander Heard at the University of North Carolina.

What follows then is a gloss on Professor Heard's statement with respect to his own country but which bears equally well for Canada, namely that "The United States is both a democracy and a pecuniary society that permits large concentrations of economic power. The interconnection of government with the rest of American society can be especially illuminated by the flow of funds from the rest of society into the channels of politics. The study of money in politics necessarily probes the organization of society in its relationship to the functions and actions of government."^{6/}

This paper stems from the writer's work as Research Director of the Advisory Committee on Election Expenses. The Committee, however, clearly bears no responsibility for the views expressed here. Much of the detailed documentation is contained in the six studies which follow but which were unavailable at the time this paper was drafted. However, the writer's acquaintance with this material was a constant guide as well as a restraint. If this paper appears somewhat speculative, general and impressionistic, the fault may be remedied by a close reading of this volume and the eleven studies in Part II

of the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses. The writer wishes to acknowledge his debt to his students and research assistants and to Professors J.L. Granatstein, Michael Stein and John Meisel whose studies form part of this volume.

The thesis presented in this paper may be stated very briefly.

Canada is a federal parliamentary state with a Cabinet system of Government. These characteristics affect our party system. On the one hand, the Parliamentary and Cabinet system places vast power in the hands of the party leader and, if the party is in power, in his Cabinet. This central role of the leaders in the structure of the major parties is reflected in the fact that they usually name the finance chairmen of their parties. Nor is this function belied by the fact that the leaders tend to disclaim knowledge about the sources and amounts of party funds. Canada's federal structure tends to fragment this power by setting up competing power centres in the provinces and provincial party organizations. Party and election finance are affected by these factors.

The traditional methods of financing the two old Canadian parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, helped overcome the splintering effect of the provinces and provincial party organizations. This was accomplished through a highly centralized system of party finance.

This system rested on a common basis: the centralized corporate industrial and financial structures located in Montreal and in Toronto. It is common knowledge that the two old parties were largely financed from essentially the same sources. These corporate contributors numbered in the hundreds rather than in the thousands. Under this system, provincial and even municipal elections, as well as federal elections, could be and were financed from the central party funds and sources. The traditional system of party finance had important integrative effects which helped overcome the centrifugal forces in Canadian political life. This beneficial result was made possible by the highly concentrated nature of Canadian industry and finance.

The development of third parties and multipartyism and the breakdown of the two-party system since 1919, together with the resurgence of the provinces on both the political and economic levels since the Second World War, have undermined the highly centralized nature of Canadian party finance. Much of Canada's postwar economic growth has been due to the development of resource and extractive industries which fall under provincial jurisdiction. This has given the provinces an economic base for their political demands and development. Large corporations which are the principal contributors to Canadian political parties now seek access to and must deal directly with provincial governments and party leaders to satisfy their interests.

That many of these corporate contributors may be subsidiaries of non-resident companies, as implied by Hon. Walter Gordon, M.P., in his recent pamphlet ^{7/} presents a related problem which may have dysfunctional effects on our federal system.

In either case, substantial funds are now available at the provincial level to provincial party organizations notably in Western Canada (whether the provincial party is in Opposition or forms the Government). This has had important consequences for and has affected the structure of Canadian politics through its effect on the articulation of our political parties. Provincial governments and provincially based parties are now able to compete successfully with the federal government and parties. In fact the federal parties themselves have been affected. The provincial wings of federal parties, notably in Western and Central Canada, are able to raise substantial sums on their own. The "quiet revolution" in Quebec has led to the establishment of a partial state subsidy system which, while ostensibly aimed at removing the abuse-ridden party finance devices of the Taschereau-Duplessis era, has in effect put the provincial parties and notably the Quebec parties in an independent position vis-à-vis the federal parties and their financial supporters. All these factors have tended to undermine the role which our national parties have played in the maintenance of traditional Canadian federalism. This may also explain in part some

of the difficulties which have emerged in recent years in the sphere of federal-provincial relations.

Now many scholarly observers like Professor Smiley ^{8/} have asserted that one should not exaggerate the role of political parties in the Canadian federal process and that attention must be paid to other supports of Canadian federalism like administrative and financial arrangements. However, even if this caveat is accepted it cannot be denied that parties do have an important role in the Canadian federal process as Meisel ^{9/} has argued. Perhaps without pushing the point as far, one may agree with Riker that there is a "causal connection" between "variations in the degree of centralization (or peripheralization) in the constitutional structure of a federalism... [and ^{10/}... the variation in degree of party centralization." The argument advanced here is that recent shifts which have occurred in Canadian party finance have had a dysfunctional effect on Canadian federalism.

At this juncture, a rapid review of some of the historical and contemporary details relating to Canadian party finance is necessary.

In the early post-Confederation period Canadian party finance reflected the legal framework of the electoral system: open voting and deferred non-simultaneous elections, the dominant "ministerialism" and the weakness of partisanship. ^{11/}

The absence of permanent party organizations and the lack of specialized fund-raising structures put the burden of raising and distributing campaign funds on the shoulders of the party leaders themselves. Thus, when the Pacific Scandal broke, Macdonald and Cartier could not dissociate themselves from blame.

It was only after electoral reform, the adoption of a modern voting system, and the expansion of the franchise that a coherent and continuous party structure, reminiscent of modern political parties, emerged. This evolution led to a specialization of function in the interests of efficiency. Party leaders were gradually relieved of the burden of soliciting funds; this function was allocated to specialized fund raisers like Hon. Thomas McGreevy, M.P., as revealed in the investigation into another of the long Canadian line of railway scandals.^{12/} The culmination of this process may be viewed in the light of the details revealed by the Beauharnois Affair. The specialized fund raiser, who still exists by the way, had now become the full-time party professional such as Senator Andrew Haydon. Haydon had been general secretary of the National Liberal Committee in 1919. In 1922 he became the main treasurer and fund raiser for election campaigns. Senator Donat Raymond acted as "trustee" of the Liberal Party funds for the Province of Quebec. When the Beauharnois Affair broke, Rt. Hon. William L. Mackenzie King, in contrast to Macdonald, managed to dissociate himself simply by asserting that he,

as Liberal Party leader, was ignorant of the details of party finance. Although this argument was met with incredulity by his counterparts in other parts of the House, Mr. R.B. Bennett and Mr. J.S. Woodsworth,^{13/} nevertheless this has been the stand that has generally been adopted by party leaders ever since. Evidence indicates, of course, that King and other party leaders were and are bound in some way or another to be informed of the identity of the major contributors to their parties.

The Conservative Party's fund-raising structure in the twentieth century has followed a somewhat similar pattern. Specialized fund raisers have emerged and full-time professionals have taken over party organizing functions. The differences between the parties, where they exist in this regard, are related to the fact that the Liberal Party's formal structure is more federalized while the Conservative Party, until Mr. Diefenbaker's assumption of leadership in 1956, had a more centralized appearance. Also, the role and impact of the leader has had a greater effect on the fund-raising fortunes of the Conservative Party. Thus, Rt. Hon. R.B. Bennett in effect personally became the main financial prop of his Party for about a decade, a benefit which his Party scarcely survived. Also the policies, and personalities of leaders like Mr. Meighen and Dr. Manion, not to speak of more contemporary personalities, have occasioned severe financial droughts for the Conservative Party.

Before considering the implication of contemporary financial structures and patterns, the sources, purposes and means by which funds are raised should be examined.

It is perhaps a truism to say that the Canadian political system and modern election campaign styles turn on the existence of parties, their leaders and the projection of the images of parties and leaders, and that the role of the individual candidate and local constituency campaigns are corollaries of this fact. Canadian law, however, persists in the myth that parties have no existence.

Modern party and election finance are, as has been stated, intimately related to the social system as well as to the Canadian party system and contemporary campaign styles. Canadian society is increasingly dominated by three great bureaucratic structures and élites. First, is the industrial corporate structure and managerial business élite. The fact that the decision-making centres for a considerable portion of this sector are located beyond the borders of Canada, and in the United States in particular, introduces a complicating factor which does not change the essence of the problem although it does have special implications for the parties themselves and their internal or democratic decision-making practices. Secondly, parallel and related to the industrial bureaucracy is a labour bureaucracy and trade union élite about whom a not dissimilar reservation regarding foreign influence may be made as that just entered regarding the managerial structure.

Finally, there exists the modern bureaucratic state and its various organs. There are sectors of our society which have not as yet been absorbed by the bureaucratic system but these are archaic, traditional and, despite occasional upsurges, of decreasing political importance. The three sectors and their élites are, or are becoming, the major providers of the financial wherewithal of the Canadian party system. Despite several efforts by the major parties, ^{14/} perhaps not persistent enough, and the repeated and sometimes partially and temporarily successful efforts of several minor parties, it is a myth that it has been possible for Canadian parties to acquire the requisite funds without recourse to either one or a combination of these bureaucracies.

Our parties require funds for three purposes: first, to fight election campaigns; second, to maintain a viable inter-election organization; third, to provide research and advisory services for the party's leadership and elected representatives at various levels.

All the evidence indicates that only the first of these, the campaign fund, receives and gets the attention it deserves. Some attempts are made to provide the second, especially if the party enjoys the advantages of incumbency. But the last comes as a very poor third, often being left to the voluntary free-will offerings of interested individuals and groups. Of course, in the case of the two traditional major parties, this may be a consequence of the fact that

they began and still are essentially parliamentary parties of the "cadre" type which Duverger has so well described. And while the minor parties began as extra-parliamentary groupings, they never completely became parties of the "mass" type. In the case of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation/New Democratic Party it can be said that the extra-parliamentary party or movement retains considerable influence. Substantial amounts in the form of membership fees and donations are still collected but the New Democratic Party is now largely dependent financially on the funds received from the trade unions. Only the Ralliement des Cr ditistes relies substantially on popular fund raising, since the national Social Credit movement is financially simply an appendage of the Alberta and British Columbia Parties which gather their funds from the same type of source as the two major parties, whether or not they are cloaked by such devices as the Social Credit Education Fund.^{15/}

The problems raised by money for the parties are not simply those of amount, although these may be heavy enough, ranging in recent federal elections from \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000;^{16/} thus the parties may be driven to tainted sources in order to achieve the sums they require. However, the nub of the problem as seen by political scientists and other students is clearly the possible influence which the sources, the fund raisers and the means by which these sums are subsequently distributed within the parties,

have on the selection of leaders and the determination of the policies of those parties.

Traditionally the bulk of the funds for the old parties has come from the corporate financial structures centered in Montreal and Toronto.

In recent years the British Columbia and Alberta wings of the Liberal and Conservative Parties have become largely self-supporting and contribute on occasion to the support of the Saskatchewan wing. Manitoba in the hey-day of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange was self-supporting but now is a net importer of election funds. The rest of Canada, as far as the two old parties are concerned, are beneficiaries of transfer payments; they are in part political colonies except when some grass-roots movement has swept a minor party into power or a traditional party can exploit the advantages of incumbency by using office to gain funds by means fair or foul. (The latter, of course, can be treated as the exploitation of the third sector, the state organs or bureaucracy, and as hidden governmental subsidies limited to the incumbents). Similar sources are exploited by the Social Credit Party in British Columbia and Alberta. In contrast to the old parties, however, the national wing of the Social Credit Party is the beneficiary of provincial to federal transfer payments, the national Party being simply an appendage of the two provincial Parties. Likewise, in the days of the old CCF, the national Party was

a financial dependent of the Saskatchewan, British Columbia and, in part, the Ontario provincial sections.

How is this money raised on behalf of the two old parties? All the evidence suggests that very few people are involved in raising this money; the collectors and contributors together number no more than several hundred.

The usual fund-raising structure has consisted of finance committees in Toronto and Montreal with the Toronto chairmen acting as the seniors. Subsidiary committees may also be established in Ottawa, Hamilton and London. In recent years the Western provincial finance chairmen have risen in importance. The chief solicitors are appointed by and are associated with the party leaders. They are not subject to the formal elected party organs. It would appear too that the solicitors of party funds normally do not hold elective office. They are usually co-opted by fellow fund raisers and often have literally inherited these positions from older members of their families or business and law firms.

Now there is some distinction between the two old parties in the treatment of funds once collected. In the Conservative Party which is more centralized, the funds have tended to be pooled and distributed centrally, often from the national office, not only for the national campaign and for the provincial organizations but to the constituencies as well. Since 1956, when Senator Grosart assumed

the position of Conservative national organizer, funds collected centrally are distributed to candidates through the provincial organizations. At one time, however, the Montreal financial community may be said to have held a veto on Conservative Party leaders and policy through the withholding of funds as witness the fate of Dr. Manion.^{17/} On the other hand, in the Liberal Party the financial operations are far more federalized, with the Quebec wing of the federal Party retaining much of the funds collected in that Province and controlling expenditures at the provincial level. As far as the rest of the country is concerned, with the qualifications mentioned, funds are collected centrally and distributed to the provincial organizations but not necessarily in proportionate amounts as witness the disaffection and consequent lethargy at the federal level of the Saskatchewan Liberals in recent years.

While there appears to have been a peripheralization of major party and Social Credit/Ralliement des Cr ditistes finances,^{18/} it is worth noting the growing centralization of the New Democratic Party financial structure due to the entry of trade union funds largely contributed by the large unions centered in Ontario with national and inter-provincial interests. Whether this trend in NDP finances has consequences sufficient to check the influence of the trends exhibited in the old parties or the rise of provincially based minor parties depends, of course, on the political success that the New Democratic Party may achieve in the future.

A word regarding a question posed by Professor Angus in a recent letter to the writer as to whether the solicitors are subject to party control or whether they control the party themselves or on behalf of the givers; i.e. to use a useful distinction introduced by Alexander Heard: Are the solicitors "party oriented" or are they "contributor oriented"? ^{19/} Only full knowledge as to source and amount and a comparison with party and government policy and appointments could allow a definitive answer. Clearly, quid pro quos have been sought; our Royal Commission reports are replete with this information. But certainly what most givers want, whether they give large or small amounts at the local or party level, is access to decision makers at various levels. In addition, donors may wish to define the parameters within which decisions are made and this helps to explain the often heard appeal for funds to preserve the "two party" system. Are union gifts much different from corporate gifts in this respect? If what is sought is simply to prevent donations from being tied to specific commitments in order to preserve honesty, then the answer is not to declare illegal the private monetary support of parties, but rather the full disclosure of sources and amounts of party funds. This procedure would make clear the origins of policies and help to free the parties from the danger of hidden manipulation by or on behalf of contributors. It must be recognized that money is a necessary political resource; if not obtained legitimately, it will be sought in other ways, and there is no

reason why the sources of such funds should not reflect the nature of our society. Perhaps greater candour in this regard would achieve that party realignment which many people appear to desire.

No attempt will be made here to describe in detail regional variations in party and election expenditure. Like the differences in expenditure and campaign patterns between rural, urban and metropolitan areas, these variations come under the rubric of political culture and can be explained as such. Suffice it to say that surveys, interviews and examinations of expenditure records demonstrate that the Ottawa River ^{20/} is an apparent boundary for many of these regional variations in attitudes and behaviour. East of the Ottawa River, constituency election expenses tend to be higher; the exchange of cash, liquor and other considerations for votes tends to be more prevalent. Constituency campaign workers to the East (and here Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces should be included together) appear preponderantly to be paid in contrast to constituency workers West of the Ottawa River. Furthermore, very little by way of constituency campaign funds tends to be raised at the local level East of the Ottawa River; subsidies from central party funds tend to be higher and cover a higher proportion of local costs. A similar pattern may be discovered, however, in the more traditional areas of Ontario. West of the Ottawa River, volunteer work is more common and in rural Western Canada constituency campaign costs are considerably lower than in the rural East.

All these, surely, are manifestations of regional variants in Canada's political culture and need not be attributed to the federal nature of the Canadian state or its party system.

Unfortunately, except in the cases of Quinn's study^{21/} of the Union Nationale and Thorburn's study^{22/} of New Brunswick politics, there is a paucity of material relating to provincial party finance. Only when this is remedied will it be possible to describe fully the financial structures of the Canadian party system. Obviously, a provincial party in office was and is able to exploit the advantages of incumbency. Provincial parties in Opposition were not and are not so fortunate. The targets for exploitation by the incumbents, in addition to Government purveyors and contractors, were often those great national and inter-provincial enterprises like banks and railways, whose welfare could be affected by provincial government policies. Nonetheless, the contributions of such corporations were made in terms of their nation-wide economic and political interests.

Since the Second World War and even for some time before, provincial economies began to develop with the expansion of the resource industries. Provincial governments and provincial parties became the target of these interests which concomittantly provided the base for provincial economic and political strength. This evolution

has strengthened provincial party organizations by providing them with sources of funds independent of, if not separable from, federal sources, and together with the factors discussed earlier in this paper, has, in the writer's view contributed to the fragmentation of the Canadian party system. This problem deserves more detailed investigation, for it is apparent that the neglected subject of political finance in Canada has implications beyond its intrinsic interest and warrants further attention by Canadian political scientists.

FOOTNOTES TO STUDY 1

- 1 Pollock, James K., Party Campaign Funds, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926.
- 2 Overacker, Louise, Money in Elections, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1932.
- 3 Heard, Alexander, The Costs of Democracy, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1960.
- 4 See also Ward, Norman A., The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963, ch. 16, passim.
- 5 Harrill, Ernest E., The Structure of Organization and Power in Canadian Political Parties: A Study in Party Financing, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1958.
- 6 Heard, Alexander, op.cit., p. 4.
- 7 Gordon, Walter L., A Choice for Canada, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1966, pp. 120, 121.
- 8 For Professor Smiley's views of the relevance of financial and administrative arrangements to Canadian federalism, see Smiley, D.V., "The Rowell-Sirois Report, Provincial Autonomy and Post War Canadian Federalism", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Feb. 1962, pp. 54-69; and his "The Two Themes of Canadian Federalism", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, Feb. 1963, pp. 80-97. See also his Introduction to the Rowell-Sirois Report, An abridgment of Book I of the Royal Commission Report on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Donald V. Smiley (ed.), The Carleton Library No. 5, McClelland and Stewart, 1963, pp. 1-8.
- 9 For Professor Meisel's views on the effect of breakdown of the cohesion of Canadian political parties and its impact on Canadian federalism, see Meisel, John, "The Stalled Omnibus: Canadian Parties in the 1960's", Social Research, Vol. 30, No. 3, Autumn 1963, pp. 367-390, and his "Les transformations des partis politiques canadiens", Cahiers de la société canadienne de science politique, No. 2, 1966, 54 ff.
- 10 Riker, William H., Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown & Company, 1964, p. 129.

- 11 For details of this system, see Escott Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada" in Thorburn, Hugh G., (ed.), Party Politics in Canada, Toronto, Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1963, pp. 14-21.
- 12 For details of McGreevy's activities and functions, see Report of the Royal Commission in reference to certain charges against Sir A.P. Caron, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1893, passim.
- 13 See Canada, House of Commons Debates, July 30, 1931, pp. 4379-4391.
- 14 Such efforts were made by the National Liberal Federation in the thirties and the Progressive Conservative Party in the forties.
- 15 See the evidence of Mr. Einar M. Gunderson in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 16, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, Tues., Oct. 18, 1966, pp. 694-696.
- 16 It is worth being reminded of the fact that the cost of the official electoral machinery in the last federal campaign was about \$13,000,000 not counting the services of the CBC to the parties. See Appendix 3 in Part III of the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses, 1966.
- 17 See Granatstein, J.L.. "Conservative Party Finances: 1939-1945", infra, passim.
- 18 For details on Cr ditiste finance, see Stein, Michael, The Structure and Function of the Finances of the Ralliement des Cr ditistes", infra.
- 19 This is a differentiation introduced by Professor Alexander Heard. See his Costs of Democracy, op.cit., ch. 10, pp. 269-274, in particular.
- 20 See study 2, "Canadian Attitudes to Election Expenses, 1965-66", and study 7, "Candidate Attitudes on Election Expenses", in this volume.
- 21 Quinn, Herbert F., The Union Nationale, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963.
- 22 Thorburn, Hugh G., Politics in New Brunswick, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961.

2

CANADIAN ATTITUDES TO ELECTION EXPENSES 1965-6

by

John Meisel

and Richard Van Loon

Preface

In the late summer of 1965 a group of scholars interested in electoral behaviour decided to launch a study of the impending Canadian general election. The study was to be based largely on interviews conducted after the election with a national sample of Canadians and was to probe into questions of particular interest to the five researchers involved. It was also intended to see how Canadians respond to questions identical with, or similar to, some which have been used in comparable surveys in the United States, Great Britain and France.

Before the plans for the study had fully matured, before, indeed, all the necessary financial support had been secured, Dr. Khayyam Z. Paltiel discussed with me the possibility of adding to the questionnaire a number of questions of particular interest to the Committee on Election Expenses, of which he was the research director. The Committee and the research team doing the election study were able to come to an agreement of which the present study is the result.

The sole focus of attention of the survey which led to the preparation of this report is the behaviour and attitude of Canadians in relation to political parties and elections. In so far as the questions dealing with election expenses are concerned, the members of the sample were asked, among other things, to react to certain possible ways of financing campaigns. No effort was made to assess the wisdom or judgment on which the replies were based. It is possible that a given proposal is supported by an overwhelming majority of citizens but that it is at the same time impracticable or incompatible with certain other conditions desired by an equally large majority. We made no attempt to evaluate the replies of the respondents from that point of view, however. This is not, in other words, a study which assesses various plans for financing parties; it is a report on what Canadians think about these plans.

The larger study was designed by the following: Professor Philip E. Converse of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Professor John Meisel of Queen's University, Kingston, Professor Maurice Pinard of McGill University, Montreal, Professor Peter Regenstreif of the University of Rochester, Rochester, New York and Dr. Mildred Schwartz of the National Opinion Research Center, Chicago. These scholars were responsible for the general design of the research, the preparation of the questionnaire and for the design of the sample. They

benefitted from the collaboration and advice of Professor Paltiel who made a number of useful general suggestions and who was particularly concerned with the questions inserted into the questionnaire for the purpose of furnishing data summarized in this report. These questions, as was noted above, were added to meet the special requirements of the Committee on Election Expenses and also, in part, to replicate in Canada some of the questions used in United States' surveys by Professor Herbert E. Alexander of the Citizens' Research Foundation at Princeton. Mr. Richard Van Loon was responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the research project, for the tabulation of the results and for the basic work which grew into this report. The field work was done by Canadian Facts Limited of Toronto and Montreal, the inventiveness of whose President, Mr. Lew Gray, was particularly helpful in overcoming numerous problems. The major tabulations were carried out on an IBM 7090 computer and some of the minor tabulations on an IBM 1401 computer at the Michigan Institute for Social Research and with the assistance of the Center's technical staff and in particular Mr. T. Lane. Financial assistance for the general project was provided by the Canada Council, the Laidlaw Foundation and the Center for Social Research. The Department of Political Studies at Queen's University generously provided many facilities free of charge. The costs incurred in obtaining the data for this report and in its preparation were provided by the Committee on

Election Expenses. It is hoped that its members will find this report useful and that they will derive some satisfaction from knowing that their interest in the larger study has been of material assistance in furthering a major Canadian social science research project. None of the organizations who have supported the survey financially are, of course, responsible for any of the material contained in this report.

Queen's University

J.M.

I. Introduction

A. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THIS REPORT

This report is based on an extensive survey into general Canadian attitudes toward politics, and specifically toward the election of November 8, 1965. It was commissioned by the Committee on Election Expenses in an effort to determine what the Canadian public thinks about present methods of party finance and to ascertain Canadian attitudes toward certain proposed reforms in the system of party finance in Canada. It sought to determine as well who, among the public, does give money to political parties, who is asked to give money and who does the asking. The report will show both how prevalent is money giving among the general public and to what extent parties actually try to use this potential method of fund raising. An indication will also be given of Canadian attitudes to various types

of fund raising by political parties and of what the respondents interviewed in the course of the survey thought their attitude would be if they were asked to give money or services to a political party.

There are a number of things this report does not seek or claim to do and these should be made clear at the outset. In the first place it is a survey of a random sample of the general public which does not deal in any special way with party activists nor with donors to parties. As we shall see below, very few Canadians do give money to parties and a still smaller number of Canadians are active in raising funds for the parties. Beyond noting this important fact it will therefore be impossible to make many statistically valid generalizations about donors or canvassers on the basis of our data. The number of cases is too small.

Neither is this a survey of opinion leaders as opposed to the general public. We were not interested, for instance, in editorial comment or the views of acknowledged community leaders except where editors or community leaders are part of our sample. This is quite simply a survey of a random cross-section of the Canadian population with no attempt made to over-represent any part of that population in the final results.

To reiterate, then, the results in this report will suggest the attitudes of the Canadian population as a whole toward election and party finance in Canada and will tell us something about the activities of parties in public fund raising across the country. It will provide a reliable indication of what the Canadian public was thinking about this subject early in 1966 and will indicate something about the public fund-raising activities of Canadian parties during the November 1965 election campaign.

B. OUTLINE OF REPORT

The report divides itself naturally into a number of sections. We shall begin with a brief, non-technical outline of the design of this survey and of the sampling procedure used. The main body of our material will then follow in two broad sections: the first will deal with behavioural data and will describe the reported behaviour of the parties in collecting money from public (non-corporate) donors, as well as the behaviour of the donors or those approached by the parties to give money. Here we will be interested in whether or not the respondent or his family has been asked for donations by any party, which party did the asking, how the approach was made and whether or not the respondent actually did give to the party on being asked to do so.

The second major section will deal with attitudes toward party finance and campaign financing on the part of the respondent. Here we will be interested in such things as attitudes toward corporation or trade union donations to the parties; the answer the respondent reported he would have given had his party asked him for money to finance its campaign; attitudes toward subsidization of the parties by public funds and toward the publication of national election expenses. The tabulations in this section lend themselves to more detailed analysis and are statistically more meaningful than those in the behavioural section for the simple reason that so few people in Canada are involved in party financing and giving as to make the numbers in the earlier tables too small to be susceptible to much analysis.

In both the behavioural and attitudinal sections, and particularly in the latter, many of the tables will involve the cross-tabulation of data - that is, having determined, for example, the percentages of Canadians favouring or not favouring the subsidization of election expenses by government, we will proceed to break down these data according to the province in which the respondent lives, his occupation or income, his language, party identification and so on. In this way we can determine differences in attitudes toward election and party finance among various types of Canadians, we can see in what sections of the country parties seem to concentrate their efforts to raise money

or, for instance, whether the Cr ditiste voters in Quebec behave differently from other voters in Quebec or the rest of Canada when asked to give money to their party.

Most of the variables used in cross-tabulation are quite straightforward and self-explanatory but one requires a short explanation: party identification refers to the respondent's self-identification as a Liberal, Conservative, NDP'er or Social Crediter rather than to his 1965 vote. The self-identification of a respondent as a usual supporter of a given party provided a more stable basis for analysis, and proved more useful for breakdowns than a respondent's vote in the 1965 election, particularly in the behavioural section of the report. To say that a respondent voted NDP in the 1965 election may tell us nothing about his regular party allegiance since he may have been a one-shot protest voter. On the other hand, if he identifies himself as an NDP supporter we can be more confident that his attitudes to politics (or his political style) favourably predisposes him toward the NDP generally.

This report breaks new ice in Canadian political studies since no comparable inquiries have ever been undertaken before. We felt it wise, therefore, to eschew attempting to set it into a complex and subtle theoretical framework: essentially we sought to find answers to some straightforward questions about Canadian behaviour

and attitudes with reference to election expenses. In identifying, phrasing and analyzing these questions we were guided by the terms of reference of the Committee on Election Expenses and by the suggestions of its Secretary and Research Director. There are, of course, certain things for which we have kept our eyes open and certain directions in which we have looked. Thus the cross-tabulating variables we have used arise from the basic assumption that behaviour and attitudes are influenced by such things as religion, language or the section of Canada in which the respondent lives. Most of these variables are standard demographic determinants and have been shown in many studies to affect a respondent's attitudes and behaviour. But extra tabulations have been done for this report to investigate three other possible special areas of behavioural and attitudinal determinants. It has been suggested that attitudes and especially behaviour may change rather sharply at the Ottawa River. For this reason we will be careful throughout our discussion of the data to watch for any evidence of such a phenomenon. Secondly it has been suggested that rural Quebec may behave and think differently from any other part of Canada and, closely connected with this, it has thirdly been suggested that the way in which Cr ditiste supporters help their Party differs substantially from that adopted by other Canadians. Special tabulations have been made to examine these hypotheses and they will receive

consideration in the appropriate places below.

There are three appendices to the report. The first, contains the sections of the questionnaire used in gathering data for this report. The second, includes a number of tables not incorporated into the main body of the report because they are only of marginal importance although they do contain some information about election expenses. Finally, a third appendix gives some details about our sampling procedure.

C. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The survey carried out to obtain data presented here is basically patterned after surveys carried out by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan to inquire into electoral behaviour in the United States. Since our setting is Canadian, however, and since this makes a considerable difference in the establishment of survey routines, there are a number of departures from standard SRC practices.

The first problem in any survey of this type is the design of the sample. Since we had decided to try to maximize the return rate by sending an advance letter to the respondents urging their cooperation it was necessary that our sample be based on actual names rather than on finding a person answering certain specifications in a house chosen more or less at random. We were also only interested in

eligible voters so the logical place to go for our sample was clearly the Voters' Lists which provided the names and addresses we needed. The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer agreed to provide us with preliminary electoral lists for constituencies chosen by us and the names were selected from these lists.

The constituencies to be used in our sample were chosen on a stratified basis, the stratifying variables being province, rural-urban distribution within the constituency and past voting behaviour in order that our selection of constituencies should be representative to all Canadian ridings. Certain constituencies in areas too remote to be reached by our interviewers were eliminated at the outset. There were twenty-six of these in all. One hundred and eighteen constituencies were selected by random sampling and it was from these that our sample names came. One hundred and twenty-one sampling units fell into 118 constituencies. This occurred because three constituencies: Halifax, York-Scarborough and Edmonton-Strathcona contained so many votes that two clusters had to be selected in each.

The size of the sample to be used usually has to be determined by the amount of money available for the work and in our case this practical limitation plus the fact that we were most anxious that our final number of replies be at least 2,000 led us to decide on an original sample of 3388 names, that is 28 names in each of our original 121

sample units. The selection of the names from the preliminary Voters' List in each constituency was done on a systematic random basis and the final 3388 names were listed as our sample. 1/

Letters were sent to each of the persons so selected pointing out the importance of the study and the confidential nature of the replies. The respondent's cooperation was requested as strongly as possible. In the absence of any strictly comparative data it is impossible to say just how much the letters helped in gaining the response rate achieved in this survey but indications are that the mailing of these letters was worthwhile.

The actual survey work was carried out by Canadian Facts, a commercial marketing research organization with a nationwide field organization. The procedure was to use one initial contact at the respondent's address and up to two call-backs if an interview was not gained on first contact and a terminal refusal was not given. In certain areas where the response rate was particularly low (Toronto, Vancouver and Windsor were the principal culprits) a second letter was sent to respondents and a second round of interviews carried out in order to improve the response rate.

This report is based upon 2125 completed questionnaires indicating an overall response rate of about 62.8 per cent. Regionally, response rates vary from well over 80 per cent

in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island to about 50 per cent in the mid-Vancouver ridings but is reasonably level across most of Canada.

Before we are done with the technical description of our survey we must mention our weighting - unweighting procedures. In order to ensure adequate numbers of responses in areas such as rural Quebec or the Maritimes, all of Canada outside of Ontario and Montreal was double-weighted. In the most densely populated areas this weighting was unnecessary. ^{2/} In the end, of course, our returns had to be re-weighted before analysis so that responses from these areas could be brought up to their proper level. The present report is based on 2125 completed questionnaires but the total number of cases in our tables is usually 2610. The difference between the two numbers is accounted for by the re-weighting process necessary to assure that our returns do not favour one region of the country over another.

A question which must be asked at this point is: how valid is our sample in describing the attitudes and behaviour of Canadians? The most convenient and clearest way of indicating this is to compare our results with those of the entire population of Canada to see how close our proportions for certain standard variables compare with those of the universe from which our sample is drawn.

The variables we shall use to make comparisons are the actual popular vote in the 1965 election, the proportion of the Canadian population in each Canadian province, the religious distribution of Canadians, the language distribution, and finally the mean family income for Canada in 1965. In all following tables, unless otherwise indicated, the numbers are re-weighted from our original data.

Table 1

SAMPLE AND POPULATION VOTING IN 1965.
FEDERAL ELECTION, VOTING AND NON-VOTING

Party	% of Popular Vote	% of Sample Vote
Liberals	40.2	44.5
Conservatives	32.4	30.3
New Democratic Party	17.8	14.8
Creditiste and Social Credit	8.3	10.3
Other	1.2	0.5
Total	99.9*	100.4
% Voting	75.4	82.5

* Occasionally throughout the report column totals will vary slightly from 100.0%. This is due, in every case, to rounding the results to one decimal place.

Table 1 shows the distribution of the popular vote for our sample and for Canada in the federal election of 1965. The first important point here is that only 17.5 per cent of our sample indicated that they did not vote. This is well below the proportion of non-voters in the population and means either that those citizens who were interested enough in politics to vote are over-represented in our sample and/or that some of the non-voters we interviewed said that they had voted. This type of distortion often turns up in election surveys for the very simple reason that those who are not interested enough in politics to vote are usually difficult to interview: they are no more interested in talking for an hour to our interviewer than they are in voting. Further, there is a tendency for non-voters to feel guilty and to pretend to have voted. The rest of Table 1 speaks for itself. Our proportion of Liberal voters is slightly high and of Conservatives, low. We exaggerate on Social Credit voting strength and under-represent NDP voting. Nonetheless, the overall picture is satisfactory.

Table 2 indicates the religious distribution of our sample. Here it can be seen that we have slightly over-represented adherents of the United Church and under-represented Roman Catholics. For the most part the rest of the distribution is very close to that of Canada and we may conclude that so far as religion is concerned our sampling distribution is excellent.

Table 2
RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION
OF SAMPLE AND POPULATION

Religion	% in Sample	Number in Sample	% in Canada*
Roman Catholic	43.2	1128	45.7
United Church	22.2	578	20.1
Anglican	12.3	320	13.2
Presbyterian	4.9	128	4.5
Baptist	3.3	87	3.3
Lutheran	3.0	79	3.6
Greek Catholic	1.3	34	N/A
Greek Orthodox	0.4	11	1.3
Jewish	1.9	49	1.4
Other Protestant	4.5	117	4.9**
Other	3.0	78	1.0**
None	-	-	-
Total	100.0	2609	99.0

* Canada Census, 1961, 1.2-6, Introduction.

** Approximations only.

Table 3
PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION
OF SAMPLE AND POPULATION

Province	Number in Sample	% in Sample	% of Canadian Population *
Prince Edward Island	24	0.9	0.6
Nova Scotia	75	2.9	4.0
New Brunswick	108	4.1	3.3
Newfoundland	24	0.9	2.5
Quebec	800	30.7	28.8
Ontario	1056	40.5	34.2
Manitoba	130	5.0	5.1
Saskatchewan	94	3.6	5.1
Alberta	171	6.6	7.3
British Columbia	128	4.9	8.2
Total	2610	100.0	99.1**

* Canada Census, 1961, 1.1-11, Table I.

** Yukon and Northwest Territories missing.

Table 3 indicates the distribution of our sample by province and compares it with the actual proportional populations of provinces in 1961. The sample over-represents Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario, and under-represents Nova Scotia, Newfoundland,

Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. Fluctuations are the result largely of differential efficiencies in the field interviewer force, the differences of accessibility of certain areas and finally of the whims of the Canadian winter.

Table 4
LANGUAGE DISTRIBUTION
OF SAMPLE AND POPULATION

Language	Number in Sample	% in Sample	% of Canadian Population*
English	1754	67.2	67.4
French	745	28.5	31.4
Other	111	4.2	1.3
Total	2610	99.9	100.1

* Canada Census, 1961, 1.3-5, Table 95. This table gives the number of people being able to speak either one or both of the official languages in Canada. The table shows 67.4 per cent as being able to speak only English and 19.1 per cent as speaking only French. Another 12.2 per cent are shown as speaking both official languages. It was assumed that an overwhelming proportion of these bilingual individuals were French Canadians who normally speak French. Our total for French-speaking respondents in the 1961 census is therefore made up by adding the 19.1 per cent and the 12.2 per cent mentioned above. Since some of the bilinguals were unquestionably English speaking, the percentage of 31.4 slightly exaggerates the proportion of Canadians whose first language is French. Our own sample therefore seems to reflect the language division in Canada with considerable accuracy.

Table 4 is also quite self-explanatory. Our sample has only slightly under-represented both English-and French-speaking Canadians. Finally, the mean family income calculated from our sample data is \$5,750 per year. This, of course, includes total household income and not just that of the family's chief earner. The Canadian population mean, as closely as it can be calculated, is about \$5,800: members of our sample may, therefore, enjoy a slightly lower income than the population as a whole but the sample distribution is excellent and we may assume that here too the sample is quite representative. ^{3/}

We may conclude, then, on the basis of the above comparisons, that our sample is sufficiently representative of the Canadian population to permit the acceptance of our data with confidence.

The need to present this report to the Committee on Election Expenses at the earliest possible moment prevented us from doing the calculations necessary to determine the exact margins of error and also precluded our "cleaning" the IBM cards on which our data are stored. In the tables which follow, therefore, occasionally a column or row entitled "Residuals" appears containing a very small number of unidentified responses.

II. Behavioural Data

This section deals with a number of questions concerning how Canadians behave when political parties ask them for money and to what extent and how Canadian parties approach people to give money. However, it is vital to repeat an earlier word of caution: since we made no attempt specially to locate and sample people who gave money to parties our figures are very low in any of the categories actually involving giving or party canvassing. Our returns show that only 5.0 per cent (130) ^{4/} of our respondents or their families were asked to give money in the 1965 election! It is, therefore, not possible to break the data down into sub-classifications and still achieve any sort of reasonable numbers in individual cells of the Tables. For that reason most of the data reproduced here are presented in aggregate form with finer breakdowns being made only when they promise to be exceptionally interesting.

Before turning specifically to election expenses it will be useful to examine one or two other questions. Table 5 gives the number of Canadians who actually helped a political party in the last election. In reply to the question "Did you personally help one of the parties or a candidate? (For example, by canvassing or addressing pamphlets)", 134 members of our sample said "yes." This indicates that slightly over five per cent of Canadians can be considered to be party activists in any way.

Table 5
PARTY ACTIVISTS

In 1965	Helped a Party	Did Not Help a Party	Residual	Total
Number	134	2467	9	2610
%	5.1	94.5	0.3	99.9

The distribution of the activists indicated in the first table in Appendix II (Table A-1) by province is very uniform; Saskatchewan has the highest proportion with 7.4 per cent (7 of 94) while Alberta has the lowest at 2.9 per cent (5 of 171). When numbers are as small as this, percentages are not particularly reliable and the margin of error is high, but we can assert that no area of Canada has a significantly large or small proportion of activists. Similarly 4.9 per cent (86) of the English respondents were activists as were 5.7 per cent (42) of the French (see Table A-2). It appears, therefore, that the English-and French-speaking sections of our population responded very similarly to the question probing the degree to which they were political activists.

The party distribution of activists, which can be seen in Table A-3 in Appendix II, is interesting in that 44.4 per cent (59) of activists were Liberals while only 20.4 per cent (27) were Conservatives. Only 1.5 per cent (2) were Social Credit identifiers, 3.7 per cent (5) Creditistes

and 22.0 per cent (29) were New Democratic Party.

Compared to the other parties, therefore, the NDP showed up strongly: the proportion of those who normally support the NDP was considerably higher among the activists than among the sample as a whole.

In addition to being a formal political activist, however, a person may engage in politics informally by talking to others in an effort to show them why they should vote for a particular party or candidate. Table 6 indicates that 22.2 per cent (580) responded positively to the question "Did you talk to any people to try to show them how to vote?" English Canadians appear to be slightly more active than the French in talking about politics, for 23.2 per cent (407) of English Canadians asserted that they did talk to others about politics while only 20.5 per cent (153) of the French said they did so. These data appear in Table A-4 in Appendix II.

Table 6

POLITICAL OPINION LEADERS

	Talked to Others About Politics	Did Not Talk	Residuals	Totals
Number	580	1991	39	2610
%	22.2	76.3	1.6	100.1

Table 7 shows the distribution by province of those who try to convince others how to vote, and indicates that as one moves west across Canada one finds an increasing

proportion of people willing to try to talk others into voting a particular way. It would be dangerous to interpret these figures without more knowledge: it is tempting (although no doubt dangerous) to assume that the proportion of activists is related to the degree of interest in, and awareness of, politics which may, in turn, be related to the number of competing parties. However, the high showing in Alberta would have to be explained if this hypothesis were adopted.

Table 7

OPINION LEADERS BY PROVINCE

Province	Number of Leaders	% of Leaders
Prince Edward Island	3	12.5
Nova Scotia	9	12.0
New Brunswick	19	17.6
Newfoundland	2	8.3
Quebec	163	20.4
Ontario	255	24.1
Manitoba	25	19.2
Saskatchewan	26	27.7
Alberta	46	26.9
British Columbia	32	25.0
Total	580	22.2

Table 8

MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

	Belong to Organization	Do Not Belong	Residuals	Total
Number	111	2495	4	2610
%	4.3	95.6	0.1	100.0

Table 8 indicates that very few Canadians actually do belong to political organizations. The figures are really too small to be significant in any statistical sense but we can assert with confidence that only an extremely small proportion of Canadians do, in fact, belong to a political club or organization.

The value of these data for a study of election expenses may appear to be fairly marginal; they have been included here to show that the figures which follow, on the extent to which Canadian individuals give to political parties, are in accord with related aspects of Canadian political behaviour. Canadians are not as active in political parties as citizens in some other western democracies and neither do they normally contribute money to their favourite political parties. With this in mind we shall now turn to an examination of actual giving on the part of Canadians and to the behaviour of parties in those rare cases where they bother to canvass for funds.

Table 9

AWARENESS OF FUND RAISING

	Heard of Fund Raising	Had Not Heard of Fund Raising	Did Not Remember	Residuals	Total
Number	521	1675	409	5	2610
%	20.0	64.2	15.7	0.2	100.1

Table 9 indicates that 20.0 per cent of Canadians had heard of some fund raising during the last election while 64.2 per cent definitely said that they had not.

Table 10

AWARENESS OF FUND RAISING BY PROVINCE

Province	Heard of Fund Raising		Did Not Hear		Don't Remember		Residuals	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
P.E.I.	1	4.2	18	75.0	5	20.8	0	0
N.S.	8	10.7	54	72.0	13	17.3	0	0
N.B.	10	9.3	84	77.8	14	13.0	0	0
Nfld.	1	4.2	20	83.3	3	12.5	0	0
Que.	132	16.5	562	70.2	105	13.1	1	0.1
Ont.	218	20.7	651	61.6	184	17.5	3	0.3
Man.	36	27.7	81	62.3	13	10.0	0	0
Sask.	45	47.9	33	35.1	15	16.0	1	1.1
Alta.	33	19.3	98	57.3	40	23.4	0	0
B.C.	37	28.9	74	57.8	17	13.3	0	0
Total	521	20.0	1675	64.2	409	15.7	5	0.2

Table 10 gives the regional distribution of awareness of fund-raising activities and here some interesting figures come to light. In the Maritimes awareness of fund raising is very low. In no province there, are more than 10.7 per cent of the sample aware of such activities. Quebec also shows a significantly lower return in this respect with only 16.5 per cent of its respondents having heard of fund raising. In Ontario, fund raising appears to be more prevalent while west of the Ontario border the figures rise still higher to a remarkable 47.9 per cent in Saskatchewan; Manitoba and British Columbia also show interestingly high results in this respect. One is again tempted to speculate about the relation between fund-raising awareness and the level of activity reached by the so-called "third" parties.

As might be expected from the Quebec results a higher proportion of English-speaking than French-speaking respondents had heard of fund-raising activities. Table A-5 in Appendix II shows that 21.9 per cent (385) of the English had heard of such activities while only 16.2 per cent (121) of the French had done so.

It has been suggested that in some significant respects there may be a difference between Cr ditiste supporters and those of other parties. If this is so, it does not appear in this variable for only 16.7 per cent (7) of Cr ditiste supporters in Quebec had heard of fund raising by any party. Moreover only 4.8 per cent (2) of

them had given money to a party and only 7.1 per cent (3) of them were actually members of the Party. The size of our sample unit here is small (only 42 responses) but we can still assert with some confidence that the average Cr ditiste supporters do not behave very differently from anyone else when asked to donate to a party, and that Cr ditiste claims of a mass party organization among their supporters may be quite exaggerated. The Cr ditistes too may be "comme les autres." We have, of course, no information about the relatively small number of Cr ditiste activists who probably devote above average zeal to their cause. Of the 47 Cr ditistes who appeared in our sample, 10.6 per cent (see Table A-3 in Appendix II) claimed to have helped out the Party last November. This is certainly a higher proportion than the other parties but is still less than the NDP average for all of Canada.

Respondents were asked if they, themselves, had canvassed for money for a political party and here the positive response was extremely low. Only about one per cent of those asked said that they had actually canvassed during the 1965 election. This figure can be compared with the 5.1 per cent (134) of our respondents who helped a political party in some way last November: of the few Canadians who did help a party out, only about 16 per cent (23) did so by fund-raising activities. The number of fund raisers discovered is far too small to yield meaningful results if broken down any further. We

must again content ourselves with the assertion that only a minute proportion of Canadians are likely to act as fund raisers.

Table 11
NUMBER CANVASSED FOR FUNDS
 (Respondent or Family)*

Respondent or Family	Asked to Contribute	Not Asked	Did Not Know	Total
Number	130	2367	113	2610
%	5.0	90.7	4.3	100.0

* In 91 cases (3.5%) respondent only was asked.
 In 39 cases (2.0%) another family member only was asked.
 In 14 cases (0.5%) both respondent and another family member were asked.

Table 11 indicates that only 5.0 per cent of Canadian families had a family member who had been asked for campaign funds by a Canadian party and Table 12 shows that of those who were asked to give money to parties, 79.1 per cent actually did give. In all cases where the respondent was aware of some other member of the family being asked to give money, was the request crowned with success. This seemingly startling finding loses some of its glitter upon reflection: requests for money which go unheeded probably receive almost no attention and thus go unnoticed.

Table 13 shows the amount of activity by the individual parties in fund raising and indicates the measure of success each attained in this field. The respondents'

Table 12

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PARTIES, NOVEMBER 1965

	Respondent Contributed	Respondent Refused	Family Member Contributed*	Family Member Refused
Number	72	19	55	0
% of those asked**	79.1	20.9	-	-

* Includes cases where both respondent and family member contributed.

** Respondent only.

Table 13

PARTY IDENTITY IN FUND RAISING
(Respondent only)

Party	Requests Made	% of Total Requests	Contri- butions Gained	Success Ratio
Liberal	27	29.7	14	0.52
Conservative	17	18.7	15	0.88
New Democratic Party	39	42.8	28	0.72
Social Credit & Créditiste	7	7.7	6	0.86
Other	1	1.1	1	1.0
Refusals and Residuals	0	0	8	-
Total	91	100.0	72	-

replies only were used here because of our question format and because it was felt that the respondents' recall would be more accurate if their own giving was involved. For this reason only 91 cases, 72 donations and 19 refusals appear in this Table. Table 14 indicates the total number of donations made to each party. Again the NDP has the highest number of donors followed by the Liberals, Conservatives and Social Credit in that order.

Table 14
TOTAL NUMBER OF DONATIONS TO PARTIES
(Respondent and Family)

Party	Lib.	Con.	NDP	Social Credit	Others	Refusals & Residuals	Total
Total Dona- tions	33	25	44	9	3	12	126
% of Totals	26.2	19.8	34.9	7.1	2.4	9.5	99.9

From these data we may draw some conclusions about fund-raising activity in Canada. The first, of course, is that it is minimal: that at least the two older parties do not engage in serious fund raising among the general public. The second is that the NDP appears to be far more active in this field than either of the older parties, especially in relation to its slice of the popular vote. Neither of these assertions is exactly new and startling but both provide broadly based evidence for what has

heretofore been largely conventional wisdom. Furthermore, our data indicate the almost incredible degree to which parties do not seek funds from the citizens at large.

Table 15

REQUESTS FOR DONATIONS BY FAMILY INCOME

Income Range (In thousands of dollars)	Number of Requests	% of Group Canvassed
Under 1	0	0
1 - 2	2	1.2
2 - 3	8	3.6
3 - 4	14	4.4
4 - 5	17	4.5
5 - 6	12	2.9
6 - 7	13	4.9
7 - 8	7	3.4
8 - 10	14	7.1
10 - 15	19	11.4
Over 15	19	17.9
Not ascertained	5	5.3

Table 15 sheds additional light on the phenomenon of party fund raising. Although the numbers involved are small, the trend is unmistakable: 17.9 per cent of our highest income category was asked for money and 11.4 per cent of the next highest category, while only 5 per cent or fewer of those whose family earning falls under \$8,000 per year were canvassed. Parties make almost no attempt

to get at the "little man" to finance their activities. The distribution of actual party giving (as opposed to requests) by income categories is presented in Table 16. The numbers involved are exceedingly small but the table is not uninformative: it shows, among other things, the broad distribution of party support in Canada. But it also has some interesting information for our immediate purposes. First, the Conservatives obtained no support from those in the highest income category while the NDP did. Furthermore, 60 per cent (9 out of 15) of the donors to the Conservatives had incomes below \$8,000. Secondly, the NDP financial support is distributed more evenly than that of others across the income spectrum, although over half of its contributors (16 out of 28) earned less than \$8,000. Thirdly, the Liberals draw most heavily from the highest income bracket. Again we must emphasize that due to the very limited nature of public party support in Canada and the consequent small numbers involved, percentages can be very misleading and any conclusions drawn from this, or any of the other minute cross-tabulations in this section, can be accepted only as the broadest of generalizations. Percentages are, therefore, not supplied in table 16.

There were 607 labour union members in our re-weighted sample but of these only 16 reported being asked by the NDP to donate money to the Party and only 11 did so. It does not appear then, that the NDP is engaged in a

noticeable effort to canvass individual union members for funds. If it does, the effort does not seem to make a memorable impression on those canvassed.

Table 16
DONATIONS TO PARTY BY INCOME
 (Respondent Only)

Annual Family Income	Lib.	Cons.	NDP	Creditiste Social Credit	Others & Residuals
0 - \$3,999	1	4	3	3	2
4,000-7,999	1	5	13	2	1
8,000-9,999	1	2	3	0	0
10,000- 14,999	3	4	5	2	1
Over 15,000	4	0	3	0	3
Refused	4	0	1	0	0
Total	14	15	28	7	7

Table 17 shows the distribution of giving by province and by party. Again, of course, our numbers are very small but one or two points are suggestive. The first is that there is little connection between party voting in an area and the amount of fund raising done in that area. For example the Conservatives had almost as many donors in Quebec in our sample as had the Liberals, and the prevalence of NDP fund raising in Saskatchewan is likely the result of the Party's provincial position rather than of

federal electoral strength. Secondly, in the Maritimes, exactly one person in our sample had given money and that, to the NDP. The table does not show that this is one person out of 230. Federal political parties, it seems, do not make any general appeal for money in the Maritimes. The difference between the Maritimes and the rest of Canada is too great to have occurred by chance and this assertion - which again bears out traditional knowledge about fund-raising activities in Canada - may be made with some confidence.

A closer look at the table will indicate that for all parties except Social Credit, fund-raising activities appear to be centred in Ontario and Quebec.

Table 17

PARTY GIVING BY PROVINCE

Party Given To	Lib.	Cons.	NDP	Créditiste & Social Credit	Others	Refused
<u>Province</u>	<u>(Number)</u>					
P.E.I.	0	0	0	0	0	0
N.S.	0	0	0	0	0	0
N.B.	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nfld.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Que.	6	4	3	3	1	0
Ont.	5	7	13	0	0	4
Man.	1	0	1	0	0	0
Sask.	1	2	7	1	0	0
Alta.	0	1	0	2	0	1
B.C.	1	1	3	1	0	0
Total	14	15	28	7	1	5

To what extent can financial contributions to parties be related to language? Table 18 shows the distribution of party donations by the language spoken in the homes of our respondents.

Table 18

DONATIONS BY PARTY AND LANGUAGE OF RESPONDENT

Party	Lib.		Cons.		NDP		Créditistes Social Credit		Refused	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Language</u>										
English	7	50.0	15	100.0	24	85.6	3	42.8	5	100.0
French	6	42.8	0	0.0	3	10.7	4	57.2	0	0.0
Other	1	7.2	0	0.0	1	3.6	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	14	100.0	15	100.0	28	99.9	7	100.0	5	100.0

Again some interesting observations can be made on the basis of this table. Of the 730 French-speaking Canadians in the sample not one gave money to the Conservatives while six of the Liberal donors were French. NDP donors were overwhelmingly English and Social Credit donors were split almost evenly between English and French. The figures are also suggestive when examined differently: forty-six per cent of the French who gave money gave it to the Liberals and 31 per cent to the Social Credit (or specifically the Creditistes). Thirty-one per cent of the English donors gave to the Conservatives and forty-nine per cent gave to the NDP. Again our numbers are too small

to give these figures any statistically valid ring of authority but the generalization that little money is raised by the Conservatives and the NDP among the French-speaking population coincides with what one would have expected.

We can now turn to a somewhat different aspect of our problem: what methods do the parties use when they seek funds? Do canvassers concentrate on people they know or on strangers? Tables 19 and 20 provide some answers to these questions.

Table 19

METHODS OF APPROACH USED IN CANVASSING

Method	Letter	Phone	In Person	At Dinner or Meeting	Other	Don't Re- member & Residuals	Total
Number	25	8	35	10	4	8	90
% of Ap- proaches	27.8	8.9	38.9	11.1	4.4	8.9	99.9

From Table 19 we can see that the majority of approaches to the respondents were made in person or by letter and that phone approaches or approaches at meetings were seldom used by the parties. Table 20 suggests that about 35 per cent of those approached did not know the person who approached them. This observation probably should be put in another way: sixty-five, or over two thirds, of the 91 approaches made to obtain funds were attempted by individuals known to the potential donor. Efforts made to

obtain party funds appear to be fairly highly personalized.

Table 20

STATUS OF CANVASSER

Status	Number	% (Of Canvassers)
Unknown	32	35.2
Relative	2	2.2
Friend	20	21.9
Fellow } Business Worker } Colleague }	15	16.5
Neighbour	5	5.5
Other	13	14.3
Don't Remember	0	0
Residuals	4	4.3
Total	91	99.9

Once again these data may be broken down further to give a better indication of what methods are used in different regions. Table A-6 (in Appendix II) breaks down the methods of approach by province. The numbers here are so small as to make percentage calculations virtually meaningless in most cases. However, we should note that in every province where any significant degree of fund raising is carried out the personal approach predominates; there appear to be few regional differences in this respect.

Table 21 indicates that all of the parties who do any fund raising prefer to rely on the "in person" approaches

to the prospective donor. The single exception is the NDP which is about as likely to canvass by letter as in person. The Liberals also appear to use a letter format in some cases. It seems that all parties may try to raise funds at a dinner or meeting at times but this is not a significant method of approach compared to mail and "in person" approaches.

Table 21
METHOD OF APPROACH BY PARTY

Approach Method	Letter	Phone	In Person	At Dinner or Meeting	Other	Residual
Liberal	6	1	10	4	1	1
Conserva- tive	1	4	7	3	0	0
New Demo- cratic Party	12	1	11	2	2	4
Social Credit	1	0	4	0	0	0
Creditiste	1	0	0	1	0	0
Residual	4	2	3	0	1	3
Total	25	8	35	10	4	8

We may, therefore, conclude that methods of approach to potential donors do not differ much across Canada and not a great deal from party to party and, finally, that the personal approaches by people known to the canvasser are the preferred way of canvassing by Canadian parties in all regions.

This completes the analysis of patterns of party giving in Canada. As the reader will have seen, our analysis could not be very extensive or subtle because of the one overwhelming fact that very few Canadians give money to parties. Only 2.8 per cent of our respondents had done so and only 3.5 per cent of them had been asked. Apparently about 5 per cent of Canadian families have one or more of their members approached to give money but unless the respondent himself was asked we cannot break down the data with much accuracy.

We can, however, make a number of assertions based on our preceding analysis always, of course, bearing in mind the limitations imposed by our small numbers.

(1) The NDP is far more active in public fund raising than any other party and is followed in order by the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Social Credit. The Conservatives appear to have the highest ratio of success and the Liberals the lowest, when they go forth seeking to collect money.

(2) The distribution of party requests for money and of giving to parties closely follows the spectrum of family income with the highest proportion of requests and donations being found in the over \$15,000 per year class and the lowest (none at all) in the lowest income category. The Conservatives receive more donations from middle income groups and the Liberals more from the highest

categories, while the NDP has a somewhat more even distribution across various income groups.

(3) The distribution of party giving by region reveals a concentration of contributions emanating from Quebec and Ontario and to a lesser extent from the West with virtually no attempt being made to raise funds, at least among the public, in the Maritimes. The Liberals and Conservatives concentrate their activities most strongly in Ontario and the NDP also shows a higher reading in Ontario than elsewhere with another high reading in Saskatchewan. Social Credit, not unnaturally, concentrates its efforts in Alberta while the Cr ditistes, of course, must rely on Quebec.

(4) Although our numbers are extremely small there is no evidence to suggest that the Cr ditistes have an inordinately large proportion of their followers giving money to the Party, although they may have a slightly higher proportion of voluntary workers. Cr ditiste claims of a numerically large dues-paying membership are not supported by our survey.

(5) Some differences in Canada's major language groups have been noted. The English appear to have given somewhat more frequently than the French and have more often heard of fund-raising activities. The French do not seem to shower the Conservatives with donations and contribute only rarely to the NDP while the English may

be slightly more likely to donate to the Conservatives than to the Liberals. The NDP again takes a numerically greater share of the English donations than does any other party.

The above conclusions are, as we have noted repeatedly, little more than suggestive hypotheses emerging from one part of our study. In turning to the attitudes of our respondents toward party financing we are stepping on firmer ground and we shall henceforth be able to speak with greater confidence.

III. Attitudes

A. WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE MONEY IF ASKED

We are now ready to examine the attitudes of our respondents to party finance and to see what they reported they would have done, had circumstances been different. We inquired, for example, into the question of what Canadians would have done had parties actually approached them for contributions. Our sample was asked:

If you had been asked to make some contribution to your favourite party or a candidate you liked, would you have given money?

Table 22 contains the aggregate responses to this question.

We see that 18.5 per cent of Canadians would have given money to a political party or candidate had they been asked to do so. Who were these people? The series of tables following, sheds light on this subject.

Table 22

ATTITUDES OF CANADIANS IF ASKED TO GIVE
TO POLITICAL PARTIES OR CANDIDATES

Attitude	Would have Given	Would Not have Given	Had Already Given & Residual	Don't Know	Total
Number	484	1637	79	409	2609
%	18.5	62.7	3.1	15.7	100.0

Table 23

ATTITUDES IF ASKED TO GIVE FUNDS BY PROVINCE
(In Percentages)

Attitudes	Would Give	Would not Give	Don't Know	Already Gave and Residuals	Total Number in Row
<u>Province</u>					
P.E.I.	8.3	70.8	20.8	0	24
N.S.	25.3	65.3	9.3	0	75
N.B.	9.3	80.6	9.3	0.9	108
Nfld.	8.3	79.2	12.5	0	24
Que.	10.5	74.7	12.6	2.1	800
Ont.	22.7	56.3	18.3	3.4	1056
Man.	22.3	52.3	23.8	1.5	130
Sask.	33.0	40.4	12.8	13.8	94
Alta.	19.9	56.1	21.6	2.3	171
B.C.	25.8	60.2	8.6	5.5	128

The breakdown by province suggests that a different response is anticipated in the two parts of Canada roughly

divided by the Ottawa River: in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces, with only one exception, less than 11 per cent of the population asserted that they would give money to a party or candidate while in no province west of the Ottawa River was the figure below about 20 per cent. Nova Scotia was the lone exception in the Atlantic Provinces with 25.3 per cent of our respondents there saying they would have given money. As might be expected from most of our behavioural data, Saskatchewan respondents were significantly more amenable than the rest of Canadians to giving money. It would make an interesting study to relate these different response rates to provincial variations in the standard of living, the intensity of the political struggle or the presence of ideological parties, to name only three of a host of intriguing possibilities.

A breakdown of attitudes by language in Table A-7 in Appendix II reveals a marked disparity between English - and French-speaking Canadians: only 8.5 per cent of French Canadians were willing to give money if asked while 22.6 per cent of English Canadians said that they would have contributed. Moreover, only 56.5 per cent of the English, said they definitely would not give money while 78.7 per cent of our French-speaking respondents would have refused. Under present circumstances it appears that any attempt to raise money by a broadly based subscription in French Canada would be doomed to failure. Our results here confirm at least in one particular the often-heard assertion that

attitudes toward party politics differ fairly substantially between English - and French-speaking Canada.

Table 24

ATTITUDES TO GIVING BY FAMILY INCOME

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Would Give	Would not Give	Don't Know	Already Gave and Residuals	Total Number in Row
Income (In thousands of dollars)					
Under 1	17.7	70.9	11.4	0	94
1 - 2	14.9	75.4	9.2	0.6	164
2 - 3	20.5	65.4	11.0	3.1	215
3 - 4	14.3	68.2	14.9	2.6	317
4 - 5	16.9	62.3	19.1	1.6	387
5 - 6	17.7	64.7	15.5	2.0	418
6 - 7	20.5	55.9	20.5	3.1	265
7 - 8	20.2	63.1	16.6	0	194
8 - 10	20.9	58.5	16.4	4.1	191
10 - 15	30.8	49.2	10.6	9.4	163
Over 15	18.5	52.0	20.4	9.1	110
Refused	10.9	62.3	19.2	7.5	88

From Table 24 we surmise that there is some connection between family income and the attitude the respondent would adopt if he were asked to make a financial contribution to a party: there is clearly a greater predisposition to

giving as income rises, with the respondents whose annual family income exceeds \$6000 being most willing to contribute.

Table 25 shows the distribution of attitudes by the religious denomination of our sample. Members of the larger Protestant groups would respond much more positively to requests for money than Catholics. So would Lutherans and Jewish respondents, but their numbers in our sample are too small to justify very much being made of this. These results are, of course, related to the preponderance of French-speaking people among Catholics and the lack of enthusiasm toward fund raising on the part of the French. Although we have no firm data to support this view, we surmise that the response of our French respondents is the result largely of ethnic factors other than religion.

The distribution by party identification of the attitudes toward giving to parties (Table 26) shows that the two major parties could count on about 20 per cent of their supporters being willing to donate money if asked, the Cr ditistes' score is 25.5 per cent and the NDP makes the most encouraging showing with 28.7 per cent of its supporters being potential givers. It is interesting that 9.0 per cent of the people who did not identify themselves with any party nevertheless said they would give money to their favourite party or, more likely, to a candidate if they were asked.

Table 25

ATTITUDES TO GIVING BY RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Would Give	Would not Give	Don't Know	Already Gave and Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Religion</u>					
Roman Catholic	13.5	72.0	12.3	1.9	1128
United	24.4	55.7	16.6	3.3	578
Anglican	21.4	57.8	18.7	2.1	320
Presbyterian	23.7	54.7	19.0	2.6	128
Baptist	20.3	68.2	11.5	0	87
Lutheran	20.2	50.4	22.3	7.1	79
Greek Catholic	14.6	61.2	18.4	5.8	34
Greek Orthodox	51.5	18.2	30.3	0	11
Jewish	23.3	41.8	24.0	11.0	49
Other Protestant	14.8	57.0	22.5	5.7	117
Other	22.3	49.8	21.0	6.9	78

We have seen, so far, that about one out of every five Canadians expects to contribute to a party if asked. This proportion does not occur uniformly throughout the country and we have noted particularly the following variations: people east of the Ottawa River, French-speaking Canadians, people in low-income brackets and Catholics are less willing to give than Canadians west of the Ottawa River,

English-speaking Canadians, high-income groups, and Protestants. Finally, NDP identifiers seem more eager to dig into their pockets for the Party than do supporters of older parties and of the Social Credit. The Creditistes run the NDP a close second which is particularly noteworthy in view of their falling into the three "low-giving" categories identified above.

Table 26

ATTITUDES TO GIVING BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Would Give	Would not Give	Don't Know	Already Gave and Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Party</u>					
Liberal	19.4	63.0	14.8	2.9	985
Conservative	21.7	58.9	16.8	2.6	661
New Demo- cratic Party	28.7	46.9	17.5	6.9	265
Social Cre- dit	17.2	57.1	21.6	4.1	99
Créditistes	25.5	61.7	6.4	6.4	47
Union Nation- ale	7.1	85.7	7.1	0	14
Other	0	76.9	0	23.1	4
No Party	9.0	74.1	15.3	1.5	441
Refused	6.4	87.2	6.4	0	16
Don't know	1.3	80.6	18.1	0	77

B. WILLINGNESS TO GIVE TIME OR MONEY

Respondents were also asked: "Which would you rather do to help your favourite party or candidate: give money or give time?" The replies are given in Table 27. A surprisingly large number (63.7 per cent) appear to be willing to give money and/or time but this startling response may in fact have been prompted by the wording of the question which suggests that the respondent ought to make a choice between the two activities: no other answer is directly suggested by the question. Furthermore, to say today that one would help in the future does not mean that, at the critical time, one would in fact live up to one's current expectations. Nevertheless, these qualifications notwithstanding, our result here is highly suggestive, indicating at least than in principle a very large proportion of Canadians accept the idea of coming to the aid of their party. Table 27 indicates the aggregate response to this question.

Table 27

PREFERENCES IN HELPING PARTY

Preference	Give Money	Give Time	Give Both	Give Neither	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
Number	243	1274	147	769	171	6	2610
%	(9.3	48.8	5.6)	29.5	6.5	0.2	99.9
	63.7						

Once again we shall seek to analyze the major

demographic characteristics of our respondents in relation to the way in which they have answered the question under discussion.

Table 28

HELP PREFERENCES BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Preference	Give Money	Give Time	Give Both	Neither	Don't Know	Residuals	Total Number in Row
<u>Party</u>							
Liberal	9.2	54.3	4.2	25.8	6.3	0.3	985
Conservative	10.6	51.1	6.2	26.9	5.1	0.2	660
New Democratic Party	15.6	47.7	10.9	20.0	5.8	0	265
Social Credit	12.2	40.2	5.1	27.7	14.9	0	99
Créditiste	2.1	59.6	14.9	23.4	0	0	47
Union Nationale	0	71.4	0	28.6	0	0	14
Others	0	76.9	0	23.1	0	0	4
None	5.2	38.1	3.8	44.1	8.4	0.3	442
Refused	0	42.5	12.8	44.7	0	0	16
Don't Know	5.2	26.3	6.9	50.4	9.9	1.3	77

An analysis of attitudes in Table A-8 in Appendix II toward helping parties by the religious background of the respondents leads to no startling insights. Roman Catholics are considerably less interested than Protestants or Jews in giving money to parties and no more interested in giving time. Only 4.6 per cent of Catholics are willing

to donate money if given a choice while other religious groups show consistently approximately 12 per cent willing to make financial donations. Catholics are also somewhat less prepared than members of most other denominations to give both time and money while the Jewish respondents were exceptionally willing to give money and to give both and exceptionally unwilling to give time alone.

To a large extent the figures concerning Roman Catholics in this question probably reflect French-English differences. Table 29 addresses itself to this question.

Table 29
HELP PREFERENCES BY LANGUAGE GROUP*
(In Percentages)

Preference	Give Money	Give Time	Give Both	Give Neither	Don't Know	Residuals	Total Number in Row
<u>Language</u>							
English	12.2	51.4	6.7	25.1	4.2	0.3	1754
French	3.0	45.3	3.0	39.1	9.5	0.1	745

* Less than 2.8 per cent of our sample spoke neither English nor French. This group is excluded from our calculations.

French-speaking Canadians are in all respects considerably less willing to be politically active than are English Canadians. Only one quarter as many French Canadians as English would give money to a party and less than one half as many would give both time and money. A

far higher proportion would refuse outright to help out a party in any way and twice as many could not decide. There is a significant difference in attitudes toward politics here; with respect to party politics, at least, French Canadians are less willing to become active than English Canadians and they are far less interested in helping out the party or candidate for whom they would vote.

Table 30 gives the preferences of people for helping parties classified by province and reveals patterns similar to those expressed in the earlier, "would you have given if asked" section of our report. Again the dividing line is basically the Ottawa River with less than 5 per cent of people east of it willing to give money rather than time and about 4 per cent willing to give both. No province west of Quebec has less than approximately 11 per cent willing to give money nor less than 6 per cent willing to give both time and money. Saskatchewan is again the Province with the highest proportion of its citizens willing to give money to a party and by far the highest proportion willing to give both time and money. Again, as we move west, we can see a growing willingness to help out parties financially and by political work.

Table 30

HELP PREFERENCES BY PROVINCE

(In Percentages)

<u>Prefer-</u> <u>ence</u>	Money	Time	Time and Money	Nei- ther	Don't know	Residuals	Total Number in Row
<u>Province</u>							
P.E.I.	0	50.0	4.2	41.7	4.2	0	24
N.S.	5.3	64.0	0	28.0	2.7	0	75
N.B.	2.8	54.6	2.8	33.3	6.5	0	108
Nfld.	4.2	37.5	4.2	50.0	4.2	0	24
Que.	4.9	43.6	4.0	38.6	8.7	0.1	800
Ont.	10.9	52.9	5.8	24.1	5.9	0.4	1056
Man.	13.1	49.2	6.2	26.2	5.4	0	130
Sask.	20.2	34.0	17.0	21.3	7.4	0	94
Alta.	12.9	48.0	7.6	23.4	7.6	0.6	171
B.C.	18.0	46.9	9.4	25.0	0.8	0	128

Table 31

HELP PREFERENCES BY RURAL QUEBECERSAND CREDITISTE SUPPORTERS

(In Percentages)

<u>Prefer-</u> <u>ence</u>	Money	Time	Both	Nei- ther	Don't Know	Residuals	Total Number in Row
<u>Support from</u>							
Rural Que.	1.8	43.6	3.6	41.7	8.5	0.6	165
Créditiste	2.4	59.5	16.7	21.4	0	0	42

A large difference may be seen between rural Quebec and the rest of Canada in Table 31, for in rural Quebec only 1.8 per cent of respondents were willing to give money to a party and only 3.6 per cent would give both time and money. The proportion willing to give time was also low at 43.6 per cent and 41.7 per cent would have refused any help at all (165). Cr ditiste supporters in rural Quebec were no more willing than other rural Quebecers to give money but 59.5 per cent would have given time and 16.7 per cent would have given time and money if asked. Only 21.4 per cent would have refused help outright. Again we can see a far greater willingness to help their party if asked on the part of Cr ditiste supporters. But it must be recalled from the behavioural data that Cr ditiste supporters were apparently not asked very effectively to help the Party for no more of them actually gave money or time than did members of other parties. It appears, therefore, that Cr ditiste claims to elicit a highly active response from its supporters could be true, if proper recruitment were carried out but at present it is not true: many potentially willing Cr ditiste workers were not asked to help.

Classifying help preference patterns by income categories (Table 32), we see that respondents in the two highest income classifications are far more willing to give money alone or time and money to parties and much less likely to refuse to help out if asked to do so than the

financially less well-endowed members of our sample. Thus, while about 32 per cent of the people whose families earn less than \$5,000 per year would have refused any help at all to a party, only about 16 per cent of people earning over \$10,000 would have done so. The findings here can be summed up quite simply: the higher a person's income the more likely he is to give time, money or both to a political party.

Table 32
HELP PREFERENCES BY INCOME CLASSIFICATION
(In Percentages)

Preference	Money	Time	Both	Nei- ther	Don't Know	Resi- dual	Total Number in Row
Family In- come (In thousands of dollars)							
Under 1	3.5	49.3	2.1	30.1	14.9	0	94
1 - 2	6.1	47.5	2.0	37.9	6.5	0	164
2 - 3	8.5	46.9	7.0	30.7	6.8	0	215
3 - 4	7.8	45.3	4.3	34.7	7.6	0.4	317
4 - 5	6.8	51.2	4.1	31.6	6.3	0	387
5 - 6	6.6	51.0	7.0	29.9	5.5	0	418
6 - 7	13.7	48.3	3.8	26.7	7.2	0.4	265
7 - 8	9.3	52.5	3.9	27.1	7.2	0	194
8 - 10	11.3	49.5	8.5	25.3	5.4	0	191
10 - 15	20.6	51.0	9.0	15.7	3.7	0	163
Over 15	18.5	51.7	12.5	14.3	3.0	0	110
Refused	3.4	33.6	6.4	43.8	8.7	4.1	88

Table 33

HELP PREFERENCES BY VOLUNTARYASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP

(In Percentages)

Preference	Money	Time	Both	Neither	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Ass'n Membership</u>							
Labour Union	9.5	54.1	4.0	25.9	6.3	0.2	607
Trade Ass'n	13.2	45.9	10.1	25.2	5.7	0	106
Farm Ass'n	13.0	42.7	3.9	30.9	9.4	0	102
Prof. Ass'n	14.4	53.5	5.9	20.7	5.2	0.3	304
Other Ass'n	13.5	53.6	7.9	21.3	3.6	0.2	534
No Ass'n	7.4	44.9	5.3	35.0	7.3	0.1	1151

In Table 33 we see the attitudes toward helping political parties in various ways classified by membership in a number of voluntary associations. People who do not belong to any association seem far less willing to give time or money to a party than do association members. Of those belonging to associations, members of professional associations show the greatest willingness to give money and labour union members the least. Labour union members are more willing to give time than anyone else while trade association members are most likely to be willing to give both.

Again, a number of conclusions may be drawn from this section. The attitudes of Conservative and Liberal supporters seem to be quite similar; NDP and Cr ditiste

backers are more willing to help their party in all ways than are supporters of the older parties; French-speaking Canadians are far less likely to help their party than are English Canadians and Catholics are less likely to give either time or money than Protestants. There is a sharp dividing line in attitudes at the Ontario - Quebec border with eastern respondents more heavily favouring "service" contributions over money gifts and generally showing much less interest than people further west in helping out at all. Saskatchewan, once again, displays an abnormally high level of political interest, when the latter is measured by willingness of people to help out their favourite party. Respondents in rural Quebec have the lowest disposition to help parties while at the same time Cr ditiste supporters in rural Quebec are very willing to be of assistance to the Ralliement. Finally, people who belong to no voluntary association are less likely to want to help a party than are those who do belong, and members of professional associations appear more willing to be helpful than are members of other associations. Labour union members are most willing to give time and least inclined to contribute money.

C. ATTITUDES TO CORPORATION AND UNION CONTRIBUTIONS

Since parties in Canada finance themselves largely from non-public sources, that is, by obtaining funds from corporations and to a lesser extent labour unions and other associations, we were interested in the attitudes of

Canadians toward giving by such groups. Table 34 contains the Canadian totals for responses to the following question:

How do you feel about contributions to political parties from organizations like business corporations or trade unions? Do you think it is a good thing or not for our parties to receive such contributions?

Table 34

ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZATION GIVING*

Attitude	Good Corp'n	Bad Corp'n	Good Union	Bad Union	Good Both	Bad Both	Don't know	Residual	Total Number in Row
Number	160	78	48	13	494	1347	463	6	2609
%	6.1	3.0	1.9	0.5	18.9	51.6	17.7	0.2	99.9

* In the titles to these tables a number of gauche but useful abbreviations have had to be used. They are:

1. Good Corp'n: Good thing from business corporations.
2. Bad Corp'n: Not a good thing from business corporations.
3. Good Union: Good thing from Trade Unions (the terms trade union and labour union are used interchangeably throughout).
4. Bad Union: Not a good thing from trade unions.
5. Good Both: Good thing from both.
6. Bad Both: Not a good thing from either.

As can be seen from this table the majority of Canadians do not approve of contributions to parties from either source. However, it is also notable that 18.9 per cent of Canadians think such giving by organizations is a good thing no matter where it comes from. If the 17.7 per cent who have no views are added, we find that 36.6 per cent do not

object to these contributions. Party contributions by corporations are considerably more acceptable than those made by unions: over three times as many respondents thought that giving by corporations alone was acceptable than those who approved of union donations. In sum, then, it seems that a majority of Canadians disapprove of any donations to parties by such organizations. Further analysis of our data was attempted but revealed little of a startling nature.

Table 35

ATTITUDES TO ORGANIZATION GIVINGBY ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP

(In Percentages)

Atti- tude	Good Corp'n	Bad Corp'n	Good Union	Bad Union	Good Both	Bad Both	Don't Know	Resi- dual	Total Number in Row
<u>Member- ship</u>									
Labour Union	5.3	3.6	2.7	1.0	21.9	49.6	15.5	0.4	607
Trade Ass'n	11.0	1.3	4.4	0.9	16.4	56.6	9.4	0	106
Farm Ass'n	3.6	1.3	2.0	0	21.2	53.1	16.9	2.0	102
Prof. Ass'n	4.1	2.1	1.1	0.3	22.9	56.1	13.0	0.3	304
Other Ass'n	4.4	3.5	1.7	0.2	19.2	58.4	12.0	0.6	534
No Ass'n	7.8	2.9	1.9	0.3	18.5	47.7	20.9	0	1151

Attitudes toward organization giving, classified according to membership in voluntary associations, are presented in Table 35. Labour union members favour corporation giving more than most other groups but they also contain a large proportion disliking corporate giving. This support for corporate donations is surprising but not as startling as unionist attitudes to union contributions: they are less in favour of union giving than are trade association members and less inclined than members of any other association to feel that neither unions nor corporations should give. Trade association members are, far more than any other group, in favour of corporation giving but are also more in favour of union giving than other groups. People who belong to no association - a slight majority of our sample - are far more sympathetic to corporate than to union giving. However, the numbers in each cell of our table are exceedingly small and it therefore appears rather risky to attempt to make too much of the figures in the table.

No striking differences in attitudes to corporate and/or union giving are noticeable between the supporters of the various parties. From Table 36, which deals with this matter, we see that Liberals appear, more than Conservatives, to be in favour of giving by organizations: only 47.9 per cent reject giving by both unions and corporations and about 22 per cent favour it from both. Liberals are more likely than Conservatives to support both corporation

Table 36
ATTITUDES TO ORGANIZATION GIVING BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION
(In Percentages)

Attitude	Good Corp'n	Bad Corp'n	Good Union	Bad Union	Good Both	Bad Both	Don't Know	Resi- dual	Total Number in Row
<u>Party</u>									
Liberal	8.2	2.9	1.8	0.4	21.9	47.9	16.8	0	985
Conservative	5.6	3.5	0.7	0.3	14.8	57.6	17.3	0.2	561
New Democra- tic Party	4.5	1.5	6.9	0.8	22.5	50.8	12.5	0.5	265
Social Credit	4.1	2.0	1.0	0	24.3	46.3	21.3	1.0	99
Créditiste	17.0	2.1	0	0	12.8	59.6	8.5	0	47
Union Nationale	0	28.6	0	0	14.3	50.0	7.1	0	14
Others	0	0	0	0	0	100.0	0	0	4
None	3.6	2.9	1.2	1.1	17.0	53.8	20.0	0.2	442
Don't Know	0	6.4	0	0	19.2	48.9	25.5	0	16
Refused	2.6	1.3	1.3	0	12.5	39.2	41.8	1.3	77

and union giving, although not many adherents of either of the older parties support the latter alone. A much larger proportion of Liberals and Conservatives favour corporate as compared with union giving, whereas the NDP supporters are far more likely than others to favour union giving. Surprisingly, however, the NDP group does not appear to reject corporate giving explicitly any more often than do the supporters of other parties. The small total number of Cr ditistes (47) robs the percentage of 17.0 supporting corporation donations of very much meaning. It is probably significant that followers of both Social Credit and Cr ditistes failed to single out unions for any kind of individual comment. Generally, however, the Social Credit supporters show a rather high tendency to accept giving from both sources as legitimate.

Attitudes toward giving are tabulated by religious denomination in Table A-9 in Appendix II but only a few generalizations can be made on the basis of this variable. Catholics are more likely, but only slightly so, to be in favour of corporate giving and somewhat more than most other groups they favour giving by either type of organization. Jews are far more often in favour than others of corporate giving but they are also more likely to mention that they think corporate giving to be a bad thing. The major Protestant denominations all show similar attitudes and the numbers involved in other denominations are too small to justify any reliable generalizations.

Table 37

ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZATION GIVING BY LANGUAGE

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Good Corp'n	Bad Corp'n	Good Union	Bad Union	Good Both	Bad Both	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Language</u>									
English	5.7	2.4	1.8	0.2	18.9	54.8	15.8	0.3	1754
French	7.2	4.6	1.4	1.3	17.9	47.0	20.7	0	745

Table 37 indicates that aside from a greater tendency on the part of the French-speaking respondents to answer "do not know" to the question and a lesser tendency to think that party donations are bad from both, there is little to differentiate between French - and English-speaking Canadians when it comes to comparing attitudes toward corporate and union giving. The French are more likely than the English to favour corporation giving but they are also more likely to condemn it.

The two central provinces, and especially Quebec, as is shown in Table 38, seem more generally favourable to giving by corporations than either the Maritimes or the West, although Alberta shows a marked divergence from other Western Provinces in this respect. The seemingly eccentric Newfoundland figure in the first column is based on too small a total of responses to give it significance. Quebec, Saskatchewan and Alberta show relatively more antipathy to corporation financing than do other provinces. Except in Saskatchewan and British Columbia there is little apparent interest either way in giving to parties by trade unions. Saskatchewan had the highest positive and negative response to trade union giving and interestingly enough (in view of the stormy history of union donations in British Columbia) no one in British Columbia thought that trade union giving was a bad thing.

Table 38

ATTITUDES TO ORGANIZATION GIVING BY PROVINCE

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Good Corp'n	Bad Corp'n	Good Union	Bad Union	Good Both	Bad Both	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Province</u>									
P.E.I.	0	0	0	0	4.2	79.2	16.7	0	24
N.S.	2.7	1.3	0	0	13.3	74.7	8.0	0	75
N.B.	3.7	2.8	1.9	0	16.7	49.1	25.9	0	108
Nfld.	8.3	0	0	0	12.5	20.8	58.3	0	24
Que.	9.9	5.1	1.1	1.0	18.2	45.4	19.2	0	800
Ont.	5.1	1.3	1.8	0.1	20.4	53.2	17.8	0.3	1056
Man.	3.1	1.5	0	0.8	18.5	57.7	18.5	0	130
Sask.	2.1	4.3	6.4	2.1	19.1	55.3	10.6	0	94
Alta.	6.4	5.3	2.9	0.6	24.0	44.4	15.2	1.2	171
B.C.	1.6	3.9	5.5	0	14.1	67.2	7.0	0.8	128

We have seen in this section that relatively few insights can be gained by breaking down attitudes toward organizational giving by our usual categories. Over one half of our respondents are opposed to giving by either corporations or unions. Stated the other way, however, we can also insist that nearly one half of them have no objections to such giving. There is little difference in attitude according to religion, language, income or membership in a voluntary organization. We were able to make a few observations about differences in the various provincial responses but even these were not startling: to some measure we may conclude that all Canadian groups seem to think more or less alike about this question.

It seems, in fact, that in our returns to this question a high "good" response is accompanied by a high "bad" response and in some ways our question may have measured awareness of corporate (or union) giving more than attitudes toward it. But even so, it does give a general indication of broad reactions to some of the major sources of party financing.

D. ATTITUDES TO TAX DEDUCTION

Do Canadians favour allowing donations made to political parties by various people to be deducted from income for tax purposes in the same way that charitable donations are now deductible? This question was put to each of our respondents and the responses are listed in Table 39.

Table 39

ATTITUDES TO TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR PARTY DONATIONS

Attitude	Favour Deductions	Against Deductions	No Answer	Total
Number	781	1694	136	2611
%	29.9	64.9	5.2	100.0

Clearly, the vast majority of Canadians are not in favour of allowing tax deductions of donations to political parties. Once again we can ask how the responses to this question vary between various groups of Canadians. Table 40 begins the analysis by breaking the response to this question down according to income category.

Certain trends appear in Table 40 which common sense might not lead us to suspect. One would normally expect members of higher income categories to be more in favour of tax deductions for donations to parties than those of lower categories but this is not what we found. The percentages of those opposed to tax deductions are consistently higher in the four top income categories than in the lower ones. There is also a pronounced trend here, as in most other questions, for a larger proportion of those with the highest incomes to have opinions on the subject than do those in the lower brackets.

Table 40

ATTITUDES TO TAX DEDUCTIONS BY INCOME GROUP

(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Favour Deductions</u>	<u>Against Deductions</u>	<u>No Answer</u>	<u>Total Number in Row</u>
Income (In thousands of dollars)				
0 - 1	34.1	51.8	14.2	94
1 - 2	23.8	61.3	14.9	164
2 - 3	39.1	54.5	6.4	215
3 - 4	27.3	66.9	5.8	317
4 - 5	29.8	67.1	3.1	387
5 - 6	32.4	61.9	5.7	418
6 - 7	27.8	67.3	4.9	265
7 - 8	26.4	70.3	3.3	194
8 - 10	28.9	70.6	0.5	191
10 - 15	29.0	69.6	1.4	163
Over 15	28.9	69.9	1.2	110
Refused	32.8	60.0	7.2	88

Table 41 shows a strong similarity between English and French points of view in this respect. Among the English respondents 30.1 per cent favoured such deductions as compared with 27.4 per cent of the French. Apparently the language spoken by the respondent has virtually nothing to do with his attitude toward income tax deductions for donations to parties.

Table 41

ATTITUDES TO TAX DEDUCTIONS BY LANGUAGE GROUP

(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Favour</u> <u>Deductions</u>	<u>Against</u> <u>Deductions</u>	<u>No</u> <u>Answer</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Number</u> <u>in Row</u>
<u>Language</u>				
English	30.1	65.1	4.8	1754
French	27.4	67.1	5.5	745

Table 42

ATTITUDES TO TAX DEDUCTIONS BY PROVINCE

(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Favour</u> <u>Deductions</u>	<u>Against</u> <u>Deductions</u>	<u>No</u> <u>Answer</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Number</u> <u>in Row</u>
<u>Province</u>				
P.E.I.	8.3	87.5	4.2	24
N.S.	22.7	76.0	1.3	75
N.B.	13.9	75.9	10.2	108
Nfld.	12.5	83.3	4.2	24
Que.	26.4	69.0	4.6	800
Ont.	35.5	59.4	5.2	1056
Man.	31.5	59.2	9.2	130
Sask.	29.8	64.9	5.3	94
Alta.	30.4	64.9	4.7	171
B.C.	28.9	67.2	3.9	128

The region in which the respondent lives does, however, seem to have some bearing on his response to our question. Maritimers, as can be seen in Table 42, are considerably less likely than other Canadians to favour tax deductions for donations. Quebecers come next, while Ontario has a higher proportion of people in favour of deductions than any other province. Again, west of the Ottawa River attitudes seem to be different than east of it, for about one third of Canadians west of the Ottawa River favour deductions while fewer than one quarter of those living east of the Ottawa River are in favour.

Some slight differences exist between the responses of adherents to various parties in their attitudes to the deduction of donations to parties. Cr ditiste supporters seem more in favour of such deductions than others (Table 43) but again we must recall there are only 47 of them in our sample. The percentage of 42.6 is not, therefore, very meaningful although suggestive. However, there are enough NDP supporters in our sample to permit comparisons with the older parties and from the table we can see that NDP supporters favour this suggestion more than do the supporters of either of the old parties. The NDP's figure is 36.0 per cent compared to the Liberal's 31.9 per cent and the Conservative's 29.5 per cent. There seems little to choose between Conservative and Liberal supporters on this question (although the Liberals have a slight edge over Conservatives), while Social Crediters

are again slightly more in favour of the idea than adherents of the old parties and slightly less so than NDF sympathizers.

Table 43

ATTITUDES TO TAX DEDUCTIONS BY PARTY

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Favour Deductions	Against Deductions	No Answer	Total Number in Row
<u>Party</u>				
Liberal	31.9	62.6	5.5	985
Conservative	29.5	66.4	4.1	661
New Democra- tic Party	36.0	60.4	3.6	261
Social Credit	35.1	59.5	5.4	99
Créditiste	42.6	55.3	2.1	47
Union Nationale	35.7	42.9	21.4	14
Other	0	100	0	4
None	23.0	72.4	4.6	442
Refused	19.2	59.6	21.3	16
Don't Know	15.5	69.4	15.1	77

Analysis of answers to this question by religious denomination again fails to reveal significant differences and the table has, therefore, been placed in Appendix II as Table A-11.

The following major points emerge from this section:

first, upper income groups are less in favour of tax deductions being allowed for political donations than are members of lower income categories. Second, attitudes toward this question change sharply when one crosses the Ottawa River. In the east, more people oppose allowing tax deductions than in the west but the difference seems to be sectional rather than a result of language: Quebec is far more in favour of the idea than are the Maritimes and there is little to differentiate between French and English in this respect. Finally, party identification or religion seems to make fairly little difference in attitudes toward this idea, although NDP supporters have a slight preference for it over adherents of the old parties. In conclusion, it may be useful to reiterate our total figures: 29.9 per cent of our respondents favoured the idea while 64.9 per cent opposed it.

E. ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF COST

One of the questions put to our respondents concerned the publication of campaign costs by political parties and was worded:

The amount of money it costs a political party to run an election campaign does not have to be made public at present. Should it be required that parties publish their expenses or not?

Table 44 shows the national totals of responses to this question.

Table 44

ATTITUDES TO PARTY PUBLICATION OF ELECTION COSTS

Attitude	Should Publish	Should Not Publish	Don't Know	Residual	Total
Number	1805	535	259	11	2610
%	69.2	20.5	9.9	0.4	100.0

Nearly 70 per cent of our sample thought that election costs incurred by national parties should be made public after the election, compared with 20.5 per cent who believed that it would be better if the parties kept such expenses secret. We shall again examine this national result by seeing how various groups of Canadians responded to the question. The first breakdown, by province, is shown in Table 45.

The highest and lowest "vote" in favour of publication can be found in the Maritimes, although the small numbers make these results highly suspect. Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba all display very similar responses with about two thirds of respondents favouring the publication of election costs. Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia all show quite high proportions in favour of publication. The central provinces appear less enthusiastic about publication than does the west, and the Maritimes have a rather inconsistent set of responses.

Most of the usual categories according to which we

have examined the replies to our questions fail to yield any insight into Canadian attitudes to the publication of election costs. As is indicated in Tables A-12 and A-13 in Appendix II, English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians as well as Canadians of different denominations respond in like fashion to the question, except that adherents of minor Protestant sects are the most numerous supporters of publication. The relevant tables can be found in that Appendix.

Table 45

ATTITUDES TO PUBLICATION OF COSTS BY PROVINCE
(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Should Publish</u>	<u>Should Not Publish</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total Number in Row</u>
<u>Province</u>					
P.E.I.	95.8	4.2	0	0	24
N.S.	74.7	20.0	5.3	0	75
N.B.	69.4	14.8	15.7	0	108
Nfld.	54.2	25.0	20.8	0	24
Que.	69.6	20.1	9.7	0.5	800
Ont.	66.5	22.9	10.1	0.6	1056
Man.	66.9	20.8	12.3	0	130
Sask.	78.7	12.8	8.5	0	94
Alta.	72.5	18.1	9.4	0	171
B.C.	73.4	18.8	7.0	0.8	128

Table 46

ATTITUDES TO PUBLICATION OF COSTS BY PARTY
(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Should Publish</u>	<u>Should Not Publish</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total Number in Row</u>
<u>Party</u>					
Liberal	64.4	24.8	10.7	0.1	985
Conservative	69.9	21.0	8.5	0.7	661
New Demo- cratic Party	76.7	14.7	8.2	0.4	265
Social Credit	66.6	22.6	10.8	0	99
Créditiste	85.1	10.6	2.1	2.1	47
Union Nationale	71.4	14.3	14.3	0	14
Other	76.9	23.1	0	0	4
None	74.4	15.3	10.1	0.2	442
Refused	53.2	31.9	14.9	0	16
Don't Know	62.9	13.4	21.1	2.6	77

Some interesting differences in attitudes toward publication emerge among supporters of each of the parties. Conservatives, it is revealed in Table 46, appear to favour publication of expenses more than the Liberals. No less than 85.1 per cent of Créditiste supporters favoured publication, a result placing them over 20 percentage points above the Liberals. NDP supporters, too, had a significantly more favourable response to the idea

of publication, with 76.7 per cent in favour. Put in another way, these differences are even more striking: proportionately, over twice as many Liberals (24.8 per cent) as Cr ditistes (10.6 per cent) were opposed to publication and the NDP-Liberal differences are almost as great. It is also worthy of note that those who identify with no party are more often in favour of disclosure than are supporters of the old parties. Over 17 per cent of our sample falls in this category. Here we can see a connection between some contemporary theories about parties and their identifiers' responses: for supporters of the old parties, which are avowedly cadre in nature, ^{5/} backed the idea of a closed financial structure more often than identifiers with the Cr ditiste and NDP groups, whose theories assert that open financial structures are more or less the people's way to run a party. It is interesting to note, too, that supporters of the NDP and Cr ditistes were less often undecided in this respect (as indeed in most others) for their parties have on occasion spoken out about the financing of the old parties; the identifiers may have listened.

Income, which we might expect to be related in some way to the position one takes about disclosure of expenses, does seem in fact, to have some effect on a person's attitudes in this respect. Those in the highest income bracket exhibited the least enthusiasm for disclosure, and, in spite of some fluctuations as we move down the

income scale, the lower a person's income, the more likely is he to feel that parties ought to publish their expenditures. The marked contrast between the two highest income groups is suggestive but we have insufficient data at present to explore the various possible explanations of the fact that the highest and lowest percentages in the first column of the table occurred in adjacent rows.

Table 47

ATTITUDES TO PARTY PUBLICATION OF COSTS BY INCOME
(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Should Publish</u>	<u>Should Not Publish</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total Number in Row</u>
Income (In thou- sands of dollars)					
0 - 1	64.2	17.0	17.4	1.4	94
1 - 2	65.4	15.1	18.9	0.6	164
2 - 3	70.3	13.0	16.0	0.6	215
3 - 4	72.4	17.8	9.6	0.3	317
4 - 5	73.0	16.5	10.2	0.3	387
5 - 6	67.4	23.3	8.4	1.0	418
6 - 7	73.5	15.2	11.3	0	265
7 - 8	68.4	23.0	7.9	0.7	194
8 - 10	62.0	35.4	2.6	0	191
10 - 15	76.9	21.8	1.2	0	163
Over 15	60.2	37.4	2.4	0	110
Refused	62.6	19.2	18.1	0	88

Few very clear-cut patterns emerge among the 69.2 per cent of Canadians favouring the disclosure of election costs by the parties. Some provinces showed considerably higher figures in favour than others. Respondents in the Prairies and on the West Coast favoured disclosure more than those residing in the central provinces. No great difference is revealed between English and French. Both the Cr ditiste and the NDP supporters showed a significantly higher predisposition than the Liberals and Conservatives to favour the disclosure of campaign expenditures but here, as in most other attitudes, there was little to differentiate one major party from the other and little to differentiate Social Credit from either. However, despite the very small differences in attitudes among supporters of the major parties a definite pattern is beginning to emerge: in almost all cases the Liberals show a slightly higher proportion of supporters in favour of what we might call an " litist" position in party finance. Thus, fewer of them favoured disclosure of expenses than Conservatives and more favoured tax deductions and more were in favour of contributions to parties by organizations and especially by corporations. We shall see that this pattern carries through all other attitudes we examined except one: fewer Liberals than Conservatives think that names and amounts of contributions ought to be disclosed and fewer are in favour of the government paying all of the election costs incurred by the parties. The only exception concerns the parties'

adherents' stand on outright government subsidies to election expenses. In no case is the difference greater than two or three percentage points but it is consistent and it does seem to form a pattern. The differences are so small, however, as to compel us to consider the speculation in this paragraph as the formulation of a promising hypothesis rather than as the assertion of a conclusion.

F. ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF DONORS

A further indicator of public attitudes was sought by asking the question "Should parties be required to disclose the names of their contributors?" Table 48 indicates that 42.2 per cent of Canadians thought that names should be disclosed while 47.7 per cent thought that they need not be. Another 9.8 per cent did not know how to answer this question.

Table 48

ATTITUDES TO THE DISCLOSURE OF NAMES OF DONORS

Attitude	Should Disclose Names	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total
Number	1103	1246	256	6	2611
%	42.2	47.7	9.8	0.2	99.9

It is difficult to discern much difference in opinions on whether or not parties ought to disclose contributors' names when we group our data by provinces. Table 49

reveals great differences between the various provinces but these do not follow a sectional pattern. Quebec displays an unusually high positive response as does British Columbia and especially Prince Edward Island. But our findings in the Island Province (like those for Newfoundland) are based on too small a number of respondents to be meaningful. Ontario and Manitoba show proportions slightly below the national average in favour of disclosure while in Saskatchewan, surprisingly, a very low proportion was in favour of disclosure. This result is difficult to explain: it clearly goes against most of the other trends we have noted in Saskatchewan.

Table 49

ATTITUDES TO THE DISCLOSURE OF DONORS BY PROVINCE

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Should Disclose Names	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Province</u>					
P.E.I.	75.0	25.0	0	0	24
N.S.	44.0	53.3	2.7	0	75
N.B.	38.0	45.4	16.7	0	108
Nfld.	25.0	58.3	16.7	0	24
Que.	46.9	41.1	11.9	0.1	800
Ont.	39.1	51.5	9.1	0.4	1056
Man.	40.0	50.8	9.2	0	130
Sask.	33.0	56.4	9.6	1.1	94
Alta.	41.5	50.3	8.2	0	171
B.C.	49.2	46.1	4.7	0	128

The next tabulation suggests that at least part of the difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada is linked to differences between French and English Canadian attitudes toward disclosure of names: 5 per cent more French than English suggest that names should be published and 11.1 per cent fewer say that they should not be disclosed. Almost twice as many French as English have no opinion on this question. The responses obtained in British Columbia (Table 49) indicate, however, that the ethnic factor was by no means the only, or even the major, determinant of attitudes toward disclosure.

Table 50

ATTITUDES TO THE DISCLOSURE OF DONORS BY LANGUAGE

<u>Attitude</u>	Should Disclose Names	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Language</u>					
English	40.8	51.4	7.5	0.3	1754
French	45.8	40.3	13.8	0.1	745

Table 51 reveals a great deal of variation in attitudes among religious groups toward the disclosure of names but again it is difficult to discern many clear patterns. Among the larger groups it is the Anglicans and Catholics who appear most in favour; the adherents of these two religions have considerably more in common with one another in this respect than either group does with people

identified with the United Church. The latter group, together with the Presbyterians and Baptists, are least disposed to favour disclosure. When the answers of Catholics are compared with the combined responses of all the other denominations the difference is only one per cent. The deviation we have noted in some of our other tables of Catholic responses from those of the other groups combined is not, therefore, present with respect to the disclosure of the identity of party "angels." It is interesting to note that, although we cannot detect a Catholic - non-Catholic difference, the French - English breakdown (Table 50) did reveal disparate responses.

Table 51

ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF DONORS BY RELIGION

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Should Disclose Names	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Religion</u>					
Roman Catholic	43.3	43.4	13.1	0.2	1128
United	37.2	56.5	5.8	0.5	578
Anglican	45.2	50.6	3.8	0.3	320
Presbyterian	34.4	56.5	9.1	0	128
Baptist	33.0	55.6	11.5	0	87
Lutheran	46.6	45.0	8.4	0	79
Greek Catholic	44.7	48.5	6.8	0	34
Greek Orthodox	66.7	0	33.3	0	11
Jewish	46.6	51.4	2.1	0	48
Other Protestant	44.2	39.0	16.8	0	117
Other	60.5	30.9	8.6	0	77

Table 52

ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF PARTY DONORS BY INCOME

(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Should Disclose Names</u>	<u>Should Not Disclose</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total Number in Row</u>
Income (In thousands of dollars)					
0 - 1	34.4	44.3	18.4	2.8	94
1 - 2	38.1	46.4	15.5	0	164
2 - 3	35.3	47.1	17.7	0	215
3 - 4	41.8	45.7	12.2	0.3	317
4 - 5	40.5	49.0	10.5	0	387
5 - 6	42.4	49.3	8.3	0	418
6 - 7	47.2	46.7	6.2	0	265
7 - 8	42.9	48.9	7.5	0.7	194
8 - 10	45.7	50.2	3.7	0.5	191
10 - 15	49.2	46.5	4.3	0	163
Over 15	42.9	55.9	1.2	0	88
Refused	46.0	39.2	14.7	0	110

A clear relationship is discernible between approval of disclosing the names of contributors and income, although it is not what common sense might tell us to expect. Table 52 shows that, as a general trend, the higher his income bracket the more likely the respondent is to favour the disclosure of names. Those in the highest income bracket contain a somewhat lower proportion favouring disclosure than respondents in the next bracket below it. This

conforms to a previously established pattern: people whose annual family income is between \$10,000 and \$15,000 consistently display attitudes which are usually expected of the radical elements in society. The wealthiest respondents are somewhat less radical, and the lowest income groups often least so. A trend then, seems to have emerged in a number of questions toward a more "liberal" or radical attitude appearing in the upper income categories with the highest category usually excepted.

Table 53

ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF DONORS BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION
(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Should Disclose Names</u>	<u>Should Not Disclose</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total Number in Row</u>
<u>Party</u>					
Liberal	37.7	50.7	11.3	0.4	985
Conservative	40.3	51.7	7.9	0.2	661
New Democratic Party	51.2	44.8	4.0	0	265
Social Credit	40.5	49.7	9.8	0	99
Créditiste	48.9	44.7	4.3	2.1	47
Union Nationale	57.1	28.6	14.3	0	14
Other	76.9	23.1	0	0	4
None	49.9	40.3	9.8	0	442
Refused	19.2	59.6	21.3	0	16
Don't Know	42.3	29.7	28.0	0	77

The responses, broken down by the party preference (Table 53), yield very much the sort of results we would anticipate on the basis of our earlier tables. More New Democratic Party supporters favour the disclosure of names than supporters of either of the old parties or of Social Credit. The percentages are: NDP 51.2; Conservative 40.3; Social Credit 40.5; Liberal 37.7. People who identified themselves with no party come immediately after the NDP (49.9 per cent) and then the Cr ditistes (48.9 per cent). Again, the slight but consistent difference between Conservatives and Liberals appears with about 2.6 per cent fewer Liberals favouring disclosure than Conservatives. The latter group in our sample, however, is also slightly larger than its Liberal counterpart in opposing disclosure.

Summing up, we find that 42.2 per cent of Canadians were in favour of the disclosure of names of donors to political parties. French-speaking Canadians are about 5 per cent more disposed to like the idea of disclosure than are English-speaking Canadians and respondents in Quebec, therefore, are also more likely than those in the other provinces (except British Columbia) to favour such disclosure. But no very clear regional and no really strong religious pattern emerges. Higher income groups generally tend to favour the disclosure of names more than do lower ones but the highest category is less in favour of the idea than is the \$10,000-15,000 per year

class. Finally, NDP and Cr  ditiste identifiers are considerably more likely than followers of other parties to support disclosure. A majority of NDP supporters, in fact, appear to support the idea. The difference between Liberals and Conservatives is slight but the Conservatives have a tiny edge over the Liberals in wishing to see the disclosure of names of people giving money to political parties.

G. ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF AMOUNTS

To disclose the identity of party contributors is only one part of the process of bringing to light the mysteries of party finance. Another part concerns the amounts given by each of the contributors and it has been suggested that this information be made available to the public. We asked our respondents for their views on this question. Table 54 indicates that 40.2 per cent of Canadians thought that amounts ought to be disclosed by the parties and one half of the population was opposed. The result differs by only two percentage points from that recording the population of respondents favouring the disclosure of names. It appears that to support publication of names is closely associated with supporting the disclosure of the relevant amounts.

In Table 55 the responses to the suggestion of the disclosure of amounts are classified according to the party allegiance of the respondent. The results are

Table 54

ATTITUDES TO THE DISCLOSURE OF AMOUNTS GIVEN TO PARTIES

Attitude	Should Disclose	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total
Number	1050	1299	243	17	2609
%	40.2	49.8	9.3	0.7	100.0

quite consistent with what we should have expected from the attitudes to the disclosure of names, for once again the Liberals are slightly less likely (1.9 per cent) to favour disclosure than are Conservatives (but a larger proportion of Conservatives (54.4 per cent) than Liberals (53.4 per cent) was opposed to disclosure); Social Credit supporters favour the idea less than others; a majority of both Cr ditiste and NDP supporters like the notion of disclosing the amounts of contributions, and they display a 15 to 20 percentage point spread in attitudes between themselves and the followers of the old parties. It is interesting to note that in both the NDP and Cr ditiste cases more respondents favoured the disclosure of amounts than favoured the disclosure of names.

When looking at the breakdown by family income, too, (Table 56) we find patterns similar to those observed in the preceding section: the lower income groups are generally less favourable to the idea of disclosure of amounts than the higher groups but the very highest income group again is less enthusiastic than other high-income groups.

Once again the trend is quite clear with the only odd men out being the \$6,000-8,000 group and those whose family income is over \$15,000.

Table 55

ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF AMOUNTS BYPARTY IDENTIFICATION

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Should Disclose	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number In Row
<u>Party</u>					
Liberal	35.7	53.4	10.6	0.4	985
Conservative	37.6	54.4	7.7	0.4	661
New Democratic Party	53.3	42.0	3.6	1.0	265
Social Credit	33.5	56.4	7.8	2.4	99
Créditiste	57.4	38.3	2.1	2.1	47
Union Nationale	57.1	28.6	14.3	0	14
Other	76.9	23.1	0	0	4
None	45.4	43.0	10.3	1.3	442
Refused	6.4	78.7	14.9	0	16
Don't Know	47.4	25.8	26.7	0	77

It is again difficult to discern any real pattern in attitudes when respondents are sorted according to province. Table 57 shows that, as before, Quebecers are more likely to favour disclosure than are the people of most other provinces except British Columbia and Prince Edward Island. We can ignore Prince Edward Island because of the small number

Table 56

ATTITUDES TO THE DISCLOSURE OF AMOUNTSBY FAMILY INCOME

(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Should Disclose</u>	<u>Should Not Disclose</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>in Row</u>
Income (In thou- sands of dollars)					
0 - 1	38.7	41.1	18.8	1.4	94
1 - 2	36.3	46.4	17.3	0	164
2 - 3	37.6	44.7	17.1	0.6	215
3 - 4	42.0	45.2	10.7	2.1	317
4 - 5	38.7	51.6	8.9	0.9	387
5 - 6	38.0	53.9	7.6	0.5	418
6 - 7	45.8	45.6	8.6	0	265
7 - 8	42.2	50.6	6.5	0.7	194
8 - 10	40.3	57.7	1.4	0.7	191
10 - 15	43.7	51.8	4.5	0	163
Over 15	40.1	59.9	0	0	110
Refused	41.1	43.8	15.1	0	88

of respondents. British Columbia differs from Quebec in that a larger proportion of its citizens is opposed to disclosure (49.2 per cent to 41.6 per cent). Again Saskatchewan and Alberta exhibit the smallest support for disclosure and the strongest opposition to it. New Brunswick and Manitoba are very close to the national figure in this

question while in Ontario the figure is noticeably lower. The data classified by section, then, shows a rather interesting pattern of attitudes. There are significant regional differences in that Quebec and British Columbia both come down quite strongly in favour of disclosure of amounts and Ontario appears to be considerably less in favour of such disclosure than other provinces.

Table 57

ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF AMOUNTS BY PROVINCE

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Should Disclose	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Province</u>					
P.E.I.	70.8	25.0	4.2	0	24
N.S.	40.0	57.3	2.7	0	75
N.B.	41.7	40.7	17.6	0	108
Nfld.	29.2	54.2	16.7	0	24
Que.	46.9	41.6	10.7	0.7	800
Ont.	34.7	55.3	8.9	1.1	1056
Man.	39.2	51.5	9.2	0	130
Sask.	38.3	54.3	7.4	0	94
Alta.	38.0	55.6	6.4	0	171
B.C.	45.3	49.2	5.5	0	128

The breakdown of responses by religion reveals that Catholics and adherents of some of the minor religious

groups are the most favourably disposed Canadians toward the publication of amounts. Of the latter, several actually show a larger proportion of respondents for disclosure than against it, while among the Roman Catholics almost the same number can be found on each side of the question. Adherents of the United Church, Baptists, Presbyterians and Jews (but note: N = 49) are the most hostile of the religious groups to the disclosure of amounts given the parties.

Table 58

ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF AMOUNTS BY RELIGION

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Should Disclose	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Religion</u>					
Roman Catholic	43.3	43.5	12.6	0.6	1128
United	34.4	59.5	1.3	4.8	578
Anglican	39.4	56.6	4.0	0	320
Presbyterian	31.3	55.5	12.2	1.0	128
Baptist	29.5	57.9	11.1	1.5	87
Lutheran	37.8	55.0	7.1	0	79
Greek Catholic	54.4	39.8	5.8	0	34
Greek Orthodox	78.8	0	21.2	0	11
Jewish	35.6	62.3	2.1	0	49
Other Pro- testants	42.7	42.4	14.8	0	117
Other	59.2	32.3	8.6	0	77

Table 59

ATTITUDES TO DISCLOSURE OF AMOUNTS BY LANGUAGE

(In Percentage)

Attitude	Should Disclose	Should Not Disclose	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Language</u>					
English	37.6	54.6	7.3	0.5	1754
French	46.6	40.1	12.5	0.8	745

Much of the difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada and between Catholics and others is here the result of a difference in attitude between French - and English-speaking Canadians. Table 59 reveals that the proportion of French-speaking Canadians favouring disclosure over non-disclosure was 46.6 per cent to 40.1 per cent whereas English-speaking Canadians opposed disclosure by a margin of 54.6 per cent to 37.6 per cent. There is a pronounced difference in attitudes here.

To sum up, then, 40.2 per cent of respondents feel that amounts of contributions should be made public by political parties and 49.8 per cent are opposed. Fairly clear patterns in the responses appear and these are largely a result of a considerable difference in attitude between French - and English-speaking Canadians: the French are considerably more in favour of disclosure than the English. This underlying difference is no doubt one

of the main reasons why Catholics are more likely than Protestants, and Quebecers more likely than Canadians in other provinces (except British Columbia), to favour disclosure. When the data are examined by party and by income, NDP and Cr ditiste supporters appear much more in favour of disclosure than do followers of other parties, and, if the highest income group is excluded, higher rather than lower income categories favour disclosure of actual amounts of donations to parties.

H. ATTITUDES TO GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES

The final attitudinal question put to our respondents inquired whether they favoured government subsidies to parties for all, some or none of the costs of political campaigns. Table 60 indicates that about two thirds of our sample favoured the idea of government paying either all or some of the cost of election campaigns and that there was no widespread opposition to the idea of subsidies. Of those favouring subsidies, well over one half preferred partial to complete subsidization. It is probably also worth noting the very low "don't know" response; most Canadians had definite opinions on this subject.

Table 60

ATTITUDES TO GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZATION OF CAMPAIGN COSTS

Attitude	Total Subsi- diz'n	Partial Subsi- diz'n	No Subsi- diz'n	Don't Know	Residual	Total
Number	778	979	620	224	9	2610
%	29.8	37.5	23.7	8.6	0.4	100.0

6 7 3

Table 61

ATTITUDES TO SUBSIDIZATION BY PROVINCE
(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	Total Subsi- diz'n	Partial Subsi- diz'n	No Subsi- diz'n	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Province</u>						
P.E.I.	58.3	37.5	4.2	0	0	24
N.S.	32.0	29.3	32.0	6.7	0	75
N.B.	37.0	31.5	13.9	16.7	0.9	108
Nfld.	29.2	41.7	8.3	20.8	0	24
Que.	35.7	34.7	18.9	10.2	0.4	800
Ont.	27.1	39.1	25.8	7.4	0.5	1056
Man.	16.9	49.2	26.2	7.7	0	130
Sask.	22.3	43.6	28.7	5.3	0	94
Alta.	21.1	42.1	29.8	7.0	0	171
B.C.	32.8	28.1	32.8	6.3	0	128

Looking at the data tabulated by province, we see that, with the exception of Nova Scotia (which, in our sample, consistently refuses to show the same attitudes as other Maritime Provinces), the further west one goes the less likely the respondents are to favour subsidization. Table 61 shows that in British Columbia 60.9 (32.8 + 28.1) per cent of the respondents support subsidization while in Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Quebec the proportion favourable to subsidization is, in each case, over 70 per cent. There is also a notable

difference between Quebec and Ontario with Quebecers preferring complete subsidization over those in Ontario by 8.6 percentage points. The best way to see the trends is to look at the "no subsidization" column for here the relationship between geographical location and attitudes toward subsidies is revealed most clearly. We appear to be confronting regional variations in attitudes which require further study. The differences are probably related to variations in political style linked to diverse historical traditions and economic and demographic circumstances. That they are also a function of language is suggested by Table 62. While 70.2 per cent of French Canadians favour some sort of subsidy, only 67.0 per cent of English Canadians have such attitudes. The difference is hardly striking but a glance at the "no subsidization" column proves more rewarding: the proportion of English Canadians opposed to subsidies exceeds that of their French compatriots by over 8 percentage points. Among those members of both ethnic groups who favour some subsidization, the proportion favouring a total subsidy is considerably smaller in the English than in the French group.

Table 62

ATTITUDES TO SUBSIDIZATION BY LANGUAGE

(In Percentages)

Attitude <u>Language</u>	Total Subsi- diz'n	Partial Subsi- diz'n	No Subsi- diz'n	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
English	28.0	39.0	26.0	6.5	0.5	1754
French	35.9	34.3	17.7	11.9	0.1	745

Table 63

ATTITUDES TO SUBSIDIZATION BY RELIGION

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Total Subsi- diz'n	Partial Subsi- diz'n	No Subsi- diz'n	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Religion</u>						
Roman Catholic	32.5	36.8	19.6	11.0	0.1	1128
United	28.3	36.0	28.7	6.1	0.9	578
Anglican	28.6	38.5	27.4	5.2	0.3	320
Presby- terian	34.6	39.6	17.7	8.1	0	128
Baptist	26.5	34.5	30.3	8.8	0	87
Lutheran	26.9	37.8	32.4	2.9	0	79
Greek Catholic	20.4	32.0	44.7	2.9	0	34
Greek Orthodox	48.5	18.2	12.1	21.2	0	11
Jewish	30.1	41.1	24.6	0	4.1	49
Other Protestants	18.0	48.4	17.7	16.0	0	117
Other	21.7	41.9	28.6	7.9	0	77

Some interesting patterns in attitudes toward subsidization emerge if we break down our figures by religious affiliation. We see in Table 63 that Catholics do not differ much from the major Protestant groups in their support for total or partial subsidies. But, aside from the Presbyterians, they contain a substantially smaller

proportion of individuals who reject them outright. They also contain a fairly large number of respondents who did not know how to answer the question. To a large extent the Catholic - Protestant difference reflects the English - French difference but it does not, of course, coincide with it.

Income also seems to have some bearing on this question as can be seen from Table 64. While there are exceptions, the higher the income classification the less the respondent seems to be sympathetic to the idea of subsidies. This result does not coincide with most of our earlier responses which showed upper income groups (with the exception of the highest category) usually in favour of change in present electoral laws. The difference should not, however, surprise us: in the earlier cases the initiative concerning action about party finance always lay with the individual donor. When we come to government subsidies the decision no longer rests with individuals but slips into the hands of "the state," however it is conceived. Other explanations of the difference are possible, such as, for example, one stressing the fear of state subsidies to all kinds of "irresponsible" parties. The question is an intriguing one which merits being explored in future studies.

The analysis of attitudes to subsidizations in terms of the party with which the respondent identifies himself produces some unexpected results. For the NDP supporters

Table 64

ATTITUDES TO SUBSIDIZATION BY FAMILY INCOME

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Total Subsi- diz'n	Partial Subsi- diz'n	No Subsi- diz'n	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
Income (In thou- sands of dollars)						
0 - 1	27.3	39.0	16.0	16.3	1.4	94
1 - 2	37.5	32.2	15.7	14.7	0	164
2 - 3	31.7	34.5	20.6	13.2	0	215
3 - 4	31.4	37.3	20.4	9.8	1.2	317
4 - 5	26.9	41.8	22.3	8.7	0.3	387
5 - 6	26.8	40.3	24.2	8.2	0.5	418
6 - 7	31.7	39.4	23.0	5.9	0	265
7 - 8	24.4	39.6	29.9	6.2	0	194
8 - 10	28.7	32.7	36.1	2.4	0	191
10 - 15	37.5	33.5	25.7	3.3	0	163
Over 15	22.8	36.5	37.1	3.6	0	110
Refused	37.0	32.8	14.0	15.1	1.1	88

appear no more enthusiastic about total or partial government subsidies than the followers of the older parties. They are more willing than the Liberals, Conservatives and Social Crediters to express an opinion on the matter and, again surprisingly, aside from the Social Crediters, they contain the highest proportion of respondents

Table 65

ATTITUDES TO SUBSIDIZATION BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Total Subsi- diz'n</u>	<u>Partial Subsi- diz'n</u>	<u>No Subsi- diz'n</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total Number in Row</u>
<u>Party</u>						
Liberal	29.6	40.7	20.7	8.7	0.2	985
Conserva- tive	31.5	34.8	25.7	7.6	0.4	661
New Demo- cratic Party	28.8	40.9	27.0	2.4	0	265
Social Credit	19.6	40.5	28.7	9.8	1.3	99
Créditiste	48.9	27.7	19.1	2.1	2.1	47
Union Nationale	57.1	28.6	7.1	7.1	0	14
Other	76.9	23.1	0	0	0	4
None	27.7	35.2	25.2	11.4	0.5	442
Refused	21.3	40.4	31.9	6.4	0	16
Don't Know	29.3	26.3	20.7	23.7	0	77

who reject subsidies outright. There is some difference between overall Liberal and Conservative attitudes:

Liberals are slightly less in favour of total subsidization and somewhat more in favour of partial subsidization than Conservatives. This, as we have noted, is a little odd in view of their slightly more "élitist" position on most issues. Liberal identifiers are about 5 per cent more

likely to favour some form of subsidization than are Conservatives. Social Crediters are, next to the NDP, least in favour of subsidization and the Cr ditiste supporters, once more at odds with their Social Credit brethern, contain proportionately by far the largest group in favour of both subsidization of any kind and total subsidization but least in favour of partial measures in this area.

In summary, then, over two thirds of Canadians favour subsidies of some kind to cover the cost of campaigning and a majority of those in favour prefer partial to total subsidization. As we move west through Canada we are likely to find less and less support for the idea of subsidization with Nova Scotia comprising the only real exception to this pattern. French Canadians favour subsidization slightly more than English-speaking Canadians and they show a greater preference for complete subsidization of campaign costs. Catholics are less given to reject the idea of subsidization than are the major Protestant groups perhaps because Quebecers may accept the provisions of the new provincial electoral law providing subsidies. Upper income categories tend to be less favourable to subsidies than do lower groups and more NDP supporters reject all subsidies outright than adherents of the older parties. There is not too much to differentiate between older parties in this respect and Social Crediters are only slightly more in favour of the idea than followers

of the old parties. Cr ditiste supporters applaud the idea of subsidization and particularly of total subsidization more than any other partisans. In general it seems that the more a person's background and identification predispose him to give money himself to finance parties, the less likely he is to favour the concept of subsidization but it must be recalled that a majority of people in every category we have examined favoured the idea in some form or other.

This completes the description of Canadian attitudes toward questions about election expenses and party finance. We can now attempt a few conclusions.

IV. Conclusion

No one familiar with Canadian conditions would claim that Canadians are a people driven by an excess of political zeal. And yet, when one observes the course of Canadian elections, particularly the activities taking place at the constituency level, one can easily get the impression that a very large number of individuals are actively involved. In a great majority of ridings most of the parties seem to muster a veritable army of election workers manning the various strategic posts required in the campaign. Party organizers nevertheless frequently complain about the difficulties they experience in finding an adequate number of workers.

Our survey suggests that the campaign managers may have a point. Only about one out of every 20 adults in Canada appears to be politically activist in the sense that he either belongs to a party or that he participates in its electoral activities. An even smaller proportion of citizens makes financial contributions to parties which seek other means than broadly based appeals for funds to meet their expenses.

Several of the findings of the present survey suggest that the level of citizen participation in the electoral process could be increased if the parties made a more determined or a more effective effort to enlist the help of favourably disposed people. We have seen above that about twenty per cent of our sample had heard of party efforts to raise money and that roughly the same proportion tried to influence informally some one's voting decision. This indicates a level of awareness and involvement which could be exploited by parties seeking active supporters.

We have been able to show that there is a surprising reservoir of goodwill toward our parties. Almost 80 per cent of those who had been asked for money responded favourably. The small numbers involved and the nature of the case (see page 27) preclude this observation from being conclusive but it is certainly suggestive, particularly when set beside some of our other findings. Nineteen per cent of our respondents said that they would have

contributed money had they been asked by a party or a candidate. Even more surprisingly, perhaps, almost one out of every ten of those members of our sample who were not identified with any party indicated that he would have made an election contribution had he been invited to do so. The most impressive indication of the willingness, in Canada, of many people to help a party was provided in our observation that 64 per cent of the respondents were not opposed to the idea that they might give time and/or money to a party or a candidate. Since the vast majority of this group prefers to give time rather than money, it appears that an impressive potential labour force is waiting to be mobilized for electoral combat.

Many a party manager would no doubt gratefully receive such hints as we might be able to throw out about how this electoral army might be recruited but this is, alas, something about which we have no data. We do know, however, that with respect to raising party funds, only about 3.5 per cent of our respondents were asked to contribute to someone's election war chest.

We also know something about the way in which parties seek to raise funds. It seems (and again the small numbers involved prevent us from making categorical claims) that almost half of the approaches for funds made to members of our sample had been tried by personal acquaintances. Table 20 shows that relatives, friends,

business associates and neighbours were responsible for 42 of the 91 recorded efforts to collect contributions. This, one can argue, is putting the matter into an entirely wrong and possibly dangerous context. A contribution given under these circumstances can all too easily be conceived of as a personal favour implying some sort of quid pro quo arrangement, whereas, were the approach made differently, it could equally well be viewed as a responsible citizen's normal participation in the political process. Solicitations on behalf of most of our major community services growing out of the citizens' commitment to a pluralist society, are not left to the whims of neighbourly and familiar contacts but are organized in a larger, systematic manner. Parties might consider organizing annual campaigns in which citizens of all kinds are invited to participate in the political process by contributing services and/or funds. But we must not allow our enthusiasm to drive us away from our data and into the realm of conjecture and prescription!

Canadians, our survey tells us, are not alarmed about the financing of parties through private initiative and almost 50 per cent (see Table 34) appear to be unmoved by the often-heard warnings that the financing of parties by private sources, particularly some businesses, may pervert the ideal process in which the definition of the national interest takes place through a free and equal struggle among the parties. Attitudes to corporate and

union contributions were discussed in the preceding section and are recalled here merely by way of introducing one of the main conclusions arising from our study: there seems to be no great anxiety abroad about the way in which party financing is being carried out at the present time. As we have remarked in the Preface, the reactions of our respondents may, of course, be wrong, misguided and downright dangerous: we have made no effort to evaluate them. All we can do is record them, and we must therefore point to what is probably the most persistent pattern of our findings: the contentment or conservatism of our respondents. The most appropriate catchword to characterize the voters' mood is laissez-faire.

The public's predisposition to leave things as they are and not to interfere with present arrangements is apparent in the way in which members of our sample responded to the five proposals or reforms submitted to them in our questionnaire. It will be recalled that we tried to discover and measure Canadian attitudes to the following innovations:

1. That tax deductions be allowed on contributions to parties or candidates.
2. That parties publish their expenses.
3. That parties disclose the names of their contributors.
4. That the amounts given by each contributor be published.
5. That the government pay all or some of the costs of election campaigns.

When trying to fit the responses into simple "yes" or "no" clusters we can summarize the answers as follows:

1. No (65 per cent to 30 per cent).
2. Yes (69 per cent to 20 per cent).
3. No (48 per cent to 42 per cent).
4. No (50 per cent to 40 per cent).
5. Yes (67 per cent to 24 per cent).

In three out of five possibilities (1, 3, 4) the decision was for the maintenance of the status quo. One might even argue that the strong approval given the idea that election costs be published (2) constitutes a vote for leaving things as they are. Despite the wording of the question, some respondents must have recalled that newspapers always publish these costs and a small number may have been aware of the requirements placed by the Canada Elections Act on the candidates' official agent (although not, of course, on the parties) to publish the expenses incurred in an election.

The unmistakable enthusiasm for government subsidies to parties (5) is surprising, in view of the otherwise stand-patish posture of our respondents. It is inconsistent with the tenor of the other responses and, on the face of it, appears to contradict directly the opposition to allowing tax deductions for party gifts. The two sets of responses can, however, be reconciled, at least to some extent. To permit tax deductions may strike many respondents as subsidizing not parties but donors to

the benefit not of the public but of wealthy contributors. Tax deductions may, therefore, have been rejected as bestowing favours on an already privileged group, particularly since the popular image of the party donor is probably one of a wealthy individual not notably in need of tax relief. Another explanation of the seeming inconsistency between the reactions to reforms (1) and (5) may have been the impression that party gifts are often an investment which may, ultimately, yield rich rewards and that as such they should not bring tax concessions. It is precisely this feeling which may have led to the support of subsidies and which is, in fact, one of the strongest arguments for them: by removing the parties' reliance on donors they would become more independent of corporate, union and other supporters conceivably prompted by vested interests. Although, as we have noted above, Canadians are clearly not alarmed over the present state of party financing, more than half of our respondents did condemn corporation and union support of election costs. By favouring subsidies to parties many members of this group may have wished to curb the influence of firms and unions.

Another factor which might possibly explain, in part at least, the seemingly uncharacteristic support for subsidies, is compatible with the non-innovative mood of our respondents. Government subsidies are, after all, hardly new in this day and age. Some of our respondents may, in

fact, have been led to believe by free-time election broadcasts on the radio and television, and by the striking increase in the use by governments of institutional (ostensibly nonpartisan) advertising that campaign expenses are already being subsidized by governments. In any event, the extensions of government subsidies into yet another field may have struck the members of our sample as being a normal and natural step, constituting no departure from the general patterns which have evolved with respect to the place of governments in society.

Having sketched one or two possible explanations of the response we obtained to the question we asked about subsidies, we must still confess to being puzzled by what may be an inconsistent pattern in the response to the questions dealing with five possible electoral reforms.

So far, in this conclusion, we have noted the public's somewhat untapped goodwill toward helping the parties and its lack of enthusiasm for large-scale and sweeping reform. The third and final general conclusion concerns the great diversity displayed by our respondents in their reactions to our questions. Canada is anything but a homogeneous country and the reactions of its citizens to questions of public policy inevitably fall into a number of fairly consistent groupings.

In the analysis of our findings we have repeatedly noted differences in the responses of our sample related

to factors such as the respondent's partisan attachment, his income, his religious preference. The most significant diversity revealed by our study, however, concerns geographical location and ethnic origin, in so far as it is measured by the language spoken in the respondent's home. We detect, in our data, significant Canadian regional differences in what we might term the citizen's political style - the sum total of his reactions to, and expectations of, the political process in general and of the parties in particular. We have repeatedly noted differences in reactions between respondents resident east and west of the Ottawa River. Furthermore, quite often we noted that a particular reaction to a question became more generally held as we travelled westward from the Ontario border to the West Coast, with the British Columbia respondents deviating most noticeably from their compatriots in Eastern Canada. Similarly, it will be recalled we often noted substantial differences in the responses of English - and French-speaking members of our sample. These differences are much greater with respect to some questions than with others and it would be highly dangerous to over-simplify the situation by making facile generalizations about the behaviour of one or more of the regions or ethnic groups.

All of this is not surprising in a country like Canada. It is underlined here because of its clear relevance to the problems of electoral reform, including those

touching on election expenses. Whatever innovation is adopted by a government in an area of human endeavour where policing is extremely difficult will succeed only if there is a reasonable measure of support for the new rules and ways of doing things. The regional and ethnic differences in political style which we just noted mean that parties and elections play a different role in the lives of citizens in the different regions and among the country's major ethnic groups. This means that whatever proposals are made will meet with quite different receptions in different parts of the country and among English - and French-speaking Canadians. Our breakdowns by province and by language of the respondents indicated something of the reaction that may be expected in the event that some or all of the reforms about which we asked were to be introduced.

Our data do not enable us to weigh the merits of various proposals, nor do they indicate how the public would react to various innovations if presented vigorously by a competent group of politicians. What they do tell us is something of the initial atmosphere in which the recommendations of the Committee on Election Expenses will be received in different parts of the country and among different sections of the public.

APPENDIX I

Relevant Parts of Questionnaire

- Q. 34 Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Conservative, Liberal, Social Credit, Cr ditiste, NDP, Union Nationale or what?
-
- Q. 69 Did you personally help one of the parties or a candidate? (For example, by canvassing, addressing pamphlets.)
- Q. 70 Did you, on your own, talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?
- Q. 71 Do you belong to any political club or organization?
- Q. 72 This year, did you hear or read anything about a federal political party or candidate having a drive, a dinner, or some other affair to raise money for campaign expenses?
- Q. 73 Did you, yourself, ask anybody to give money to help pay the costs during the November election campaign of a candidate or political party?
- Q. 74 (a) During this last year, were you or any member of your household asked to give money, buy tickets, or otherwise contribute financially to help pay the campaign expenses of a political party or candidate?
- (b) (If "Yes"): Were you, yourself, asked or was this some other member of your household?

IF RESPONDENT WAS ASKED TO GIVE MONEY, ASK

- Q. 75 By which parties were you asked?
- Q. 76 In what way were you approached when you were asked for money? By letter? By telephone? By someone in person? At a dinner or a meeting?

- Q. 77 (a) Were you asked by someone you knew personally or by someone you didn't know?
- (b) IF KNOWN: How did you know him/her?
- Q. 78 (a) Did you give money, buy tickets, or make other financial contributions to help a candidate or party pay campaign expenses for this last election?
- (b) (IF "YES") To which party did you give?
- Q. 79 (a) As far as you know, did any other member of your household contribute to a candidate or party's campaign fund?
- (b) (IF "YES") To which party did they give?
- Q. 80 (ASK ONLY IF DID NOT MAKE CONTRIBUTION IN Q. 78(a)) If you had been asked to make some contribution to your favourite party or a candidate you liked, would you have given money?
- Q. 81 Which would you rather do to help your party or favourite candidate: give money or give time?
- Q. 82 How do you feel about contributions to political parties from organizations like business corporations or trade unions? Do you think it is a good thing or not for our parties to receive such contributions.
- Q. 83 Would you be against or in favour of allowing people to deduct from their income tax the money they give to parties and candidates, in the same way that they deduct money they give to charity?
- Q. 84 (a) The amount of money it costs a political party to run an election campaign does not have to be made public at present. Should it be required that parties publish their expenses or not?
- (b) Should parties be required to disclose the names of their contributors?
- (c) Should parties be required to disclose the amounts given by each contributor?

Q. 85 Do you think the government should pay all, some or none of the costs of political campaigns?

. . . .

Q. 91 Would you mind telling me of what religion you are?

. . . .

Q. 95 What language do you most often speak at home?

. . . .

Q. 103 Into which of the groups on this card did the total income for your family fall last year (before taxes)?

- A. UNDER \$1,000
- B. \$1,000 to \$1,999
- C. \$2,000 to \$2,999
- D. \$3,000 to \$3,999
- E. \$4,000 to \$4,999
- F. \$5,000 to \$5,999
- G. \$6,000 to \$6,999
- H. \$7,000 to \$7,999
- I. \$8,000 to \$9,999
- J. \$10,000 to \$14,999
- K. \$15,000 or over
- DON'T KNOW, REFUSED

(ESTIMATE) _____

APPENDIX II

Additional Tables

Table A-1

PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY ACTIVISTS

(In Percentages)

Province	Helped a Party	Did Not Help a Party	Residual	Total Number in Row
P.E.I.	4.2	95.8	0	24
N.S.	5.3	94.7	0	75
N.B.	4.6	95.4	0	108
Nfld.	0	100.0	0	24
Que.	5.5	94.2	0.2	800
Ont.	5.2	94.5	0.4	1056
Man.	4.6	95.4	0	130
Sask.	7.4	91.5	1.1	94
Alta.	2.9	97.1	0	171
B.C.	5.5	93.0	1.6	128

Table A-2

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY ACTIVISTS BY LANGUAGE*

(In Percentages)

Language	Helped a Party	Did Not Help a Party	Residual	Total Number in Row
English	4.9	94.7	0.3	1754
French	5.7	94.0	0.3	745

* Less than 2.8 per cent of our respondents spoke neither English nor French. This group is excluded from our calculations.

Table A-3

DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVISTS BY PARTY

(In Percentages)

Party	Helped a Party	Did Not Help a Party	Residual	Total Number in Row
Liberal	6.0	93.9	0.1	985
Conservative	4.1	95.3	0.6	661
New Democratic Party	11.1	88.9	0	265
Social Credit	2.0	97.0	1.0	99
Créditiste	10.6	89.4	0	47
Union Nationale	14.3	85.7	0	14
Other	0	100.0	0	4
No Party	1.5	98.0	0.5	442
Refused	2.6	97.4	0	77
Residual	0	100.0	0	17

Table A-4

OPINION LEADERS BY LANGUAGE

(In Percentages)

Language	Talked to Others About Politics	Did Not Talk	Residual	Total Number in Row
English	23.2	75.6	1.3	1754
French	20.5	77.8	1.6	745

Table A-5

AWARENESS OF FUND RAISING BY LANGUAGE

(In Percentages)

Language	Heard of Fund Raising	Did Not Hear	Don't Remember	Residual	Total Number in Row
English	21.9	61.0	16.8	0.2	1754
French	16.2	71.4	12.3	0.1	745

Table A-6

METHOD OF APPROACH BY PROVINCE

Approach Method	Letter	Phone	In Person	At Dinner or Meeting	Other	Residual
<u>Province</u>						
P.E.I.	0	0	0	0	0	0
N.S.	0	0	0	0	0	0
N.B.	0	0	0	1	0	0
Nfld.	1	0	0	0	0	0
Que.	7	1	6	1	0	1
Ont.	9	4	15	6	3	5
Man.	1	0	2	1	1	0
Sask.	4	1	6	1	0	1
Alta.	0	2	2	0	0	0
B.C.	3	0	4	0	0	1
Total	25	8	35	10	4	8

Table A-7

ATTITUDES TO PERSONAL GIVING BY LANGUAGE

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Would Give	Would Not Give	Did Not Know	Already Gave & Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Language</u>					
English	22.6	56.5	17.4	3.5	1745
French	8.5	78.7	10.8	1.9	745

Table A-8
HELP PREFERENCES BY RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION
(In Percentages)

Help Preference	Give Money	Give Time	Give Both	Neither	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
<u>Religion</u>							
Roman Catholic	4.6	49.7	4.1	32.1	9.2	0.3	1128
United	13.2	48.9	7.1	26.7	3.9	0.2	578
Anglican	12.6	55.5	2.9	23.3	5.7	0	320
Presbyterian	10.4	54.4	7.8	23.2	4.2	0	128
Baptist	13.4	48.7	0	37.9	0	0	87
Lutheran	10.9	51.3	9.7	23.5	4.6	0	79
Greek Catholic	0	50.5	8.7	37.9	2.9	0	34
Greek Orthodox	9.1	12.1	30.3	36.4	12.1	0	11
Jewish	24.6	35.6	10.3	26.7	0	2.7	49
Other Protestants	12.0	36.5	5.7	36.2	9.7	0	117
Other	16.7	27.5	18.4	32.2	5.2	0	78

Table A-9

ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZATION GIVING BY RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION
(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Don't</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Religion</u>	<u>Corp'n</u>	<u>Corp'n</u>	<u>Union</u>	<u>Union</u>	<u>Both</u>	<u>Both</u>	<u>Know</u>		<u>Number</u>
Roman									
Catholic	6.4	3.5	1.6	0.9	19.7	48.1	19.8	0.1	1128
United	5.6	2.2	1.7	0	16.4	58.1	15.2	0.7	578
Anglican	4.6	2.5	1.0	0	23.4	54.2	14.3	0	320
Presbyterian	5.0	4.2	1.8	0.8	15.6	59.9	12.8	0	128
Baptist	10.7	2.7	1.5	0	12.3	53.6	19.2	0	87
Lutheran	5.0	0	2.9	0	26.5	47.9	17.6	0	79
Greek									
Orthodox	2.9	2.9	2.9	0	27.2	42.7	21.4	0	34
Greek									
Catholic	27.3	0	0	0	12.1	39.4	21.2	0	11
Jewish	20.6	11.0	4.1	0	15.1	34.9	14.4	0	49
Other									
Protestants	4.6	2.0	3.1	1.7	14.8	47.3	26.5	0	116
Other	2.6	2.6	5.6	0	18.5	55.4	15.4	0	78

Table A-10
ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZATION GIVING BY FAMILY ANNUAL INCOME GROUP

(In Percentages)

Attitude	Good Corp'n	Bad Corp'n	Good Union	Bad Union	Good Both	Bad Both	Don't Know	Residual	Total Number in Row
Income (In thousands of dollars)									
0 - 1	3.5	4.3	0	0	16.3	36.2	39.7	0	94
1 - 2	4.3	3.7	4.5	0	14.7	46.6	26.3	0	164
2 - 3	9.3	0.9	0.5	0.5	20.5	43.6	24.7	0	215
3 - 4	5.6	3.2	1.0	0.6	20.0	49.5	20.2	0	317
4 - 5	7.7	3.2	2.0	0.8	15.8	53.7	16.8	0	387
5 - 6	5.9	2.5	2.6	0.8	20.2	54.1	13.5	0.3	418
6 - 7	3.8	1.5	1.8	0	18.7	51.5	22.3	0.5	265
7 - 8	5.5	4.5	0.7	0.5	19.7	56.9	11.2	1.0	194
8 - 10	5.6	3.1	2.6	1.0	21.8	55.9	9.4	0.5	191
10 - 15	7.1	2.5	1.2	0	18.6	66.7	3.9	0	163
Over 15	6.7	7.9	0.9	0.9	25.8	49.5	8.2	0	110
Refused	8.3	2.3	4.5	0	15.1	37.7	32.1	0	88

Table A-11

ATTITUDES TOWARD TAX DEDUCTIONS
FOR POLITICAL DONATIONS BY RELIGION
(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Favour</u> <u>Deductions</u>	<u>Against</u> <u>Deductions</u>	<u>No</u> <u>Answer</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Number</u> <u>in Row</u>
<u>Religion</u>				
Roman				
Catholic	30.8	63.3	5.9	1127
United	27.3	68.8	3.9	578
Anglican	30.1	67.0	2.8	320
Presbyterian	32.8	62.0	5.2	128
Baptist	21.4	70.1	8.4	87
Lutheran	35.7	59.3	5.0	79
Greek Catholic	29.1	65.0	5.8	34
Greek Orthodox	42.4	48.5	9.1	11
Jewish	31.5	62.3	6.2	49
Other				
Protestants	34.5	60.1	5.4	117
Other	25.3	66.1	8.6	77

Table A-12

ATTITUDES TO PUBLICATION OF COSTS BY LANGUAGE
(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Should</u> <u>Publish</u>	<u>Should</u> <u>Not</u> <u>Publish</u>	<u>Do Not</u> <u>Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Number</u> <u>in Row</u>
<u>Language</u>					
English	68.9	21.7	9.1	0.2	1754
French	71.4	17.6	10.3	0.7	745

Table A-13

ATTITUDES TO PUBLICATION OF ELECTION COSTSBY RELIGION

(In Percentages)

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>Should Publish</u>	<u>Should Not Publish</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Residual</u>	<u>Total Number in Row</u>
<u>Religion</u>					
Roman					
Catholic	68.6	19.7	11.4	0.4	1128
United	70.0	21.1	8.2	0.7	578
Anglican	70.0	23.9	5.8	0.3	320
Presbyterian	70.8	18.7	10.4	0	128
Baptist	65.5	21.8	12.6	0	87
Lutheran	66.0	30.2	3.8	0	79
Greek					
Catholic	71.9	16.5	5.8	5.8	34
Greek					
Orthodox	48.5	18.2	33.3	0	11
Jewish	58.2	31.5	10.3	0	49
Other					
Protestants	76.4	8.0	15.7	0	117
Other	71.7	18.5	9.9	0	78

APPENDIX III

The Sample Design

The major considerations in drawing samples for a survey of this type are sample size and sample structure. The actual size of the sample is determined quite simply by the costs involved and the resources at one's command. It was decided that the largest feasible sample was about 3300. This determined, the next problem is the structure of the sample. It was decided that we should stay as close to a random sample as possible but within this proviso it was felt necessary to make some preliminary stratifications along rural-urban lines, along the lines of past voting behaviour and finally, to ensure an adequate number of units in each section of the country, along sectional lines with extra weighting allotted to all sections aside from Toronto and Montreal.

At the outset some 26 constituencies had to be eliminated as being simply too remote for respondents to be reached at reasonable costs. This, of course, introduces a bias into our survey, for the more remote regions of Canada are definitely under-represented but the bias is unavoidable within any reasonable cost range. Once we were ensured that we could have preliminary voting lists from the Chief Electoral Officer it was decided to draw our sample from these so that we could have names and addresses of our respondents and so that we would have a definite basis for the calculation of our inclusion probabilities.

Once the non-accessible constituencies were eliminated the remaining ones were separated by province. Within each province the constituencies were stratified rural or urban according to the definition used by the Electoral Officer. Then within each such stratification, a sub-stratification was carried out according to past Liberal voting percentages (in 1963) except in Rural Quebec where it was felt that past Cr ditiste voting patterns would provide a more sensitive basis for stratification.

This provided us with an ordered list of accessible constituencies from east to west but weighting had still to be carried out according to section. The weights assigned were:

Maritimes	-	2
Montreal	-	1
Rest of Quebec	-	2
Toronto	-	1
Rest of Ontario	-	1.5
Prairies	-	2
British Columbia	-	2

The corresponding cumulative total of 1963 eligible voters was run beside the constituencies according to our weighting procedure. We had then to select 121 constituencies, this being a reasonable number considering our sample size and the desire to have a reasonable number (in this case 28) voters in each cluster of respondents. This was done by dividing the weighted cumulative total of voters by 121 to give our constituency sampling interval and then selecting a random start number between 1 and this interval. If we call the random number R and the interval A then the first constituency chosen is that in which the R 'th voter falls, the second that in which the $R + A$ 'th voter falls, the third that in which the $R + 2A$ 'th voter falls and so on until we have gone through the entire list of constituencies. In three cases two successive intervals fell in the same constituency and it is therefore double-sampled. There are, then, 118 constituencies but 121 sample units.

This completed the selection of the constituencies. The next step was the selection of the polling divisions to be used. It was carried out as follows:

1. The total number of available polling divisions in the constituency was divided by 28 and rounded to the nearest whole number. This was the interval I .
2. A random number between 1 and this interval was then chosen. This was the start number M .
3. Starting with the polling division of number M we wrote down that number and then $M + I$, $M + 2I$... until we ran out of polls. This yielded in every case 27, 28 or 29 poll numbers. Beside each poll number we wrote the number of voters in that poll. These were listed in order and totalled.
4. The total number of voters was then divided by 7 (the number of polls to be finally chosen) to yield a new interval (R).
5. We then picked a new random number (P) equal to or less than the new interval, R .
6. We started at the polling division in the list, number P and listed it. We listed also polling divisions $P + R$, $P + 2R$... $P + 6R$. We now had 7 polls from which our respondents were to be chosen.

The selection of the individual respondents was considerably more straightforward, the complications of the preceding steps being brought about by the difficulty of ensuring equal probabilities of selection for polls when such small numbers were involved. The steps simply:

1. We selected a random number >0 and \leq the total number of voters on the list.
2. We picked the person whose name fell beside that number and then picked every 8th person (to avoid choosing more than one member of the same family) until we had six names. The first four of these were the respondents, the other two were spares to be interviewed only in the event we decide to increase our sample size.

FOOTNOTES TO STUDY 2

1. A more detailed and technical description of the sampling procedure followed is attached to this report as Appendix III.
2. The weights assigned were: Maritimes 2, Montreal 1, Rest of Quebec 2, Toronto 1, Rest of Ontario 1.5, Prairies 2, British Columbia 2.
3. See Canada Census, 1961, 2.1-9, Table 80 and Economic Goals for Canada, Economic Council of Canada, December 1964 for relevant data.
4. The absolute numbers given throughout this report refer to the cases involved after re-weighting.
5. See Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties, London, Methuen, 1954, pp. 63-7.

3

FINANCING THE LIBERAL PARTY 1867-1965

by Khayyam Z. Paltiel
and Jean Brown Van Loon

I. Introduction

This study attempts to delineate the fund-raising structure of the national Liberal Party, the sources of its funds, its fund-expending structure, and the objects of its expenditures. The emphasis in this description is less upon such details as the exact amounts of money received or expended than upon the centres of authority in the Party's financial structure and the major types of sources and expenditures. An historical description of the Party from the time of Confederation has been attempted in the belief that trends may be discerned. A general description of the financial relations between the national and provincial Liberal Parties is attempted where material is available.

II. Sources

A. THE EARLY LIBERAL PARTY, 1867-1887

The pattern of Liberal Party finance in the early

decades of Confederation must be viewed in relation to the state of the Party's general organizational patterns. In the years around 1867, Party lines were by no means clearly defined. Although political parties had begun to develop before Confederation, factors such as deferred and open voting tended to hamper the development of disciplined parties.^{1/} Nevertheless, there had been at least a core of politicians recognizable as "Reformers" or "Liberals" and a core recognizable as "Tories." But Confederation itself, because it was implemented by means of a coalition ministry, tended to blur party lines. In the election of 1867, the first after Confederation, there was even a dispute about who was campaigning against whom. Sir John A. Macdonald claimed that the old Party lines were dissolved, while George Brown argued that the coalition of the two old Parties had been brought about solely to achieve Confederation and should have ended with the attainment of that goal.^{2/} In June 1867, a Reform convention repudiated those of its supporters who remained with Macdonald, and in this way clarified Party lines to some degree.^{3/}

The Liberal Party of the early years of Confederation was far from being an organized and coherent body. There remained a large number of "Ministerialists" in the House of Commons - politicians who would support whichever party formed the government and who could not, therefore, be counted upon by either Party in an election campaign.^{4/} Although the Liberals after the 1867 campaign had an

acknowledged leader, in the person of Alexander Mackenzie,^{5/} he was not officially chosen as leader until 1872.^{6/} Even then, there was rivalry between Blake and Mackenzie. For a short while in late 1874 and early 1875 there was even a "Blake wing" of the Party, with its own newspaper, the Liberal.^{7/} The effect of this rivalry was to hamper greatly the development of party organization. The Liberal Party of 1873 was described by W.L. Morton as "not yet a national party but rather the representatives of provincial political parties."^{8/} O.D. Skelton described the Liberals as "a party which had not been fused into unity, with the federal leadership distracted by the rivalry of Blake and Mackenzie, and with the Quebec lieutenants shifting with kaleidoscopic quickness."^{9/}

It would therefore be a mistake to search for a highly-organized system of financing. The material available on the finances of the Liberals in this period is as fragmentary as the party organization was fragmented; and the available evidence is inconclusive. It appears certain, however, that the Liberals were slow to develop regular, fairly dependable sources of income for a central fund. In the 1872 campaign the Liberals, with Hon. Oliver Mowat in power in Ontario, were beginning to build up an organization in the Province. John A. Macdonald estimated that for this campaign the Liberals had over a quarter of a million dollars in Ontario alone.^{10/} This estimate is very much at variance with those made by observers of Liberal

sympathy. Mr. W.T.R. Preston, for many years a Liberal organizer in Ontario, maintained that "with the exception of one, when we had a central fund of \$23,000, we never had a larger amount than \$8,000 for any General Election." ^{11/} Sir Richard Cartwright stated that the Liberals ran the election of 1872 (and that of 1874) "with a very trifling expenditure of money." ^{12/} George Brown estimated the total amount of the Liberals' Ontario "Big Push" fund of 1872 at \$3,700. ^{13/}

Fantastic though the difference at first appears between the estimate of John A. Macdonald and those of the Liberals, it may be at least partially accounted for. It may be that Macdonald was assessing the total amount of money available to all the Liberal organizations (from the constituencies to the central fund) while the Liberals referred only to the central fund. Considering the undeveloped nature of centralized organization in the Liberal Party, it would not be unreasonable to assume a corresponding lack of development in centralized fund raising. It is apparent that little money went toward grants to aid candidates in the constituencies.

Evidence of the levels of aid to local candidates was provided by the 1877 by-election which returned Laurier for Quebec East. Several factors were operating to make central-Party help seem likely: in a by-election, the Party could presumably concentrate its resources; elections in Quebec were traditionally costly; Laurier was appointed

to take a Cabinet post (which necessitated a by-election) and serve as Mackenzie's Quebec lieutenant and had just lost a violent campaign in Drummond-Arthabaska, where the "Bleus" had not hesitated to spend freely. ^{14/} But even in this case Mackenzie was outraged by the suggestion that \$8,000 would be needed for financing Laurier's campaign. "Think of a Minister's friends deliberately contributing money!" he exclaimed. ^{15/} "The thing would be a disgrace." In the end Members of the Cabinet sent \$800 and Montreal Liberals raised \$1,800 for the campaign. ^{16/}

Thus even if, as George Brown had said, there was only \$3,700 in the central fund in 1872, the rest of the one quarter of a million dollars which Macdonald alleged that the Liberals had, could have been raised locally, with an average contribution of about \$3,000 for each of the 82 Ontario constituencies existing at the time.

The "Big Push" threw some light upon the type of sources upon which the Liberal Party relied at this time. In 1875, the Toronto Mail published a letter allegedly written by George Brown to Senator John Simpson, president of the Ontario Bank, asking Senator Simpson for campaign funds for the 1872 election. The letter said, in part:

A big push has to be made on Saturday and Monday for the East and West Divisions, if we are not to succumb to the cash of the Government.... There are but half a dozen people who can come down handsomely, and we have all done what we can possibly do, and we have to ask a very few outsiders to aid us. Will you be one? ^{17/}

It was alleged by the Conservative press that Senator Simpson had made a contribution, and then when the Liberals gained power government deposits were withdrawn from the Bank of Montreal and placed in the Ontario Bank. Brown replied to the charges in an affidavit:

I say that the entire amount of the said General Election Fund was less than thirty-eight hundred dollars, and consisted entirely of voluntary subscriptions from members of the Reform Party, and I say further, I have no doubt whatever that this was the only General Election Fund of the Reform Party for the Province of Ontario at the said General Election of 1872, as I never heard of the existence of any other such fund, and had any such existed I am sure I must have known it. 18/

The entire amount sent or received in response to the said three or four letters ... was either \$122 or \$123. And I say further that the largest amount I hoped to receive from Mr. Simpson in response to my letter was one hundred dollars. 19/

According to George Brown's description, the Liberal Party's central fund was collected for the most part from Party members. The Party seems to have depended upon the few members who could, as Brown put it, "come down handsomely." It appears to have sought the help of "outsiders" only as a last resort.

In the 1878 campaign, even after a term in office, the Liberal Party seems to have had a very small election fund. According to Sir Richard Cartwright (an admittedly biased source) Alexander Mackenzie had refused to use his position as Minister of Public Works (as well as Prime Minister) to the advantage of his Party. As a result "Mr. Mackenzie went into the election of 1878 with a smaller supply of the sinews of war than any leader of a

Government ever had at his command I have positive knowledge ... from the disclosures of Mr. McGreevy and others, that Sir John had at least four or five times the amount of money at his disposal that Mr. Mackenzie had." 20/

After the Party's defeat in 1878, conditions were even worse:

The Liberal party was not only penniless, but the Ontario Association was five thousand dollars in debt. It was decided to take over Goldwin Smith's defunct National Club, and turn it into a Liberal headquarters. Alexander Mackenzie headed the list of donors who gave a thousand dollars each to get it off to a proper start. "We hope to get \$30 to \$40 thousand," he wrote to his former secretary.... 21/

It is not clear either whether the hoped for total was reached or who were the other donors on the list.

Even with a new leader, Edward Blake, the Party apparently still had not succeeded in establishing dependable sources of funds by 1882. According to one writer, "the Liberal treasury was empty. There was no party fund even for legitimate expenses." 22/ There was some money among Liberal supporters: after the 1882 election a cheque for four thousand dollars "collected among Liberal friends in Quebec" was presented to Mackenzie for his own personal use. 23/ Preston's estimate of what the Liberals had was much higher than Willison's, though still a modest enough amount. Preston said that for the two general elections of 1882 and 1887 the Party had a total of only \$16,000 in the central fund, of which \$8,300 formed the central

war chest for 1887. ^{24/} Considerably larger amounts may have been collected in the constituencies during this period. Preston himself alleged that a Liberal Senator once offered him \$30,000 to move to Peterborough and run as a Liberal there. ^{25/}

B. SOURCES: THE LAURIER PERIOD, 1887-1919

1. Campaign Funds

The year 1887 was in many ways a turning point for the Liberal Party. By this time the Ontario Liberals, firmly established in office, were making extensive use of patronage to aid their Party. ^{26/} Although Sir Richard Cartwright was still regarded by Goldwin Smith as "the real thing, not the nominal leader of the Liberal opposition," ^{27/} a new leader had been formally chosen, Wilfrid Laurier. Laurier and Cartwright were casting about for a new key policy, something to unite the Liberal followers and to catch the imagination of the voters. The discussions between Cartwright and Laurier on the subject of commercial union or reciprocity with the United States indicated that the Ontario Liberal Party was beginning to draw upon manufacturers as a source of campaign funds - a new direction in Liberal fund raising. Cartwright explained to Laurier the reluctance of Ontario Liberals to support commercial unions.

I believe the real explanation of the matter is that several of our friends are under obligations to individual manufacturers in their respective constituencies.... ^{28/}

In another letter Cartwright described the Ontario Liberals as "all more or less mixed-up with the manufacturing element in one way or another." ^{29/} Cartwright was confident, however, that "the lumbermen and railway people generally (C.P.R. probably excepted)" ^{30/} were in favour of commercial union. Evidently the Liberal Party was no longer looking solely to its own membership for positive campaign contributions; the party was beginning to look toward the business community for help.

As the election of 1891 showed, reciprocity was not the plank to win business support for the Liberal Party:

They faced an organized and aggressive campaign by the business interests which considered themselves in peril. Manufacturers ... wholesalers ... bankers ... worked quietly and effectively in town and city. Most effective of all the anti - reciprocity forces was the Canadian Pacific.... ^{31/}

In every constituency but one - that of Marquette, where Robert Watson won a six-vote victory, wholly through oversight, Van Horne declared, - through which the main line of the Canadian Pacific ran, a Conservative was elected. ^{32/}

The Liberal Party was not without friends in the business world. Even in this campaign "the Grand Trunk threw its influence into the opposite scale," ^{33/} to the C.P.R. The inquiry into the Baie des Chaleurs Railway scandal showed that one of Laurier's organizers in Quebec had received \$100,000 in political funds (for the provincial Party) from a railway contract. ^{34/} Ten thousand dollars of this money eventually came into Laurier's hands. ^{35/}

Under Laurier, the Liberals were able to broaden and consolidate the Party's relationship with business and hence to put the Party's finances upon a better footing. One student of the Liberal Party regarded this as the key to Laurier's success:

The contrast between him and previous Liberal leaders was particularly marked by his success in coming to terms with the commercial interests whose funds and support had sustained Macdonald for so long. 36/

Many of the men Laurier chose for his Cabinet had had well-known connections with business. Hon. Sir William Mulock, for example, "had had a large part in the organization of a bank," and was "connected with one of Toronto's oldest, staidest, and most wealth-encrusted families." 37/

Hon. William Paterson was an Ontario manufacturer, who "represented the Ontario business community in the post of Controller of Customs." Similarly, Hon. William Stevens Fielding, Hon. Andrew George Blair, Hon. Sir Oliver Mowat and Hon. Sydney Fisher were connected with business. 38/

The importance of business' financial support is evident from the fate of the Liberals when they lost it in 1911 over the reciprocity issue. Clifford Sifton had already left the Cabinet in 1905 over the school issue, and in the 1911 campaign:

It was Clifford Sifton, aided by Zebulon Lash, the confidential lawyer of Mackenzie and Mann, who organized the Revolt of the

Eighteen, a carefully staged and very effective repudiation of reciprocity by eighteen residents of Toronto, all eminent in the world of finance, and all attached or semi-detached Liberals. 39/

Sir William Van Horne of the C.P.R. opposed the Liberals, 40/
and Sir Hugh Graham of the Montreal Star spent an estimated \$250,000 of his own money against them, donating the time and talents of some of the Star's best writers to the Liberals' opponents. 41/ Skelton estimated that Liberals were able to raise only one third of the money their opponents could raise. 42/ In Quebec the Conservatives allied themselves with the Nationalist leaders, Mr. Henri Bourassa and Mr. Armand Lavergne, to defeat the Liberals, their enemy in common. As Mason Wade summed it up, "Protectionist and imperialist big business was willing to use the nationalist movement to defeat reciprocity." 43/

Railways were one of the most important sectors of Canadian business. Hon. Andrew G. Blair of New Brunswick and Hon. Clifford Sifton of Manitoba, both Cabinet Ministers under Laurier, were said to be connected with Mr. William Mackenzie and Mr. Donald A. Mann, the two key men in the Canadian Northern Railway. 44/ But the link between the Liberals and Mackenzie and Mann was not clear. Sifton is reported to have been "instrumental" in getting state financial aid for their Winnipeg-Port Arthur line. 45/ Yet Laurier apparently did not regard Mackenzie and Mann as financial friends of the Party. 46/

His reservations were apparently justified.

During the federal general election of 1904, in which the chief issue was the Liberal Government's sponsorship of a subsidy for the Grand Trunk Railway, Mackenzie and Mann actively opposed Laurier. In fact, it has been alleged that they were involved in one of the most complicated and fantastic plots in Canadian history. Mackenzie and Mann, along with Graham of the Montreal Star, certain persons with interests in the Canadian Pacific Railway, and Arthur Dansereau worked to defeat the Liberal Government and the Grand Trunk plan. They planned to purchase important Liberal newspapers and alter their editorial policies, and to bribe at least twenty Liberal candidates to retire from the campaign on nomination day. The plotters were reportedly willing to spend \$250,000 just to bribe the Liberal candidates. 47/

The support of Mackenzie and Mann, therefore, seems to have been based purely on their own immediate business interests. Skelton concluded:

No little of the decline of the Liberal Party from its original ideals, no little of its overthrow of 1911... no little of the Union movement in 1917, can be traced directly to the manoeuvres and exigencies of Mackenzie and Mann or of those who saw gain in their profit or in their emergencies. 48/

Mackenzie and Mann were not the only businessmen connected with railways and interested in politics. The Grand Trunk had been "the first railway alliance" of the Liberal Party, and as "the natural enemy of the Canadian

Pacific" was also "the natural backer for some time of Liberal fortunes." ^{49/} When the Liberals purchased control of La Patrie in 1897 it was a Mr. Greenshields, owner of a small Quebec railway (later acquired by the government), who delivered the cheque. ^{50/}

Once the Party was in power, it became possible to place government expenditures in such a way as to be to the Party's advantage. Newspapers, business interests, workmen could be won over to the Party that provided them with work. Laurier himself had "a large toleration for patronage," ^{51/} and so did many of his chief Cabinet Ministers. ^{52/}

While the members of the cabinet from each province usually determined the appointments which could be localized, all the more important came to Sir Wilfrid before decision, and to him the prayers of most of the seekers were turned. ^{53/}

There was ... a system of purchase of public supplies and distribution of public contracts which effectually excluded political opponents from any profitable access to the treasury.... From the privileged dealers in supplies political subscriptions were taken, and from many contracts there was a generous return to the party fund. ^{54/}

The (Liberal) Ottawa Free Press, in defending these practices, declared in 1904, "To appease a political foe by gifts of patronage is a sign of cowardice, or even worse." ^{55/}

The friendly press was provided with government advertising and printing contracts:

The practice of favouring only sympathetic newspapers ...became institutionalized to such an extent that by 1905 the Laurier government was printing a confidential booklet listing the newspapers with whom the King's Printer was permitted to deal....^{56/}

Between the years 1895-6 and 1896-7, the federal government's advertising expenditures in the Toronto Mail (Conservative) fell from \$2,744 to \$907, and those in the Globe (Liberal) rose from \$0 to \$1,765. In 1897-8, the Mail received no government advertising and the Globe received advertising expenditures of \$2,205.^{57/} Friendly newspapers also received official information which opposition journals found very hard to get.^{58/} As for business interests, Hon. Joseph Israel Tarte was reportedly able to win many Montreal businesses to the Liberal camp by his public works on the Montreal harbour.^{59/} Although officially "all patronage lists for purchasing supplies in all the departments" were abolished in 1907, the election of 1908 still prompted John Willison to write, "There never was in Canada a more flagrant misuse of public works and public appropriations ... than in the general election of 1908...."^{60/}

Nor was the use of patronage confined to the federal Party. In Ontario and Saskatchewan, where the Party was in power provincially as well, manpower and money were readily available to the provincial Liberal Parties. In Ontario, Willison wrote:

In establishing central control over the liquor traffic, he (Mowat) enlisted an army of officials in the service of the Government. Never was an army more faithful to the High Command. For the most part these officials were active agents of the Government in every electoral contest. The liquor regulations were tempered to the behaviour of the license-holders. 61/

Similarly in Saskatchewan, highways inspectors and other public servants were used to perform the organizational work of the Party. 62/ In effect, then, the state was paying for party workers - it was a source of gifts in kind for the parties.

In addition to business support, the Liberals under Laurier received some assistance from individuals. In Toronto, for example, several prominent businessmen such as P.C. Larkin, Milton Hersey, E.G. Long, A.B. Matthews and Frank O'Connor and a well known newspaper editor J.E. Atkinson of the Toronto Star were dependable contributors. 63/ In Quebec two prominent Senators, Senator Raoul Dandurand and Senator Marcellin Wilson, were "the most substantial contributors" among several other Senators and businessmen such as Senator Jacob Nicol, Senator Donat Raymond, Senator Arthur Tourville, Alphonse Decary, Gaspard de Serres, Sydney Fisher, Aimé Geoffrion, and Albert Hudson. 64/ When in 1899 the Evening Star was purchased (at Laurier's request) to help the Party in Toronto the "group of wealthy and powerful businessmen" who bought it included "Senator George Cox, president of the Canadian Bank of Commerce;

Walter E.H. Massey, president of Massey-Harris; Honorable William Mulock, postmaster-general and chief Liberal organizer in Ontario; Timothy Eaton, the founder of the department store company; William Christie, head of the Christie Brown Biscuit Company; and Peter Larkin, founder of the Salada Tea Company."^{65/}

Clearly, then, during the period of Laurier's leadership the Liberal Party had come a long way from the days of Confederation toward establishing a dependable network of sources for campaign funds. Virtually all the funds, however, came from the same type of source: businesses or men clearly identified with business. The pattern of dependence upon business support had been established.

2. Operating Funds

Attempts were made during the period of Laurier's leadership to systematize party income, at least the income required for the operating costs of the Party. In the four years preceeding the 1896 victory, Israel Tarte was acting as Laurier's chief organizer in Quebec. It was suggested (by Laurier) that Tarte be paid a salary of \$4,000 a year by the Party. This sum was to be raised by having prominent Quebec Liberals contribute \$25 a year. The scheme was not a success: Tarte received only \$1,200 over three years.^{66/}

When the Party gained power, however, a salary was available for Tarte as Minister of Public Works. Tarte did take advantage of his position to do Party work.

Before the September 1898 plebiscite on prohibition, for example:

Tarte spent July and August touring Quebec and New Brunswick inspecting public works projects supervised by his department. "I am going from county to county," he wrote to Clifford Sifton from Islet, "and doing good work. We will organize the plebiscite vote in fine shape." 67/

Another attempt to gain a dependable source of money was apparently more successful. In 1896 William Mulock suggested that Laurier's personal finances be permanently assured by the establishment of a retirement fund of \$50,000-\$100,000. 68/ This would be collected from wealthy persons who did not have "business relations with the government." 69/

When the Party established its Central Information Office in 1912, with a paid director and a monthly publication, a third scheme was tried. The funds to maintain the office were supposed to be raised at the regional, rather than the national level. This plan, however, failed. The office was \$15,000 in arrears by 1919:

The Maritimes had not subscribed anything, the West had contributed only one-third of its quota of \$10,000 and both Quebec and Ontario had contributed but one half of the \$20,000 they had each been assessed. 70/

It is not clear whether this plan was a search for new sources of funds or merely an attempt to regularize and decentralize collection. In Quebec, at least, it appears to have been just a change in the collection system. When Laurier wrote to Dandurand in 1917 about Quebec's failure to

contribute her quota, Dandurand's explanation was that Wilson and Béique were skeptical of the usefulness of the national office to French Canadians and preferred to keep their donations for the Montreal office. ^{71/} Obviously these two traditional supporters were still of great importance.

C. SOURCES: THE KING PERIOD, 1919-1948

The pattern of dependence upon commercial sources was continued while Mr. W.L. Mackenzie King was the Party leader. Some attempts were made, however, to find new sources, such as membership dues or sustaining memberships, or contributions from constituency or provincial organizations.

1. Campaign Funds

Although King made certain efforts to obtain help from other sources, it was clear from the nature of King's backers at the leadership convention of 1919 that the traditional sources of party income would be available to him. ^{72/} His Cabinet choices too, reveal a concern that "the interests" be represented:

/King/ angled for the support of the Montreal business community when he made Gouin the minister with the greater prestige and bade Lapointe serve as Minister of Marine and Fisheries. ^{73/}

King's careful attention to the financial implications of Cabinet appointments is evident in an entry in his diary in 1926:

Lemieux wd (sic) be the strongest man to keep the Montreal group with us, the Bank of

Montreal, C.P.R. etc. to lose that group is to consolidate the Conservative Party give it new life & financial support I do not want to lose Quebec support, much less incur active opposition of powerful financial mffgs. (sic) interests.... 74/

In general, however, King was suspicious of donations from corporations. He preferred the help of wealthy individuals, persons such as P.C. Larkin, Vincent Massey, J.E. Atkinson, and Senator Raymond. And he did receive considerable financial support from such sources:

Throughout their lives, both Atkinson and Larkin were King's financial "angels". The latter was for many years Treasurer of the Ontario Liberal Association.... He is reported, for example, to have spent \$100,000 in refurbishing Laurier House as King's residence after King was elected leader. 75/

The Party did accept funds from corporations as well. According to Harrill, much of the money came from oil companies, construction companies, railroads, and manufacturers. 76/ When Hon. J.G. Gardiner raised money in Toronto for the Quebec provincial election of 1939, it came from certain large companies there, some of them in the retail meat-packing industry. 77/

The most notable example, of course, was the Beauharnois Power Company, which gave between \$600,000 and \$700,000 to the national Liberal Party in the 1930 election campaign. 78/ Sen. A.W.L. McDougald, closely connected with the Beauharnois Company and also a prominent Liberal, contributed to the Liberals in the campaigns of 1921, 1925, and 1926 and paid King's hotel bill in

Bermuda in 1930. ^{79/}

It has also been alleged by political opponents that campaign funds were collected from companies which had received government contracts, ^{80/} and that lists of the "loyal" ^{81/} were kept at party headquarters.

2. Operating Sources

However valuable business sources may have been for campaign purposes, there seem to have been great difficulties in tapping these sources to pay for the ongoing expenses of the Party: administrative costs of the central office, continuing publicity, etc.

The usual sources for the Party's ongoing needs were a few dependable contributors. ^{82/} One of these "stalwarts" during the twenties was the late Senator Andrew Haydon, then in charge of the Liberals' central office. If the office ran short of funds, Haydon would often advance the rent and the secretaries' salaries himself. ^{83/}

The Party's central office was continually short of funds. Not until the fifties did it achieve any kind of financial stability. ^{84/} Although it was active in elections between 1921 and 1925, it received little money between elections. It did not even have the funds to pay for publicity, let alone fulfil its suggested organizational role. ^{85/} By 1922 the office's finances were so precarious

that Haydon officially resigned as Executive Secretary for lack of support. ^{86/} Again in 1926 the financial problems of the office were dramatized when Mr. Charles Murphy, responsible for paying the rent, locked up the office instead. ^{87/} Murphy too had been paying office expenses out of his personal funds. Several attempts were made during the twenties and thirties to establish new ways to pay for operating expenses. Some of these were simply attempts to streamline collection methods. ^{88/} Others, however, represented efforts to find new sources of funds.

A plan to initiate a system of annual membership dues was apparently discussed by Party officials in 1919-20. The plan, however, was "forgotten in the urgency of the election of 1921." ^{89/}

The first constituency quota system was begun in the early twenties. The Executive Council of the National Liberal Association decided that each constituency should be asked to contribute \$250 per year to maintain the national office. ^{90/} This scheme worked so poorly that Murphy was driven to his 1926 lock-up. Thus by the time Sir Joseph Flavelle advocated constituency contributions, ^{91/} they had already been tried and had already failed.

After the Beauharnois Affair in 1931, King attempted to set the central office on its feet. The first approach to the problem of financing the office was to try to use roughly the same sources as were used for campaign purposes:

wealthy Liberals. To get the office started, King sent letters requesting contributions of \$1000 to a capital fund. By 1933 only one half of the \$50,000 considered ^{92/}necessary had been collected.

At the same time, provincial associations were urged to make contributions equal to the sum of \$200 per constituency in the province. The receipts from this appeal, too, were to be put into the \$50,000 capital fund. But this plan also failed. What money did come in "came, as usual from Senators and wealthy Liberals in central Canada." ^{93/}

The one apparently successful drive was the system of "associate memberships." To become an associate member of the National Liberal Federation, a party supporter paid a \$1 annual fee; he was then entitled to receive party publications. This plan is said to have attracted 50,000 supporters by 1933. ^{94/} It was dropped however, when the Federation closed down for the "political truce" during World War II, and was never resumed.

It is clear, then, that the sources of campaign funds during King's leadership were much the same as those in Laurier's time: corporations and wealthy individuals, mostly in central Canada. The attempts made to find new sources, in order to regularize income for ongoing expenses, were distinguished by no great success. Ultimately the Party relied for inter-election income on the same sources it had found for campaign funds. The major problem with

the new schemes seems to have been that these schemes made the office dependent upon contributions flowing up from the lower levels of the Party structure. The only one which appears to have had any success was one which appealed directly to Party supporters, and the fact that it was not resumed after World War II may indicate that the financial returns may have been offset by the administrative and production costs involved in reaching so many supporters.

D. SOURCES: THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD, 1949-1965

1. Campaign Funds

As far as can be determined, the patterns of fund raising established under Laurier and continued under King have continued to the present. Harrill estimated in 1953 that for both Liberal and Conservative Parties, 50 per cent of the national Party income came from industrial or commercial firms, 40 per cent from businessmen closely associated with particular companies, and only 10 per cent from individuals. ^{95/} Conversations with fund raisers who worked in the 1965 election suggest that it is still true that the bulk of the campaign funds comes from business. One highly placed fund raiser said that the national fund received hardly anything from individuals, Members of Parliament or Senators, and nothing from trade unions, although individual candidates received funds from all these sources.

The contributions from businesses are substantial. From conversations with fund raisers, one may gather that in

1957 the Party raised most of its campaign fund from 300-400 donations. The largest of these would probably be up to \$75,000. Harrill, in 1953 wrote:

It would appear that a donation of a thousand dollars is expected today from purely local firms and that for large businesses the scale rises considerably higher. 96/

It is impossible to ascertain to what extent such contributions are given in return for specific favours. The opportunities for patronage are, however, restricted, being "limited to a few well-known areas such as advertising accounts, and legal contracts...." 97/ In the area of advertising accounts the quid pro quo can be fairly readily indicated. The Cockfield, Brown advertising company, which had worked for the Liberals during the fifties "dropped" the Liberals after the defeat of 1957. MacLaren's then offered to work for the Party, and contributed the services of a full-time publicity man. MacLaren's now gets "the major portion" of government advertising contracts. 98/ Most corporations give donations in the interest of "good government relations" rather than in the hopes of special favours. Or, as Porter has expressed it, businessmen are interested in a party's ability to "stabilize the field for corporate activity." 99/ They seek (to use the phrase of an American student of party finance) "access to government," the privilege of presenting their views on any issue directly and personally before political decision makers. 100/

Apart from the donations of money, the Liberals occasionally receive gifts "in kind." These gifts are incidental, i.e., when a particular supporter of the party wishes to contribute the resource which he happens to have. For example, in 1958 one owner of a TV station provided videotapes; a sympathizer in the radio business helped with radio broadcasts in certain areas. 101/ In some cases newspaper support may also be considered a gift in kind.

Writing in 1963, a close student of the Liberal Party stated:

The most notable big-city daily supporting the Liberals today is the Toronto Star which is still in the hands of the Atkinsons and which is still very much an "insider" in the party's highest circles. The Winnipeg Free Press, after a brief lapse into non-partisanship in the middle 'fifties, is next in importance. The two major Saskatchewan dailies, the Regina Leader Post and the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, are not much more than house-organs of the Liberal Party of the province.... In Quebec, Le Soleil of Quebec City is the most noteworthy long-term Liberal supporter, having remained steadfastly in the fold throughout its life. 102/

Because the Liberal campaign resources mainly come from the business world, they are drawn to a greater extent from Ontario and Quebec than from other provinces. With the exception of Ontario and Quebec almost always the funds raised within a province are spent within that province. Ontario and Quebec generally raise more than is required for the campaign within their own borders, and transfer some 103/ to the National Committee for use wherever it is needed. British Columbia is usually self-sustaining in national

campaigns. In the 1965 campaign, however, the British Columbia committee did receive a transfer, along with the Prairie Provinces, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories. One source stated that the transfer to Saskatchewan was extremely small; the Saskatchewan organization received only \$6000 from the National Committee (and very late in the campaign) while it raised and spent an estimated \$40,000-^{104/}\$50,000. The Maritime committees received larger subsidies than did the other provinces.^{105/} Altogether these grants totalled something less than \$150,000, in 1965.

At the national level, then, campaign funds usually come in as large contributions from large corporations. Provincial campaign committees in federal elections obtain funds from the national Party fund raisers in the province, and in most cases from Ontario and Quebec fund raisers through the National Campaign Committee.^{106/}

2. Operating Funds

During the fifties the National Liberal Federation succeeded in placing the finances of the national office upon a more stable footing, by ending its dependence upon subscriptions from provincial associations.^{107/} A "regular contribution schedule" was worked out. The sources of these contributions were, once again, large corporations.

At present the custom is as follows:^{108/} About 30 to 50 "major friendly" corporations are asked for contributions to pay the expenses of the national office. These companies

make regular annual contributions (often to both Conservatives and Liberals) as well as campaign contributions. Individual supporters also contribute to the maintenance fund.

Even with this fairly systematic approach to the collection of operating funds, there is no pool of money available. Collections are made as needs arise. In 1958, after the Party had been in power for twenty-two years, the national office was \$90,000 in debt. Again in the autumn of 1965 the Federation was in overdraft.^{109/} Such deficits are covered out of campaign funds which are in effect the largest single source of funds for the national office.^{110/}

Recent suggestions have been made for finding new sources of operating funds. At the Advisory Council meeting of 1958, Hon. L.B. Pearson suggested a national system of membership fees, at \$5 per year, with the income to be used for ongoing expenses.^{111/} The Finance Committee reported in 1959, however, that such a scheme was not practicable. A constitutional committee in 1961 put off the question of finances on the ground that public opinion was not yet ready for such a discussion. In 1963 the Standing Committee on Finance recommended that provincial associations gradually assume responsibility for the operating expenses of the national office, on an annual quota system. Nothing came of this suggestion. Nor was a suggestion that Liberal Members of Parliament make a voluntary donation of \$200 per year put into effect.^{112/}

Some of the Party offices in the provinces have found more regular sources of income for operating expenses. The office in Ontario, for example, which serves both the federal and provincial Parties in the Province, relies on receipts from the Liberal Union, a group of about 400 Liberal supporters or more at the present time who contribute \$100 per year. ^{113/} In Manitoba the Century Club plays a similar role in Party finance. In Ontario occasional mailed appeals for funds are made to Liberal supporters. In 1961-62 one such appeal cost \$4,000; net receipts were \$6,800. Another mailed appeal resulted in a net loss of \$500. ^{114/}

The Quebec Liberal Party operates its Montreal and Quebec offices on funds derived from (1) annual fund-raising dinners, (2) \$50 per year quotas from constituency associations, and (3) fees from the annual meeting. It was reported that the 1965 annual dinners in Quebec and Montreal made net profits of \$28,000 and \$70,000 respectively. Revenues from the constituencies were said to be \$5,000. Special publicity projects are financed by extra contribution campaigns. ^{115/}

It is not clear how the \$50 constituency quotas are met. It may be from membership dues: Regenstreif described the Quebec Liberal Federation in 1960 as "a genuine mass party, organized down to the poll level" and with "a dues-paying membership which party officials claimed exceeded 50,000." ^{116/}

III. Patterns of Fund Raising

The structure of the Liberal Party's fund-raising apparatus inevitably reflects the sources from which funds have been sought. Since business concerns and wealthy individuals have usually been the sources of the funds, solicitors have generally been recruited from the appropriate social groups: financiers, businessmen, and from "old" wealthy families; certain names appear and reappear in lists of solicitors.

At first glance, the history of Liberal Party fund collection appears to indicate two clear trends: specialization and institutionalization. Gradually the function of fund raising has been removed from the practising politician and filled by a distinct group. Gradually, too, this group has come to have continuity, a definite structure, and a defined role in the overall party structure.

Two clear-cut models may be defined to emphasize the differences between the Laurier period and the present: (1) the Laurier-type structure, where organizational and fund-collection functions were by and large concentrated in the parliamentary leadership and (2) the contemporary structure, where organization and fund collection are distinct functions, performed by specialized informal groups outside both the Cabinet and the Party Membership in the House of Commons. 117/

This distinction is somewhat arbitrary. The scanty material available on the structure of the Party in the Laurier period and earlier contains some references to extra-parliamentary supporters who performed specialized fund-raising functions; and in recent years there have been Cabinet Ministers who combined their ministerial duties with organizational and fund-raising tasks. In addition, if the great gap in information regarding this area of the Party's early history was eliminated one could perhaps establish the existence of a specialized fund-raising structure with an institutionalized role in campaign planning which, because of its informal nature, was perhaps never included in writings about the Party. Nevertheless, viewing the earliest and latest periods as poles at either end of trends in specialization and institutionalization in the fund-raising structure is useful if only as a device to simplify the scattered information which is available.

A. FUND RAISING: THE EARLY LIBERAL PARTY, 1867-1887

Very little is known about the fund-raising structure of the Liberal Party in the days of Alexander Mackenzie and Edward Blake. But incidents such as the "Big Push" furor in 1875 and occasional articles about particular persons have illuminated certain aspects of early fund-raising practices.

In general, it can be said with some degree of certainty that fund raising was decentralized. When the size of the

central fund is compared with the style of campaigns of the period, which involved many costly activities, ^{118/} it can be seen that much of the Liberals' money must have come from elsewhere. Montreal Liberals must have played an important role in fund raising: it was they who raised money to help Laurier in 1877 and it was they who collected the \$4,000 fund from Quebec Liberals for a personal tribute to Mackenzie in 1882. ^{119/} Other local groups also raised money, even after the campaign in 1882: the York East Liberals collected \$500 for Mackenzie's election debts and Liberals from Sarnia raised \$5,500 for him. ^{120/}

It is not clear whether members of these local groups held elective office in the Party or were active politicians themselves, or whether they were simply sympathizers with no formal role in Party affairs. The publicity over the "Big Push" case showed that George Brown was acting as a fund raiser while he had no official position in the Party. ^{121/}

Hon. James D. Edgar was also a fund raiser during the eighteen-seventies and eighties. From 1872 until 1874 and again from 1884 until his death in 1899 he was a Member of Parliament and, at the end, Speaker of the House. During the eighties, he also held positions in the formal Reform Party structure; among others, as chairman of the Liberal parliamentary committee on organization and as a member of the Ontario Reform Association's seven-member finance committee. ^{122/} It is not clear in what capacity Edgar raised Party funds, i.e. whether the Ontario finance committee was

a purely formal body or an operative and important part of the Liberal Party machinery. Edgar himself seems to have played in Ontario the all-around role in organization, fund raising, general liaison and policy influence which Haydon came to play on the national scene in the early years of King's leadership. ^{123/} To judge from Preston's knowledge of the Liberals' financial status, his work as organizer in Ontario deeply involved him in fund collection as well. ^{124/}

Two conclusions can be drawn in summing up the description of the Liberal fund-raising structure under Mackenzie and Blake: collection was decentralized; some Liberal supporters outside of Parliament as well as some inside were active fund raisers. The roles of the Party association and the Party leaders remain vague.

B. FUND RAISING: THE LAURIER PERIOD, 1887-1919

Laurier's years as leader of the Liberal Party saw significant developments in the pattern of fund collection. Unofficial Party workers continued, as in Mackenzie's and Blake's time, to collect funds, but after the Party came into power in 1896, a certain amount of centralization took place.

One of the unofficial collectors of funds was Mr. Ernest Pacaud, a valuable organizer for Laurier since his period in provincial politics. In 1889

Pacaud was raising money for federal and provincial by-elections indiscriminately, and fighting them in the same way. ^{125/}

The inquiry into the Baie des Chaleurs scandal of two years later showed clearly the role of Pacaud as middle-^{126/}man between the railway company and Mercier.

Around 1891, Joseph Israel Tarte began to turn toward the Liberal Party from the Bleus, and at the Liberal Party convention of 1893 he became officially a Liberal.^{127/} From then until 1896 he worked as a full-time organizer building up the organization in Quebec, and raising funds where necessary.^{128/} Tarte continued these activities as Minister of Public Works in Laurier's Cabinet^{129/} to such an extent it made it difficult for him to escape charges of having been involved in scandal.^{130/} While the movement for commercial union with the United States was still alive, Tarte reportedly even sought funds in the United States,^{131/} though there is no evidence that he received any.

In Ontario, two men who had played key roles in Party organization before Laurier's accession to the leadership were still active in the field of Party finance under Laurier. In the late eighteen-eighties Preston solicited funds to prevent the sale of the Globe to persons hostile to the Liberal Party. Preston's description of the incident gave a good insight into the way the Party's needs were met at the time.

There was an immediate decision that at all costs The Globe must be retained as the official exponent of Liberalism. Robert Jaffray and George A. Cox agreed to subscribe an amount slightly in excess of one-half the sum required, provided that friends of the party should pay the balance.

Armed with letters from Laurier and Mowat, I was commissioned to go over the province and explain the situation to those whom it might concern, with the result that the necessary money was obtained and The Globe saved. George A. Cox and Robert Jaffray were afterwards appointed to the Senate, as a mark of gratitude, by the party, for their services in this matter. 132/

Later on in the 1896 campaign J.D. Edgar, who had been so important under Mackenzie and Blake, was still able to make at least a negative contribution to Liberal fund raising. Through his personal friendship with Sir William Van Horne he "helped to keep the C.P.R. out of the Conservative camp." 133/

Once in power, the tendency in the Laurier period, and one which has been repeated since, was to divide up organizational responsibilities among Cabinet Members on a regional basis. 134/ Although responsibilities did not always include fund raising, in many cases they did. 135/ Clifford Sifton, for example, who had charge of organizing the West (and sometimes Ontario), did engage in the business of raising Party funds. 136/

William Mulock, Laurier's Postmaster General, was also a Party fund raiser and was obviously well-suited by his background to contact wealthy Liberals. 137/ It was he who, in 1896, took charge of raising a fund from wealthy supporters to help Laurier with his personal expenses. 138/ He, along with other wealthy Liberals from Toronto, helped Atkinson to purchase the Toronto Evening Star to create

Liberal journal in 1899. ^{139/}

Hon. Charles Hyman of London, Ontario, who was a Cabinet Minister until he resigned in 1907 in the face of allegations of corrupt electioneering was at one time Party treasurer. It is not clear whether Hyman retained this post while in the Cabinet, but in 1895 while still leader of the Opposition, Laurier was very dependant on funds from the Party treasurer.

The party leader had much to do with the treasurer, and in one way more than he liked. The cheques came from Hyman, when they came. Hyman paid the secretary who sat ... beside /Laurier's/ cluttered desk. ^{140/}

Hon. Andrew Blair, Hon. W.S. Fielding, Hon. William Pugsley and Hon. Raymond Préfontaine as Ministers were all at one time or another charged with organizing responsibilities ^{141/} and were likely to be involved in fund raising.

In contrast to Sir John A. Macdonald's very active part, Laurier's role in fund raising is not clear. Some writers have suggested that he did not solicit funds himself.

He knew that "funds" were necessary to organize constituencies and carry elections and seldom was anxious to discover the sources of the contributions. ^{142/}

On the other hand, there is some evidence that Laurier did take a more direct interest in collection. In a letter to Ernest Pacaud in 1890, he warned Mercier against paying "a certain 'party' a large sum of money for his old state claim (sic) in the North Shore Railway." ^{143/} Another writer

has described the Laurier, Tarte and Dandurand papers as "full of letters from Laurier to Tarte, Dandurand, Sydney Fisher and others arranging for special committees and soliciting personally." ^{144/}

The Party's collection structure was gradually building up and, for a while, seemed to centre on key figures among the national Party's practising politicians. But this did not mean that the structure was centralized under the Party leader. The events of 1917, during the Unionist crisis in the Party made that clear. Centralization had developed only at the regional level, with the result that when certain of the regional leaders left Laurier to join the Unionist government, the Laurier wing of the Party was left with very little money.

The formal Liberal leaders of Ontario, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta were members of the Union cabinet. The party organizations, the party rolls, ^{145/} and the party war chests had gone with them.

The exact extent of the losses to the Laurier Liberals is difficult to assess. According to John W. Dafoe, the C.P.R., the Bank of Montreal and some other "big interests" were on the side of Laurier. ^{146/} Yet another writer has reported that by late 1917 "there was no money and even the party helpers were disappearing." ^{147/} Whichever view is closer to the truth, it is apparent that Laurier's regional lieutenants were of considerable importance in fund raising.

C. FUND RAISING: THE KING PERIOD, 1919-1948

Under King the development of the campaign fund collecting structure took a new direction. The trend toward centralization continued, but there was an attempt made to place this task in the hands of persons outside of the House of Commons. Specialization was beginning to be a feature of the Party's organization.

King himself always wished to make it clear that he was not involved with the raising of funds for the Party. At the 1919 convention, where he was named leader, "provision was made for raising money for the party needs, although on King's insistence, it was expressly understood that he was to have nothing whatsoever to do with the party funds." ^{148/} This provision was for a highly decentralized finance committee.

It was, however, strictly formal. ^{149/} King did take some part in the raising of funds: he wrote letters of appreciation to contributors; ^{150/} he prodded Cabinet Ministers about raising money; ^{151/} in the thirties he personally sent out letters requesting funds for the national office. ^{152/} But most of the responsibility for fund raising during the twenties was delegated, and delegated not to the finance committee but to one man, Senator Andrew Haydon. Haydon, who was elected Executive Director of the national office in 1919, had a valuable asset, the complete confidence of King. Another valuable asset was Haydon's

nation-wide network of contacts. ^{153/} By 1930, Haydon was King's "most trusted political adviser." ^{154/}

During election campaigns, ... it was Haydon who arranged for the distribution of literature and the scheduling of speakers in cooperation with the provincial organizations. And, inevitably, it was Haydon who collected and distributed campaign funds. ^{155/}

The inquiries into the Beauharnois Affair in 1931 and 1932 revealed something of the structure of the Liberal Party's fund-raising apparatus as it had developed during the twenties. Before the election of 1930, Mr. R.O. Sweezey, a promoter of the Beauharnois Power Company which was interested in obtaining the rights to develop water power resources on the St. Lawrence, had given the Liberal Party between \$600,000 and \$700,000. ^{156/} The two men who received the money for the Party were Senator Andrew Haydon, acting as the Party's national treasurer and Senator Donat Raymond, acting as the "trustee" for the Province of Quebec. ^{157/} According to the evidence presented, it was Haydon who did the actual soliciting. ^{158/} Senator Raymond testified that some of the money was given to him and then passed on to Senator Haydon, ^{159/} but most of it was turned over directly to Haydon. The funds were paid in instalments. As Sweezey stated, "I do not think he [Senator Haydon] demanded all that money at once or I might have been frightened." ^{160/} Of the money which was collected, according to Senator Haydon, one half was

sent to Senator Raymond. ^{161/} This portion of the money ^{162/} was to cover the needs of the Liberal Party in Quebec.

The whole series of transactions was apparently carried on without the knowledge of the Party leader, King. Senator Haydon testified that he "made no explanations or disclosures regarding campaign funds to Mr. King, or to any of his Ministers or to anyone else." ^{163/} King himself, speaking in the House of Commons, denied that his role as leader of the Party entailed anything to do with fund raising:

There must be a division of labour in a political party ... it is the duty of the political head of the party to see to matters of policy, to be able to discuss questions on the floor of parliament, and throughout the country; but ... it is not his business to get out the literature of the party, nor is it his business to organize political campaigns. Such work belongs to the rank and file of the party and to those who will act on their behalf. ^{164/}

I would not care to have to deal with the questions with which this house has to deal and be possessed of an inventory of those who had contributed to the party funds. All the time that I have been the leader of the party I have never asked a single individual to make a contribution to a political campaign. I have had no knowledge of what the political campaign funds were. ^{165/}

The inquiries thus revealed several interesting aspects of the Liberal Party's fund-raising structure. One of these was the key role of Senator Andrew Haydon. At the time, Haydon held no elected office in the Party, either as a Member of Parliament or as an elected official of the

Party association. He had resigned as the National Liberal Association's general secretary in 1922 and had been appointed to the Senate in 1924. Yet his work as the mainstay of the Party's organization had continued. This type of role was beginning to be separated from that of a politician in the House of Commons, although the roles of fund raising, fund distribution and general organization had not yet developed as separate specialized tasks.

Another of the interesting aspects of the fund-raising structure revealed during the inquiries was the special treatment of Quebec for the purposes of running a campaign. Apparently there were by this time at least two major campaign funds, one for Quebec and one for the rest of Canada. It also appeared that the special fund for Quebec was larger than its proportion of the number of seats in Parliament.

The third and perhaps most important aspect of the fund-raising structure revealed in 1931 and 1932 was its convenience for the Party leader. By having a fund-raising structure that was distinct from the position of the Party leader, King was able to dissociate himself personally from the discredit which fell upon Haydon. The only difficulty, it seemed, was that the differentiation had not been carried far enough. Because Haydon held no official position in the Party, it was possible for the public to assume that he was acting as a personal agent of King.

During the thirties King "imposed a central office

with a permanent staff on the party." ^{166/} This office was to take over the organizational and fund-raising duties formerly performed by Senator Haydon. In 1933 Hon. Vincent Massey was appointed president of the National Liberal Federation and Mr. Norman Lambert its secretary.

Little was changed, however, in the actual methods of fund raising. For the 1935 campaign, "informal Montreal and Toronto finance committees ... to make collections" were appointed. Certain individuals were designated as collectors by "the National President, or the national organizer with advice from the party leader" and made their collections during the few months before the election." ^{167/}

In 1936, Mr. Norman Lambert attempted to reorganize and regularize the system of collecting:

First Lambert made a Dominion-wide tour, talking to the key people in the various provinces. He then appointed a representative of the national party organization in each province. Sometimes this was the local provincial organizer Lambert's scheme involved collections ... at regular yearly intervals, thus building up a party reserve for election day. The funds collected were to be split on an equitable basis between provincial and national party organizations.... ^{168/}

The plan was obviously aimed only at improving the collection machinery: collection was spread out over a longer period and responsibility for collection was more clearly defined. But the sources of funds remained the same: corporations and wealthy individuals. ^{169/} It is not even clear that the idea of annual collections was successfully carried out. At

least one collector was working only at election time. ^{170/}
 By 1945 a prominent fund raiser was complaining that the
 instalment plan was working poorly ^{171/} and by 1953 there
 was no evidence that it was still in use. ^{172/}

In theory, then, the changes of the thirties created a fund-raising apparatus separate and distinct from the parliamentary membership of the Party. In practice the distinction was not completely clear. There is some evidence that King and several members of his Cabinet were still involved in fund raising. A memo circulated by King to the Members of his Cabinet in 1939 provided an inkling of the role the Cabinet played in campaign finance. In this memo King was seeking the opinions of Cabinet Members as to the advisability of holding an autumn election and their estimation of what campaign funds might be available within each Minister's own province and in the country as a whole. King added:

I am, of course, aware that the National Liberal Federation is expected to have to do with ... finances, but ... the Federation is in a position to effect but little without the cooperation of the Members of the Government. ^{173/}

King is also said to have written letters of appreciation to donors of large amounts. ^{174/} One of King's Ministers even played a key role in raising funds for the Quebec provincial campaign of 1939, soliciting mainly business interests in the Toronto area. ^{175/}

Although the membership of the fund-raising structure of the Party never became completely distinct from the membership of the Party in the House of Commons, the fund-raising function was never completely taken over by the Party's leaders in the House. The pattern appears to have developed in a much more informal way. Through the thirties the informal group of fund raisers expanded. Prominent and respected persons, usually with extensive business connections, sometimes with a seat in the House or the Senate, were taking on the task of collecting Party funds. Gradually the group assumed a recognizable structure: two collectors in Montreal, two in Toronto and one in Winnipeg, Edmonton or 176/ Calgary, and sometimes Vancouver.

By the forties the structure was fairly well established. Collection quotas had been worked out: one collector complained in 1945 that the "earlier arrangement," by which Toronto collectors were expected to raise twice as much money as those in Montreal, was too hard on Toronto. 177/ In 1945 the major fund raisers were five Senators (Daigle, Campbell, Raymond, Robertson and Bouffard), two Cabinet Ministers (J.G. Gardiner and C.D. Howe), and two others (J. Gordon Fogo and Duncan K. McTavish). 178/ By this time, key fund raisers were represented on the National Campaign Committee. Five members of the National Campaign Committee for 1945 were also fund raisers. 179/

D. FUND RAISING: THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD, 1945-1965

Since King's time the Liberal Party's fund-raising

structure has tended to develop rather than to change. During the fifties and sixties it continued to become more closely defined and more stable. It began to develop distinctive patterns of renewal which lent greater continuity to the structure. There were, however, certain significant changes in the overall structure, particularly in the Province of Quebec.

By 1963 the collection structure of the Liberal Party appeared to be well adapted to suit the type of source to which the Party appealed for funds:

The traditional practice has been to have standing Finance Committees, staffed by trusted party supporters in the corporate and business world, in the major cities - Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver. The Montreal and Toronto Committees are the most important because these cities are in the areas which are the sources of most of the party's funds. 180/

These committees work under the National Treasurer, appointed by the Party leader. There are usually two key men in Montreal and two in Toronto, and one in Winnipeg, Calgary or Edmonton, and Vancouver. These men, the "first string" of fund raisers, are Senators, Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament, or simply prominent Liberal supporters. 181/ Below them in the structure are the "second string" collectors, the many more workers who try to cover the network of contacts in the business world. In the 1965 campaign, for example, 182/ about twenty men collected funds in Ontario.

Recently the national fund-raising structure in Quebec has been undergoing changes. In June 1965 Hon. Guy Favreau, leader of the Quebec wing of the Liberal Federation of Canada, announced plans for the "democratization" of the federal wing. ^{183/} As a part of this program, the traditional fund raisers were replaced by a four-man Finance Committee under the chairmanship of a prominent Montreal stock-broker who was appointed by the Party leader. ^{184/} The three other members were to be chosen by the head of the Committee in consultation with the national Party leader and the leader of the Quebec wing. The Finance Committee as a whole was responsible to the Party leader ^{185/} through the leader of the Quebec wing.

According to the National Treasurer the fund-raising structure at the present time is far from monolithic. There is a great degree of decentralization at the provincial level. No detailed reports are asked for or received by the National Treasurer. ^{186/}

Since the Party depends for its funds largely upon business sources, the most useful men to use as collectors are those who have good contacts in business circles. Often the men recruited as collectors are businessmen themselves. Sometimes they are also prominent in the formal Party structure or among the members of the Party in Parliament; but often they are not. The operative qualification appears to be the possession of established contacts in business circles.

In the 1950's the Presidents of the Federation, Fogo, Woodrow, MacTavish and Matthews also engaged in collecting funds for the party However, this is not normally the function of the President. Fund raising happened to be the forte of these Presidents, especially the latter two, and it would have imposed some hardship on the party had these men terminated this activity upon assuming their new position. 187/

New collectors are recruited informally by already active collectors. A known Liberal who is also a rising young businessman will be approached very informally about collecting some money for the Party. Participation in fund raising is sometimes a family tradition. 188/ Since its personnel is renewed from within itself, the fund-raising structure usually continues even when the leadership of the Party changes. Thus the fact that established business contacts are the key to success in this aspect of Party activity leads toward the apparent autonomy of the fund-raising structure.

The fund-raising structure is recognized as a part of the Party organization in the stage of campaign planning. According to a Party official there is always at least one fund raiser on the National Campaign Committee as well as at least one representative of the Party leader and one from the national office. 189/ Thus the three main branches of the Party's activity: financing, policy making, and organization, are represented on the National Committee.

1. Relations with Provincial Liberal Parties

Between 1955 and 1958 "a thorough organizational revamping" was carried out in New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba. ^{190/} Certain changes in finances were involved. In Ontario and Manitoba, for example, sustaining funds were established for the provincial offices. ^{191/} The Ontario offices of the national and provincial Parties had been combined somewhat earlier. In New Brunswick, some national Party fund raisers collected funds for the Liberals' successful provincial campaign in 1960. In Saskatchewan, too, the names of federal contacts were given to Mr. Thatcher's chief collector for his first successful provincial campaign. ^{192/} In turn, the provincial organization in Saskatchewan raised \$30,000-\$40,000 to operate in the 1965 federal election. ^{193/}

In Quebec, the organizational changes were indeed thorough. Between 1949 and 1955, organization in the Province had been extremely loose; some federal Liberal Members of Parliament had gone so far as to enter agreements with the Union Nationale that they would not aid provincial Liberal candidates, should the rival Union Nationale refrain from helping Conservative candidates against them in federal campaigns. ^{194/} In the early fifties the provincial Liberal leader Mr. George E. Lapalme began the poll-by-poll reorganization which resulted, in 1955, in the establishment of the Quebec

Liberal Federation (QLF). Two provincial offices were established: one in Montreal and one in Quebec City. (The federal Party maintained its separate office in Montreal).

The affiliation of the QLF with the National Liberal Federation in 1957 was an attempt to tighten up the relations between the federal and provincial Parties. ^{195/}
In 1960 a brief of the QLF to Mr. Pearson suggested machinery for cooperation in organization for federal campaigns in Quebec. This plan suggested complete cooperation: only two organizational committees would be chosen jointly by the federal and provincial Party leaders; the sole financial committee would handle all the Party's funds for the Province. The national organizer would direct the campaign as a whole. ^{196/}

When this plan was not put into operation, the provincial Party continued its separate development. This trend culminated in the state subsidy system established in Quebec in 1963, a system which assured the provincial Party a certain minimum campaign fund even without any cooperation from national Party contacts. Operating funds for the two Quebec provincial offices are reported to come entirely from fund-raising dinners and constituency quotas. ^{197/} Campaigns for donations for special projects such as the television program Le Quebec en Marche are ^{198/} run by a special canvasser, Paul Bedard, in Quebec City.

Steps were also taken by the Quebec provincial Liberals to formalize the structure for collecting funds to supplement the subsidies. Three persons (Mr. Roger Letourneau of Quebec City and Mr. René Hébert and Mr. Peter Thompson of Montreal) were authorized to receive funds between elections. Others could be authorized in writing by the treasurer of the QLF to collect during campaigns. All donations were to go through two specified trust accounts, and a report (not including the names of donors) ^{199/} was to be given by the trust companies to the Party leader.

In Newfoundland there has always been close cooperation between the federal and provincial Parties. What donations are collected for a federal campaign are collected by the treasurer of the provincial organization. Contributions are therefore received by the candidates ^{200/} as a grant or a gift in kind from the provincial Party.

IV. Fund-Expenditure Structure: Budgeting

Very little can be said about responsibility for allocating Liberal Party funds during the first few decades after Confederation. By Laurier's time, it appears, Cabinet Ministers responsible for organization in specified districts made the major decisions about campaign fund allocation. At present, the allocation function has been taken over by a nation-wide system of campaign committees, working under a National Campaign Committee. In the course of

this change in structure, non-parliamentary party workers, fund raisers and organizers came to participate in the process of allocation.

A. BUDGETING: THE EARLY LIBERAL PARTY, 1867-1887

Only descriptions of isolated incidents are available to aid in the study of fund-expending practices of the Liberal Party before 1896.

George Brown's defence of himself in the "Big Push" case gave an indication that he was a prominent figure in the allocation of the Party's central fund. According to Brown, the urgency of his written request for funds was due to the fact that a promise of \$500 in aid had been made to a candidate in an uncertain constituency: "this promise was given by me on behalf of myself and others.... The said amount not having been forthcoming /from the General Election Fund/, I paid it from my own funds in order to fulfil my promise." ^{201/}

By 1877, however, a change appears to have taken place, not an unlikely eventuality in view of the fact that the Party had chosen an official leader and was at that time in power. During the 1877 by-election which gave Laurier a seat after his selection as Cabinet Minister, the federal Minister of Agriculture, Hon. Charles Pelletier, and the Party leader himself, took part in the decisions made about spending for the campaign. It was Pelletier who told Mackenzie that Laurier would need

\$8000 for the campaign, and it was Mackenzie who decided that this was too much to spend. 202/

The actual spending of the money in constituencies, once the major decisions were made, was left to others.

Sir Richard Cartwright described the system:

When all the elections in the Dominion ... are timed to come off on the same day, the expenditure of whatever money is used (always excepting that employed to secure the foreign vote) must be left to the local talent. These worthies will work, and work hard, but in an enormous number of cases the cash entrusted to them will never find its way to the actual voter.... In bye-elections it is quite different. These can be held on different days at the pleasure of the Government, and it is comparatively easy to move a troop of experienced agents from place to place as may be required. These men can be trusted to expend the funds placed in their hands for the best of all reasons, that if they fail to produce the required results their occupation, which is lucrative enough, will speedily be gone. 203/

To some extent, then, the early Liberal Party had developed a group of specialized, professional campaign organizers.

B. BUDGETING: THE LAURIER PERIOD, 1887-1919

Information on budgeting procedures in the Liberal Party after 1896 is just as difficult to find as that concerning the earlier years of the Party. Apart from some isolated cases where there is specific information about spending, only general inferences can be made from related information. For example, when it is known that a man was an organizer, it may reasonably be inferred that he had some influence on the distribution of funds.

At the very least, his assessment of which constituencies would be "safe" and which "doubtful" would have some influence upon spending decisions.

According to one student of the Liberal Party, organizational responsibilities rested with the Cabinet after the Liberal victory in 1896.^{204/} Responsibility was apportioned by area, with one Cabinet Minister in charge of each area. Three Ministers in Laurier's first Cabinet had, in fact, been provincial Premiers; Oliver Mowat in Ontario, W.S. Fielding in Nova Scotia, and Andrew G. Blair in New Brunswick. Louis H. Davies had been active in politics in Prince Edward Island, Clifford Sifton in Manitoba and both Henri Joly and Joseph Israel Tarte in Quebec.

In Ontario, Mowat and Mulock, "chief Liberal organizer in Ontario"^{205/} until his retirement in 1904, appear to have had general charge over organization. Charles Hyman must also have been involved in fund distribution, since his resignation from the Cabinet in 1906^{206/} was prompted by allegations of electoral corruption. In addition, Clifford Sifton at times aided the organizers in Ontario. After the Ontario provincial Liberals had been defeated in 1905, the national Party set about building up its own organization prior to the federal election of 1908:

The Liberals ... had been engaged for months before the election in building up in every constituency and every poll the most efficient organization that had ever been known in the province in a Dominion election, ... the whole

campaign, - the selection of candidates, the strategy for the province and the individual constituencies, the character of the literature distributed - had been planned with foresight and judgment. Upon the Board of Strategy which, behind the screen of the official organization, planned this campaign, Mr. Sifton served; it derived, in large measure, its directing force from him. 207/

Cabinet Ministers were not the only men active in organizing and spending for campaigns:

Under Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Tarte and Blair and Sifton and Prefontaine were denounced as "corruptionists." I single none of these out for attack or aspersion. I am thinking rather of the public man who escaped attack, but through whose hands money poured into the constituencies as naturally and freely as water falls at Niagara. 208/

Under such men as Sifton and Mulock were other organizers such as W.T.R. Preston and Alexander "Silent" Smith. Smith, who worked as an organizer in Ontario between 1895 and 1908, must have had something to do with expenditure decisions: his preferences in allocation (and his assessment of Ontario farmers) were evident in his campaigning maxim "You can always buy votes on the sand." 209/

In the Western Provinces, Sifton was the key man in organization, at least while he was working with the Party. By 1900 he was "the undoubted, accepted leader of the Party in Western Canada." 210/ When he withdrew from active organization in 1905, the Manitoba Liberal organization felt his loss severely, and in the last five weeks

before polling day in 1908, he took over once again. ^{211/}
 Toward the end of Laurier's career, J.G. Gardiner became
 a dominant figure in Saskatchewan, and probably had much
 to do with Liberal organization in the West. ^{212/}

Ernest Pacaud was an organizer in Quebec for Laurier
 long before Laurier came to power. In 1891, when Joseph
 Israel Tarte ran as an independent candidate, it was
 Pacaud who handed him \$2000 for his campaign. When Tarte
 ran as a Liberal in 1893, Pacaud sent him \$1000. ^{213/}
 From 1893 until his resignation from the Party in 1902,
 Tarte was the chief Liberal organizer in the Province of
 Quebec, working for provincial as well as federal Liber-
 als. ^{214/} In the 1900 election he also handled the French
 constituencies of New Brunswick. ^{215/} There was also an
 organizer for the Quebec City region (Philippe Paradis
 around 1915) ^{216/} and one for Montreal ("Boss" Arthur
 Dansereau until 1899). ^{217/}

The Party was spending significant amounts of
 money in between elections as early as the eighteen-nineties.
 From 1893 to 1896 Tarte seems to have handled such expendi-
 tures in Quebec: he spent these years setting up a perma-
 nent office in Montreal and organizing Liberal clubs in
 constituencies. ^{218/} In 1912, the Central Information Office
 was established and W.L. Mackenzie King was appointed dir-
 ector. Inter-election expenditures on Liberal publicity
 were then made by King, under the supervision of a commit-
 tee consisting of Laurier, King himself and three other

ex-Cabinet Ministers: Sydney Fisher, Rodolphe Lemieux,
219/
 and Charles Murphy.

The little information that exists suggests that during Laurier's term as leader of the Liberal Party, the major budgetary decisions were probably made by the top few practising politicians; both campaign and operating expenditures were under their surveillance.

C. BUDGETING: THE KING PERIOD, 1919-1948

The Liberal Party's organization fluctuated considerably during the King period. Two national organizers, Andrew Haydon and Norman Lambert, took prominent roles in election campaigns, and hence in the distribution of campaign funds. The Cabinet, however, still played a vital part in campaigning when the Party was in power. The National Campaign Committee, which now takes the predominant part in allocating funds, made its first appearance during these years.

Both Haydon in the twenties and Lambert in the thirties, were connected with the national office and also engaged in the allocation of campaign funds. 220/ But both of these men were most influential when the Party was out of power, in the elections of 1921 and 1935. Whenever the Party was in office, at least part of the responsibility for organization lay with the Cabinet. 221/ Men prominent in the provincial Parties were also active in organizing

during the twenties. 222

Probably because of the fluctuations of the budgeting structure during King's leadership, the statements of many persons who have studied this structure are often contradictory. According to one writer, "the collected money is subject to the absolute control of the party leader, but his decisions are carried out by the central office."^{223/} Another stated that control was exercised "through some informal party treasurer."^{223a/}

At least three different descriptions have been given of the process by which central Party funds were allocated to the constituencies. Hon. C.G. Power in 1949 described the flow as going "to the regional organizations and, through them, into individual ridings."^{224/} Lederle, on the other hand, said that "national headquarters maintains a large floating fund, usually under the immediate control of the national organizer, from which allocations are made to the various Party candidates to help them win their constituencies."^{225/} Regenstreif detected yet another pattern:

There is also the question of allocation of funds to the individual candidates in the constituencies across the country.... Such evidence that exists seems to be that this was a matter of cabinet discretion during the years of power. ^{226/}

Thus no clear picture of Liberal budgeting can be described.

By the time of the campaigns of 1940 and 1945, there was a National Campaign Committee in charge of the overall

direction of the campaign. This Committee consisted of "one or two cabinet ministers, together with the President of the Federation and the General Secretaries." 227/

The 1945 Campaign Committee was headed by Hon. James G. Gardiner and included Hon. C.D. Howe and Mr. Ernest Bertrand, all Members of the House of Commons, and Senators 228/ Campbell, Daigle and Robertson.

The Committee began serious planning in January, 1945. The National Liberal Federation's offices were turned over to the Campaign Committee for the duration, and a draft budget was prepared. 229/

It was during the forties that advertising agencies began to participate in the planning of campaigns. The Liberal Party hired Cockfield, Brown of Montreal:

Often, Ministers would by-pass the Central Office and deal directly with the agency ... during election campaigns There are many within the party who claim that Cockfield, Brown was the central office of the party, particularly around election time. 230/

D. BUDGETING: THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD, 1949-1965

1. Campaign Expenses

The pattern of overall planning and budgeting by a central Campaign Committee has continued to the present:

A National Campaign Chairman is appointed by the Leader. Through this National chairman, and in consultation with the provincial association concerned, the provincial chairmen are chosen to round out a National Campaign Committee.

These ten provincial chairmen then gather provincial committees in their own provinces. The provincial chairmen report constantly to Ottawa and the National Federation. 231/

At the beginning of the campaign, the financial needs and resources of the National Committee are discussed by part of the Committee: the national campaign chairman, the national organizer, the national treasurer, and a representative of the Quebec campaign committee. 232/ The national office draws up an estimate of its needs, as does each of the provincial campaign committees. The Party's advertising agency (MacLaren's since 1958) draws up suggested advertising programs. The National Campaign Committee then decides upon allocations for national advertising, grants to constituencies, and provincial offices. Since the Party's financial resources are never entirely predictable, the budgets must be flexible. Usually several alternative spending programs are drawn up.

The Quebec campaign committee is slightly more autonomous than those of the other provinces. 233/ In the 1953 campaign there was a separate national organizer for Quebec. 234/ At present the Quebec campaign committee consists of nine members, three named by the Quebec caucus, three by the Quebec wing of the Liberal Federation of Canada, and three by the organization for the Quebec City region. 235/ Although the National Campaign Committee decides the general direction of the campaign in Quebec, funds are collected and expended on the approval of the

Quebec campaign committee; even transfers to the national fund are subject to its approval. The Quebec committee alone is responsible for national Party advertising within the Province. 236/

Once the overall budget decisions have been made, one man is appointed to be responsible for the distribution of funds within each province. Through him, the grants to the constituencies are made. Disbursements are made by cheques written on trust accounts. Payments are usually made in instalments as the campaign funds come in. 237/ The campaign committee in each province and the fund distributor there are responsible for spending the funds allotted in the budget to their province. This responsibility includes that for the allocation of grants to the constituencies. 238/

The National Campaign Committee's budget covers national advertising (except for Quebec), surveys, speakers' and leaders' tours, special events, radio and television production costs, and the extra administrative costs of the national office (extra telephones, staff, etc.). Provincial committees are shown the national advertising program and may decide to take on supplementary advertising. In the 1965 campaign, for example, all the provincial committees except the one in Ontario hired advertising agencies themselves. 239/ In addition to doing this advertising, the provincial committees

distribute subsidies to the candidates, provide professional public relations advice and factual information, provide a speaker's bureau, and arrange the leader's tour in the province. ^{240/} In arranging the tour, the provincial committee schedules special events en route, rents space for these events, and pays for any extra advertising connected with the tour.

In all of this process, the influence of the leader appears to be indirect. He names the national campaign chairman, the national organizer and the national treasurer and is consulted on the appointment of the provincial campaign chairmen. ^{241/}

The role of provincial associations during federal campaigns is not clear-cut. Regenstreif has stated that the National Federation "has working agreements with each provincial association so that these organizations will be available for the purposes of the federal organization...." ^{242/} While this is certainly true in such Provinces as Ontario and Newfoundland, it is not invariably the case in all provinces. During the 1957 election, for instance, provincial Liberals in Manitoba remained completely aloof from the federal campaign; in Alberta relations between federal and provincial Liberals were strained. ^{243/}

Where there is cooperation, the form varies from province to province. In Ontario the provincial office, technically speaking, closes down during federal campaigns.

The National Campaign Committee takes over the office from the day the election writs are issued to the week after polling day, paying the rent, telephone bills, staff salaries and all other costs. ^{244/} In Newfoundland, nearly all expenditures for radio, television, and newspaper advertising are made through the provincial office. ^{245/} In fact, distinctions between federal and provincial Party organizations are less usually made in any of the Maritime Provinces. The federal Party in Quebec, however, operates through its own Montreal office. ^{246/} In British Columbia the degree of closeness of federal and provincial organizations varies considerably from one election to another. The former Saskatchewan provincial organizer, Mr. Hazen Argue, was also the federal Party's organizer for the Province, and Premier Thatcher was "in the federal campaign with both feet" in 1965. ^{247/}

2. Ongoing Expenditures

The operating budgets of the national and provincial offices are separate from the campaign budgets of the Party. The national office's inter-election responsibilities are, in general terms, "intelligence," publicity (including the publication of "regular" periodicals, maintenance of up-to-date mailing lists, and liaison with affiliated Party groups and provincial associations. ^{248/} In the provincial offices, inter-election responsibilities are fairly similar: general publicity, up-dating of mailing lists, and some organizational work. Funds for

these purposes are provided out of the operating budgets. The operating budget for the central office is drawn up annually by the national organizer, the president of the Liberal Federation of Canada, and the national treasurer. It is then ratified by the whole executive of the Liberal Federation. ^{249/}

It is not clear how much discretion is left to the national organizer within the framework of his total budget. There have been attempts made, none of them permanent, to establish Cabinet supervision over the office. As early as 1943 a Cabinet sub-committee was formed for that purpose. ^{250/} Later a Cabinet Minister (Hon. Brooke Claxton) provided the Cabinet's liaison with the office and supervised the editing of the Canadian Liberal. ^{251/} Then from 1953-57 a special federal liaison committee was set up, consisting of twelve Cabinet Ministers, the chief whip, the president of the Federation, its two general secretaries, and the Prime Minister's secretary. The extent to which these arrangements led to detailed supervision of the expenditures of the national office is difficult to ascertain.

The only information available about budgeting in the provincial offices concerns the Ontario office. Here the annual budget is prepared by the provincial organizer and the elected president and treasurer of the provincial association. Usually two or three alternative budgets

are prepared in keeping with different estimates of the total income which will be available for the year.

V. Expenditures

A. INTRODUCTION

Little is known about the actual costs of running an election campaign or maintaining the Party between elections during the early years of the Liberal Party's history. For this period, then, all that can be given is a general description of the style of the campaigns, the types of expenditures made, and a rough estimation of their importance. Later periods have been given more detailed coverage in written material. For the King period, several estimates of total campaign costs have been made by journalists and other writers. Similar estimates are available for elections during the period of Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent's leadership, and some information about the costs of the national office can also be found. There is considerably more detailed information for the last few years of the Party's history. No specific comparisons can thus be made about total expenditures from one period to another. What can be indicated are trends in the type of campaign used at various times.

B. EXPENDITURES: EARLY LIBERAL PERIOD, 1867-1887

The main emphasis in Liberal campaigns during the early years of Confederation appears to have been upon the

mobilization of support. In essence, this meant getting Liberal voters to the polls. For several reasons, this was an extremely expensive task. One reason was that there were only one or two polling stations per constituency, "with the result that whether legal or not many teams had to be provided to bring the voters to the polls and refreshments found for them when they got there." ^{252/} Because ownership of property was the qualification for voting, many electors could vote several times, and there was a widespread (and expensive) practice of importing voters not resident in a constituency (or even in the country) to vote in it. ^{253/}

Other expensive practices common at the time were bribery and treating. ^{254/} The custom of distributing liquor to the voters was well established. One custom, established since before Confederation, was that "there were no less than four days, the nomination, two days polling, and declaration day, on all of which ... the candidates in many constituencies were compelled to keep open house for their supporters." ^{255/} As one reporter wrote:

While we know that Mr. Mackenzie and Mr. Blake discouraged the use of improper influences in elections, many Liberal candidates did not shrink from illegal expenditures, and occasional judicial exposures of Liberal corruption materially weakened the /Liberal/ attack upon the electoral methods of Sir John Macdonald and his associates. ^{256/}

In its early campaigns the Liberal Party did put some emphasis upon communication as well as mobilization. Probably the most important means of communicating with the electors was by speeches from the campaign platform.

According to the custom of those days /around 1867/, a political campaign was a series of platform duels between the candidates or their representatives. 257/

Public halls were few in number and limited in accomodation /in 1872/, and so it was necessary to hold numerous meetings to fully instruct the electors. Newspaper readers were comparatively few, and it was only by personal canvass, or through meetings in schoolhouses and elsewhere, that the electors could be reached. In my first campaign I addressed thirty-five meetings. 258/

As a candidate for the opposition Party, a Liberal was often handicapped in his attempt to communicate to the electorate by his inability to secure either official information or reports of House of Commons debates:

The want of political literature was also a great disadvantage to a candidate without inside knowledge of the doings of Parliament.... The Globe could not be quoted as an authority - it was a party organ.... Such an authority as the Journals of the House were only available to the few who had friends in the public offices from which they were supplied. 259/

The central fund of the Liberal Party, such as it was, was used to aid candidates in both major aspects of campaigning: communication and mobilization. According to George Brown, the central fund of 1872 was used "for the

purpose of promoting the success of the Reform Party in various constituencies at the said election, by defraying the travelling expenses of public speakers, by printing and circulating political documents, by assisting to pay the legal and necessary expenses of candidates, unable to bear the lawful expenses of election contests, and by aiding in similar necessary and lawful expenditures." 260/

In summary, then, major emphasis of the Liberal Party's early campaigns was upon mobilizing Liberal support in the constituencies. Communication of ideas to the electorate was restricted both by the dependence upon platform speeches which were tiring for the candidate and could reach only limited numbers of electors, and by the candidates' lack of access to official information as long as the Party was out of power. No definite descriptions can be found of Party expenditures during the inter-election periods at that time. But the decision in 1878 to establish the National Club as a Liberal headquarters showed that Party leaders were making at least some attempt to maintain 261/ contact with their supporters between campaigns.

C. EXPENDITURES: THE LAURIER PERIOD, 1887-1919

Striking changes occurred in the campaign style of the Liberal Party during the years of Laurier's leadership. Most important of these was the increased use which the Party made of printed material. Newspaper reports, posters and pamphlets all came to be much more important

than they had been previously.

Once the Liberals had gained power they were able to provide much aid and encouragement to their supporters among the press, and thus were in a much better position to make good use of the medium. As Sir John Willison put it in 1916:

In office the Liberal party made its press strong. It supported its newspapers with extraordinary energy and complete organization. As a result Liberal newspapers became strong alike in circulation and in advertising patronage. 262/

In 1905, Willison estimated that "within the last five years between three hundred and four hundred thousand dollars of party money, or what amounts to party money, has been put into Liberal papers in Canada." 263/

Part of the reason that the Party spent such large amounts on newspapers can be explained in terms of the kind of journalism that was prevalent during Laurier's premiership. At that time newspapers tended to be extremely partisan. In order to ensure that its viewpoint on public issues was heard, it was often necessary for the Party to give financial aid to Liberal papers, or even to operate papers itself. 264/ Heavy financial aid was given to L'Electeur and its successor, Le Soleil, and also to Le Cultivateur; and the Party itself founded Le Soir in 1894. 265/ Liberal funds assured the retention of the Liberal traditions of the Globe in the late

eighteen-eighties; ^{266/} Liberal funds gained control of La Patrie in 1897; ^{267/} and Liberal funds bought the Toronto Evening Star in 1899. ^{268/} This method of securing newspaper support necessitated expenditures not only during campaigns, but in between elections as well. The necessary funds were collected and the newspapers were bought and owned by Party supporters.

Other uses of the printed word were more concentrated in the actual campaign period. Pamphlets, articles and posters were used to woo the electorate. It was a favourite campaign technique of Israel Tarte to flood a constituency with articles and pamphlets during campaigns. ^{269/}

But public meetings had not been displaced as a means of communicating political propaganda to the electorate. Tours and meetings were important elements of Laurier's campaign style. ^{270/} According to Tarte, between 1895 and 1896 he and Laurier attended between two and three hundred meetings and came in contact with nearly 200,000 prospective voters. ^{271/} During the 1904 campaign Laurier spoke at Hamilton, Toronto, Chatham, Wingham, Lucknow, Uxbridge, Orillia, Peterborough, Cornwall, Carleton Place, and Alexandria in Ontario and at Montreal, Farnham, Sherbrooke, Valleyfield and Trois-Rivières in Quebec - all between October 12 and October 29. ^{272/} In 1911 he addressed over fifty meetings in the five Eastern provinces in a period of four weeks. ^{273/}

Some of the expenses involved in holding a large public meeting are evident from a description of such a meeting held in 1900. At this meeting, held at Brandon, Manitoba, Clifford Sifton opposed Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper:

The meeting was held in the town rink, which was packed up to the doors. Special trains brought people from outside points in the province, while from an area thirty miles around the people came in, mostly by carriage or on horseback. 274/

While the communication of ideas to the electors was much expanded, the older style of campaigning by mobilizing voters was not entirely neglected. Bribery was still not uncommon. 275/ Nor was treating unknown:

In one constituency a hotel keeper kept open house for all comers and sent in bills to the two candidates on the basis of the votes finally polled for each. 276/

Politicians still resorted to the use of personation; a particularly costly example was "the voyage of the Minnie M. with a boat-load of personators, sworn, to save their consciences, on specially provided bogus Bibles." 277/

Some evidence exists that the central election fund was making larger contributions to the funds of Liberal candidates in the constituencies. One Quebec candidate, announcing in 1904 his decision not to run again as a Liberal, gave as his reason that he could not "bend the knee" before the Party's will:

Were I rich enough to dispense with the asking of assistance from the electoral fund of my party, as I have always done in the past, I would remain in the political arena. 278/

The years of Laurier's leadership saw a change not only in the emphasis placed upon various campaigning techniques but also in the pacing of the campaign as a whole. Gradually there was coming to be a concentration of activities in the period immediately before polling day:

Of late years there had been less and less political discussion between elections. Members met their constituents in single or in joint debate less often than of old. The newspapers gave less of their space to politics, more to business, sport, society and personal news. A more concentrated and strenuous campaign at election-times, increased reliance on organization, headlines and posters and cartoons ... a shriller note in all the contest, became inevitable. 279/

In another aspect of the Party's affair an opposite trend had been established. If the Party's efforts at persuasion were being concentrated during the last weeks before polling day, other efforts were being made to keep the Party organization in order between campaigns. As early as 1894 the Liberals had established a permanent office in Montreal. Israel Tarte, as full-time organizer for Quebec, received only \$1200 between 1894 and 1896 of the promised salary of \$4,000 per year for his work of organizing Liberal clubs in the constituencies while "his travelling expenses were high and his postal bill alone was about \$1,000." 280/ Progress made in the

direction of a permanent office at either the central or the provincial level between 1896 and 1912 was intermittent but in 1912 a Central Liberal Information Office was set up on Ottawa. W.L. Mackenzie King was named its full-time director at a salary of \$2,500 per year. ^{281/}

Publication of the Party's journal, the Canadian Liberal Monthly began in 1914. ^{282/} Evidently the central office project met with financial difficulties as had the earlier one in Montreal for, by 1917, the office was ^{283/} \$15,000 in arrears.

D. EXPENDITURES: THE KING PERIOD, 1919-1948

Many of the changes in campaign style which had begun in Laurier's time continued under King. The increasing trend toward the concentration of publicity expenditures in the period just before polling day continued. The attempt to establish permanent Party offices was carried further.

Perhaps the greatest change, certainly the most striking, was the development in campaign communication. One writer attributed the new emphasis upon communication to the growth in the size of the electorate:

The modern electorate, whether more or less honest than its predecessors, is simply too large to manipulate voter by voter. ^{284/}

During the thirties a whole new means of communication,

radio, became an important campaign tool. Tours by prominent Party speakers, the distribution of Party literature, and the use of the press were still important; but the way in which newspapers were used was changing. As late as 1923 the Liberals had tried to purchase a newspaper franchise, to gain press support in the manner of Laurier's time. ^{285/} For the most part, however, the nature of Canadian journalism was changing. The predominantly partisan style of journalism of the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century was beginning to give way to nonpartisanship. ^{286/} To use this new type of newspaper the Party had to find a new type of publicity, the newspaper advertisement. This change meant a further accentuation of the pattern of concentrating publicity expenditures at campaign time, for unlike the costs of maintaining a newspaper, the cost of placing advertisements did not have to be sustained between elections.

The increasing emphasis upon communication led to a further development in the Liberals' campaign style. The Party began to seek expert guidance in planning its publicity program. In the forties the Liberals made their first recorded use of advertising agencies. ^{287/}

Some idea of the cost of Liberal campaigns during this period can be gained from various estimates. One Conservative estimated that the national Liberal Party spent \$1 million in the Quebec provincial campaign of 1939. ^{288/}

Norman Lambert estimated that in the 1940 federal general election the total expenditures for the Liberal Party were approximately \$1 million. ^{289/}

The Party continued its attempt to maintain a national office. The office which had closed briefly in the twenties, was closed again during World War II, but generally the Party tried to keep it in operation.

The tasks assigned the office were such as to require a full-time staff: there were two permanent officials to coordinate the activities of the provincial Liberal associations, ^{290/} and there were one or two stenographers. ^{291/} The office was expected to do printing and publishing of Party literature in addition to coordinating Party activities. ^{292/} All of the Party leader's personal expenses were charged to the Party too. "There are no charges for telephone calls or telegrams in his [Mr. King's] personal accounts." ^{293/} All of this cost money, but no estimates are available of exactly how much was needed to run the national office.

E. EXPENDITURES: THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD, 1949-1965

1. Campaign Expenses

A little more information is available concerning the Liberal Party's expenditures during the late forties, and in the fifties and sixties. It is clear that during these years the pattern of heavy emphasis upon communication

in general and national advertising in particular remained a prominent characteristic of Liberal campaign style. National advertising even seems to have absorbed a growing portion of the national campaign budget. It became evident during this time that financial aid to candidates was another large item on the budget. The Party continued to maintain its national office and the office came to play a vital role during campaigns as well as between elections.

Several estimates are available of the sums the Liberal Party spent on campaigns during this period. One writer estimated that at least \$3 million was spent altogether by the National Committees of the Liberal and Conservative Parties in each general election campaign between 1945 and 1953, and that over one half of this was spent by the Liberals. ^{294/} A prominent Liberal, Hon. C.G. Power, reported in 1949 that over a four-year period including a general election, the national Liberal Party could be expected to spend about \$3 million; a further ^{295/} \$3 million would be spent at the constituency level.

Party literature was still an important item and was estimated by a prominent journalist to have cost the Liberals between \$500,000 and \$750,000. ^{296/}

The 1953 campaign was apparently no less costly. In Quebec alone, according to Hon. C.G. Power, this campaign cost all levels of the Liberal Party approximately \$2

million. ^{297/} Another estimate put the total expenditure of both Liberals and Conservatives at the national level only, at \$8 million. ^{298/} A prominent Conservative stated that if that were true, three quarters of the total was spent by the Liberals. ^{299/} According to an estimated breakdown of Liberal Party expenditures at about this time by Harrill, the National Campaign Committee's total budget was usually allocated as follows: tours of Party leaders, 10%, headquarters organization (rent, salaries, supplies), 10%; national advertising (radio, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines), 40%; individual candidates, 40%. ^{300/} No television was used by the National Committee in 1953, but radio stations are said to have charged prime time rates for all political broadcasts. ^{301/} Subsidies to candidates amounted to about \$3,000 per constituency, more in key areas, according to a well known Liberal. ^{302/}

A Party official active in the 1957 campaign gave his estimate of a partial breakdown of expenditures: aid to candidates, about one third of the total budget; national publicity, about 20%-25%; leaders' tours, up to one half of a million dollars (including the cost of special events en route). ^{303/}

The national office was very actively involved in the national advertising campaign. Since television was being used as a campaign weapon for the first time in the 1957 national campaign, the office turned some of its

resources toward teaching Liberal candidates how to use television time effectively. The office employed a man experienced in television to set up a studio. There he coached Liberal candidates and produced radio tapes and television films which could be used upon payment of a fee. ^{304/} The national office was also active in other aspects of national advertising. It arranged newspaper, poster and billboard publicity; it circulated draft radio speeches and radio and television schedules; it operated a news service for weekly newspapers; it prepared printed material, pamphlets, leaflets and a 384-page Speaker's Handbook, for use in the constituencies. For the duration of the campaign its staff increased from about fifteen to between fifty and sixty, apart from the forty or so persons working for the Liberals in the offices of Cockfield Brown, the Party's advertising agency.

The exact cost of all of this cannot be ascertained. One writer suggested that the Liberal national office spent two or three times the estimated \$1,700,000 spent by the Conservative office in the 1957 campaign. ^{305/} With regard to the campaign as a whole he wrote:

It is no doubt safe but not greatly enlightening to conclude that the national, provincial, and constituency organizations of the Liberal party spent between six and ten million dollars in the course of the 1957 election. ^{306/}

One of the Liberal officials of the campaign suggested a narrower estimate of seven and one half million dollars. ^{307/}

Liberal campaign expenditures since 1957 do not appear to have reached the heights attained in that election when the Liberals enjoyed the advantages of 22 years of incumbency. Loss of office and the frequency of elections appear to have led to a closer rationing of funds from traditional sources.

According to several sources, the Liberals had less money than usual in the 1965 campaign.^{308/} Party officials report that the National and provincial Campaign Committees spent approximately \$3,500,000 on the election.^{309/} A substantial part of this sum was spent by the Quebec campaign committee which "runs its own campaign." The expenditures of the National Campaign Committee (as distinct from the Quebec campaign committee and the other provincial committees) were as follows:

Table 1

NATIONAL EXPENDITURES FOR THE 1965 CAMPAIGN

Radio	\$ 70,000
TV	200,000
Newspapers & Publications	55,000
Printed & Other Material	75,000
Leader's Tour	30,000
Other Travel	10,000
Administration, etc.	45,000
Other Expenses	40,000
Total	<u>\$ 525,000</u>

The expenditures on newspapers and periodicals included the cost of producing some advertisements which were later used by provincial committees.

By adding up the advertising space bought by the Liberals in all periodicals: dailies, weeklies, magazines and trade publications, and by multiplying this space by prevailing advertising rates, an independent research firm obtained detailed estimates of the Party's 1965 expenditures on this type of advertising. ^{310/} According to this study the total amount spent by all levels of the Liberal Party organization on newspaper and periodical advertising was \$489,641. ^{311/} The amount spent on advertisements declared to be sponsored by the national Party was \$141,237. ^{312/} When the expenditures made by the National Committee in Quebec (\$65,995) are subtracted ^{313/} this leaves a figure of \$75,342 spent on advertisements attributed to the National Campaign Committee. This is \$20,342 more than the \$55,000 estimated by a Party spokesman. This difference is due to the fact that provincial campaign committees often receive advertisement mats from the National Committee, and use them without changing the name of the sponsor. Thus what are in fact provincial committee expenditures may appear as those of the National Committee. Figures were also compiled by province for Liberal Party advertising expenditures in periodicals.

Table 2

ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES IN PERIODICALS*

(By Province)

Province	National Liberal Assn.	Provincial Liberal Assn.	Local candi- dates and Associations	Total
Nfld.	-	\$ 627	\$ 1,759	\$ 2,386
P.E.I.	-	1,798	3,625	5,423
N.S.	\$ 5,754	8,769	15,410	29,933
N.B.	304	5,391	18,215	23,910
Que.	65,995	938	34,878	101,811
Ont.	32,114	1,002	122,927	156,043
Man.	6,608	5,420	13,608	25,636
Sask.	1,386	62	11,355	12,803
Alta.	4,330	2,557	23,066	29,953
B.C.	25,162	28,341	46,533	100,036
Yukon & N.W.T.	84	1,182	442	1,708
Canada	141,737	56,087	291,818	489,642

* SOURCE: See Tables 4-15 in study 9 "Newspaper Advertising Expenditures and Lineage of the 1965 and 1963 Federal Elections" in Part II of the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses, pp. 338-349.

For the leader's tour, an airplane was chartered at a cost of from \$600 to \$1000 per day. ^{314/} The staff traveling with the leader numbered 10 plus two advance men. Reporters going along were charged air fares.

Other transport costs are divided between the party and the Government, according to whether Mr. Pearson is acting as Prime Minister or a campaigning party leader....

Advance men /Allan/ O'Brien and /Sydney/ Wayne and Quebec liaison man /Serge de/ La Rochelle are paid privately. Mr. /Richard/ O'Hagan draws a salary as an aide to the Prime Minister from public funds and gets a supplement from the party - as a political assistant to Mr. Pearson. ^{315/}

It is not clear under what heading survey costs fell; they amounted, however, to about 5 per cent of what the National Committee spent.

The cost of these runs ranges from \$500 for a quickie poll in a single riding to \$50,000 for a nation-wide depth study. ^{316/}

In addition to the \$3,500,000 spent on the campaign by the National Campaign Committee there were other substantial items of expenditure. One of these was the retirement of the accumulated deficit of the Liberal Federation of Canada which cost approximately \$250,000. ^{317/} Another was the sum allotted to the provincial committees to be used for financial aid to the constituencies. In Ontario over \$405,000 was used this way in 1965. ^{318/} The provincial committees themselves spent considerable amounts of money on the campaign. ^{319/} Ontario, for example, had a

total budget of over \$517,000 (including the amounts earmarked for aid to constituencies).^{320/} Of this \$156,043 was spent on advertising within the Province. Total expenditures by the Saskatchewan committee have been estimated at between \$40,000 and \$50,000 most of which is said to have been raised within the Province.^{321/} In the private report on periodical advertising expenditures during the 1965 election the total figure estimated for all provincial committees for the Liberal Party was \$56,087.^{322/}

Expenditures by other provincial committees can only be guessed at from descriptions of the campaign in each province. It is clear that special events such as the huge rallies in Winnipeg, Halifax and Toronto must also have bitten a sizeable chunk out of any campaign budget. The Winnipeg rally drew an estimated 6,500 persons, many of whom were brought by special buses from across Manitoba.^{323/} In Halifax the attendance was reported to be between 7000 and 8000.^{324/} Entertainment (soloists and singing groups) figured largely in the rallies.

To generalize from the 1965 campaign, then, it appears that communication of its platform by advertising and by tours of Party leaders is the main aim of the Liberal Party's national campaign. It is also apparent that while radio and television are of vital importance in a modern Liberal campaign, the Party still attaches substantial importance to more traditional forms of communication,

such as newspapers, periodicals and personal appearances by the Party leader. The nature of these personal appearances has changed considerably, however, from the days of Alexander Mackenzie: public meetings in the early days of the Party's history were public debates held before small audiences; modern public meetings are coming to assume the character of mass entertainments, with the appearance of the Party leader as an item on the program.

2. Operating Expenses

Between election campaigns the Liberal national office continues its activities. The costs of running it appear to be rising, although not necessarily in a consistent upward trend:

Depending upon the activities in which the office is concerned during any year, it has operated on annual budgets ranging from \$45,200 in 1945 to over \$150,000 in 1960.... Today /in 1961/ the office may be expected to spend over \$100,000 yearly. 325/

Information about recent years shows that the usual annual cost is now about \$250,000, or at the minimum, \$200,000. 326/

About half of the total is spent on salaries and administrative expenses. The staff generally numbers between 15 and 20. 327/ Maintenance, supplies, mailing, non-campaign travel and production (the publication of the Canadian Liberal and occasional pamphlets) are other expenses included in the regular budget of the national office. A

national convention, which would cost approximately \$100,000 extra, is expected to cover its costs from registration fees. ^{328/} Polls are also considered extra or irregular expenses, and are not regularly provided for in the budget.

At the provincial level, too, costs of maintaining an office are substantial. One estimate of the annual cost of operating the Ontario office was \$80,000 - \$90,000. ^{329/} Another estimate was that the ideal budget for this office would be \$100,000, but that in the last two or three years it had been run on less than one half that amount. ^{330/} The office has one full-time organizer and two secretaries plus extra secretarial help when necessary. Salaries took well over \$24,000 in 1963-64. Rent was over \$6,000, communications over \$5,000, travel nearly \$5,000. The annual meeting cost over \$4,500, and a leadership convention over \$11,000. (The leadership convention costs were offset by income from registration fees.) The cost of producing the 4-page monthly newspaper and distributing it to the 75,000 people on its mailing list is about \$2,500 per issue.

The Saskatchewan office is said to cost nearly as much as the Ontario office. Even before the Party came to power in Saskatchewan, it employed five full-time field organizers. The Montreal office of the federal Party costs more than the Ontario and Saskatchewan offices, the offices in other provinces much less.

VI. The Liberal Party in the Constituencies

The main variation in electioneering techniques in Canada is to be found less between the parties (certainly as far as the Liberals and Conservatives are concerned) than among the various constituencies. 331/

Because of the great differences among constituencies it is impossible to give a simple and detailed description of the finances of the Liberal Party at the constituency level. All that can be done is to indicate in a very general way the types of sources of funds which are available to candidates in the ridings and the types of expenses incurred at the local level. 332/ Furthermore, since little or nothing has been written about the history of constituency finance in the Liberal Party, even this very general description must be confined, by and large, to the situation in recent years.

Generally speaking the local sources of campaign funds available to the Party at the constituency level can be listed in the following categories: 333/ local industry; individual "regulars" who always give \$25 to \$100 to the local Party; personal supporters of the candidate; union locals; 334/ reserve from membership dues; incidental donations of \$10 to \$25. In addition to the contributions from local industries, candidates may receive gifts from firms of national extent. Often such a firm earmarks part of its contribution to the national Party for use in the constituency in which its plant is situated, sometimes

a separate gift is made through a local company official directly to the constituency Party. ^{335/} In many ridings little or no reserve remains from membership dues. Although in most ridings the Party attempts to keep an active organization between campaigns, many ridings set membership fees very low (\$1 or \$2 per year) and some set none at all. Even when dues are set, collection is rarely systematic. Ridings with good organization have been known to raise up to \$5000 over a three-to four-year period from dues and special fund-raising activities, ^{336/} but such ridings are rather rare:

More often than not, the candidate is forced to spend a great deal of his own money in order to get elected.... The candidate may have local sources such as personal friends or some area business establishments to which he can appeal but it is a certainty that his constituency association (if there is one) is usually unable to help very much.

Under such circumstances supplementary grants from the Party's provincial or central fund assume substantial importance. As has been indicated earlier, an important portion of the national campaign fund is sent to provincial campaign committees to be used for financial aid to constituencies. ^{337/} The size of these varies from one riding to another. According to a Party official, the Party tried to provide a basic \$3000 per constituency in the 1953 campaign, with more available in key areas. ^{338/} A candidate from Quebec reported that in that election candidates in his

Province received \$10,000 each from the national fund.^{339/}
 It is far from obvious just exactly how large a part of total expenditures in the constituencies is derived from central party grants. Some observers say that such grants cover no more than 40% of the constituency expenditures in Ontario. On the other hand in Quebec and the Maritimes constituency costs tend to be more completely covered.^{340/}

At one time the president of the National Liberal Federation tried to get the constituency associations to build up enough financial resources that they would be self-sufficient during election campaigns.^{341/} To judge from the grants made to constituencies in 1965, the plan did not take root. A major difficulty inevitably encountered in such a plan is the wide variation in the fund-raising capacities and financial needs of the constituencies. Some have local industries to solicit; many have not. Some cover vast territories which entail high travel costs; some are geographically small. It is often the case that those constituencies with the highest costs, due to geographical size and scattered population, are also those with the most sparse financial resources. Even in constituencies in which there is a concentration of large industries local fund raisers may find they are competing with national fund raisers for contributions.^{342/}

In one Province, Newfoundland, candidates appear to receive substantial aid from the provincial Party probably because of the rather unusual way in

which funds for constituencies are collected in that Province. Hon. J.W. Pickersgill described the system in a letter to the Committee on Election Expenses:

... anyone wishing to make any contribution to my campaign is directed to make such contribution to the Treasurer of the Liberal Party of Newfoundland who in turn provides the funds required by my official agent to pay the bills incurred during the campaign. The Provincial Office also orders most of the printed matter for all the /Liberal/ candidates in Newfoundland, which is therefore received as a contribution in kind, the cost being apportioned in the various ridings in proportion to the use made of the material. The only other contribution I received was a contribution of printed matter worth \$350.00 from a personal friend. 343/

In most of the other provinces, too, candidates receive aid in kind. The provincial campaign committees for each province generally provide such things as information bulletins and campaign and public relations advice. 344/ The Ontario committee, for example, has in recent years run a campaign college for Liberal candidates in the Province.

Campaign expenditures at the constituency level have been categorized by one writer as follows, in order of decreasing importance: payments to workers, local advertising, rent and office expenses, cars, travel and refreshments. 345/ A Party official suggested another breakdown. 346/ According to him, the largest single campaign expense at the constituency level is mailing. He estimated that for a riding of between 30,000 and 40,000 constituents one mailing of "where-to-vote" cards would cost between \$1,200 and \$1,600. Usually a main pamphlet and a final letter are

mailed out too. This Party official listed headquarters expenses as another large item. This would include paying a campaign chairman (who is usually paid what he would otherwise have earned during the six-week campaign period), a full-time secretary and a full-time handyman (whose salary would be \$50 to \$60 per week). On polling day many other workers are usually paid:

Rates of pay vary from region to region, but it is probably not misleading to assume that drivers with cars cost from \$10 to \$30 per day.... Canvassers, scrutineers, and baby sitters are somewhat less expensive, costing about \$6 to \$8. But in some constituencies very large numbers of these may have to be hired. 347/

The costs of local advertising vary considerably among ridings. In many ridings public meetings are highly popular; monster rallies are organized in some large centres while coffee parties are more generally popular. Printed materials such as poll cards, verandah cards and favours are also widely used. 348/ Newspaper, radio and television advertising are also used, but radio and television advertising is not uniformly popular at the constituency level. Candidates in a metropolitan riding are unlikely to use radio or television since in buying time on these media they have to pay for the entire audience reached, only a small part of which is in any one riding.

Total costs of constituency campaigns are difficult to assess, despite the statutory requirement that a report of expenditures be made for each candidate. 349/ An

experienced Liberal campaigner from Ontario estimated that in a riding of 30,000-40,000 constituents the highest expenditure that would be necessary would be \$14,000; any more would be wasted. According to him, a good campaign in such a riding could be run for \$10,000, or even for \$7,000 to \$8,000 if there was good volunteer help. ^{350/}

Another estimate, for rural, urban and metropolitan constituencies, is as follows:

A normal election campaign in a rural constituency probably costs the Liberals or the Conservatives from \$7,500 to \$12,500. It is difficult to conduct a satisfactory urban campaign for less than \$15,000 and a reasonably conducted fight in a metropolitan constituency can hardly be attempted for much under \$25,000. ^{351/}

The official declarations of 232 of the 265 Liberal candidates in the 1965 campaign revealed that at least \$2,616,000 was spent in the constituencies. This meant that the average amount spent for each reporting candidate was \$11,276. ^{352/}

In between elections there are still expenses to be met. Writing in 1919, Sir John Willison complained:

We bleed members of Parliament for churches, for sporting organizations, for social entertainments, for fairs, concerts and testimonials, and for a multitude of other projects by which busy people think they benefit the community. ^{353/}

Conversations with party workers suggest that this aspect of politics has changed little during the intervening years. One organizer said that a sitting member can expect to pay about \$2,000 or \$3,000 per year in his riding for

contributions to churches, charities, volunteer groups and private associations. ^{354/}

The inflow of funds is not nearly so certain to carry on between election campaigns. The inter-election flow of funds at the constituency level is highly irregular, if it exists at all. As indicated previously, membership fees are neither uniformly nor regularly collected. In Hamilton and Toronto, district associations hold successful fund-raising dinners. The Toronto dinner at \$15 a plate usually makes a profit of \$15,000. However, most constituencies between elections have little organization and few funds.

VII. Conclusions

Despite the dearth of detailed information about the finances of the Liberal Party, particularly in the first few decades of Confederation, it is possible to discern certain patterns in the Party's finances. Perhaps the most obvious generalization to be made is that the Party, above the constituency level, appears to look almost exclusively to business for its financial support although this is decreasingly true for the inter-election maintenance funds. The first time the Party's finances really began to be set on a firm basis was in the late decades of the nineteenth century when it began to tap these sources. Nearly every subsequent attempt to raise money from other sources has met with failure, although recent efforts such as fund-raising

dinners, the Liberal Union and Century Clubs appear to show a new trend.

The fund-collecting structure of the Party has shown very striking changes from the early days to the present. As the responsibility for fund raising gradually moved from two or three men who collected informally to Members of the Cabinet, and again to more and more specialized and clearly defined committees, it achieved a considerable degree of continuity and became more and more effectively adapted to suit the nature of the Party's sources of funds.

The structure of authority in Party expenditure also appears to have tended to become more specialized and more formal. In Laurier's time responsibility for fund allocation appears to have rested with some leaders of the Party in the House of Commons and, occasionally, with an organizer outside the House. The transformation in the years between then and the present has brought about the existence of a whole system of campaign committees, each preparing a formal budget and each under the general direction of the National Campaign Committee. This Committee is responsible to the party leader.

From the nature of the information available, it is impossible to outline in detail the trends in campaign costs except to note a general and continual rise over the years. But trends in the overall style of campaign are strikingly apparent. Most obvious of these trends is the shift from

"mobilization" campaigning to "communication campaigning." Naturally there was communication involved in the campaigns of Mackenzie and there is mobilization involved in the campaigns of today. But the political stump speech of Mackenzie's day hardly compares with the present array of print and broadcasting media as a means of communicating a platform or an image. Moreover the emphasis in communication appears to have shifted from the candidate or personal level to the national or Party level, an inevitable development following the replacement of the small meeting by the expensive media of radio and television.

FOOTNOTES TO STUDY 3

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- 2 Ross, Hon. Sir George, Getting into Parliament and After, Toronto, William Briggs, 1913, pp. 17-18.
- 3 Ward, Norman, The Public Purse, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962 and 1964 ed., pp. 48-49.
- 4 Reid, op.cit., pp. 14-15.
- 5 Ward, op.cit., p. 49.
- 6 Thomson, Dale C., Alexander Mackenzie: Clear Grit, Toronto, Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1960, p. 147.
- 7 Skelton, O.D., Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol. 1, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1921, New York, Century, 1922, pp. 174, 178.
- 8 Morton, W.L., The Kingdom of Canada, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1963, p. 346.
- 9 Skelton, op.cit., Vol. 1, pp. 159-160.
- 10 Creighton, Donald G., John A. Macdonald, The Old Chieftain, Toronto, Macmillan, 1955, pp. 140-141.
- 11 Preston, W.T.R., My Generation of Politics and Politicians, Toronto, Rose Publishing Co., 1927, pp. 117-118.
- 12 Cartwright, Rt. Hon. Sir Richard J., Reminiscences, Toronto, W. Briggs, 1912, p. 192.
- 13 Globe, July 8, 1877, as reported in the case of Regina v. Wilkinson - Re Brown (H.T. 40 Vict. 1877), Upper Canada Queen's Bench Reports, Vol. 41, 1878, p. 69.
- 14 For a detailed description of this campaign see Schull, Joseph, Laurier, The First Canadian, Toronto, Macmillan, 1965, pp. 123-125 and 127.
- 15 Thomson, op.cit., p. 316, quoting a letter from Mackenzie to Pelletier, Nov. 1, 1877, Letterbooks, VII, p. 292.
- 16 Ibid., footnote, p. 318.

- 17 Regina v. Wilkinson (H.T. 40 Vict. 1877) Quoted in Upper Canada Queen's Bench Reports, Vol. 41, 1878, p. 11.
- 18 Regina v. Wilkinson - Re Brown, op.cit., p. 59.
- 19 Ibid., p. 60.
- 20 Cartwright, op.cit., p. 191.
- 21 Thomson, op.cit., p. 346.
- 22 Willison, John S., Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party, Vol. II, Toronto, C.N. Morang, 1903, p. 12.
- 23 Thomson, op.cit., p. 375.
- 24 Preston, op.cit., p. 163, p. 169.
- 25 Ibid., p. 117.
- 26 Willison, Sir John S., Reminiscences Political and Personal, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1919, p. 93.
- 27 Quoted in Graham, W.R., "Sir Richard Cartwright, Wilfrid Laurier, and Liberal Party Trade Policy, 1887," Canadian Historical Review, XXXIII, No. 1, March 1952, p. 12.
- 28 Laurier Papers, Letter from Cartwright to Laurier, August 22, 1887, quoted in Graham, ibid., p. 9.
- 29 Laurier Papers, October 15, 1887, quoted ibid., p. 11.
- 30 Loc. cit.
- 31 Skelton, op.cit., Vol. 1, pp. 416.
- 32 Ibid., p. 418.
- 33 Ibid., p. 418.
- 34 See Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Baie des Chaleurs Railway Matter, 1891, Reports, Proceedings and Depositions, Quebec, 1892, pp. 51-65.
- 35 Schull, op.cit., p. 254, p. 257. Also, Fraser, Barbara, "The Political Career of Sir Hector Louis Langevin," Canadian Historical Review, XLII, June, 1961, p. 125.

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- 37 Schull, op.cit., p. 210.
- 38 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 318-319.
- 39 Skelton, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 372.
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- 43 Wade, op.cit., p. 598.
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- 45 Dafoe, Sifton, p. 149.
- 46 Schull, op.cit., pp. 552-3.
- 47 Skelton, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 204-210; Hopkins, J. Castell, The Canadian Annual Review, 1904, pp. 221-227; Wade, op.cit., p. 529; Schull, op.cit., pp. 442-444.
- 48 Skelton, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 419.
- 49 Muller, Steven, Canadian Prime Ministers 1867-1948, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell, 1958, p. 310. Microfilmed.
- 50 Neatby, H. Blair, Laurier and a Liberal Quebec: A Study in Political Management, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1956, p. 226. Microfilmed.
- 51 Willison, Sir John S., Sir Wilfrid Laurier, The Makers of Canada Series, London and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1926, p. 468.
- 52 Neatby, Laurier, pp. 223-226; Dafoe, op.cit., pp. xiii-xiv.

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- 54 Willison, Reminiscences, pp. 280-281.
- 55 Quoted in J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs 1904, Toronto, Annual Review Pub. Co., 1905, p. 162.
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- 57 Ibid., Table 1, p. 9.
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- 59 Neatby, Laurier, pp. 223-226.
- 60 Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, The Makers of Canada Series, pp. 468-469.
- 61 Willison, Reminiscences, p. 93.
- 62 For details, see Reid, Escott, "The Saskatchewan Liberal Machine Before 1929," in Thorburn, H.G., Politics in Canada, Toronto, Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 49-50.
- 63 Schull, op.cit., p. 610. Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 126, pp. 211-212.
- 64 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 128, pp. 211-212. Many of these men had extensive business connections. For example, Senator Béique was president of the Banque Canadienne Nationale, member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Pacific Railway and connected with other business interests. For details on his personal background, see Caroline Béique, Quatre-Vingts Ans de Souvenirs: Histoire d'une Famille, Montreal, Bernard Valiquette, 1939.
- 65 Porter, John, The Vertical Mosaic, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965, p. 536.
- 66 LaPierre, Laurier Joseph Lucien, Politics, Race and Religion in French Canada: Joseph Israel Tarte, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Toronto, University of Toronto, 1962, p. 311. Reissued by University Microfilm Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1964 in microfilm.
- 67 Ibid., p. 366.

- 68 Until 1905 there was no special indemnity for the Leader of the Opposition, and Laurier was in personal financial difficulty. Schull, op.cit., p. 215, p. 223.
- 69 Ibid., p. 325; Skelton, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 276.
- 70 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 127.
- 71 Quoted in Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 128.
- 72 Ferns, H.S. and Bernard Ostry, The Age of Mackenzie King: The Rise of the Leader, London, William Heinemann, Ltd., 1955, p. 331, pp. 295-6; Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 339 ff.; Dawson, R. MacGregor, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1958, pp. 298 ff.
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- 75 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 423 n. 90.
- 76 Harrill, Ernest Eugene, Structure of Organization and Power in Canadian Political Parties: A Study in Party Financing, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Xerox, 1958, pp. 236-237. Harrill cites Senators Lambert and Power.
- 77 See study No. 4, "Conservative Party Finances 1939-1945," by J.L. Granatstein, in this Volume, footnote 35.
- 78 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Beauharnois Power Project, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1931, p. xx.
- 79 Neatby, King, pp. 371-373.
- 80 Letter from R.B. Hanson, June 14, 1945, quoted in study No. 4, op.cit., footnote 133.
- 81 Lederle, J.W., National Organization of Liberal and Conservative Parties in Canada, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1942, Microfilmed, No. 4513, p. 189.
- 82 Lederle, op.cit., p. 193; and Heppe, Paul Henry, The Liberal Party of Canada, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1957, p. 146.

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- 83 Neatby, King, p. 330.
- 84 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 169.
- 85 The National Liberal Organization Committee, with its head office in Ottawa, was supposed to organize on a national scale, to prevent a recurrence of the breakdown which occurred when Unionist Liberals defected in 1917, taking their organizations with them. Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 131.
- 86 Neatby, King, p. 330. Haydon stayed on unofficially until 1924.
- 87 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 134-135.
- 88 Senator Norman Lambert's changes initiated in 1936 were really just changes in collection methods, not sources. They will therefore be discussed under Section III, "Patterns of Fund Raising," infra.
- 89 Neatby, King, p. 327.
- 90 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 134-135.
- 91 Flavelle's letters, Feb. 1925 and Jan. 1926, are quoted in Colquhoun, A.H.U., Press, Politics and People: The Life and Letters of Sir John Willison, Toronto, 1935, Macmillan Co. of Canada, pp. 286-287.
- 92 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 168-169.
- 93 Neatby, King, p. 388. Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 137.
- 94 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 168.
- 95 Harrill, op.cit., pp. 251-252.
- 96 Harrill, op.cit., p. 236.
- 97 Gwyn, Richard J., The Shape of Scandal, a Study of a Government in Crisis, Toronto, Clark, Irwin & Co., 1965, p. 241.
- 98 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 99 Porter, op.cit., p. 296.
- 100 Heard, Alexander, The Costs of Democracy, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1960, p. 97.

- 101 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 102 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 272-273.
- 103 Letter from the National Treasurer to the Chairman of the Committee on Election Expenses, January 26, 1966.
- 104 Confidential information, February 1966. The Toronto Globe and Mail, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 7 confirms the story that nearly all the money for the Saskatchewan campaign was raised in the Province by the provincial organization.
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- 107 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 169.
- 108 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 109 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 110 See for example, the 1965 campaign expenditures, discussed in section V.E.1. infra.
- 111 Quoted in Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 237.
- 112 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 113 Confidential source.
- 114 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 115 Le Devoir, May 27, 1965, p. 2.
- 116 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 230.
- 117 Dafoe, John, Globe and Mail, Oct. 17, 1966.
- 118 See infra section V. "Expenditures."
- 119 See supra section II.
- 120 Thomson, op.cit., p. 375.
- 121 See supra, section II, "Sources."

- 122 Stamp, Robert M., "J.D. Edgar and the Liberal Party," Canadian Historical Review, XLV, No. 2, June, 1964, pp. 96, 98, 105, 107.
- 123 Ibid., pp. 93-115 passim. For details on Haydon's role, see infra, in this section.
- 124 See supra, section II, "Sources." Preston definitely collected funds under Laurier. See also infra.
- 125 Schull, op.cit., p. 224.
- 126 Pacaud, Lucien ed., Sir Wilfrid Laurier: Letters to My Father and Mother, Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1935, pp. 10, 128. Schull, op.cit., p. 224, 254, 257.
- 127 LaPierre, op.cit., p. 247.
- 128 Ibid., pp. 242-250.
- 129 Schull, op.cit., p. 339. Dafoe, J.W., Laurier: A Study in Canadian Politics, Carleton Library edition, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart 1963, p. 72. LaPierre, op.cit., p. 366.
- 130 LaPierre, op.cit., p. 526.
- 131 Ibid., pp. 249-250.
- 132 Preston, op.cit., pp. 134-135.
- 133 Stamp, op.cit., p. 115.
- 134 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 122.
- 135 Ibid., p. 123.
- 136 Dafoe, Sifton, p. xiv.
- 137 Schull, op.cit., p. 210.
- 138 Ibid., p. 235.
- 139 Porter, op.cit., p. 536.
- 140 Schull, op.cit., p. 299.
- 141 Willison, Reminiscences, p. 277; Schull, op.cit., pp. 458-9.
- 142 Willison, Laurier, p. 469.
- 143 Pacaud, ed., Letters, p. 54.

- 144 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 215.
- 145 Schull, pp. 591-592.
- 146 Main Johnson Papers, Main Johnson to N.W. Rowell, August 7, 1917. Quoted in Ramsay Cook, "Dafoe, Laurier, and Union Government," Canadian Historical Review, XLII, September, 1961, p. 201.
- 147 Schull, op.cit., p. 590.
- 148 Dawson, op.cit., pp. 326-327.
- 149 Harrill, op.cit., p. 256.
- 150 Ibid., p. 262.
- 151 Memo, King to Cabinet 1939, quoted in Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 198.
- 152 Neatby, King, p. 385; Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 168.
- 153 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 136.
- 154 Neatby, King, p. 331.
- 155 Ibid., p. 330.
- 156 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Special Committee on Beauharnois Power Project. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 1931, p. xix.
- 157 Canada, Parliament, Senate, Special Committee on Beauharnois Power Project, Report and Proceedings, 1932, p. 243; Ibid., p. 34.
- 158 Ibid., p. 50.
- 159 Ibid., p. 147.
- 160 Ibid., p. 50.
- 161 Ibid., p. 243.
- 162 House of Commons Committee Report, Minutes, op.cit., p. xx.
- 163 Senate Committee Report, op.cit., p. 189.
- 164 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, July 30, 1931, p. 4380.
- 165 Ibid., p. 4384.
- 166 Neatby, King, pp. 385.

- 167 Heppe, R.H., op.cit., p. 145. See Lederle, op.cit., passim.
- 168 Lederle, op.cit., p. 192.
- 169 Interviews with Norman Lambert and C.G. Power, cited in Harrill, op.cit., pp. 236-7; Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 339.
- 170 Lederle, op.cit., p. 191.
- 171 Gardiner Papers, "Politics General," Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, Letter from J. Gordon Fogo to Gardiner, May 5, 1945.
- 172 Harrill, op.cit., p. 257.
- 173 Quoted in Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 198.
- 174 Harrill, op.cit., p. 262.
- 175 Granatstein, op.cit., study No. 4, footnote 35.
- 176 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 177 Gardiner Papers, Letter from J. Gordon Fogo to J.G. Gardiner, January 25, 1945.
- 178 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 212; Gardiner Papers, Letter from Fogo to Gardiner, January 25, 1945.
- 179 Gardiner Papers, Letter from Fogo to Gardiner, January 25, 1945.
- 180 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 211.
- 181 Ibid., p. 212 has a list of persons who have been active in fund raising in recent years.
- 182 Globe and Mail, October 11, 1965, p. 7.
- 183 Montreal Star, June 7, 1965, p. 3.
- 184 La Presse, Sept. 1, 1965, p. 28.
- 185 Fournier, Jean-Pierre, "La Vieille Garde Libérale Croule," Le Magazine Maclean, Oct. 1965, p. 56.
- 186 Letter from the National Treasurer, January 26, 1966.
- 187 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 175.
- 188 La Presse, Sept. 1, 1965, p. 28.
- 189 Confidential interview, December 1965.

- 190 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 230.
- 191 See Section II, "Sources."
- 192 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 193 Confidential letter, February 1966.
- 194 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 253-254.
- 195 Ibid., p. 255.
- 196 Ibid., pp. 257-258.
- 197 Le Devoir, May 27, 1965, p. 2.
- 198 Lesage, Premier Jean, "Cartes Sur Table". Speech in Quebec City, May 26, 1965, p. 11.
- 199 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
- 200 Letter from Hon. J.W. Pickersgill P.C., M.P., to the Committee on Election Expenses, January 22, 1966. Quoted below, section VI, "The Liberal Party in the Constituencies."
- 201 Regina v. Wilkinson Re Brown, op.cit., p. 60.
- 202 Thomson, op.cit., pp. 316-318.
- 203 Cartwright, Reminiscences, pp. 310-311.
- 204 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 122.
- 205 Porter, Vertical Mosaic, p. 536.
- 206 Schull, op.cit., p. 458.
- 207 Dafoe, Sifton, pp. 341-342. Sifton also organized Ontario, against the Liberals this time, in 1911. Skelton, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 372.
- 208 Willison, Reminiscences, p. 277.
- 209 Schull, op.cit., p. 269, p. 475.
- 210 Dafoe, Sifton, p. 195.
- 211 Ibid., p. 340.
- 212 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 332.
- 213 LaPierre, op.cit., p. 232, p. 242.

- 214 Ibid., p. 350.
- 215 Ibid., p. 398.
- 216 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 126.
- 217 Dafoe, Laurier, p. 76.
- 218 LaPierre, op.cit., pp. 303-304, p. 311.
- 219 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 124-125.
- 220 Neatby, King, p. 330; Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 170.
- 221 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 261-2, p. 133.
- 222 Ibid., p. 133.
- 223 Heppe, op.cit., p. 146.
- 223a Lederle, op.cit., p. 196.
- 224 Power, Hon. C.G., "Wanted: A Ceiling on Election Spending," Maclean's, Feb. 1, 1949, p. 8.
- 225 Lederle, op.cit., p. 193.
- 226 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 214.
- 227 Ibid., p. 199.
- 228 See supra, footnote 178.
- 229 Gardiner Papers, Letter from Senator Wishart Robertson to J.G. Fogo, January 24, 1945 (copy).
- 230 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 197.
- 231 Ibid., p. 234. Advertising agencies still participate in planning. "By late 1956 and early 1957, four members of the agency Cockfield, Brown sat in on the Federation Liaison committee in order to prepare for the coming election."
- 232 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 233 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 234 Harrill, op.cit., p. 203.
- 235 Fournier, op.cit., p. 56.
- 236 Confidential sources.

- 237 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 238 Confidential source. See for example, Globe and Mail, Monday, October 11, 1965, p. 7.
- 239 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 240 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 241 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 411-412.
- 242 Ibid., p. 232.
- 243 Meisel, John, The Canadian General Election of 1957, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962, p. 64, n. 2.
- 244 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 245 Letter from Hon. J.W. Pickersgill, op.cit.
- 246 Harrill, op.cit., p. 203.
- 247 Globe and Mail, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 7.
- 248 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 249 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 250 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 195.
- 251 Ibid., p. 196.
- 252 Cartwright, op.cit., p. 21.
- 253 Loc.cit., and Ward, Norman, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1950, p. 221. The property qualification was fairly well eliminated in all provinces but Quebec and Nova Scotia by 1898. Ibid., p. 223.
- 254 Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, p. 245.
- 255 Cartwright, op.cit., pp. 20-21.
- 256 Willison, Laurier, Vol. II, pp. 18-19.
- 257 Ross, op.cit., p. 27.
- 258 Ibid., p. 40.
- 259 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
- 260 Regina v. Wilkinson - Re Brown, op.cit., p. 60.

- 261 More details of this above, under Section I, "Sources."
- 262 Quoted in Ward, "The Press and The Patronage," p. 10.
- 263 Quoted in Colquhoun, op.cit., pp. 98-99.
- 264 Skelton, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 269.
- 265 Pacaud, ed., Letters, p. 18 & p. 101; LaPierre op.cit., p. 304.
- 266 Preston, op.cit., pp. 134-135. See above, Section II, "Sources."
- 267 Neatby, Laurier, p. 226.
- 268 Porter, op.cit., p. 536.
- 269 LaPierre, op.cit., p. 524.
- 270 Schull, op.cit., p. 542.
- 271 LaPierre, op.cit., p. 305.
- 272 Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review for 1904, p. 181, 187-188.
- 273 Skelton, op.cit., II, p. 378.
- 274 Dafoe, Sifton, p. 207.
- 275 Schull, op.cit., p. 124-125; Skelton, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 267, p. 268.
- 276 Skelton, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 268.
- 277 Ibid., p. 268.
- 278 Quoted in Canadian Annual Review of 1904, p. 167.
- 279 Skelton, op.cit., II, p. 267.
- 280 LaPierre, op.cit., p. 303, p. 311.
- 281 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 124; Schull, op.cit., p. 538.
- 282 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 124.
- 283 Ibid., p. 127.
- 284 Ward, The Canadian House of Commons, p. 255.

- 285 Ward, "The Press and The Patronage," p. 7.
- 286 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 272.
- 287 Ibid., p. 196-197.
- 288 See Granatstein, study No. 4, footnote 36.
This was not an ordinary provincial campaign; Mr. Duplessis was fighting the campaign largely as a campaign against the federal government.
- 289 Ibid., p. 28.
- 290 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 177.
- 291 Neatby, King, p. 330, p. 387.
- 292 Ibid., p. 332.
- 293 Ibid., p. 302.
- 294 Harrill, op.cit., p. 197.
- 295 Quoted in Harrill, op.cit., p. 181.
- 296 Blair Fraser, quoted in Harrill, op.cit., p. 211.
- 297 Quoted in Harrill, op.cit., p. 180-182.
- 298 Blair Fraser, quoted in loc.cit.
- 299 J.M. Macdonnell, quoted in loc.cit.
- 300 Ibid., pp. 202-203.
- 301 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
- 302 The late Senator Lambert according to Norman Campbell as quoted in Torrence, op.cit., p. 453.
- 303 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 304 Meisel, op.cit., p. 67-72. The following description of the role of the Liberals' national office in 1957 is drawn mainly from these pages.
- 305 Ibid., p. 173.
- 306 Ibid., p. 173.
- 307 Memorandum on confidential telephone conversation, autumn 1965.

- 308 See for example reports in The Ottawa Citizen, Saturday, Nov. 13, 1965, p. 17; the Globe and Mail, Thursday, September 30, 1965, p. 10.
- 309 Most of the following material is from a letter received by the Committee on Election Expenses from the National Treasurer, January 26, 1966.
- 310 See McDonald Research Limited, "Newspaper Advertising Expenditures and Lineage of the 1965 Federal Elections," in Report of the Committee on Election Expenses, Part II, study No. 9, pp. 331-358.
- 311 Ibid., Table 2. Totals added, in all following figures.
- 312 Ibid., Table 4.
- 313 Since they are made by the Quebec campaign committee of the national Party.
- 314 Globe and Mail, Oct. 8, 1965, p. 7.
- 315 Loc.cit.
- 316 Gwyn, Richard, "Ad-Men and Scientists Run this Election," in Thorburn, H.G. ed., Party Politics in Canada, Toronto, 1963, p. 71.
- 317 Letter from the National Treasurer to the Chairman of the Committee on Election Expenses, January 26, 1966.
- 318 In 1963 Ontario Liberal candidates altogether received over \$457,000 in aid from the central Party; in 1962 they received over \$447,000. Confidential interview, January 1966.
- 319 Information is not available for all provincial committees since no detailed reports are required by the Party's national treasurer.
- 320 Total Ontario committee budget 1963, over \$630,000; 1962, over \$610,000. Confidential interview, January 1966.
- 321 Globe and Mail, Monday, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 8, quotes Senator A.H. McDonald as saying that Western Liberal candidates received no financial aid from the central fund. Other sources indicate that Saskatchewan did receive national campaign funds, but only a small amount and late in the campaign. Confidential interview.

- 322 McDonald Research Study, op.cit., Table 4.
- 323 Globe and Mail, Tuesday, Nov. 2, 1965, p. 8.
- 324 Ottawa Citizen, Saturday, Oct. 23, 1965, p. 3.
- 325 Regenstreif, op.cit., p. 192.
- 326 Confidential interview, December 1965; letter, January 1966.
- 327 Usually it consists of a national organizer, an assistant organizer, a women's director, a Young Liberal director, a publicity man and one secretary for each of these offices plus two printers, two people to run the addressograph machine, one general handyman and a person in charge of records.
- 328 Confidential interviews, December 1965. The October 1966 Convention in Ottawa assessed each registrant a fee of \$25, raising an estimated sum of \$50,000 from the 2,000 delegates. Another \$10 fee was pooled to subsidize the travelling expenses of delegates from provinces other than Ontario and Quebec.
- 329 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 330 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 331 Meisel, op.cit., p. 84.
- 332 Some details on candidate finances in all parties during the 1965 campaign are found in the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses, Part II, study No. 11, "Candidate Spending Patterns and Attitudes," pp. 410-416, and Appendix II in Part III, pp. 470-496.
- 333 The confidential interviews from which this information was obtained were with Party officials much of whose experience was in Ontario.
- 334 A party official said that union locals give to the Liberal Party in "practically every riding where there is an organized union."
- 335 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 336 Confidential interviews, December 1965.
- 337 See supra, section V.E.1., "Campaign Expenses."
- 338 Quoted in Torrence, op.cit., p. 453.

- 339 Quoted in Harrill, op.cit., p. 189.
- 340 Confidential source.
- 341 Regenstreif, op.cit., pp. 237-238.
- 342 Intra-party quarrels have been known to arise out of just this type of situation. Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 343 Letter to Mr. J.S. McEachran, Secretary of the Committee on Election Expenses, January 22, 1966.
- 344 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 345 Harrill, op.cit., p. 213.
- 346 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 347 Meisel, op.cit., p. 116.
- 348 Ibid., pp. 86-119 gives a detailed description of the types of campaign weapons used in the constituencies in the 1957 campaign.
- 349 Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., c. 39, s. 63. Professor Meisel summed up the situation: "It is a universally accepted fact ... that most of the official returns do not represent anything like the real election costs incurred by the candidate and the local parties." Op.cit., p. 116.
- 350 Confidential interview, December 1965.
- 351 Meisel, op.cit., p. 116.
- 352 See the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses, Appendix II, Part III, pp. 469-496.
- 353 Willison, Reminiscences, p. 278-9.
- 354 Confidential interview, December 1965.

CONSERVATIVE PARTY FINANCE 1939-1945*

by J.L. Granatstein

Money plays a vital role in any political system.

Without it, no party can hope to win power at the polls; with it, almost all things are possible. The two "old-line" Parties in Canada traditionally have relied on contributions from business and financial institutions, industry, and sympathetic wealthy individuals to finance their operations. Such a system has drawbacks. An obvious one is that the contributor may expect to receive compensation for his offerings. Another drawback is the heavy burden placed upon the party leader. The leader cannot afford to be, or even appear to be, the choice of "big business", but his party cannot operate without funds. To be assured of a substantial war chest, therefore, the leader must fashion policies that are attractive, or at least not offensive, to the business community. The contributor, on the other hand, has his own problems. A contribution may not assure him of favours from the government of the day, but it probably guarantees him a hearing. As a result, many large corporations contribute to both parties, allegedly

* This study is a revision of a paper submitted to the Committee on Election Expenses and which was referred to in the Committee's Report under the same name.

dividing their funds on a sixty-forty basis with the party in power receiving the larger portion.^{1/} The rationale for such a policy is probably based on two major premises: first, that the maintenance of the two party system, i.e., two parties operating within the ethos of the free enterprise structure, is vital; and second, that it is well to have insurance in case the government is turned out and the Opposition installed in office.^{2/}

But the "sixty-forty" system has sometimes been neglected in recent Canadian politics, especially when the policies or the leader of one of the major parties have been deemed unfriendly to business. There are, perhaps, more lessons to be learned from these periods than from the years when the system was honoured. Although popular mythology has tarred the Conservative Party as the party of the "big interests," there can be little doubt that, like most labels, this is an inaccurate statement. Certainly it is incorrect for the thirties and forties, the years in which the Conservatives were more often in financial difficulty than out of it. This brief paper will explore the reasons for the unhappy condition of the Conservative Party from 1939 to 1945 by examining the interrelationship of policy, leadership, and party finances.

I. Dr. Manion and Business

The Conservative Party was in financial difficulties almost continuously from 1933 to 1943. During these ten

years, the Party decisively lost two general elections and disposed of four leaders in a desperate search for the magic formula that would guarantee success. Whether the straitened finances sprang from Conservatism's disarray, or whether the defeats and the uncertainties of leadership resulted from a financial blockade is, like the old saw about the chicken and the egg, impossible to determine. What is clear is that the nadir of Canadian Conservatism occurred during a period in which a succession of leaders had tremendous difficulties in finding enough money to carry on the business of political organization.

Rt. Hon. R.B. Bennett's Conservative Party had won the general election of 1930 with the aid of a superb, efficient organization run by General A.D. McRae of Vancouver. To judge from the results it produced, the financial organization must have been similarly well run. In Montreal alone, more than \$575,000 was collected from most of the city's corporate concerns. One list of these 1930 donors indicated the following contributors:

Atlantic Sugar Company	\$10,000
Hon. C.C. Ballantyne	2,500
Bank of Montreal	50,000
Belding-Corticelli Ltd.	2,500
Henry Birk and Sons	2,500
Brandram-Henderson Co.	2,000 and 1,500 subsequently
B.C. Telephone Co.	5,000
Canada Cement Co.	17,500
Canada Starch Co.	3,000
Canada Sugar Refining Co.	10,000

Canadian Bag Co.)		
Consumers Cordage Co.)	\$	3,000
Canadian Car and Foundry Co.		35,000
Canadian Cottons		6,500
Canadian Fairbanks-Morse Co.		1,000
Canadian Industries		10,000
Canadian Pacific Railway		50,000
B.J. Coughlin Co.		500
Canadian Consolidated Rubber Co.		7,000
Canadian Vickers		7,000
Dominion Bridge Co.		20,000 and 5,000
		subsequently
Dominion Oilcloth Co.		10,000 and 5,000
		subsequently
Dominion Textile Co.)		
Montreal Cottons Co.)		
Paton Manufacturing Co.)	20,000	and 10,000
		subsequently
Drummond, McColl Co.		1,000
Dominion Glass Co.		5,000
Foundation Co.		10,000
Fraser Co.		5,000
Elwood Hosmer		1,000
Imperial Tobacco Co.		15,000
F.P. Jones		1,000
Hugh Mackay		500
J.W. McConnell		20,000
G.E. McCuaig		1,000
McDougall and Cowans		4,000
Melcher's Distilleries		1,000
Meredith, Holden, etc.		1,000
Molson's Brewery		12,500
Montreal Light, Heat and Power		
Interests		32,500
Montreal Star		25,000
A. McA. Murphy		100
National Breweries		25,000
National Steel Car Co.		10,000
J.C. Newman		5,000
Ogilvie Milling Co.		7,840
A.E. and G.L. Ogilvie		100
W.C. Pitfield		5,000
Rolland Paper Co.		5,000
Royal Bank of Canada		25,000
Shawinigan Water and Power		25,000
Sherwin Williams Co.		2,500
R.O. Sweezy		10,000
Hon. Lorne Webster		5,000
Hon. Smeaton White		3,000
C.R. Whitehead		5,000

Aluminum Ltd. \$544,040

\$21,500
10,000
 \$31,500

The accuracy of this listing^{3/} is unverifiable, but the presence of such men as Mr. J.W. McConnell, Senator C.C. Ballantyne, and Mr. J.C. Newman, and of such concerns as the Canadian Pacific Railway (C.P.R.) and the Bank of Montreal, suggest that it may be regarded as a reasonable compendium of Montreal contributors for the 1930 election.

The Conservative financial situation had altered drastically by 1935. The ever-worsening depression had eroded the base of Bennett's popular support, and his New Deal legislation had provoked a fierce reaction from the merchant class and from the Old Guard of the Party. The prominent Liberal industrialist, **Hon. Vincent Massey**, jeered in a letter to a friend that Bennett was "a self-appointed St. George. . . out to slay the dragon of 'uncontrolled capitalism,' of which until a few months ago he was the leading defender."^{4/} Understandably, the dragon's reaction was to withhold the contributions without which the Conservative campaign in the 1935 election could not function effectively. Financial problems were compounded by the collapse of the party organization. There was not a single Conservative government in office in any of the provinces in 1935; two years earlier there had been six. The superb machine that had won the 1930 election was no more. The offices had been closed, the files allowed to become outdated. The resurrected organization had no chance.^{5/} Bennett

was to remain as the leader of the battered Party until the summer of 1938. The Party he would turn over to his successor, Dr. Robert J. Manion, was at its lowest point.

Dr. Manion was a 56-year old physician from Fort William, Ontario, who had first been elected to Parliament as a Liberal Unionist in the 1917 election. Unlike many others, he had not returned to the Liberal fold after the war but had held portfolios in both of Meighen's short-lived administrations. He had served in the Bennett Government as Minister of Railways and Canals, losing his seat in the debacle of 1935. An outgoing, delightfully personable man, and a highly effective platform speaker, Manion had, nonetheless, made enemies with his forthright opinions. As Minister of Railways and Canals he had filled one of the hottest seats in Canadian politics, and in the opinion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, he had been judged wanting.

The railway question had bedevilled Canadian politics since Confederation. One of the greatest achievements of Sir John A. Macdonald's long career had been the construction of the nation-spanning Canadian Pacific Railway; his greatest humiliation had been the earlier "Pacific Scandal" caused by the revelation that his Party had accepted substantial campaign funds in the election of 1872 in return for the promise of the trans-continental charter. The Dominion had experienced a tremendous boom in railway construction in the last

decades of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth centuries, but the expansion had been shakily financed. The inevitable collapse could be postponed, but the railroads, particularly vital for Canada, could hardly be permitted to go out of business. This situation resulted in the formation of the Canadian National Railways, (C.N.R.) from a group of insolvent lines during and immediately after the Great War. The expansionist twenties had seen heavy expenditures made by both the C.N.R. and the C.P.R., and the onset of the Depression placed the two railways in difficulty. Revenues tumbled by more than one quarter, and the annual deficit of the C.N.R. exceeded \$60 million on two occasions. The burden of the C.N.R.'s losses fell on the government; the losses of the C.P.R. had to borne by its shareholders. This was an unsatisfactory state of affairs, and Sir Edward Beatty, the President of the C.P.R., proposed that the management of the two roads be unified, a solution that would supposedly produce yearly economies of \$75 million, sufficient to wipe out the heavy annual deficits of the C.N.R. and to ease the plight of the C.P.R.'s stockholders.^{6/}

Manion's assessment of the problem, characteristically offered with more vigour than tact, was that Beatty "desired to unload the C.P.R. on the people of Canada before it came crashing down around his ears,"^{7/} and he favoured a policy of "cooperation" between the

two great railways. Unification, he insisted, "would mean complete monopoly in the hands of one company of Canadian railway transportation. It would mean the building of huge voting power under one management. . . ." ^{8/}
 In view both of the huge sums involved and the close-knit nature of the Canadian "corporate élite," feelings on this issue ran deep.

The extent of the role played by the Canadian Pacific Railway in the leadership manoeuvrings before the Conservative Convention of July, 1938 is difficult to determine. Certainly Manion believed that Beatty ^{9/} was doing everything in his power to block his selection, and there can be no doubt that at least one candidate for the leadership of the Party carried on extensive conversations with the C.P.R. president in hope of winning his support. ^{10/} When it is considered that this aspirant was Hon. H.H. Stevens, the Bennett Cabinet Minister who had broken with his Party in 1935 because of his radical attitude to business, there can be little doubt that the C.P.R. was hunting for friendlier candidates.

Manion's election on the second ballot was a blow to the proponents of railway unification, as was the Conservative platform adopted by the Convention. The Party was declared to be against "any plan of unification or amalgamation of the great railways of Canada" and to favour a policy of cooperation, ^{11/} but Manion apparently ^{12/} had little to do with the passage of this resolution.

Hon. R.B. Hanson, briefly Bennett's Minister of Trade and Commerce and the chairman of the Convention Resolutions Committee, wrote that "no one could have got a resolution through the Committee or through the Convention, in favour of unification." The fact is, he added, "that the great mass of Canadians...are against this proposal and to advocate it in our party platform is only to commit suicide."^{13/} Nonetheless, if he was to succeed as leader of his Party, Manion would have to arrive at an accommodation with the C.P.R. and with the Montreal wing of Conservatism.

Manion's immediate efforts toward this end were unpromising. Because he warned in some of his first speeches as leader that the reform of the social order was the only alternative to "wreck, anarchy and revolution," he was assailed by the Conservative press of Montreal and Toronto. The Montreal Gazette, widely believed to be the spokesman for the C.P.R. and St. James Street financial interests, expressed itself most pointedly:

If the new leader has any inclination to move to the left he can, of course, indulge it, but he cannot take the Conservative party with him. In his own interest he should be warned against a false step which may lead him away from the great political element in this country upon whose support he must rely, a step which may conceivably compel that element to seek a new allegiance.^{14/}

The warning could not have been more clearly stated.

Manion noted this criticism, but he refused to alter a course which he felt was well received elsewhere

in the Dominion. "My terrible crime," he wrote his son, "has been that I have pointed out that if our system is to endure, we must give opportunity to youth and work and wages to people willing to take them."^{15/} He was privately convinced that the attacks had been made because of his attitude on railway unification,^{16/} but he apparently felt it necessary to assert his conservatism. "I am just as orthodox as anyone in my desire to preserve our economic system," he wrote to a Western Conservative, but " [I] believe that action is necessary at the present time to cure the blot of unemployment and to bring a greater measure of social justice to all our citizens."^{17/} Manion was no radical, but to certain elements in his Party he seemed so.

The problems of financing the Party's operations were not eased by Manion's first key appointment. Within a few weeks of his election, the leader had selected as his national organizer Dr. John Robb, a physician from the tiny Northern Ontario village of Blind River. Robb had some experience of provincial politics, but he was not a national figure and had no wide circle of acquaintances among the business and financial interests that might have served to circumvent the hostility already evident toward Manion.^{18/} Manion realized that the opposition to him in Montreal might make it more difficult to raise the money needed for organizational work, but he doubted that this would be impossible. However, as he noted in

a letter to his son, "quite frankly, we have not had much evidence to the contrary, as yet."^{19/}

The root cause of the Party's difficulties continued to be Manion's attitude to the railway problem. In letters and conversation with Beatty of the C.P.R., he refused to give ground in his opposition to railway unification.^{20/} As a result, Beatty could write to Bennett, who needed little convincing, that "I had quite a chat yesterday with your successor in Ottawa, and it only served to confirm my previous impression that he will not measure up to the office and lacks both the ability and wisdom to succeed men like Sir Robert, Arthur Meighen and yourself."^{21/} The pressures on Manion to be more pliant increased. Letters from Members of Parliament and from friends in late 1938 and 1939 urged him to reach an accommodation with Beatty and business.^{22/} Among these friends pleading with Manion was Major-General D.M. Hogarth, a wealthy mining promoter in Toronto, Manion's mentor on the stock market, and an influential figure in Conservative fund raising. In an extraordinarily frank letter, Hogarth assessed the attitude of the "money-bags" to the Manion Party:

As things stand whilst they are almost unanimously against King this element will be unanimously for him with their money and influence in preference to you and the Conservative party....I believe with all my heart and soul that this means disaster at the polls and that as time goes on

many [word illegible] who are presently behind you will be influenced by this element and you will be left holding an empty bag. You can't compete with the C.C.F....Even if you should... King and laissez-faire will be seized upon as the house of refuge and security. I beg you to heed this warning in shaping your course of action.

The Railway problem is of course the key to the situation - The Montreal Gang through various ramifications will freeze up the financial channels right across the country.... The strange part of it is that they do not want King.^{23/}

Hogarth then suggested a procedure which could right the situation.

"Despite your differences with A [Arthur] M [Meighen]," he wrote, "he is the man to use for the purpose of developing a formula. He has the confidence of this crowd, loathes...King and has a profound respect and liking for Bob M. [Manion]."^{24/} If Manion would only consent to talk to Meighen and to appear on the same platform with him, he would win the next election without doubt "and be certain of the wherewithal with which to fight it." Unfortunately by the time this letter was written in June, 1939, Manion was already out of patience (and probably out of favour) with the former Prime Minister. As Conservative leader in the Senate, Meighen had served on the Special Senate Committee on Railway Conditions and had been instrumental in producing a minority report calling for unification. After this embarrassing episode, Manion had met with Meighen in his chambers in the Parliament Buildings, had called him a "tool of the C.P.R.," and had told him to emphasize

in the future that he spoke only for himself and not for the Party.^{25/} With this in mind, Manion refused Hogarth's suggestion that he appear with Meighen, stating that if he did so he could only be regarded as a traitor to the Party's convention resolution against unification. The doughty Conservative concluded his reply with a firm declaration of principle:

You may be right regarding the impossibility of getting financial support with Beatty and his crowd bucking us but whether we get financial support or not I intend to possess my own soul and not be merely the hireling of Beatty and his little coterie. I had hoped that there were enough independent Conservatives to stand by the party...but if I am wrong...I and the party will have to face the consequences.^{26/}

The first instalment of the consequences was reflected on the Party's balance sheet. Some \$35,000 was still owing from the 1935 election,^{27/} and the Party's financial apparatus was meeting difficulty collecting sufficient funds to pay for the widespread organizational effort needed to build the Party into a contender for power. Immediately after his election in July, 1938, Manion had authorized Robb, his national organizer, and Mr. Allan Ross and Mr. Harry Price, two Toronto businessmen, to collect funds.^{28/} But from September to December, 1938, the Party collected only \$9,700. The next six months saw an additional \$33,500 taken in, but this was hardly sufficient to rebuild a nation-wide organization long in decay. All told, from August, 1938 to October, 1939, the Party raised

\$87,000 and spent \$94,500 for a deficit of over \$7,000.^{29/} Nonetheless, some progress was being made. Financial representatives were being appointed in the Maritimes and on the Prairies, contacts explored, and arrangements made for Manion to meet informally at dinner with groups of business leaders.^{30/} The results of these meetings, at which the affable Manion showed to his best advantage, gave some grounds for hope. "I imagine that I had been painted by our big business friends who are opposed to us as such a complete nitwit," he wrote of one Toronto gathering, "that they were somewhat surprised to find that I was presentable at all."^{31/}

Manion's problems were increased by his position on conscription, his attitude to Quebec, and other matters somewhat extraneous to this particular subject. Suffice it to say that Manion came out against conscription for overseas service in March, 1939, beating Prime Minister Mackenzie King to this declaration by a few days. Nonetheless, his supporters in Quebec pressed him to go even further, urging that he declare against an automatic commitment by Canada in the event of the United Kingdom becoming involved in a European war. At the same time, Manion was negotiating through intermediaries for an arrangement with Premier Duplessis of Quebec. An agreement was reached in August, 1939, for Union Nationale aid to the Conservative Party in the forthcoming federal election, but like the demands of Quebec

Conservatives, all came to naught with the Nazi invasion of Poland and the subsequent Canadian declaration of war.

The outbreak of war led to the establishment of a political truce between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. When King and Manion met on September 6, the day before the opening of the hastily called special session of Parliament, the Prime Minister promised that "there would be no general election certainly until after the next session--that is, the January session." Manion gladly accepted this, and he proposed that any necessary by-elections should not be contested, but should go by acclamation to the party that had previously held the seat.^{32/} A political ceasefire, and one without stated duration, was in effect.

The truce was taken very seriously by the Conservatives. All organization was stopped, and the party offices in Ottawa were rented to the High Commissioner for Eire. Unofficially, some local organization was continued throughout the country, but when Dr. Robb, the national organizer, submitted a plan for a reduced headquarters establishment, Manion's rejoinder was that if he wanted to keep the organization in operation, he would have to pay the costs himself. In part at least, as indicated by Manion's words, the total cessation of organization was the result of the Party's inability to raise money. As soon as the war broke out, Manion wrote, "those who were kind enough to help us simply told us:

'Well there is a war on now and we will not assist political organizations' and they have stayed by that resolution--so much so that, confidentially, we have not been able to pay off the money we owe...."^{33/} In September, 1939, the Party still was in debt some \$22,500.^{34/}

The Liberal organization, on the other hand, suffered little difficulty in financing a major campaign in Quebec in October, 1939, when Duplessis' bid to secure a renewed mandate on a non-participationist platform was squelched with the assistance of a determined effort by the federal cabinet. Hon. J.G. Gardiner, King's Minister of Agriculture, apparently played a major role in financing the election with his efforts in Toronto. The chief contact in Toronto was a Dr. W.P. St. Charles, a man with extensive connections in the mining industry. Gardiner also solicited contributions from large corporations, Simpson's and Canada Packers, for example, and played a role in directing the efforts of the Globe and Mail along proper channels.^{35/} His success was most noticeable, for one Conservative reported to Manion that he had heard "on the best authority" that the King administration "if necessary, are going to spend \$1,000,000 in Quebec to win this election."^{36/}

None of this was good news to Manion. The Conservative leader believed that the only reason for the federal government's intervention in the Quebec election had been to "give Lapointe and his gang a chance to get their

filthy machine back in power down there,"^{37/} and he was well aware that his own Party in Quebec had split into pro- and anti-Duplessis factions. The chances of aid from the Union Nationale in the general election were now gone. Duplessis' support, while it might still be of value in Quebec, would lose the Conservatives more votes in English Canada than it could possibly gain in Quebec.

II. The Election of 1940

Manion did not have long to wait for an opportunity to test the temper of the nation. Mackenzie King's sudden dissolution of Parliament on the first day of the 1940 session caught the Conservatives by surprise. The central offices were still closed down, financial representatives had not been appointed in all the provinces, and only tentative arrangements yet existed for providing Manion with a research and publicity staff for the session.^{38/} On the day after King's coup, however, Manion announced that if he was elected he would form a National Government, a government of the "best brains" in the country. This step had been taken with the full support of the Conservative caucus,^{39/} as had the decision to fight the election on a policy of no conscription for overseas service.^{40/}

The unforeseen election made the financial position of the Party even more critical. Despite the war, the railway problem remained as the thorn in the Conservative

leader's side. Even R.B. Hanson, earlier a strong opponent of any concessions to the proponents of unification, was wavering. The cause, evidently, was the difficulty of getting financial support: "I feel sure you will have great difficulty in getting funds together," he wrote to Manion. "In Montreal, the people who usually do for the party want a National Government and they want something done about the Railway question." The only answer, the New Brunswick Conservative stated, was to declare for unified management, holding out only against physical amalgamation.^{41/} Manion had already declared for National Government, but it was highly unlikely that he would or could modify his forcibly expressed views on the railway problem. At this point, however, he was offered a packaged solution to all his problems.

On January 28, only three days after the dissolution, Manion came to Toronto at the request of a former Cabinet colleague, Hon. Wesley Gordon of Haileybury, Ontario. Gordon proposed that Manion issue a statement, and he produced a draft in his own handwriting, to the effect that after the election the Conservative leader, if successful, would permit the elected representatives chosen to support National Government to select the man to form the government.^{42/} If this was done, the implication was clear, financial difficulties would vanish overnight. Manion was being asked to fight the election, win it, and then step aside. Of course, Gordon said,

it was unthinkable that the caucus would spurn the victorious leader, but Manion did not believe this:

I went into a rage [He later recorded], telling him that this was merely a scheme to get rid of me should I win, that it was another move of the Montreal gang to get me out of the way....I talked pretty rough...and of course I refused point blank. ^{43/}

This rejection did not stop a deluge of similar pleas in the next ten days. His friend, Don Hogarth, sent a letter urging support for the plan: "There is positively nothing on the ball but what is stated," he said, "to ensure the defeat of King throu ^{44/} [sic] the leadership of Bob Manion"- and he enclosed a long memorandum from Arthur Meighen ^{45/} warmly endorsing it. According to Colonel C.E. Reynolds, President of the Canadian Corps Association and another of those who called upon the hard-pressed Manion at this time, Mitchell Hepburn, Premier of Ontario, also ^{46/} agreed with the proposal. In addition, Manion's two principal money raisers, Harry Price and Allan Ross, joined with several other ^{47/} Toronto Conservatives to press the scheme upon the leader. "I told them, among other things," Manion later noted, "that if I did not get a vote at all I should rather own my own soul than follow this stupid course" ^{48/}

The inventor of this truly extraordinary plan is unknown, but certainly the idea was a foolish one. Manion believed that he was being asked to act as "a sort of front man" for Bennett or Meighen. ^{49/} Mr. Howard Ferguson, the former Premier of Ontario who had also

urged the plan on Manion, was told by him that "I would at once be accused by the liberals ... of promising such things as no conscription ... and that I was to be bought out immediately after ... to allow Bennett or Meighen or some other to do things I had promised I should not do." ^{50/} It is impossible to judge the accuracy of Manion's assessment, but in the Byzantine atmosphere that characterized Conservative politics at this time, it would seem unlikely that he was far off the mark. Certainly if he had agreed to the proposal, he would have been devastatingly attacked by the Liberals.

Having refused to consider stepping aside in the event of victory, Manion was now faced with the necessity of organizing his financial apparatus as quickly as possible. The result was the formation of a "Toronto Committee." The committee varied in size, but it included as its key participants Allan Ross and Harry Price, both of whom had been collectors for Manion since 1938; Colonel William Price, Attorney-General of Ontario from 1926 to 1934; Mr. J. Earl Lawson, a Bennett Cabinet Minister in 1935 and the Member of Parliament for York South, Ontario; and Mr. Rupert Bain, a prominent Toronto stockbroker. ^{51/} The role of the group was primarily to coordinate the raising of money, but as Allan Ross, the National Treasurer, wrote his leader in March, the committee had turned into a "little strategy group" dealing with "all kinds of political questions." ^{52/}

The Toronto committee seemingly functioned on both a national and a provincial level in its financial role. Colonel Price was the Ontario financial representative, and his membership on the committee served to coordinate matters. A similar group was in charge of fund raising in Montreal, but this committee apparently lacked a policy-shaping role. The key figure in Quebec Province was Mr. George B. Foster, a barrister and company director, who was provincial financial representative as well as the leader of the Montreal committee. His committee members were Senator C.C. Ballantyne, part owner of Sherwin-Williams Co. and a director of numerous companies, Colonel W.P. O'Brien, a stockbroker; and Mr. J.C.H. Dussault, a lawyer and company director.^{53/}

In the other provinces, the financial representatives were as follows:^{54/}

Nova Scotia:	Mr. F.T. Stanfield, Truro (President of Stanfield's Ltd.)
New Brunswick:	Senator George B. Jones, Apohaqui (Merchant and company director)
Prince Edward Island:	Dr. W.J. MacMillan, Charlottetown (Physician and Leader of the Opposition in the Legislature)
Manitoba:	Mr. H.R. Drummond-Hay, Winnipeg (Lawyer and mining company director)
Saskatchewan:	Mr. James Rutley, Regina
Alberta:	Mr. H.R. Milner, Edmonton (Lawyer and company director)
	Mr. Rube Ward, Calgary (President, Canadian Bakeries Ltd. and company director)
British Columbia:	Mr. A.C. Desbrisay, Vancouver

In general terms, the money raised by these provincial representatives was used within their provinces, but this

probably amounted to no more than 15 per cent of the money raised by the Party. Understandably, the bulk of the funds was found in Ontario and Quebec, and these provinces supported the central fund of the Party. Of this central fund, national advertising took perhaps 30 to 40 per cent, while the remainder was devoted to supporting candidates in ridings across the country where the Party was believed to have a good chance.^{55/} (Part of the central fund was devoted to staffing the Party's headquarters during the campaign.)^{56/} The decision as to which candidates were to receive assistance was apparently made in each province, or at least this was the case in Ontario where Joseph Harris, M.P., was the key man in this regard.^{57/}

Conservative funds in 1940 were raised in the traditional way: by appeals to companies and wealthy individuals. Rupert Bain of the Toronto committee had suggested that the American "Jackson Day Dinner" could be adapted to Conservative needs, and he had estimated, perhaps over-optimistically, that \$250,000 could be raised in this way in Toronto alone.^{58/} This plan was never put into effect, nor apparently was any attempt made to raise money by popular appeal. In retrospect, the failure to search for alternative methods can only be seen as a major error, for certainly in 1940 the traditional methods did not work for the Conservative Party.

The Problem was centred in Montreal. The Gazette and the Star, both traditionally Conservative newspapers, were

either lukewarm to Manion or, in the case of the Star, supporting Mackenzie King. Whether these newspapers shaped opinion in Montreal or merely reflected it, their attitude was symptomatic of the plight of Manion's fund raisers there. The effect of this drought was felt elsewhere. New Brunswick had always received its funds through Montreal; Hanson wrote to Meighen in a letter pleading for his intervention in that city, but nothing was forthcoming this time. "I could handle my own position," he wrote, "but no other candidate in New Brunswick can do this and we have got to have money for them." The tragedy, Hanson added, was that the prospects were excellent in New Brunswick.^{59/} Meighen's reply, while indicating that he had made efforts in Montreal, was not hopeful. With J.W. McConnell and the Star opposed "and the others quite frigid toward our present leader,"^{60/} he wrote, "I don't think we can get anywhere there."

The situation did not improve as the campaign progressed. In March the campaign was still being financed on a day-to-day basis, and current accounts were in arrears.^{61/} Candidates who had been promised financial support from the central office either received less than had been pledged or, in some cases, nothing at all. One candidate, promised \$2,250, received only \$1,250, and less than \$100,000 in all was available for Ontario, the Province in which Party prospects were brightest.^{62/} Throughout the nation as a whole, one Conservative fund raiser later estimated, the Party

spent between \$470,000 and \$500,000 in 1940, finishing the campaign \$25,000 in debt.^{63/}

The same source estimated that his Party's expenditures were only one quarter or one third that of the Liberals.

Liberal expenditures are unknown, but the late Senator Norman Lambert, President of the National Liberal Federation in 1940, has been quoted as

saying that his Party spent \$1 million in the election.^{64/}

This figure may be low, but if it is accepted, the Liberals evidently spent twice as much as the Conservatives. Manion's radicalism and his unfriendly attitude to business and the C.P.R. had cost him and his Party dearly.

The Manion Papers contain a list dated April 22, 1940, well after the election, of contributors of more than \$1,000 to the Conservative campaign. The list follows:^{65/}

H.R. Bain	\$ 1,500
Goodyear Tire and Rubber	1,500
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt	23,000
Imperial Oil	10,000
Hill, Hill & Hill	10,000
Imperial Oil	10,000
John Frame and Co.	4,946.98
Little Long Lac Gold Mines	2,500
Fred Page Higgins	2,500
Dufferin Construction Co.	5,000
N. Urquhart	10,500
McLean	20,000
T.A. Russell	10,000
Imperial Oil	5,000
Jack Hammell	2,500
B.A. Oil	10,000
Bank of Nova Scotia	5,000
Bob Bryce	4,000
Algoma Steel	5,000
General Steel Wares Co.	5,000
Pickle Crow	2,500

General Steel Wares Co.	\$ 5,000
St. Mary's Cement	2,000
Percy Gardiner	10,000
Houson	4,000
Hollinger	5,000
Famous Players Canadian Corp.	2,500
Bethune Smith	10,000
International Nickel Co.	5,000
Dufferin Construction Co.	2,000
Bunny (G.B.) Foster	3,000
do (Hill)	6,500

The total is \$205,446.98. Some comparisons can readily be made with the list from the 1930 election cited earlier. In the first place, the total raised in 1940 is much less than that found in 1930 in Montreal alone. Such 1930 contributors as the C.P.R., the Bank of Montreal, the Montreal Star, J.W. McConnell, heavy industries, power companies and the like were apparently not contributors in 1940. The Canadian Pacific Railway could not have been expected to support Manion. McConnell's Star was supporting the Liberals, and he could not have been expected to contribute. Where, then, was the industrial support? First, industry probably believed that Manion was a radical, and hence unworthy of support. In addition, the war made government contracts extremely valuable, and this fear of offending the Liberals could have been an important factor. Most important, perhaps, Manion simply did not appear to have a chance of forming the government. In this circumstance, the other factors militating against the Conservatives were reinforced, and the result was the election of only 39 Conservatives to the House of Commons.

III. The Plight of the Party

Manion's brief tenure of the leadership of the Conservative Party came to an abrupt end at the first caucus of the Conservative Members of Parliament in May 1940. For some weeks the defeated leader had been writing innumerable letters indicating his wish to step down from his onerous responsibilities,^{66/} and there is little reason to believe that he was other than sincere in this feeling. The alacrity with which the caucus accepted his resignation, however, was a grievous blow, and Manion ended his association with Conservatism in some bitterness.^{67/} His successor, selected by the caucus after several ballots, was Hon. R.B. Hanson of Fredericton. Briefly a Minister in Bennett's Cabinet, Hanson had extensive Parliamentary experience and was believed to be sound and able. His position was uncertain, for he had not been selected by a full convention, and Hanson hesitated to make policy or to take irrevocable steps. His urgent task was to keep the party alive, however, and it was this which occupied most of his time for the next eighteen months.

Very little effort would have been necessary to kill the Party. The disastrous election had left its federal organization in a state of collapse, and the provincial Parties were scarcely better off. No Conservative government was in office anywhere, and there were Party leaders in only five provinces. In Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Quebec, Hanson noted, the Party had virtually

"ceased to exist."^{68/} Without strong provincial parties upon which to build, the process of reorganizing the federal Party would be slow and exceedingly difficult.

If the Party were to live at all, money was immediately necessary. It was not forthcoming. Had Meighen taken the leadership in May 1940, as many had hoped he might, the problem would have been solved. Sir Edward Beatty, Hanson had been told, had guaranteed relief from financial worries, but "when Mr. Meighen decided not to come, this undertaking no longer obtained."^{69/} Possibilities for fund raising existed in Montreal now that Manion was gone, but the sudden collapse of the European front in the spring of 1940 took the heart out of attempts to approach contributors. As a result, while Hanson was estimating that \$5,000 per month was necessary for effective organization,^{70/} the Party on July 1, 1940, had a bank balance of \$222.94.^{71/} So serious was the Party's plight that the salaries of the regular office staff were placed in jeopardy, and Hanson was reduced to pleading that "I need \$1000 before the end of the week. I could put this up myself and impoverish my family, but I do not see any use in doing that."^{72/} In desperation, Hanson at last was forced to appeal to the Members of Parliament and Senators for contributions to keep the headquarters operating.^{73/} Each gave \$50, and this device raised \$3,350. Apparently this was all the money available for the last six months of 1940.^{74/}

Hanson's despairing search for money was made more

urgent by his belief that if the Conservative Party died the only alternative to the Liberals would be the socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. Hanson's fears were based on information given him by a CCF Member of Parliament that organized labour, "controlled, I am told, directly by the C.I.O. in Indianapolis," had come to an arrangement with the CCF to make a bid for power at the next election. This was based on the theory, he said, "first that the present government would be defeated at the next election, second that the Conservative Party was too weak to form an alternative government." The policy of such a labour-CCF link, he added, "is to be National Socialism."^{75/} Other Conservatives were reaching the same conclusions. "I am trying to put together some thoughts on the desirability of a resurgence of the Conservative Party," Mr. J.M. Macdonnell, President of the National Trust Company, wrote from Toronto to his friend, Mr. John W. Dafoe of the Winnipeg Free Press. "The lower we fall, the more I feel we are needed. The opposition should not be allowed to get into the hands of the CCF. Only a handful of people in this country want Socialism."^{76/}

James MacKerras Macdonnell was an extraordinary man. Born in 1884, he had been a Rhodes Scholar and had served with distinction in the Great War. Although he was a Conservative by inheritance and conviction both, he was not bound by the dogma that inhibited so many of his compatriots, and perhaps because of this, he had been

asked to join the King Government in June, 1940. Deeply patriotic though he was, he had refused the offer, believing that it was a serious matter to leave one's party.^{77/} Troubled about the condition of Conservatism, Macdonnell was searching for some way to assist in restoring the Party's fortunes when, by chance, he met Hanson on the train to Montreal on December 7, 1940.

The two men talked of the Party, and Macdonnell suggested that a confidential and informal meeting to discuss organization and finances might be useful. Hanson was overjoyed, and within the week plans were in hand for the meeting. With Hanson's complete agreement, Macdonnell decided that with the exception of one or two Senators long prominent in party financing, no members of the Parliamentary Party would be invited other than Hanson himself. If some were asked, the two believed, others would be jealous. For similar reasons, it was decided to permit no publicity.^{78/}

The meeting, "a meeting of friends in no way intended to be representative in any technical sense",^{79/} convened at the Mount Royal Hotel in Montreal on January 11 and 12, 1941, "for the purpose of considering what they could do to assist the Party to resume the important part it has played in the maintenance of constitutional government in Canada."^{80/} Representatives from every province except Prince Edward Island, numbering some thirty in all, were present. The guests included Mr. George Drew, Mr. Hugh Mackay, and Mr. John Diefenbaker

(provincial Party leaders in Ontario, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan), seven members of Manion's defunct financial organization, and a number of prominent industrialists and financiers.^{81/} Discussion was wide ranging but was centered on the need to rebuild the Party's organization.

The meeting did more than talk. The guests agreed to use their collective influence to raise funds for the establishment of a Central Federal Organization. On Hanson's advice that \$60,000 annually would be necessary (\$20,000 for salaries and expenses and the balance for publicity) financial committees were created in Toronto and Montreal, each responsible for half the required amount.^{82/} The Montreal committee was formed of Mr. George B. Foster, Senator C.C. Ballantyne, and Colonel W.P. O'Brien, all of whom had previously raised funds for the Party. Macdonnell headed the Toronto committee, assisted by Mr. Robert Bryce, a mining engineer, and Mr. R.A. Laidlaw, a financier and company director. None of the Toronto group was an experienced "bag-man," and perhaps for this reason it was more inventive than the Montrealers who relied on the traditional method of collecting from large corporations. Macdonnell arranged a dinner for thirty guests and asked each for \$1,000. Senator A.D. McRae, Bennett's organizer in 1930, was one of those invited. He "nearly queered the pitch," Hanson wrote, "by telling the meeting... that \$5,000 a month was a bagatelle, and that when he started out with Bennett, previous to the 1930 election, they had a budget of from

\$25,000 to \$30,000 a month, which I understand Bennett paid out of his own pocket. We are," Hanson added, "a little more modest."^{83/}

The Montreal meeting was an interesting development. It illustrated the fact, first, that Hanson had been unable to construct his own financial organization in the seven months he had held the leadership. This was, of course, not his fault, but was rather the result of the Manion legacy, the war, and the disorganization of the Party. Had Macdonnell not provided the lead, it is quite possible that the Conservative Party would have expired from financial malnutrition. Another point is that the Montreal committee established by the meeting was made up of the "old guard" of Party financiers: Foster, Ballantyne, and O'Brien. Characteristically, the Quebec committee chose to conduct its campaign along traditional lines by appealing to business and industry. In the Ontario capital, by way of contrast, a new group adopted a novel approach. A third point is that the two committees were established by the meeting, not as had always been the custom by the party leader. The uncertainty of the leader's position, the condition of the Party, and the circumstances that led to the gathering had made that body itself into the directing force in party finances.

The reorganization of the Conservative Party was given considerable impetus by the Montreal meeting. Difficulties still remained, however, as pledges proved difficult to convert into cash, and the hope of \$60,000

soon faded. In all, only \$36,000 was collected, and of this figure Toronto raised almost twice as much as did Montreal.^{84/} Strenuous efforts to collect the balance failed,^{85/} but the money raised was a far cry from the \$3,300 squeezed from the Members of Parliament and Senators, and some organizational work was begun. The caucus made plans for a Party conference in the fall of 1941 and selected Mr. Gordon Graydon, M.P. for Peel, Ontario, as the National Chairman. Graydon set to work immediately and spent \$6,500 on a prolonged organizing trip across the country. The provincial Party in Nova Scotia received a grant of \$2,500, and \$9,000 was sent to Saskatchewan in a vain effort to revive faltering Conservatism on the Prairies. A further \$9,600 was spent by the Party offices in Ottawa.^{86/} "With regard to organization," Hanson soon could write, "let me say that we are now well on our way."^{87/} The beginning had been made, and both Macdonnell and Hanson deserved well of their Party.

IV. From Meighen to Bracken

The return of Arthur Meighen to the Conservative leadership in November, 1941, altered the situation once again. A meeting of the parliamentary Party, defeated candidates from the 1940 election, and leading Conservatives from across the nation had been summoned to Ottawa to decide on the time and place for a national leadership convention. Over the vigorous objections of J.M. Macdonnell and a small group of maverick western delegates, the purpose of the conference was subverted, and Meighen was

selected as leader. Apparently the new leader had not been a party to the coup, but his loathing for Mackenzie King's policies was such that he accepted the proffered leadership. His return meant the scrapping of the laboriously raised structure created at Montreal in January, 1941, and the creation of a new financial organization.^{88/}

The new set-up, its operations and its results, were kept highly confidential, and apparently even Hanson (who remained as Leader of the Opposition) knew little of the details beyond the fact that General McRae was the head of Meighen's group.^{89/} Theoretically, there ought to have been no difficulty in financing the Meighen Party. "I took my present post," the new leader wrote, "on certain definite understandings and one of them covered [finance]. .."^{90/} (Meighen's biographer has indicated obliquely that \$200,000 was to be provided for the Party's needs.)^{91/} Meighen had been guaranteed relief from financial worries, and this undertaking might have been carried out had he not suffered defeat in his attempt to enter the House of Commons in the Toronto constituency of York South in February, 1942.

The York South by-election is one of the more interesting episodes in the politics of the war years. Meighen, twice Prime Minister and the leader of the Conservative Party, was matched against an unknown CCF school teacher, Mr. Joseph Noseworthy. There is no room here for an extended analysis of the reasons for Meighen's defeat. To the Conservative leader, the reason

for the debacle was obvious: Mackenzie King had so feared his presence in the House that he had aided the CCF in accomplishing his defeat. Members of the old CCF deny this, maintaining that the victory was a triumph of organization. Some candid Party members have admitted, however, that some Liberal aid was given, but this, they say, did not extend beyond the provision of some cars on election day. No financial aid, they maintain, was received from the Liberals either directly or indirectly. This writer's investigations tend to support the case advanced by the CCF workers. Certainly the CCF was well organized for the fight. The little Party spent \$5,000 in the riding, probably the most it had ever managed to raise for a single constituency, and this money was collected by strenuous efforts all across the nation.^{92/} As only the campaign manager received a salary, the Party received the maximum use for its money: twenty-two billboards, literature, seven radio broadcasts, and \$1,000 in newspaper advertising.^{93/}

Meighen's campaign, on the other hand, seems to have been financed almost entirely out of his own pocket. Of the \$7,150 expended in the unsuccessful fight, all but \$160 was provided by the Conservative leader.^{94/} Meighen's funds were spent for twenty-six radio broadcasts (\$1,823), for billboards (\$1,048) and for the production and distribution of leaflets (\$2,700).^{95/}

To Meighen, the defeat was only another bitter incident in a continuing political tragedy. For the Party it was

a crushing blow.

When Meighen failed to win his seat, Hanson wrote in May 1942, "this new financial set up did not have to function....They recognize no duty to us and we are left just where we were in the year 1940."^{96/} In some ways, indeed, the situation was now worse. "Your failure to get a seat," Hanson wrote to Meighen of his conversation with a Montreal Conservative,

had given the movement a black eye. They have no faith at the moment that we can come back. Briefly, according to him, they (the people with money to whom we could look for support) think a) that King will be defeated at the next General Election b) that the CCF will likely have the largest group in the next House of Commons....^{97/}

Certainly this was Hanson's fear as well, and he believed that the pressing need was in Saskatchewan. The Party there had to be kept alive as an alternative to the Liberals, or the inevitable CCF victory would have calamitous effects federally. If \$75,000 could be raised for this task, he said, the CCF could be defeated in Saskatchewan.^{98/} For self-defence, mortgage and trust companies, wholesalers, and "representatives of the creditor class, generally," should do what they could to defeat socialism by helping the Conservative Party.^{99/} The immediate effect of these pleas is unclear, but apparently some money (although not \$75,000) was sent from Montreal and Toronto in the summer and fall of 1942.^{100/}

The federal organization had less success in finding money for itself. By September, 1942, little more than

\$1,000 remained of the \$30,000 collected in 1941.^{101/} No contributions had been received since November, 1941, and Meighen apparently was making no efforts to correct this situation. In addition, the Party was bitterly divided on the Hong Kong affair, on conscription, and on the best way to counter the CCF threat. During the summer of 1942, the Conservative Party seemed beyond saving.

At this low point, J.M. Macdonnell once again provided the needed direction and leadership. This time the lead was given in the area of policy rather than finance. Although the Party had no money, it had not lost its reputation as the Party of the "interests." Macdonnell dealt a severe blow to this image. Working with many of the same people who had attended the Montreal meeting and with some of those who had fought with him against Meighen's selection as leader, Macdonnell organized a "thinker's" conference at Port Hope, Ontario, in September 1942. This meeting produced a platform which scrapped the high tariff, took an advanced view of labour problems, and put the Party on record in favour of social welfare legislation. The Conservative Party had moved to the left of the Liberals.

Within a few weeks of Port Hope, Arthur Meighen called a national convention. The convention met at Winnipeg in December 1942, and produced far-reaching changes in the Party. Most important for the immediate future was the choice of Hon. John Bracken as leader. The Liberal-

Progressive Premier of Manitoba for twenty years, Bracken was slow, cautious, and inexperienced in federal politics, but he had the reputation of being a genuine Prairie progressive. This would do the newly christened Progressive Conservative Party (so named at the new leader's suggestion) no harm if the main fight was, as expected, to be against the CCF. Party finance was apparently not widely discussed at Winnipeg, but in the following weeks attempts were made to build a firm, permanent foundation for the Bracken Party.

The key figure in the reorganization of the Party was Mr. Richard A. Bell. At the age of 21, Bell had been Assistant Private Secretary to the Minister of National Revenue in the Bennett Government's last year. He had then served as assistant Dominion organizer in the 1935 election, as Private Secretary to Manion and Hanson, and as the organizer of the Winnipeg convention. Able and pragmatic, Bell led the attempt to establish a new financial structure. In one letter written at the end of December, 1942, Bell estimated the Party's needs for 1943 at \$150,000 to \$250,000, and he urged that fund raising begin immediately before the favourable psychological effect of Bracken's selection was dissipated. Then, in a suggestive approach, Bell recommended that consideration be given to the "democratization" of fund raising. Bracken's aim, he said, was to build a people's party, and the best way to achieve this was to appeal to Party supporters to assist their political

organizations in the same way they assisted their church.^{102/} More would be heard of this idea in the future, but the pressing need for money necessitated recourse to the "old" methods.

Certainly the Progressive Conservative Party's prospects seemed promising. One Alberta Conservative wrote that "in one afternoon we got \$6,000.00. Without touching the people who would give \$200.00 or less," he added, "we hope to make this a pot of about \$10,000.00 which is substantial for this Province."^{103/} R.B. Hanson, soon to be replaced as Leader of the Opposition by Gordon Graydon (who was to remain in that position until Bracken chose to enter the House after the 1945 election), was also attempting to leave a healthy organization for Bracken. He was thinking in terms of a fund of "at least \$250 M,"^{104/} he said, and one firm "was prepared to go 50 grand at once...."^{105/} In addition, Hanson pointed out, Bracken would have no income until he won a seat in the House, and at least \$1,000 a month should be made available for his personal use.^{106/}

Despite these efforts, the initiative was lost. With a new, still hesitant leader and without a mandate from duly constituted authority, the members of the Port Hope group, the "Port Hopefuls" they were called, tended to draw back. "What I am afraid of," Bell wrote, "is that we may fall into the situation where no one feels that they have the jurisdiction and nothing will be done until Mr. Bracken gets his feet on the ground, which

may be some little time."^{107/} This sudden concern for form had another important effect. "If we are not very quickly able to make it apparent that there is a new crowd taking hold," J.M. Macdonnell wrote,

there will be widespread disappointment, inevitably a feeling that there has really been very little change except the advent of a new leader, and incidentally a feeling on the part of the leader that he is in a rather false position....

While the raising of money is only one feature of this.../and/while I have the highest regard for Bunnie Foster and Ballantyne, and while I do not question the wisdom of...leaving the money-raising in their hands in Montreal, nevertheless we must face the fact that this will be construed as the continuation in control of the Old Guard. If that happens in Toronto also I think it will be a great misfortune.^{108/}

The situation grew worse. In February, Macdonnell wrote that he, certainly, did not know the Party's financial position:

Does anyone know the full position? Is anyone firmly guiding matters or have we a situation where people are working in compartments, where one group is raising money without any very clear-cut idea as to what is to be done with it and where others are anxious that things should be done and have no means of knowing whether money is available?^{109/}

Later in the month, after a trip to Montreal, Macdonnell answered his own questions:

Foster told me that he and Ballantyne were doing nothing at the moment. I understand that they were waiting till the situation clarified, that in particular before collecting in Montreal they wished to know what was being done in Toronto--the names of the Toronto committee etc.^{110/}

At last, in April, 1943, Bracken appointed Bell to the newly created position of National Director of the Party. With responsibilities extending to all phases

of organization, Bell's job included the allocation and disbursing of funds to the federal Party organizations in the provinces, a task which always produced acrimony as each organization attempted to press its claims.^{111/} And according to the one published study of the Conservative Party, the 30-year old Bell was also to play "the major role in negotiating for enough money to maintain the party between elections."^{112/}

One index of the success of Bell's work is the amount of money raised by the Party in 1943. A financial statement, listing the year's expenditures, provides one guide to this total.^{113/}

Salaries	\$ 21,000	
Research	10,058	
Special Allowances	10,300	
Travel	9,288	
Rent	2,040	
Organization:		
Grants to Provinces	64,079	
Printing and Publicity	19,742	
<u>Public Opinion</u>	13,986	[Monthly newspaper]
Miscellaneous	22,939.52	
	<hr/>	
	\$173,432.52	

The new leader, the new lead in organization provided by Bell, and the increasing fear of the CCF on the part of the business community had resulted in a respectable sum for the Party.

V. The Popular Finance Campaign

Despite the Party's successes in 1943, Bell was still dissatisfied with the rigid, inflexible methodology of money raising. He had long had the intention of making the collection process more democratic, and as National Director he was in a position to put his ideas into play.

When, therefore, J.M. Macdonnell wrote to him in July, 1943, suggesting that it would be fatal for the Progressive Conservative Party to be dependent on "a few rich men,"^{114/} Bell was able to reply that "we are working on a plan to raise money in small amounts. An appeal will be made under the Chief's signature...."^{115/}

This first appeal, presumably on a trial basis, was made in October 1943, in the second edition of the Party's monthly newspaper, Public Opinion. Under the headline, "Progressive Conservative Leader Seeks Realistic Approach to Organization For Political Purposes," Bracken asked for small contributions:

... the money must come from those who are interested--the people themselves. I am, therefore, asking for your financial support for our organization. We desire small contributions from large numbers of people. The contributions will be used to build an organization with no other purpose than to bring about better conditions in Canada..
..^{116/}

The response to this first appeal is unknown, but the results were apparently promising enough to justify planning a major national campaign.

The idea was developed further at a meeting of the staff of Party headquarters in the fall of 1943.

All agreed that the time had come to make a wide appeal to the public for contributions to support the national organization and to assist in waging the coming election fight. A national advertising campaign was necessary, not only to assist the campaign for funds, but also to show the public that the Party was drawing away from its dependence on big business. The CCF's best weapon, the headquarters' staff believed, was this claim that the Progressive Conservative Party was the captive of the "interests"; a properly conducted campaign could neutralize this charge. Such a campaign would be expensive, however, and the results in terms of cash receipts would have to be substantial enough to pay the costs of the advertising and yet leave something for the Party. The theme of the popular appeal was to be built around the "party's position as the sole custodian of political liberty and economic opportunity. Both the Liberals and the CCF lay emphasis on security rather than opportunity", the planners believed, "and herein lies the one palpable difference between the Progressive Conservatives and their political opponents." The aim was to "sell people a share in the future of their country and an insurance policy to protect their political heritage and their freedom of opportunity."^{117/}

An elaborate structure was to be raised to conduct the drive. A National Board of Trustees to include representatives of labour, agriculture, small business, and at least one woman would be set up under a chairman

of national repute. A publicity campaign, including advertisements in the press, on radio, and by direct mail, would be launched as soon as possible. A series of provincial conferences would be held and provincial campaign committees organized. To be formed with the assistance of the Party's provincial organizers, these committees would ideally be composed of hitherto inactive Conservatives who had gained fund-raising experience by participating in Victory Loan campaigns. Provinces would be subdivided into regions, and the regional committees would handle the actual canvassing in the constituencies. The entire organization was to be in the charge of a professional fund raiser who would endeavour to keep the operation running at fever pitch.^{118/}

Subscribers would receive a certificate, suitable for framing, stating the Party's aims and principles. Persons contributing \$2 or more would get subscriptions to Public Opinion. The hope was that the widest possible support would be found, and to this end canvassers were to be instructed not to ask for more than \$25. Contributors would also be assured that the money would be properly spent and that a substantial proportion (how much was not clear) would remain in the donor's constituency. From time to time, too, publicity would be given to the progress of the campaign, but this could obviously be done only if the drive was successful.^{119/}

The preparation of the publicity material for the Popular Finance Campaign was entrusted to the advertising agency of McConnell, Eastman and Company. A series of four 200-line newspaper ads would open the campaign on the theme

"Preserve Our Political Heritage and Enlarge Our Economic Opportunities." The ads would include coupons inviting contributions of \$1 to \$25. Each of the four layouts would be run twice in the daily newspapers and once in the weeklies over a four-week period. The agency also prepared an engraved certificate, closely resembling stock certificates, attesting to the fact that the contributor "subscribes to the principle of preserving our political heritage and enlarging our economic opportunities." A thank-you card, to be mailed with the certificate, would assure the subscriber that his money would be used correctly. In addition, the contributor would receive a one year membership in the Dominion Progressive Conservative Association.^{120/}

The Popular Finance Campaign was a brilliant conception. Ideally, it should have provided a method of breaking with the often unsuccessful methods of the past and, in addition, a way of pressing the Party's election themes upon the public in a strikingly effective fashion. Unhappily for the future of Canadian politics, the campaign was a complete failure, and R.A. Bell later described it as the "most disappointing" project with which he had ever been closely associated. The Party's planning had been based on the assumption that receipts would total \$1 million, but the amount collected did not even meet overhead. The only consolation for Bell and his staff was that the public thought the campaign a good idea--even if they did not contribute.^{121/}

Why did the campaign fail? First, there were

inevitable difficulties with organization. The plan depended on finding a huge number of volunteer canvassers willing to go door to door collecting money for their Party. Such dedication was rarer than the organizers had believed. The alternative dependence on coupon advertisements also had weaknesses. The response had to be very heavy to pay the cost of the advertising, and this level was difficult to achieve. Most important, however, was that the Canadian people were unable or unwilling to accept this type of approach. No old-line party had ever publicly asked for money before, and suspicion, apathy, and tightfistedness killed the project.

VI. The Election of 1945

The collapse of the Popular Finance Campaign was a disappointment to its advocates within the Party, but its failure did little to weaken the financial resources of Conservatism. In 1943, the Party's national expenditures had reached \$173,500; in the next year, spending increased by 250 percent: ^{122/}

Salaries	\$ 58,142
Research	7,040
Special Allowances	15,600
Travel	24,448
Rent	215.20
Organization:	
Grants to Provinces	217,891
Printing and Publicity	59,000
<u>Public Opinion</u>	54,485
Miscellaneous	41,259.49
	<hr/>
	\$478,080.69

Financially, the Conservative Party was in its best position in years.

The inevitable problems persisted, however. The national financial chairman, J.H. Gundy, President and Chairman of Wood, Gundy and Co. Ltd., Toronto, was becoming increasingly difficult to deal with during 1944. The Toronto situation was troubled with squabbling factions, and the Montreal financial committee was in need of new blood.^{123/} The organizational difficulties did not cease until John S.D. Tory, Q.C., a leading Toronto barrister, replaced Gundy as chairman in 1944. A non-practising Liberal until 1944, Tory became one of the most successful chairmen in the Party's history, and he assumed responsibility not only for the collection of funds but also for determining the Party's overall budget. Under his direction the provincial financial organizations were rejuvenated. The financial representatives were as follows:^{124/}

British Columbia	A.E. Jukes (Stockbroker and mining company director) A.C. Desbrisay
Alberta	H.R. Milner Rube Ward
Saskatchewan	G.R. Whitmore (President, Sicks' Breweries)
Manitoba	H.R. Drummond-Hay Dr. H.J. Merkley (Dentist)
New Brunswick	Senator G.B. Jones
Nova Scotia	C.W. Stairs (Halifax Merchant and manufacturer)
Prince Edward Island	Noel DeBlois

It is significant that despite the changes in the Party there were relatively few newcomers to the ranks of the

provincial representatives since Manion's day.

The Conservatives began active preparation for the coming general election in July, 1944. The Party commissioned an advertising agency to plan the campaign ^{125/} themes--apparently the first time this had been done in Canada--and a wide-ranging organization was set up. The military vote overseas was canvassed as thoroughly as possible, and gifts of cigarettes were sent along with the campaign literature. In addition, the Party contracted for an entire issue of the "independent" monthly Canadian Veteran and arranged for wide distribution overseas and in Canada. Party headquarters conducted "candidates' schools" in Ottawa and in several provincial capitals where the prospective parliamentarians were instructed on constituency organization, on the role of women and youth in the campaign, and on public relations and finances. A national speakers' bureau was established, and preparations were made for the most effective use of the Party's allotted free time on the national radio network. In all, the Party fielded 204 candidates (only twenty-nine of sixty-five seats were contested in Quebec), proudly boasting that more than half were veterans. The Conservative campaign organization, in all its aspects, was probably as efficient as any in ^{126/} Canadian history to that time.

The campaign was an expensive one, costing approximately \$1,500,000, but for the first time since 1930 there was no difficulty finding the money. On May 28, 1945, with

two weeks to go before the election, the Party had collected more than \$550,000, with Toronto contributing some \$270,000 and Montreal \$293,000. Expenditures kept pace with contributions. On the 28th, indeed, expenditures were some 128/ \$10,000 ahead of receipts:

Advertising	\$297,929.21
Candidates	42,700
Provinces	165,000
Dominion headquarters	52,701.28
Regular Provincial	
Party Allotments	14,500
	<u>\$572,830.49</u>

As an indication of the rapidity with which money could be spent, three days later advertising commitments had jumped \$30,000 to \$326,871. 129/ At this late date, too, collections were still continuing. The usual method was to provide the collector with an innocuous note of introduction:

This letter will introduce you to Mr. _____ of Ottawa; and Mr. _____ of Hamilton, who have been requested by the National Executive of the Party to interview you in connection with the election on June 11th next. I trust that you may give them a sympathetic hearing. 130/

The healthy state of the party finances made its mark in the constituencies. In Manitoba, for example, no constituency received less than \$1,800 from provincial headquarters in Winnipeg, and each candidate also received additional 131/ assistance:

Dauphin:	free radio time, 18 speakers, 15,000 blotters, 400 window cards, U.K. mailings, 167 display cards, \$2,000;
Marquette:	free radio time, 7 speakers, 15,000 blotters, 400 window cards, 167 display cards, organizer's salary, \$2,000;

Brandon: free radio time, 2 speakers, 167 display cards, \$2,000;

Lisgar: free radio time, 3 movie showings, meeting posters, local press advertising, 7,000 letters, \$4,750;

Portage: free radio time, 8 speakers, 6 movie showings, 15,000 blotters, 400 window cards, 167 display cards, meeting posters, organizer for two weeks, \$1,900.

The remaining Manitoba constituencies were similarly treated.

Despite the massive organizational effort, the election results did not match Conservative expectations. Only sixty-seven Members were returned compared with thirty-nine in 1940. The Party's popular vote was actually lower than in 1940 (although this was because there were very few Conservative candidates in Quebec) and "the greatest chance in fifteen years" was lost. ^{132/} One prominent Conservative attributed the defeat to Liberal money:

I hear that the Grits tapped everyone whoever had a contract with Munitions and Supplies. It is said that the Government "slush" fund exceeded five million dollars. I know myself of two parties who had to give, or thought they had to, very unwillingly. ^{133/}

Arthur Meighen, however, assessed the results from a different point of view:

The business element of Canada, whose sympathies were definitely with the Conservative Party, scuttled to cover in quite substantial numbers, thinking that a vote for King was more likely to result in a sure defeat for the C.C.F. than a vote for the Conservative Party, which before the election had so small a number in the house--only forty. This conduct those who are at all capable of an intelligent appraisal will now know to have been stupid. ^{134/}

Whatever the explanation, the Bracken Party had lost. How-

ever efficient the organization, however successful the fund raising, imponderable factors apparently still played their part.

VII. Conclusion

The interrelationship of policy, leadership, and finance is a complex one, but there can be no doubt that such a relationship exists. Manion's disastrous 1940 election campaign is one excellent example. Because he was believed to hold "radical" views and because he was known to be an outspoken opponent of railway unification, Manion and his fund raisers faced great difficulties. The opposition was strongest in the board rooms of St. James Street, but through "various ramifications" the "financial channels right across the country" were blocked, almost exactly as Hogarth had foreseen in 1939. With business and important segments of the daily press against him, Manion had little chance. Today Manion is most often portrayed as a genial incompetent, a lightweight of little consequence. This is unfair. He was not a Macdonald, a Meighen, or a Bennett, but he was intelligent, honest, and sincere. His main error was in opposing, rather than appeasing, powerful business and financial leaders, but this was an error of principle, and Manion acted in the belief that he was serving the best interests of his Party and his nation. His fate, nonetheless, illustrates the party leader's vulnerability to a financial blockade.

The political situation that destroyed Manion had changed by 1943. The new threat of the CCF and the complete

certainly that the Liberals would be defeated after the war so frightened business and industry that some of the very same forces that had attacked Manion for his radicalism brought in Bracken as leader of the Progressive Conservative Party. Their hope was that Bracken would appeal to progressive-minded Canadians not yet ready to go whole hog and support the CCF, and many believed that he would form the next government. In these circumstances, and despite Bracken's doubtful political antecedents, the Conservatives did not want for financial support.

The Party had less success in its attempt to develop an alternative source of campaign funds. The failure of the Popular Finance Campaign was significant, demonstrating as it did that the Party had no alternative other than to appeal to the "traditional" sources. Perhaps it was in recognition of this fact that the Party's financial representatives remained virtually unchanged through all shifts in policy and changes of leader during the war years.

The financial difficulties that plagued the Conservative Party from 1938 to 1945 doubtless have parallels in Canadian politics both before and since that time. Such experiences may be good medicine for the soul. But it may be doubted if they are helpful to our politics, for if there is any lesson that may be drawn from the Conservatives' problems, it is that one can clash with the wishes of the world of business and finance only at grave risk. Until such time as the mechanics of political financing are altered, this lesson is unlikely to be forgotten.

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- 2 Ibid., pp. 243-44, 269-70.
- 3 Public Archives of Canada, R.J. Manion Papers, Vol. 11, "List of contributors to September 2, 1930."
- 4 Massey to Lord Howard of Penrith, February 22, 1935, in Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, C.H. Toronto, Macmillan, 1963, p. 220.
- 5 Ford, Arthur R., As The World Wags On, Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1950, pp. 145-46. Attempts had been made in 1933 and 1934 to begin organizational work, but as Dr. Manion put it, "all we receive from the Chief is a stare....So far, this Great Conservative Party, which is supposed to be the friend of big business, has not one dollar in its treasury." Manion to his son, James, January 12, 1934, quoted in Wilbur, J.R.H., "H.H. Stevens and the Reconstruction Party," Canadian Historical Review, XLV, March 1964, No. 1, p.6.
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- 7 Manion Papers, Vol. 45, Memorandum of meeting with Meighen, May 8, 1939.
- 8 Press release of Manion's speech at Smith's Falls, Ont., July 24, 1939.
- 9 Manion Papers, Vol. 16, Manion to his son James, March 26 and June 19, 1938.
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- 14 Montreal Gazette, editorial, August 12, 1938, p. 8.
See also Montreal Star, August 11, 1938.
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- 16 Ibid., August 26, 1938.
- 17 Ibid., Vol. 9, Manion to H.R. Milner, September 26, 1938.
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- 19 Manion Papers, Vol. 16, Manion to his son James, October 16, 1938.
- 20 Ibid., Vol. 2, Beatty to Manion, July 8, 1938;
Manion to Beatty, August 25, 1938.
- 21 University of New Brunswick, R.B. Bennett Papers, Notable Persons File, Beatty to Bennett, October 1, 1938.
- 22 E.g., Manion Papers, Vol. 12, W.A. Walsh, M.P. to Manion, September 22, 1938.
- 23 Ibid., Vol. 8, Hogarth to Manion, Wednesday June 7, 1939 .
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- 26 Ibid., Vol. 8, Manion to Hogarth, June 20, 1939.
- 27 Ibid., Vol. 5, Bennett to G.B. Foster, January 28, 1939 (copy).
- 28 Ibid., Manion to V.M. Drury, September 30, 1938.
- 29 Ibid., Vol. 14, Miss Denison to Manion, December 31, 1939; ibid., Vol. 11, financial statement, n.d.

- 30 Ibid., Vol. 10, Harry Price to Manion, March 7 and April 27, 1939.
- 31 P.A.C., R.B. Hanson Papers, file P-450-M, Manion to Hanson, August 26, 1939.
- 32 Manion Papers, Vol. 45, Memorandum of meeting with King, September 6, 1939.
- 33 Ibid., Vol. 13, Manion to A.L. Hanna, November 4, 1939.
- 34 Ibid., Vol. 10, Price to Manion, September 13, 1939.
- 35 Saskatchewan Provincial Archives, J.G. Gardiner Papers, Gardiner to C.L. Burton, J.S. McLean, C.G. McCullagh, October 27, 1939; Gardiner to St. Charles, October 27, 1939, and reply, October 30, 1939.
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- 39 Ibid., Vol. 14, Manion to F.W. Turnbull, April 29, 1940.
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- 58 Ibid., Manion to H. Price, February 2, 1940.
- 59 P.A.C., Arthur Meighen Papers, Series 6, Vol. 141,
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- 60 Ibid., Vol. 15, Meighen to G.B. Jones, February 26,
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- 61 Manion Papers, Vol. 14, Ross to Manion, March 7, 1940.
- 62 Ibid., Bell to Wilson, April 29, 1940.
- 63 Confidential Source; Manion Papers, Vol. 11, Ross to
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- 64 Harrill, op. cit., p. 180.
- 65 Manion Papers, Vol. 11, "List of subscriptions over
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that the chartered banks also contributed.
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- 67 Ibid., Vol. 8, Manion to C.D.H. MacAlpine, May 25,
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- 68 Hanson Papers, file P-450-HB, Hanson to R.A. Bell,
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- 69 Ibid., file O-100-F-1, Hanson to G.B. Foster, June 19, 1940; ibid., file O-150, Hanson to D.C. Coleman, June 11, 1940.
- 70 Ibid., file O-100-F-1, Hanson to Foster, June 19, 1940.
- 71 Ibid., file O-160-F, Miss Denison to Gordon Graydon, M.P., February 25, 1941.
- 72 Ibid., file O-160-F, Hanson to G.H. Ferguson, June 24, 1940.
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- 75 Ibid., Hanson to J.M. Macdonnell, December 9, 1940.
- 76 P.A.C., J.W. Dafoe Papers, Microfilm roll M-79, Macdonnell to Dafoe, October 14, 1940.
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- 79 Ibid., Macdonnell to meeting guests, December 30, 1940.
- 80 Ibid., Macdonnell to meeting guests, January 13, 1941.
- 81 A list of delegates is in ibid. Diefenbaker was also a Saskatchewan M.P. Because of his dual role, he was the only M.P. at the meeting.
- 82 Ibid.
- 83 Ibid., file O-160, Hanson to R.A. Bell, February 4, 1941.
- 84 Ibid., file O-160-T, "Statement of Trust Account #1," February 3, 1942.
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THE FINANCES OF THE
COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION
AND THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY
1933 - 1965

by

Khayyam Z. Paltiel,

Howat P. Noble and Reginald A. Whitaker

I. Introduction

The New Democratic Party and its predecessor the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation trace their origins to the various agrarian and labour protest movements which arose in the first quarter of the twentieth century in Canada. The Depression of the thirties and the social discontent which it nurtured provided the impetus for a coalition of these movements. The new Party had its birth in July 1932 at a conference in Calgary of Western agrarian parties and organizations and small labour parties and organizations west of the Great Lakes. It was joined shortly afterwards by the influential League for Social Reconstruction, composed of intellectuals with a social democratic orientation. The following year the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation

(CCF), as it was named, held its first national convention in Regina, where a Party constitution was framed and a general policy declaration, the "Regina Manifesto," was formulated.^{1/}

The CCF Party organization was to be an instrument for the political realization of social democratic ideology. The key to understanding the financial history of the CCF must, therefore, be sought in the radical concept of party organization held by the Party's leaders. The CCF wished to construct a party organization which would itself be a close reflection of the Party's ideology. In the matter of political finance, the Party hoped to develop a microcosm of economic democracy: a Party financed by small "grass-roots" contributions from a wide base of citizens who would donate freely as individuals.

A study of the financial history of the CCF and NDP reveals two dilemmas which have challenged the original doctrine of party finance as formulated by the CCF at its inception. First of all, the Party consistently experienced great practical difficulty in operating on a grass-roots financial basis. Secondly, where such fund raising has been successful, it has usually been associated with an organized form of giving through groups like trade unions. These donations may be made on an individual basis but since they are collected through the organized groups, it may be ambiguous to characterize them as being simply "individual."

The delegates who came to the Calgary conference of 1932 had much to offer in the way of hopes but little in the way of financial resources with which to translate these hopes into political reality. Neither the Socialist Party of Canada, based in British Columbia, nor the Independent Labour Party of Manitoba possessed any appreciable financial assets. Representatives from the newly formed Farmer-Labour Party in Saskatchewan had no visible means of financial support. The Canadian Labour Party and the Dominion Labour Party, representing local labour interests centred in Calgary and Edmonton, might have been able to draw upon local labour councils for token support, but this was never done.^{2/}

Only two groups had the potential to provide an initial financial base: the United Farmers of Alberta and the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees. But the UFA was structurally so decentralized that all money for electoral and party finance was collected locally at the constituency level; thus there existed no machinery by which funds could be obtained other than on an ad hoc basis. The delegate from the CBRE left the conference with high hopes of affiliating his union with the new Party, but this hope proved illusory, as the CBRE did not in fact affiliate with the CCF until a decade later, in 1942. As Mr. J. S. Woodsworth, the Party leader, declared: "We were starting with not a dollar in the treasury - an immense task ahead."^{3/}

This study is an attempt to analyze the patterns of party finance as exhibited by the CCF and NDP, from the

point of view of fund raising, budgeting, and expenditure as well as intra-party transfers. The subject is treated chronologically, and may be subdivided into four periods: 1933-1939 (the Party's formative years); 1940-1945 (the period of wartime expansion); 1946-1950 (the period of post-war decline); 1961-1965 (the Party's rebirth as the New Democratic Party). The CCF-NDP has always maintained a highly decentralized party structure, and thus the study must necessarily be concerned with provincial Party organizations, but only where provincial activity is directly relevant to federal politics.

II. The Formative Years 1933-39

The decentralization of party structure was most apparent in the first period of the Party's existence. The CCF began as a federation of local and provincial groups.^{4/} The main organizational task of the CCF at the outset was to create and maintain a national office in order to weld the various groups into a viable organizational unit. At the Calgary conference in 1932 Mr. Norman Priestly, Vice-President of the United Farmers of Alberta, was elected secretary and the initial direction and coordination of CCF operations began from his office in Calgary. In 1934 Mr. M.J. Coldwell, newly elected treasurer of the Party, set up an "office" in Regina, which in reality consisted only of Mr. Coldwell himself on a part-time basis together with any voluntary help he could obtain. Nevertheless, by 1935 this was being referred to as the "national office."^{5/} The development of a

national office was to be financed by a provincial affiliation fee of \$25^{6/} and voluntary subscriptions to be promoted by a national appeal. These sources, however, proved to be far from adequate and at the national convention in 1936, an amendment to the Party constitution provided that each provincial Party was to forward to the national office ten cents for every member.^{7/}

This share of membership also proved to be inadequate. If the total affiliation fees (\$25 for ten affiliates) had been paid together with ten cents per member, and assuming the optimistic figure of 30,000 members, total revenue for the national office would have been only \$3,250. Since the amounts to be collected were unpredictable, realistic budgeting by the national office in these early years was precluded. In actual fact the amounts collected in the early years were negligible (see Table 1).

Much time and thought were expended in attempting to stabilize and expand the financial resources of the Party at the national level; typical of the concern lavished on this problem was the following resolution at a national council meeting in 1937:^{8/}

- (1) to draw to the attention of the provincial councils the extreme importance of national direction and of means to make that possible;
- (2) to urge provincial councils to make strong efforts to increase our ranks;
- (3) to urge provincial councils to remit moneys due to National Office as promptly as possible;

- (4) to advise provincial councils to remit contributions due to National Office as promptly as possible;
- (5) to request provincial councils to set aside for the National Office an adequate proportion of finances raised by them through special campaigns;
- (6) the Treasurer was authorized to attempt to collect from individual contributors for the work of the National Office....

The lack of adequate financial resources had a debilitating effect upon the early organizational plans of the Party. To build a national Party it was necessary to have national organizers to supervise and coordinate local efforts, but capable people could only be maintained on a reasonable salary, and the Party was too weak and disorganized to raise the money to provide such salaries. The Party remained entrapped within this vicious circle throughout the thirties.

The first national organizational effort was made in 1935 when Mr. G.F. Garland, a former CCF member of Parliament who had been defeated in the general election of that year, travelled from province to province, "often relying upon contributions made as he proceeded"^{9/} in an attempt to aid weak or inchoate CCF organizations with personal work, advice and encouragement. But Mr. Garland's talents as the lone full-time organizer^{10/} were spread much too thinly. Recognizing this, the national executive drew up a budget of \$19,000 in 1937, most of which was to finance the activities of at least six national organizers.^{11/}

TABLE 1

TOTAL RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
AT THE CCF NATIONAL OFFICE (1932-33 - 1959-60)

YEARS	RECEIPTS	EXPENDITURES
1932-33	\$ 759.24	\$ 712.81
1933-34	1,475.28	1,312.26
1934-35	1,745.50	1,435.22
1935-36	2,832.36	2,244.80
1936-37	2,217.38	2,694.56
1937-38	3,442.93	3,266.48
1938-39	9,157.45	8,157.34
1939-40	11,547.45	11,544.77
1940-42	16,497.99	17,164.92
1942-43	17,172.81	12,727.62
1943-44	28,320.92	33,355.08
1944-45	35,928.88	34,535.16
1945-46	38,166.46	29,820.57
1946-47	37,846.40	43,034.74
1947-48	49,507.80	49,959.27
1948-49	49,584.86	53,005.34
1949-50	31,242.00	48,417.00
1950-51	25,679.38	30,692.62
1951-52	29,980.14	29,759.93
1952-53	42,632.97	43,240.52
1953-54	36,921.61	41,123.92
1954-55	36,772.00	35,257.00
1955-56	35,261.00	32,763.00
1956-57	33,960.74	34,173.27
1957-58	36,498.00	32,852.19
1958-59	28,547.00	42,483.00
1959-60	48,994.00	44,117.00

SOURCE: Based on yearly audited financial statements of the CCF National Office presented yearly at the Meeting of the National Executive. See also McHenry, op. cit., p. 51.

However, receipts for 1937 fell rather short of the planned figure when only \$3,433 was collected. ^{12/} Expansion of the national organization was thus frustrated.

A new era opened when Mr. David Lewis, who had worked on a part-time basis in 1937 and most of 1938, took over the secretaryship of the national office in Ottawa late in 1938

as a full-time post.^{13/} As may be seen from Table 1, both receipts and expenditures increased sharply in 1938-1939. Nevertheless, the finances of the national office were still grossly inadequate for the role it was expected to play. Much self-sacrifice was required of Mr. Lewis and others to allow the office to carry on. By 1939 the CCF had still failed to develop a solid financial basis on which to build a national organization.

In addition to the difficulties of developing a national office, the Party had little success in the thirties in the development of strong provincial organizations. In Alberta the CCF was tied to the discredited United Farmers and while throughout the thirties a political base was being slowly built in Saskatchewan, which later became the site of the Party's greatest success, the provincial organization was hampered by severe financial difficulties. Elsewhere, provincial CCF organizations were virtually non-existent.

The CCF followed the traditional pattern of mass-membership parties in raising money for federal election campaigns from individual Party members or supporters. The modest campaign efforts in 1935 and 1940 were financed by membership fees of one dollar per member.^{14/} These sums were not sufficient. Additional amounts were solicited from members and supporters prior to and during the election campaign. The constituency organizations^{15/} were responsible for collecting all funds on which the provincial and national office depended as well.

This system of fund raising meant that the financial burden of the election campaigns was borne almost exclusively at the constituency level with little or no national participation. When it is noted that total yearly receipts including funds for election expenses at the national office for the years of the federal election campaigns of 1935 and 1940 were \$1,745 and \$11,547 respectively, ^{16/} it will be apparent how small the sums involved were. The original expectations of financial support from organized groups such as labour, farm organizations and cooperatives were not fulfilled. In the period between 1932 and 1940 only one trade union affiliate, Local No. 26 of the United Mine Workers of America, in Cape Breton Island, ^{17/} provided significant monetary aid.

III. Wartime Expansion 1940-45

The expansion of the finances and activities of the national office following Mr. David Lewis' assumption of the full-time secretaryship was accelerated during the war years. In fact, the period ending with the 1945 election was the most successful period in the CCF's history. The Party attracted a mass following in Saskatchewan and assumed power in that Province in 1944. In British Columbia the CCF became the official Opposition in 1941. Similarly, in Ontario the Party emerged from the provincial election of 1943 as the official Opposition, with only four seats less than the Government had. And finally in the 1945 federal general election the Party more than tripled its representation in the House of Commons: from eight seats to twenty-eight. This sharp rise in the CCF's

political fortunes coincided, as might be expected, with an improvement in the Party's finances. As an organization which tried to subsist on grass-roots financial support, it is not surprising that the increase in membership which accompanied the Party's rising political fortunes in the early forties was reflected in an increase in financial resources. By 1942 the CCF had approximately 20,000^{18/} members concentrated in the three areas of the Party's greatest success, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Ontario. From 1942 to 1945 national membership increased five-fold and was variously estimated to have ranged from 80,000 to 100,000.^{19/} During World War II a number of local trade unions affiliated with the CCF,^{20/} but the affiliation fees of only 2 cents per member per month^{21/} meant that the trade union movement was as yet an unimportant source of funds.

In this period a system of provincial quotas was designed to help finance the national office. Under this scheme, each provincial office was given a target quota. The total of these target quotas was intended to provide enough money to maintain and to expand the national office gradually. Quotas were established on the basis of what were thought to be reasonable expectations, but these were not met by all provinces in any single year, although Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Ontario could usually be counted on to fulfil theirs. Table 2 shows a typical set of quota targets:

TABLE 2
MONTHLY PROVINCIAL QUOTA TARGETS
PAYABLE TO NATIONAL OFFICE FOR 1945

Alberta	\$300.00
British Columbia	480.00
Manitoba	300.00
New Brunswick	50.00
Nova Scotia*	130.00
Ontario	500.00
Quebec	100.00
Saskatchewan	500.00
<hr/>	
Total	\$2,360.00

*Including affiliation fees of United Mine Workers

SOURCE: CCF Records Vol. I. (P.A.C.) National Council Meeting, Sept. 7-9, 1945, p. 4.

Most of the money earmarked for these quotas was collected through finance drives directed by the various provincial offices. These appeals at the constituency level had been a yearly phenomenon of the CCF since 1937 but were successful only where the political success of the Party had created viable local organizations.

In the period between the 1940 and 1945 federal elections, provincial organizations of the Party were considerably strengthened in some provinces. Saskatchewan provided the most successful example of a CCF organization in Canada, and has always been held up to the rest of the Party as the ideal. Indeed in Saskatchewan the Party came very close to fulfilling its goal of setting up a genuine grass-roots political party. As one American observer has remarked,

the CCF in Saskatchewan "...succeeded in involving more people in direct political activity than any other party in American or Canadian history, with the possible exception of certain similar farmers' parties."^{22/} Lipset has described how rural Saskatchewan, the heart of CCF support in the Province, developed extensive community organizations through which farmers were able to participate in making decisions concerning their own economic affairs. This system of participation gave rise to a large and responsive system of communication "...between the mass of farmers and their leaders."^{23/} When the leaders became convinced of the rightness of the CCF ideology the task of mobilizing mass support for the Party was greatly facilitated by the extensive community organizations.

By 1945 CCF membership in the Province reached 31,858. This large membership always provided the provincial Party with the financial resources needed for the provincial election campaigns and for Party organization in the inter-election period. Saskatchewan has always been a prime supporter of national Party operations and campaign expenditures.

Other provinces fell far short of the Saskatchewan example, but nevertheless Party organizations in British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba were relatively stronger than they had been in the thirties. Even Quebec, where the Party had been under a clerical "ban" from 1934 to 1943, showed hopeful signs as membership approached 1,000.^{24/}

With the improved political climate and hopeful signs of strength at the provincial organizational level, the Party approached the federal general election of 1945 in a spirit of optimism. The CCF began collecting funds for the 1945 election two years before it was held. Most of the substantial amounts of money gathered came in the form of individual contributions to a "Victory Fund" from the three strongest provincial organizations: British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Ontario, where overall Victory Fund totals of \$78,048.50, \$107,108 and \$37,027.39 were raised respectively, for the use of all levels of the Party.^{25/} Seven provinces in all, contributed \$83,822.38 from their Victory Funds to the National Office for the 1945 federal campaign: British Columbia donated \$15,488.25; Alberta, \$7,120; Saskatchewan, \$42,491; Manitoba, \$6,812.50; Ontario, \$6,151; Quebec, \$100; and the Maritime Provinces, \$685. Direct donations from other sources amounted to \$5,015.^{26/} The record of the receipts from the provinces reveals no contributions from unions, although contributions from District No. 26 of the United Mine Workers of America were included within the Nova Scotia quota. With this exception all the provincial quotas appear to have been collected as a result of local finance and membership drives.

The amount of money raised for the 1945 federal general election campaign actually exceeded the expectations of the national office whose original budget called for a mere \$50,000.^{27/} Early in 1945 a plan had been drawn up which

carefully delineated the role of the national office in the next federal election. The plan included the following functions: ^{28/}

- (1) drafting and printing of literature
- (2) national advertising
- (3) national radio
- (4) national free publicity
- (5) coordination of provincial and national planning
- (6) itineraries for speakers with partial or complete cross-Canada tours
- (7) research and similar information for publicity and for the candidate and his committee
- (8) speaker's notes
- (9) supervision of distribution of campaign literature
- (10) miscellaneous campaign correspondence.

Major expenditures in the 1945 national campaign ^{29/} included the following items: campaign publicity \$47,126; subsidies to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and the Yukon \$6,690; organizers' salaries \$10,229; organizers' expenses \$2,129; campaign expenses of national officers \$5,364; general office expenses \$2,954.

The 1945 election marked the high point, politically and financially, for the CCF. The following period, 1946-60 was to witness a decline in the Party's fortunes.

IV. Postwar Decline 1945-60

By 1946 the CCF had developed a federal structure with viable

political organizations in each of the following Provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia. At the same time the Party sought to expand the relatively small role which the national office had played in federal elections up to the end of World War II, and to centralize the direction of campaigns.

In 1946 the Party decided that the provincial quota system had not proved successful and a new -- "hope-fully" more adequate -- system, the "national membership fee," was instituted. Enrolment of members had always been a provincial responsibility and under the national membership fee it remained within the provincial jurisdiction, except that for every membership paid at the provincial level one dollar was to be remitted to the national office. Table 3 shows the receipts from this system.^{30/}

TABLE 3

RECEIPTS AT THE NATIONAL OFFICE
FROM THE NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP FEE 1947 - 1957^{31/}

Year	Receipts
1947	\$29,820.00
1948	38,782.00
1949	29,261.00
1950	20,238.00
1951	24,176.00
1952	24,204.00
1953	25,046.00
1954	18,273.00
1955	19,751.00
1956	24,771.00
1957	27,586.00
1958	24,852.00
1959	23,022.00
1960	29,097.00

Prior to the 1949 federal general election, the national executive drafted a budget for the national office which included the following items.^{32/}

TABLE 4
BUDGET FOR THE 1949 FEDERAL GENERAL ELECTION

Draft Budget		Provincial Quotas	
1) Display	\$ 20,000	British Columbia	\$ 7,500
2) Radio advertising	5,000	Alberta	3,000
3) Posters	1,000	Saskatchewan	25,000
4) Deposits	10,000	Manitoba	3,000
5) Travelling	2,500	Ontario	15,000
6) Office	5,000	Quebec	3,000
7) Organization	5,000	New Brunswick	1,000
8) Literature	5,000	Nova Scotia	3,000
9) Contingencies	6,500	P.E.I.	800
Total	\$ 60,000	Total	\$ 60,000

The totals were later revised downward, first to \$55,000 and finally to \$42,000.^{33/}

The principal tasks of the national office were also revised^{34/} to include the following items:

- (1) speakers' notes
- (2) radio scripts
- (3) organizational literature
- (4) encouragement of weaker constituencies
- (5) national literature
- (6) national newspaper advertising
- (7) advertising of national broadcasts
- (8) provision of posters
- (9) literature.

In reality, not even the twice-modified budget was possible.

Only \$34,628 was received by the national office from the provinces and direct contributions. On the expenditure side the Party spent close to \$30,000 at the national level in the 1949 campaign. The largest items represented the cost of radio and newspaper advertising, pamphlets, and a subsidy to the Quebec CCF.^{35/}

The provincial Party organizations had to bear much of the financial burden of the national CCF in the late forties, and this was never more true than in the case of Saskatchewan. That Province's mass membership provided all the financial resources needed for provincial organization and campaigning, and also formed the financial backbone of the national Party. Evidence indicates that when, in the late forties, Saskatchewan fell behind in its quota payments there remained little else to support the national office's precarious financial position. Much of the money which was transferred from Saskatchewan to Ottawa was in turn transferred to Quebec or the Maritimes to support the CCF movement there. Often special appeals were made to Saskatchewan for designated sums of money to support specific projects in other provinces. A typical example was a request for \$100 per month for a year to help pay the salary of a CCF organizer in Nova Scotia.^{36/}

In Saskatchewan, campaigns in rural ridings might cost between \$1,500 and \$3,000. In Saskatoon and Regina costs might range between \$6,000 to \$10,000. In 1947 the CCF in Saskatchewan spent the largest part of its funds on

pamphlets, postage, and local newspaper advertisements. Virtually all the money raised came from individual donors. Some of the northern ridings had to receive financial assistance from the provincial office, but most were financially self-sufficient. The bulk of the money came in small contributions up to \$10; however, there were a small number of larger contributors who might give from \$100 to as much as \$1,000.^{27/}

Saskatchewan is the only Province or level of organization where the CCF successfully maintained an election fund. This fund was held at the provincial office and was maintained from contributions of the money not used by the CCF constituency organizations in provincial or federal elections.

Federal election campaigns in Saskatchewan were highly decentralized. The provincial office usually coordinated the printing of posters and pamphlets where costs could be saved by central mass printing, and paid for radio and newspaper advertising and sometimes sent part of its staff to aid in a weak constituency during the election campaign. But there was no attempt to set up a system of regional organizers as in the case of Ontario. Most of the work of distributing leaflets and engineering support for CCF candidates was done on a volunteer basis by local members of a particular constituency; the only paid worker in any Saskatchewan election campaign was the campaign manager.

That the 1949 election marked a definite downturn in CCF fortunes from their highpoint in 1945 was nowhere more

evident than in Manitoba. Here, as in Saskatchewan, the Party saw its representation cut and its popular vote decline. This was paralleled by a decrease in funds available at both the constituency and provincial office level for the 1949 campaign. Estimates indicate that less than \$15,000 was expended at the constituency level. The provincial office receipts and expenses greatly declined from 1945, dropping to \$2,205 and \$1,981, respectively, ^{38/} (the comparable figures for 1945 were \$6,599 and \$8,728).

Financial difficulties were so great that an attempt to raise \$3,000 as the Manitoba quota for national office election expenses failed to raise even half that amount (\$1,293 was eventually received). ^{39/} While the evidence is incomplete it is probably not unfair to suggest that the pattern of financial difficulty experienced by the Manitoba Party was typical of most provincial organizations in the late forties.

The Party's experience in the 1940, 1945 and 1949 elections had demonstrated the weaknesses of trying to plan a campaign without adequate knowledge of the scope of available financial sources. Accordingly, the "National Three Year Expansion Programme" ^{40/} was set up in 1949.

The Programme was intended to raise \$175,000 over a three-year period 1949-51. Provincial quotas were designated and it was hoped that at least fifty per cent of this \$175,000 would be collected during the first year; Table 5 shows the provincial quotas. Twenty-five thousand dollars were to be used to establish a federal election fund. Though

quotas were set, it was recommended that "the National Executive and National Treasurer be given discretion to make the best arrangements with each provincial section and that no attempt be made by lay down any hard and fast rules to be applied to all provinces."^{41/} It was also noted that: "In most cases, however, provincial secretaries have an annual fund-raising campaign and an annual financing objective. In many of these provinces it will probably be considered undesirable, for obvious reasons, to attempt two separate campaigns within the same year."^{42/}

TABLE 5
PROVINCIAL QUOTAS FOR THE THREE YEAR
NATIONAL EXPANSION PROGRAMME^{43/}

Provinces	Quotas
British Columbia	\$ 25,000.00
Alberta	15,000.00
Saskatchewan	50,000.00
Manitoba	15,000.00
Ontario	50,000.00
Quebec	10,000.00
New Brunswick	3,000.00
Nova Scotia	4,000.00
Prince Edward Island	2,000.00
Newfoundland	1,000.00
Total	\$175,000.00

The Programme was an attempt to put membership drives, membership renewals and appeals for financial support on a systematic basis. The response was tepid. In the first year, instead of the projected \$87,500, the drive netted

less than \$9,656.^{44/} The plan was then revised. It now aimed at collecting \$30,000 annually: half of this amount was to be used to put three national organizers in the field; the other half was to accumulate as a general election fund. The revised plan generated an even more dismal response than the original; a mere \$4,489^{45/} was collected in 1951. The plan was finally laid to rest in 1953.

A. THE 1953 FEDERAL GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Prior to the 1953 federal general election a budget of \$40,000 was proposed for the national office. Only \$24,051 was actually collected; \$22,462 was spent.^{46/} As in 1949, British Columbia, Ontario and Saskatchewan were the sources of the largest amounts received at the national office, with Saskatchewan actually contributing close to one half of the total receipts.^{47/} The bulk of election expenditure went into advertising both in radio and the print media, office administration and salaries, and subsidies to Quebec and the Maritimes.^{48/}

The extent to which the Saskatchewan CCF was subsidizing the rest of the Party can be seen in the riding of Rose-town-Biggar in the 1953 election. Here supporters of the national leader, Mr. Coldwell, raised \$13,000. About \$3,000 was spent on his behalf. The remaining \$10,000 was sent to the provincial office where it could be transferred to other ridings in the Province or to the rest of the country.^{49/} As an example of a less well-endowed province we may look at Alberta, where the provincial office spent a total of \$2,640.^{50/}

The responsibilities of the office included provincial-wide radio, additional office staff, travelling expenses, constituency deficits on literature ordered and supplied by the office, and several candidate deposits. Twelve CCF candidates spent an estimated total of \$8,400; ^{51/} none spent over \$1,000 individually.

The Ontario CCF managed to expand its revenue by developing an organization called the "Ontario 500 Club" - a group of more affluent Party members who pledged a certain amount of money above their membership fee. In the urban environment of Toronto this approach proved to be successful. But the limitations of the plan became apparent when Manitoba tried a "5,000 Club" (1951-53) modelled after the Ontario example. But in the rural environment of Manitoba the concept of five-thousand CCF members regularly contributing one dollar proved financially difficult and an administrative nightmare. The general decline of the CCF politically and financially in Manitoba continued through the 1953 election campaign. The national expansion fund, noted above, was a complete failure in that Province. The "Resurgence Fund" (1950-55) designed to pay off a rising number of debts, brought about no resurgence. In the 1953 election campaign itself the provincial office struck an all time financial low: only \$1,959 was collected and \$1,806 was spent. In the constituencies the spending was low, probably not over \$12,000.

B. THE 1957 FEDERAL GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

In the 1957 federal election campaign, financial support for the national office sank to its lowest point since the 1940 election. Only Saskatchewan and Ontario contributed amounts of any importance; Saskatchewan gave \$8,154, Ontario \$4,000. The only other province to contribute was Manitoba which managed \$150. Interestingly, however, two unions, the United Packinghouse Workers and the United Automobile Workers, contributed \$5,000 and \$3,000 respectively. A total of only \$20,304 was thus collected by the national office. Expenditures, concentrated on literature publicity, organizational and administrative expenses, and subsidies to Quebec and the Maritimes, came to \$18,326.^{52/}

At the provincial office level, the 1957 campaign was equally uninspiring. Saskatchewan probably followed its usual pattern as the best-financed provincial Party. In Ontario, the only other Province which could afford a significant contribution to the national office, somewhat between \$90,000 to \$100,000 was probably spent at the provincial office and constituency level. Interviews with Party officials^{53/} indicate that an average of less than \$2,000 was spent per candidate (60 candidates were nominated), with some ridings spending in excess of \$5,000 and many less than \$500. A breakdown of provincial office receipts and expenditures shows that over two thirds were of an indirect nature, i.e., money raised and spent on behalf of the provincial office by other organizations. The Political Action Committee of

the Ontario Federation of Labour spent \$13,597 on newspaper advertising for the CCF in Ontario. Similarly, the national office of the United Packinghouse Workers paid \$2,400 toward deposits for CCF candidates.^{54/}

The national office was given full responsibility for radio and television. But by far the largest amount of money spent provincially in Ontario in 1957 was on newspaper advertising which was covered by the Political Action Committee of the Ontario Federation of Labour.^{55/} A further \$1,988 was spent on advertising in the ethnic press, in thirteen languages.^{56/} Interviews indicated that the amount of money spent by local candidates on newspaper advertising was negligible. To save on printing costs, all leaflets, pamphlets and other printed matter which could be used by the CCF across Canada especially at the constituency level were printed by the national office and distributed through the provincial offices. Only the mimeographed material such as Scrutineer's Instructions and a small printing of leaflets aimed at ethnic groups were produced by the provincial offices. The national office produced one main, full-colour leaflet "Share Canada's Wealth" and three subsidiary leaflets. The main leaflet was sold to the provincial office and the constituencies while the other three were distributed free of charge. In Ontario, 584,500^{57/} of the main leaflets were sold to the constituencies and 20,000 given away free. The total cost of these leaflets was \$6,134. The leaflets were sold to the constituencies on the basis of trying to cover costs; in the end, the provincial office was forced to write off a loss of just over \$100.

Speakers from the national Party and Mr. Donald MacDonald, the provincial CCF leader, spoke at a number of meetings throughout Ontario during the campaign. The local constituency organizations where such speeches were made paid for expenses such as advance advertising and the rent for halls, while the provincial office paid for the traveling expenses of the speakers. This latter expense amounted to a total of about \$650.^{58/}

In Manitoba, the provincial office managed to collect \$3,052 from individuals and a scattering of union contributors; it expended \$2,826 on the campaign. A total of between \$20,000 to \$25,000 was spent at the constituency level by fourteen CCF candidates. Even though revenues in Manitoba had considerably declined since 1945 the office merely spread the money more thinly, and resisted the idea of curtailing certain functions and concentrating on others.

C. THE 1958 FEDERAL GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The 1958 federal general election, the last which the Party was to contest as the CCF, witnessed an even further deterioration in the Party's financial support from the provincial organizations. Since this election followed so closely on the 1957 election, it was extremely difficult for the Party to raise money. The one significant factor, despite a decline in general revenues, was the increasing financial participation by trade unions - a trend which began in 1957.

The national office raised \$22,108.70,^{59/} \$8,500 coming from the three strong provincial organizations, in British Columbia, Ontario and Saskatchewan, and \$13,232 coming from trade unions. The national office spent \$20,184.29 in the campaign. Expenditures were as follows:

TABLE 6

NATIONAL OFFICE EXPENDITURES FOR THE 1958 ELECTION CAMPAIGN^{60/}

Travel and other organization Expenses	\$ 2,749.11
Literature	16,635.86
Publicity	3,120.62
Subsidies	6,800.00
CCF national office charges - salaries communications, express, etc.	5,000.00
	<hr/> 34,305.59
Less - literature sales	14,121.30
	<hr/>
Total	\$20,184.29

In the 1958 federal election in Ontario,^{61/} the provincial office received \$7,819 in direct contributions of which \$6,469 came from riding quotas and the remaining \$1,350 came from individual contributions to the provincial office; \$5,749 was paid indirectly by the Ontario Federation of Labour's Political Action Committee toward the cost of newspaper advertising.^{62/} In addition to this expense, the Political Action Committee "... incurred substantial campaign expenditures on its own account".^{63/}

The two major expenditures by the Ontario provincial office were for newspaper advertising and printed matter. As

in 1957, radio and television were the responsibility of the national office; provincial funds were concentrated on the print media, \$4,185 being spent on daily newspaper advertising (with the national office providing \$521)^{64/} and \$740 being spent by the provincial office on advertising in ethnic newspapers.^{65/} Despite the limited funds available, the Ontario CCF concentrated a high proportion of its meagre budget on printed matter. Much of the material was printed centrally by the national office and then sold to the provincial offices across Canada. In Ontario, six main pieces of literature were used. The provincial office acted as a central clearing house for this material and sold around 250,000 pieces to the constituencies. The provincial office spent \$13,168 on literature and recovered \$10,438 in receipts^{66/} from the constituencies.

In Manitoba, provincial office revenues rose for the 1958 election, mainly as a result of union contributions.^{67/} \$6,709 was collected in all; \$5,997 was spent. At the constituency level, fourteen candidates spent approximately \$21,500.

The pattern which emerges from a study of the CCF from 1945 to 1960 shows two conflicting trends. On the one hand, revenues declined from the high point reached in 1945. The Party seemed to have lost the political impetus it had in the war years. When the high points reached in 1945 passed and the CCF failed to displace the Conservatives

as the leading Opposition party, the Party lost the initiative, and sank into a prolonged decline, both political and financial. However, at the same time as the Party's financial resources were falling to their lowest point since the thirties, the financial base of the Party had begun to shift, from individual donors to trade unions. This shift has proved to be of greater long-run importance than the decline of general revenues in the late forties and fifties. When the Party changed its form and emerged under a new name in 1961 the trade unions became a prime source of funds and the decline in revenues was dramatically halted.

V. The New Democratic Party 1961-65

Soon after the NDP Founding Convention in 1961, an agreement^{68/} was reached between the national office now called the federal office, and the provincial Parties concerning federal election finance. In contrast to the CCF system, the provincial Parties were no longer to contribute to the election finances of the federal office. The federal office of the NDP was given sole access to the national offices of the Party's trade union affiliates for financial contributions to federal election campaigns. This decision was a logical extension of the pattern of union financial contributions to the CCF which had developed in the 1957 and 1958 federal election campaigns.

The fourth period began with a significant increase in the receipts of the federal office. In the previous

TABLE 7

PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF THE TOTAL RECEIPTS AT NATIONAL OFFICE1947 - 1964

(Election fund receipts not included in these totals.)

Year	Total Receipts	National Membership Fees	Affiliated Membership Fees	Ontario 500 Club	Sustaining Membership Fees	Direct & Sundry Contri- butions
	\$	%	%	%	%	%
1947	37,846	-	-	-	-	-
1948	49,507	-	-	-	-	-
1949	49,584	79.8	-	-	-	20.2
1950	31,242	72.5	-	-	-	27.5
1951	25,679	-	-	-	-	-
1952	29,980	85.3	3.5	-	-	11.2
1953	42,632	-	-	-	-	-
1954	36,921	49.7	37.2	-	-	13.1
1955	36,772	65.3	7.6	10.1	-	17.1
1956	35,261	60.0	30.0	10.0	-	-
1957	33,960	69.2	13.2	9.7	-	11.9
1958	36,498	68.1	11.4	12.3	-	-
1959	28,547	80.6	6.9	10.2	-	2.3
1960	48,994	59.4	11.5	14.9	-	15.2
1961*	-	-	-	-	-	-
1962	96,020	50.0	38.5	-	-	11.5
1963	181,185**	21.9	45.8	-	20.7	11.6
1964	141,697	26.4	44.7	-	32.1	5.8

* Figures not available for 1961, the last year of the CCF and first year of NDP. The figures for 1962 cover the period Sept. 1, 1961 to Aug. 10, 1962.

** 1963 total covers a 16-month period ending Dec. 31, 1963.

SOURCES: CCF Records, Vols. 1, 2 and 3, 1958, 1959, and 1960; Report of 16th National Convention CCF, 1961; Report of NDP, 1962 and 1963; and Report of Annual Convention of NDP, 1964.

period, (1945-60) the national membership fee accounted for the largest proportion of the income of the federal office, with union affiliation fees and the Ontario 500 Club making up most of the remainder. Since 1961, affiliation fees have greatly increased and the previously localized Ontario 500 Club has re-emerged in a national form as "sustaining memberships."

TABLE 8
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE NDP FEDERAL OFFICE
INCLUDING ELECTION FUNDS

	Revenue	Expenditures
1961-62	\$278,464	\$320,163
1962-63	214,475	187,107
1964	141,697	133,640
1965 (Sept. 1-Nov. 30, 1965)	207,634	207,308

SOURCE: 1961-62: Proceedings of the Second Federal Convention, pp. 28 - 29, August 6 - 9, 1963.
 1962-63: Ibid., pp. 29 - 30.
 1964: Proceedings of the Third NDP Federal Convention, August 1965, p. 20.
 1965: Letter from Mr. Terence Grier, federal secretary, NDP Dec. 13, 1965.

A comparison of tables 7 and 8 illustrates the great increase in receipts of the federal office for the period 1961-1965. Table 7 shows that the source of this great increase has been the affiliated membership and the sustaining membership; the former coming entirely from the unions, in all provinces, and the latter from members in the three most financially stable Provinces, British Columbia, Ontario and Saskatchewan.

A. THE 1962 FEDERAL GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

A breakdown of the expenditures by the NDP federal office in the 1962 campaign is contained in Table 9.

TABLE 9
EXPENDITURES BY NDP FEDERAL OFFICE
IN 1962 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN^{69/}

Expenditures	Amount
Federal office administration	16,570.42
Federal council and executive expense	1,956.43
Leaderships	8,778.42
Organization	6,044.79
Research	2,541.62
Literature and printing	1,190.58
Women's activities	3,526.83
Woodsworth House	373.68
Election campaign	
Travel	7,793.18
Advertising	49,813.61
Printing	8,513.99
Photography	101.00
Special assistance	8,084.46
Others	1,043.03
Total	\$116,332.04

The audited statement of revenue shows only one entry "Election and Victory Funds" \$117,267.88 with no detailed breakdown available, which the federal secretary affirmed as having come from contributions to the federal office from NDP union affiliates.

1. The 1962 Federal Election in Ontario

The first federal election campaign for the NDP in

Ontario was conducted "...centrally by an Election Committee named by the Provincial Executive."^{70/} Eighty-one candidates contested the election for the NDP; six won seats. Although the local constituency associations were responsible for their own campaigns, the Ontario provincial organization tried to conduct the election campaign on a regional basis. On paper the Province was divided into sectors, each sector having one or more ridings. One individual, (or more) working under a Director of Organization from the provincial office, was to be given the responsibility of improving the efficiency of the riding organizations in his (or their) sector. The CCF had never had the money to finance such a system. When the 1962 federal election was called, the NDP made an attempt to institute the system of regional organization, but at no time during the election was the Party able to employ more than ten regional organizers in various parts of Ontario, on a full-time or part-time basis.

A budget of \$15,000 was fixed for the provincial office. This meagre budget was based on the following considerations:

- (a) The Federal organization took responsibility for almost all of the advertising, and supplied material to candidates such as the Speakers' Notes, organizing manuals, press releases, posters, cards and so on.
- (b) The Ontario Federation of Labour spent their money on our behalf, instead of contributing to the campaign. Morden Lazarus, at the Executive meeting of April 28, announced the intention of the OFL to spend \$2,000.00 on a Public Relations Office, \$2,000.00 on advertising in Ethnic papers, and \$3,000.00 on assistance to ridings.^{71/}

The initial plan was that the trade unions would support the constituencies and the federal office, while the provincial office would be supported by a rebate from the individual ridings of 20% of the money budgeted for constituency campaigns. This system failed to work effectively, and in the end a direct appeal was made to the unions to contribute to the provincial office. Trade union funds were now to be shared between the provincial office and the constituency organizations on a one-third and two-thirds basis respectively. However, some unions did not follow the latter scheme, preferring to support only the local candidates. Table 10 shows the receipts and expenditures at the provincial office level.

TABLE 10

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES

OF THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL OFFICE IN THE 1962 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{72/}

Receipts

Riding contributions	\$4,345.71
Union contributions	7,117.48
Individual donations	530.00
	<u>\$11,993.19</u>

Expenditures

Office and field assistance	2,841.50
Travelling expenses	473.77
Assistance to ridings:	
Cash donations	5,163.42
Free literature	1,508.79
Telephone, telegraph and postage	6,672.21
	456.85
Newspaper advertising	1,829.37
Television and Radio	448.00
Candidates' school	146.42
Miscellaneous (bumper stickers, windshield stickers)	375.47
Reception -- Mrs. Douglas	106.93
	<u>\$13,350.52</u>

As can be seen from Table 10 the unions contributed the largest share to the provincial office. This money came from over 70 locals, boards and labour councils throughout Ontario. Only nineteen ridings which fielded candidates contributed to the \$4,345.71 received at the provincial office from riding associations. Over half of these ridings are centres of union strength and it was suggested in an interview with the provincial secretary of the Party that most of the money contributed by these ridings came from union sources. Available information indicates that about 50 per cent of the \$200,000 spent in Ontario in the 81 constituencies which the NDP contested in the 1962 election came from union sources. The other 50 per cent came from membership fees and individual donations collected in local finance drives.

2. The 1962 Federal Election in Saskatchewan

In the 1962 election the NDP spent approximately \$163,600 in Saskatchewan; \$80,000 in the seventeen constituencies and \$83,628 at the provincial office. Table 11 shows a breakdown of the receipts and expenditures at the provincial office.

As can be seen from Table 11, the greatest proportion of the money collected at the provincial office came from individual donations from within the Province. It is significant that Saskatchewan is the only province where the provincial office gets the bulk of its financial support for an election campaign from individual contributions.

TABLE 11

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
OF THE SASKATCHEWAN PROVINCIAL OFFICE
IN THE 1962 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{73/}

Receipts

Membership fees	\$ 6,441.00
Contribution from individuals	59,038.00
Trade union affiliation fees	169.00
Sale of custom work	519.00
Sale of literature	<u>5,206.00</u>
	\$71,373.00

Expenditures

Federal Party	\$11,988.00
Provincial organizer's salaries and expenses	10,804.00
Advertising:	
Newspaper	18,507.00
Radio	5,984.00
Television	14,666.00
Production	2,021.00
Postage	694.00
Telephone and telegraph	1,512.00
Office salaries	7,744.00
Stationery and supplies	914.00
Literature	8,794.00
	<u>\$83,628.00</u>

An examination of candidates' declarations of expenditures to the Chief Electoral Officer (Form 61) indicates that at the constituency level the NDP candidates spent over one half of the funds available to them on the print media, posters and display advertising. ^{74/}

In 5 out of the 17 federal ridings in Saskatchewan direct financial assistance was received from unions; in

1962 in the ridings of Regina and Saskatoon about \$1000 was contributed to each election fund, while about \$250 was given to the election funds in the Moose Jaw and Prince Albert constituencies. In all cases these funds were raised "...in and by locals located in the riding concerned."^{75/}

3. The Federal Election of 1962 in Manitoba

In the 1962 federal election, the NDP spent approximately \$56,000 at the Manitoba provincial office and constituency levels. In the fourteen federal constituencies expenditures were slightly more than \$40,000, the highest expenditure being in the urban Winnipeg ridings but which did not exceed \$6,500 in any one constituency. The provincial office spent \$8,976.76. Table 12 gives the details of the provincial office expenditures.

TABLE 12

EXPENDITURES BY THE MANITOBA PROVINCIAL OFFICE IN THE 1962 FEDERAL ELECTION^{77/}

Receipts:

Trade Unions	\$1,400.00	
Sundry Donations	140.00	
Winnipeg North	522.00	
Wpg. North Centre	296.65	
Wpg. South Centre	174.00	
Winnipeg South	150.00	
Churchill	160.00	
Dauphin	14.50	
Marquette	400.00	
Portage Neepawa	282.71	
Selkirk	185.55	
St. Boniface	178.00	
Springfield	392.50	
	<u>\$4,295.91</u>	<u>\$4,295.91</u>

Table 12 - Continued

Expenditures

Newspaper advertising	\$2,322.70	
Radio and TV	1,517.00	
Advertising <u>Co-operator</u>	404.60	
" <u>Voice of Farmer</u>	285.50	
Literature	818.64	
Travel expenses	419.50	
Hotel expenses	209.50	
Photographs	124.77	
Candidate deposits	200.00	
Payment to constituencies	140.00	
Extra salaries	593.00	
	<u>\$7,035.21</u>	<u>\$7,035.21</u>
<u>Cash deficit</u>		2,739.30
Accounts payable		<u>1,941.41</u>
Total		<u>\$4,680.71</u>

As can be seen from Table 12, receipts at the provincial office came from three sources: trade unions, direct individual donations, and the constituencies. The individual or "sundry donations," were for the most part from people in the Winnipeg area, given in small amounts. The amounts from the listed constituencies represent payments toward budgeted quotas agreed upon before the election. In some cases, the constituencies met their quotas but the majority did not and gave as much as they could spare from their modest funds.

4. The 1962 Federal Election in Alberta

In 1962 the Alberta NDP ran a full complement of seventeen candidates in the federal election. The candidates spent an estimated \$25,000 at the constituency level.

TABLE 13
A BREAKDOWN OF THE MONEY SPENT
IN FOURTEEN RIDINGS IN ALBERTA
IN THE 1962 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{78/}

Item	Expenditure	Percentage
Radio and television	\$3,427.81	16.62
Newspapers and periodicals	3,326.09	16.13
Pamphlets and brochures	3,249.70	15.76
Pay for scrutineers and canvassers	662.98	3.21
Hall rental	1,499.65	7.27
Postage	438.45	2.13
Transportation and travelling expenses	340.07	1.65
Posters	7,678.28	37.23
Total	\$20,623.03	100.00

As can be seen from Table 13, approximately the same amount of money was spent on the three categories, radio and television, newspapers and periodicals and pamphlets and brochures, while posters accounted for almost forty per cent of the expenditures. Those figures reflect the fact that on a relatively small budget the NDP prefers to use all the less expensive methods of mass communication rather than lump all the money into the expensive media of radio and television. Interviews suggested that in a province such as Alberta where the NDP has been quite unsuccessful, more voters are made aware of the NDP platform through these cheaper methods of advertising at the local level. A likely reason for

the lack of expensive media advertising at the local level is that to get the maximum effect from this type of appeal, it is generally done on a province-wide basis, directed and coordinated through the provincial office.

The Provincial Office spent just over \$11,000 in the 1962 election; a breakdown of this figure appears as Table 14.

TABLE 14

EXPENDITURES BY THE ALBERTA PROVINCIAL OFFICE
IN THE 1962 FEDERAL ELECTION^{79/}

Expenditures	Amount
Newspaper advertising	\$1,298.00
Radio advertising	220.00
Television advertising	2,675.00
Salaries for office staff	3,340.00
Douglas rally advertising	800.00
Deposit payment	400.00
Office operating costs	2,000.00
Sundry expenses	400.00
Total	\$11,133.00

The provincial office was supported by the following sources of election funds: individual donations, riding quota payments, union donations^{80/} and a support payment of \$750 per month from the federal office. The constituencies were supported by direct donations from members and supporters in each constituency, union donations, and support "in kind" from the unions. There is no accurate record of individual donations but most of them were under \$25.^{81/}

A total of about \$4,000 from union sources was spent in the following seven constituencies: Strathcona, Edmonton East, Edmonton West, Calgary South, Calgary North, Lethbridge and Medicine Hat. Four unions also paid the salaries of four union employees to work for various periods of time as organizers in the election as donations in kind to the Party. The Packinghouse Workers paid for one organizer to work full time for three weeks as "general purpose" organizer. The Glass Workers paid the salary of an organizer who worked half time for the whole election in the constituency of Medicine Hat. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers paid for a general representative to work throughout the election for the provincial office. The Steel Workers paid for an organizer to work half time for the whole election (8 weeks) in the constituency of Edmonton East.

5. The 1962 Federal General Election in Quebec

Despite an apparent quickening of interest following the founding convention in 1961, the organization for the 1962 federal election in Quebec did not differ appreciably from the CCF period. ^{82/}

Two full-time organizers bore the brunt of the work, plus members of the NDP who organized the campaign in the forty ridings where their Party candidates ran. Over fifty per cent of the candidates were in the area of metropolitan Montreal.

TABLE 15
AN ESTIMATE OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
OF THE QUEBEC NDP OFFICE
IN THE 1962 FEDERAL
ELECTION ^{83/}

Receipts

Contributions from within Quebec	\$18,200.00
Federal contributions	
For deposits (25)	5,000.00
For television and press	3,200.00
	<u>\$26,400.00</u>

Expenditures

Deposits	5,000.00
Publicity, including television, radio, printing, posters, rallies, etc.	18,700.00
Office staff salaries	1,500.00
Sundry	10,000.00
	<u> </u>
Total	\$35,200.00

Table 15 showing the receipts and expenditures of the provincial office in the 1962 federal election, reveals the restricted nature of the Quebec NDP's finances. The fact that 25 out of the 40 candidates deposits were paid for from the provincial office indicates that very little money was collected at the constituency level, a problem which dates back to the CCF when funds were transferred from the West. The NDP, like the CCF before it, has found difficulty collecting money for election campaigns from individual donors in Quebec.

Information gathered in the course of an interview^{84/} indicates that the money raised in 1962 came from two sources: about fifty per cent from the Quebec labour movement and about fifty per cent from a group of less than 150 members who gave amounts ranging from \$5 to \$500.

As Table 15 shows, the major expenditures by the Quebec provincial office in the 1962 election were on the mass media, including television, radio, and the press,^{85/} and the printing of leaflets and posters.

The shortage of money for the 1962 election campaign in Quebec led to proposals for (1) "a campaign with an immediate objective of \$10,000 based on \$1.00 per month membership cards;" (2) "an immediate attempt to raise \$10,000;" (3) "the establishment of a '500 Club'."^{86/} None of these proposals bore fruit.

6. The 1962 Federal General Election in the Maritimes

In Nova Scotia the provincial office spent approximately \$1,000 for deposits, and \$400 for assistance to ridings. Office operating costs amounted to about \$1,500 with staff salaries approximately \$2,000. The money for the 1962 campaign came from individuals and various donations, the union share being approximately \$3,500. The federal office also provided a subsidy of \$600 to help with candidate deposits.^{87/}

In Prince Edward Island a provincial office organized in 1961 lasted until just after the 1962 federal election.

New Brunswick organized a provincial office which lasted from 1962 until 1963. Newfoundland has never successfully organized a provincial office. All of these attempts at organization were financed with small subsidies provided by the federal office. Prior to the 1965 federal election the federal office placed an organizer for the Maritimes in Moncton and decided to keep him there on a full-time basis.

In the 1962 federal election most of the meagre sum of approximately \$13,000 spent by the NDP in Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Newfoundland went for posters, leaflets and television.^{88/}

B. THE 1963 FEDERAL GENERAL ELECTION

The 1963 election followed so closely upon the 1962 election that the Party was hard-pressed for funds. The drop in receipts and expenditures is a reflection of this difficulty. In the 1963 federal election the federal office spent \$70,678.47. Table 16 shows a breakdown of these expenditures. The receipts totalled approximately \$72,000 and came from the same union sources as in the 1962 federal election.^{89/}

TABLE 16
EXPENDITURE BY NDP FEDERAL OFFICE
IN THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION

Expenditures	Amount
Federal office administration	\$ 7,628.13
Federal council and executive	147.42
Leadership	558.72
Organization	1,741.80
Research	2,120.23
Literature and printing	--
Federal women's committee	1,686.58
Woodsworth House	591.05
Election campaign	
Travel expenses	9,075.89
Advertising	8,668.87
Television	5,532.86
French public relations	6,000.00
Printing	7,791.91
Special assistance	8,496.50
Communications	3,989.25
Advance to Quebec	6,649.26
Total	\$70,678.47

1. The 1963 Federal General Election in Saskatchewan

In 1963 the CCF-NDP spent approximately \$103,000 in Saskatchewan: \$53,000 in the 17 constituencies and \$50,135 at the provincial office. Table 17 gives a breakdown of the receipts and expenditures of the provincial office.

Union contributions in Saskatchewan in the 1963 election were approximately the same as in 1962.^{90/} It is a reflection of the commitment of the individual supporters that the CCF-NDP in Saskatchewan was able to raise so much money for the 1963 election, following so closely

on the 1962 election. In other provinces the two elections placed a severe strain on the ability of the Party to raise money.

TABLE 17
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
IN THE SASKATCHEWAN PROVINCIAL OFFICE
IN THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{91/}

Receipts

Membership fees	\$6,995.00
Individual contributions	42,252.00
Trade union affiliation fees	267.00
Sale of custom work	630.00
Sale of literature	1,864.00
Collections at public rallies	3,612.00
Total	55,620.00

Expenditures

Federal Office	8,114.00
Organizers salaries and expenses	4,307.00
Advertising and publicity	
Newspapers	7,058.00
Radio	3,891.00
Television	4,836.00
Production & Misc.	1,074.00
Postage	910.00
Telephone and telegraph	1,092.00
Office salaries	10,004.00
Stationary and supplies	1,990.00
Literature	2,181.00
Rally expense	4,578.00
Total	\$50,135.00

2. The 1963 Federal General Election in Ontario

The 1963 federal election caught the NDP in Ontario in a difficult position; nevertheless a total of approximately \$120,000 was spent at the constituency and provincial office levels. Table 18 shows the receipts and expenditures at the provincial office.

TABLE 18

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL OFFICE IN THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION^{92/}

Receipts

Donations	\$ 3,206.28	
Quota payments	12,759.14	
Literature, etc.	5,320.18	
Advance re: advertising	<u>1,000.00</u>	<u>22,285.60</u>
Accounts receivable		16,705.61

Disbursements

Deposits (22 ridings)	4,400.00	
Assistance to ridings, other than deposits	1,375.00	
Loan - Nipissing	300.00	
Speakers' Expenses	161.00	
<u>New Democrat</u> - special issue	646.00	
<u>CCF Saskatchewan</u> - Farm Leaflet	210.00	
Express, etc.	263.16	
Telephone & telegraph	349.33	
Miscellaneous	18.00	
Salary - Metro & WPWA	1,040.60	
Organization expenses	6,441.77	
Office expenses	<u>4,482.76</u>	<u>19,687.62</u>
Accounts payable		\$13,678.19

Table 18 shows that 1963 quota payments produced much more revenue for the provincial office than in the 1962 election; however, \$6,500 came directly from union sources, \$3,000 from the Steelworkers via the Hamilton area council, and \$3,500 from other unions via the Toronto area council.^{93/} As in the 1962 election, much of the riding contributions or quotas for the provincial office came from areas of high labour concentration.^{94/}

As in previous elections the production and distribution of campaign literature was coordinated by the federal office. Table 19 shows the cost of literature from the federal office distributed through the provincial office to Ontario constituencies.

TABLE 19

COST OF CAMPAIGN LITERATUREUSED BY ONTARIO CONSTITUENCIES IN THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION^{95/}

Expenditures	Amount
Federal leaflet	\$ 9,963.75
Farm leaflet	110.90
Special issue - <u>New Democrat</u>	707.13
Nuclear leaflet	292.00
Federal program	496.95
Bumper stickers	547.30
Douglas posters	21.00
Total	11,139.03

(a). The Douglas Rally: In the 1963 election campaign,

the NDP held several major rallies across Canada. One of these was held in Toronto at Maple Leaf Gardens with Mr. T.C. Douglas the Party leader as principal speaker.^{96/}

The rally was administered by the Toronto area council of the NDP using the facilities and manpower of all the metropolitan Toronto ridings. It illustrates that such rallies were used by the Party as fund-raising instruments as well as for electioneering. Table 20 shows a summary of the receipts and expenditures for the rally.

TABLE 20

SUMMARY OF THE RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE
DOUGLAS RALLY IN TORONTO DURING THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION^{97/}

Receipts

Collection at rally	\$ 9,194.83
Special donation	500.00
Total	<u>9,694.83</u>

Expenditures

Advertising (see Table 21)	6,312.53
Rental of Maple Leaf Gardens	1,775.00
Entertainment	622.00
Rally programs	353.00
Sundry	<u>1,107.94</u>
Total	\$10,170.47

Table 20 shows that the NDP almost succeeded in covering the costs of the rally with collections from the audience. Most of the other rallies held across Canada were also financed by such collections. Table 21 shows the total costs involved in the four types of advertising used to promote

the Toronto Douglas rally. A total of 430,000 leaflets were printed. These leaflets were distributed by the metropolitan constituency organizations and certain unions in Toronto. Advertising during the week preceding the rally consisted of seven spot announcements on radio which cost \$1,503 plus three "8 second" television spots at a cost of \$495. Newspaper advertising in the three days immediately prior to the rally consisted of four advertisements in Toronto newspapers at a cost of \$2,571.^{98/}

TABLE 21

SUMMARY OF PROMOTION COSTS OF THE
DOUGLAS RALLY IN TORONTO DURING THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION^{99/}

Expenditures	Amount
Leaflets (430,000)	\$1,743.53
Radio	1,503.00
Newspapers	2,571.00
Television	495.00
Total	6,312.53

3. The 1963 Federal General Election in Manitoba

In 1963 Manitoba was able to raise the sum of \$6,462 for provincial office purposes but at the constituency level little money was available. The NDP contested only twelve of the fourteen ridings, spending slightly more than \$16,000. The provincial office spent \$6,317 in this election. The provincial office was able to do a little better in 1963

than in the previous years because Manitoba trade unions provided slightly more.

Table 22 gives a breakdown of the provincial office receipts and expenditures. ^{100/}

TABLE 22

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE
MANITOBA PROVINCIAL OFFICE IN THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{101/}

Receipts

Trade Unions	\$2,529.00
Sundry donations	747.04
Collection. Lunch	437.00
Collection. Playhouse	1,157.68
Constituencies	375.00
Letter appeal	882.50
Newspaper appeal	334.00
	<hr/>
	\$6,462.22

Expenditures

Newspaper advertisements	\$1,194.18
" "	851.27
Radio and T.V.	1,021.00
Postage	49.00
Telegraph	9.12
Telephone	202.10
Paid Constituencies	2,189.00
Cost of lunch	59.75
Cost of Playhouse	361.00
Travel expense	75.27
Printing	17.76
Express charges	7.93
Miscellaneous	279.65
	<hr/>
	\$6,317.03
	<hr/>
Surplus	\$ 145.19

As can be seen from Table 22, the 1963 sources of revenue for the provincial office differed from those for the 1962 federal election. There was a discernible shortage of funds at the constituency level. In 1963 over one third (\$2,189) of the provincial office expenses was made up of payments to the constituencies.

When the constituency quota system failed to provide the provincial office with sufficient funds the provincial office had to resort to the devices listed in Table 22 as "Collection", "Lunch", "Letter Appeal," "Newspaper Appeal."

4. The 1963 Federal General Election in Alberta

In common with most other NDP provincial organizations, Alberta had a difficult task raising money for the 1963 election. The Alberta NDP was faced with trying to solicit funds from the same people who had recently given \$36,000 for the 1962 federal election. Attempts at raising money for the constituencies and the provincial office met with only limited success, and only \$24,000 was spent at all levels during the 1963 campaign in that Province. In the 1963 election trade unions contributed to several constituency funds, to a total of just over \$1,500. Trade union contributions in kind were also much less than in 1962. Only one union member, the campaign manager for Edmonton East, was paid by a union while working for the NDP.

The provincial office was financed from the same sources as in the 1962 election: constituency quotas, ^{102/} individual

donations, union affiliation fees and a federal office subsidy of \$500 per month (\$1,000 for the election period).

Table 23 shows a breakdown of the expenditures.

TABLE 23
EXPENDITURES BY THE ALBERTA PROVINCIAL OFFICE
IN THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{103/}

Expenditures	Amount
Television	\$1,000.00
Douglas rally - Edmonton	800.00
Deposit payment	200.00
Office staff salaries	1,870.00
Office administrative costs (approximate)	2,000.00
Total	\$5,870.00

5. The 1963 Federal General Election in Quebec

The 1963 federal election provided little breathing space for the small over-worked staff at the Quebec provincial office. Again the campaign was run by the Party's provincial secretary and an organizer supplemented by an assortment of workers who were responsible for certain regions of Quebec. The campaign funds were collected at the provincial office and distributed through that office. No accurate figures are available regarding receipts and expenditures at the provincial office; ^{104/} however, the provincial budget for the campaign is presented in Table 24 with the qualification that the present secretary of the

NDP in Quebec has indicated that the Party probably spent about two thirds of this amount.

TABLE 24

PROVISIONAL BUDGET OF THE QUEBEC PROVINCIAL NDP
IN THE 1963 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{105/}

Items	Amount
Television	\$13,110.00
Support for candidates	11,000.00
Printed matter	11,000.00
Staff salaries	920.00
Office administration	2,820.00
Sundry	4,440.00
Total	\$43,290.00

6. The 1963 Federal General Election in the Maritimes

In 1963 the NDP spent a total of approximately \$10,000 at all levels of the campaign in Nova Scotia. The role of the provincial office was severely restricted. ^{106/} More than half of the amount spent by the nine candidates was expended in the old centre of CCF and trade union strength, Cape Breton. Many of the candidates spent little more than the deposit of \$200. Funds for the campaign were collected from individuals at the local level with the unions contributing \$2,500. The labour unions also made a contribution in kind by assigning a member of the staff of the Nova Scotia Federation of Labour to work in the constituency of Pictou for four weeks.

In New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, less than \$10,000 in all was spent with only twelve Party candidates contesting the election in these Provinces. In New Brunswick \$4,830 was spent by seven candidates. ^{107/}

C. THE 1965 FEDERAL GENERAL ELECTION: THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN

The New Democratic Party spent considerably more on its national campaign in 1965 than in any previous election. In the 1965 election the Party's federal office spent \$207,308. At all levels of the Party, expenditures for the 1965 campaign were approximately \$1,000,000. Details of the expenditures of the federal office from September 1 to November 30, 1965, covering the entire period of the campaign are contained in a letter from the federal secretary of the NDP, Mr. Terence W. Grier, to the Research staff of the Committee on Election Expenses.

The federal secretary drew: ^{108/}

the committee's attention to the manner in which funds are raised and expended by our Party during a campaign.

The constituency associations, which pay the full cost of the campaigns in the ridings, raise their revenue by means of contributions from individual members and from local unions affiliated to the Party.

Of these revenues from individual members, some 20 percent are rebated to provincial offices to cover their campaign expenses. Certain local unions and district labour councils also turn over a share of their contributions.

The federal office, having left the membership and local union sources entirely to the constituencies and the provinces, re-

lies entirely on donations from the Canadian headquarters of unions which have locals affiliated to the party. In 1965 this figure stands at \$149,875, raised from approximately 2 dozen organizations.

It is too early to estimate a percentage distribution of revenue sources for 1965, but a study we carried out after the 1962 general election showed that individual members contributed 65 percent of the party's global revenues, local unions 15 percent, and Canadian union headquarters the remaining 20 percent.

I would guess the proportion for 1965 would be roughly the same, with our total expenditure at all levels of the party being close to the \$1,000,000 mark.

Attached to the aforementioned letter is the following breakdown of income and expenditures of the NDP federal office for the period September 1 to November 30, 1965.

TABLE 25

NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY FEDERAL OFFICEINCOME AND EXPENDITURES - SEPTEMBER 1 TO NOVEMBER 30, 1965

<u>A. Party Income</u>	<u>Amount in Money</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Monies on hand at time of dissolution - September 8.	18,852	9
Membership Fees	30,923	15
Contributions:		
From Commercial Corporations	-	-
From Trade Unions	149,875	72
From individuals	2,984	1.5
From MP's and Senators	-	-
Other sources:	<u>5,000</u>	<u>2.5</u>
TOTAL	\$207,634	100%

Table 25 Continued

<u>B. Party Expenditures</u>	<u>Amount in Money</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Radio	17,538	8.5
Television	56,670	27.
Newspapers		
1. dailies	36,188	17.5
2. weeklies	-	-
3. periodicals	-	-
Printed Matter)		
Posters & Outdoor)		
Advertising)	13,021	6.5
Leader's Tour	10,954	5.5
Grants to Candidates and Constituency Organizations	15,204	7.
Administrative Expenses:		
National Headquarters	49,415	24.
Provincial & Regional Headquarters	-	-
Other Expenses:	8,318	4.
 TOTAL	 \$207,308	 100 %

1. Sources of Money for the National Campaign in the 1965
Federal Election

Affiliation fees collected from members of NDP affiliates by means of a "check-off" were the largest single source of funds for the 1965 campaign. Campaign funds from this source were made available at the constituency and provincial levels in addition to the amounts received by the federal office. By 1965 a pattern had emerged as to which echelon of the trade union affiliates could be approached by any of the three levels of the NDP organization.

The federal office had access to the national offices of affiliated trade unions while the constituency organizations could approach local and area trade union bodies.

Several of the NDP provincial offices, notably Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia, received funds from trade unions and labour federations within these Provinces.

Approximately \$150,000 was collected from several labour unions at the national level, notably the Steelworkers (U.S.W.A.) and the Packinghouse Workers (U.P.W.A.). This money was collected on the basis of 50 cents per member from certain trade unions. The money was solicited on a voluntary basis with no compulsory check-off being used. The response to the request for this money was "very encouraging" to the NDP and in several cases the unions achieved almost one hundred per cent of their quota. 109/ Funds were also spent on behalf of the federal office in Saskatchewan, Ontario and British Columbia from sources available to the NDP in those Provinces. The money for the tour of Mr. T.C. Douglas is discussed on the following pages.

At the beginning of the 1965 campaign, the NDP had \$18,852 on hand as well as \$30,923 from membership fees. During the campaign it collected a further \$7,984: \$5,000 from "various sources" and \$2,984 from individual donations. 110/

2. The Costs of the Tour of the National Leader of the NDP in the 1965 Federal Election

An attempt has been made to indicate the overall costs of Mr. Douglas's 1965 national campaign tour on the basis of estimates obtained from NDP organizers who were ^{111/} directly connected with the tour.

TABLE 26

BREAKDOWN OF THE EXPENSES OF THE NATIONAL TOUR OF THE LEADER OF THE NDP IN THE 1965 ELECTION

(a)	The costs of physically moving Mr. Douglas and his staff around Canada including transportation, accommodation, meals, etc.	\$10,954.00
(b)	Salaries and extra expenses of his staff.	3,600.00
(c)	Total cost of Meetings, Banquets, Rallies across Canada	35,800.00
Total		<u>\$50,354.00</u>

Table 26 gives a broad breakdown of the total cost of \$50,354.00. Item (a) indicates the costs of moving Mr. Douglas and his staff which were paid by the federal office out of the contributions received at the national level. Item (b) shows the salaries and expenses of the two men who travelled with Mr. Douglas: Mr. C. Scotton, the present federal secretary and formerly the editor of the Canadian Labour Congress publication Labour; and Mr. Desmond Morton, then assistant provincial secretary of the NDP of Ontario. Both their salaries were paid by their respective employers. Mr. Morton and Mr. Scotton

travelled with Mr. Douglas through most of the national campaign, Mr. Scotton being mainly concerned with public relations and Mr. Morton with the preparation of material for speeches. Item (c) consists of an estimate based on information gathered in interviews with Mr. Morton and Mr. Scotton. The sum of \$35,800 includes the total costs of all meetings, banquets and rallies which were considered part of the national campaign. These include rentals of halls, leaflets, advance publicity, food and entertainment. These expenses were borne at the local level by one or more federal ridings in the area in which the functions occurred. In many cases the provincial office provided other aid in the form of money or administrative assistance. For instance in Winnipeg, the Manitoba provincial office and the Winnipeg ridings worked together to provide the work force, planning and money for the Douglas rally in Winnipeg.

Most of the meetings and rallies across Canada were self-supporting financially, because the collection taken at each meeting usually covered the costs of both the meeting and advertising. Mr. Douglas spoke to approximately 54,000 people at these meetings and rallies and the average donation was 45 cents. Thus about \$24,300 out of the \$35,400 spent on meetings and rallies was paid for by donations from those who attended the various functions. The remaining \$11,100 came from the riding associations and the various provincial offices.

3. The 1965 Federal General Election in Saskatchewan

In the 1965 election the Saskatchewan CCF-NDP spent approximately \$122,000; \$46,000 by the provincial office and \$76,000 in the constituencies. No detailed data was available at the time of writing; however, interviews indicated that the proportion of expenditures was the same as in 1962. Table 27 shows a breakdown of the receipts and expenditures at the provincial office.

TABLE 27

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE
SASKATCHEWAN PROVINCIAL OFFICE
IN THE 1965 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{112/}

Receipts

Membership fees	\$3,642.00
Individual contributions	20,581.00
Federal election fund	25,195.00
Trade union affiliation fees	101.00
Sale of custom work	1,072.00
Sale of literature	3,526.00
	<hr/>
Total	\$54,117.00

Expenditures

Contributions to the federal Party	2,349.00
Organizers' salaries and expenses	6,629.00
Advertising and publicity:	
Newspaper	8,422.00
Radio	4,816.00
Television	5,627.00
Production	2,032.00
Postage	2,007.00
Telephone and telegraph	714.00
Salaries or office staff	9,200.00
Literature	3,667.00
Stationery and supplies	894.00
Total	<hr/> \$46,357.00

The contributions from unions followed the same pattern as for the 1962 and 1963 elections. Only four riding associations, (Regina, Saskatoon, Moose Jaw and Prince Albert) received union contributions. The first two received approximately \$1,000 each, the others about \$250 each. Approximately \$1,250 was received at the provincial office from the provincial area councils of two unions, in addition to affiliation fees. All other funds contributed to the provincial office and riding levels were from individual members of the CCF-NDP. ^{113/}

No detailed information is available regarding the value of contributions in kind such as the services of employees of unions or other organizations who continue to be paid by their employers while actually working for an NDP candidate during the election campaign. However, to quote the present provincial secretary of the Party: "Dozens of individuals who are union members are also party members, gave their time and money in each campaign, the same as people from other walks of life do." ^{114/}

According to the provincial Party secretary, Mr. L.G. Benjamin, the CCF-NDP in Saskatchewan operated at a deficit of \$33,406 during the fiscal year 1965-1966 ending May 1, 1966. Income was \$165,494 and expenditures were \$198,900. The deficit compared with a surplus of \$16,588 during the previous year. The Party's total assets on May 1, 1966, totalled \$124,850 as compared with \$148,980 the previous year. Partially responsible for the drop in

income from \$207,090 the previous year were decreases in membership revenue and contributions. Revenue from memberships was \$18,704 compared with \$19,615, and contributions dropped to \$71,564 from \$133,604.

On October 31, 1966, total membership was 27,801, considerably lower than in the provincial election year of 1964. The provincial Party secretary added, however, that the 1966 membership total is the fifth highest in the Party's history. ^{115/}

4. The 1965 Federal General Election in Ontario ^{116/}

For the 1965 federal election, the NDP in Ontario presented 84 candidates in 85 constituencies and amassed the largest financial support in its history. Estimates indicate that the Ontario Party spent over \$330,000 at all levels. Directly related to this increased financial support was a significant expansion in the Party's province-wide organizational system.

As has been described elsewhere, the Ontario NDP has always sought to improve its electoral efficiency by grouping the eighty-five constituencies into regional organizations, with experienced organizers working in each region. In the 1965 election, the system of regional organizers was not completely effected, but instead of the few individual regional organizers who worked in the 1962 and 1963 elections, approximately 60 organizers were at work in the 1965 election. These organizers worked throughout the Province, lending ex-

perience and expertise to riding election organizations throughout the Province. These organizers were from many spheres: Members of the Legislature, members of the provincial executive, union employees, and ordinary members of the Party. They worked both part time and full time under the general direction of the provincial office and each person arranged his own remuneration with the provincial office.

At the provincial office, approximately \$52,000 was raised for the campaign. This sum came from three sources: rebates from the constituencies of 20 per cent of their election budgets, direct donations from various sources, and money funnelled through the Toronto area council. A greater amount (\$23,500) was received under the 20 per cent rebate system than in any previous campaign. Union contributions in 1965 covered between 60 per cent to 80 per cent of the total of \$330,000 spent by the NDP in Ontario. Support was received from numerous individual unions as well as the Canadian Labour Congress and the Ontario Federation of Labour.

Expenditures at the provincial office level amounted to approximately \$55,500, one quarter of the amount being spent on campaign literature. Loans were made to cover the excess of expenditures over receipts.

At the constituency level, expenditures amounted to approximately \$280,000. The amounts spent ranged from a little more than the \$200 deposit in the riding of London to \$20,000 spent in York South.

5. The 1965 Federal General Election in Manitoba

In the 1965 election, the NDP won three constituencies in Manitoba: Winnipeg North, Winnipeg North Centre and Springfield. Approximately \$37,000 was spent in the fourteen constituencies, and \$7,954^{117/} at the provincial office.

Table 28 shows that in the 1965 federal election, the Manitoba provincial office was able to depend on the established constituency quota system for the bulk of its financing.

TABLE 28

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE MANITOBA PROVINCIAL OFFICE IN THE 1965 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{118/}

Receipts

Sundry donations	\$ 321.12	
Trade Unions	680.00	
Churchill	105.00	
Lisgar	75.00	
Marquette	500.00	
Portage Neepawa	105.00	
Springfield	200.00	
Winnipeg North	218.00	
Wpg. North Centre	421.50	
Winnipeg South	289.50	
Wpg. South Centre	27.30	
St. Boniface	92.50	
	<u>3,034.92</u>	
Charged to Constituencies	679.73	
	<u>\$ 3,714.65</u>	\$3,714.65

Table 28 Continued

Expenditures

Newspaper Advertisements	3,306.46	
Radio Advertisements	1,437.75	
Billboards & Signs	570.25	
Cuts & Mats	137.06	
Photographs	79.00	
Buttons	244.20	
Refunds to Constituencies	200.00	
Mimeographing	79.48	
Aerial Flags	495.00	
Postage	34.35	
Express charges	10.06	
	<u>\$6,593.61</u>	<u>\$6,593.61</u>
Deficit		\$2,878.96

Election Accounts Payable

Fingold Signs	754.80	
Saskatchewan NDP	520.00	
National Office	86.50	
	<u>\$1,361.30</u>	<u>\$1,361.30</u>
Total Deficit		\$4,240.26

By far the largest amounts of money were spent in the three winning constituencies. In Winnipeg North, the total reached \$6,500; in Winnipeg North Centre, \$4,954; and in Springfield, \$4,700. The financial statements ^{119/} of these candidates portray the general trends of receipts and expenditures for all fourteen candidates. ^{120/}

On the receipt side it appears that no candidate received money from the national office or from corporations. All money received came from individuals and unions. Teas, social evenings and raffles were also used to raise money by the respective campaign organizations. Another method

of raising money was used by at least two of these campaign organizations. Bank loans were undertaken by the riding association or by one of the executives of the association prior to, or during, the election campaign. The liquidation of this debt was used as an incentive in raising money after the election.

The above-mentioned financial statements indicate a pattern of expenditures. Besides the necessary payments for committee room rentals, transportation, etc., the items of expenditure in these three ridings reflect the traditional campaign style of the CCF-NDP which is based on the belief that there is no substitute for personal door-to-door canvassing for votes. The financial statement indicates that while the NDP in Manitoba recognized the usefulness of general advertising on radio, television, billboards and posters, it spent as much, or more, money on pamphlets and brochures as it did on television. In both ridings of Churchill and Winnipeg North Centre more money was spent on pamphlets and brochures than on radio and television combined. These pamphlets and brochures were distributed on a door-to-door basis by the candidate and his organization.

6. The 1965 Federal General Election in Alberta

In the 1965 federal election the Alberta NDP spent approximately \$37,000 at the constituency and provincial office levels. In an effort to keep expenses down to a

minimum the activity of the provincial office was sharply curtailed. Table 29 gives a breakdown of these expenses.

TABLE 29
EXPENDITURES BY THE ALBERTA PROVINCIAL OFFICE
IN THE 1965 FEDERAL ELECTION ^{121/}

Expenditures	Amount
Douglas Rally	\$ 700.00
Salaries of Office Staff	1,500.00
Office Operating Expenses	2,000.00
Deposit Payment	200.00
Total	4,400.00

In an attempt to save money, the 1965 election campaign was completely decentralized. The provincial office undertook no television, radio or newspaper advertising. All advertising of the NDP in Alberta in the 1965 election was done either by the federal office or the local constituency.

The provincial office was supported by the same sources as in previous elections. ^{122/} Local unions donated \$930 but no subsidy other than the above-mentioned advertising was provided from the federal office to the provincial office.

At the riding level in Alberta, trade unions played an active financial role in the 1965 election. A total of \$5,100 was donated to the constituency campaigns in Lethbridge, Calgary South, Calgary North, Bow River, Jasper-Edson, Peace River, Wetaskiwin, Edmonton East, Edmonton West

and Edmonton Strathcona, by the trade unions in Alberta. The unions' contributions in kind were also much greater than in previous years. A total of eight union employees worked part or full time for the NDP on union salary. One representative of the Canadian Labour Congress worked full time in the constituency of Wetaskiwin. Two members of the United Packinghouse Workers from the Calgary local worked part time in Bow River. Two members of the International Woodworkers of America worked in Peace River on a full-time and part-time basis. Two other members of the IWA worked in the Jasper-Edson campaign and another worked part time in the constituency of Macleod.

In order to try to maximize the returns from its limited funds, the Party in 1965 decentralized its election campaign organization, allowing the constituencies to spend as much money on the mass media as they could individually afford while the provincial office funds were severely reduced.

7. Quebec After the 1963 Election

After the 1963 election, the Quebec NDP split into two groups: one supporting an extreme nationalist position, the other a federalist position. This split caused the complete disruption of the small organization which had developed until 1963; even the provincial office was closed. At the time of writing little information is available for the 1965 election, but interviews indicate that it was heavily supported financially by the federal office and personally by the provincial leader, Mr. Robert Cliche.

Quebec has always had to be supported to a large degree from money collected in other provinces. The little money that has been collected in Quebec came from a small ^{123/} minority, mostly intellectuals living in the Montreal area.

The present provincial Party secretary in an interview stated that he felt very uneasy about the Quebec NDP ever being able to finance itself from individual contributions. To quote him: "If you had ever been with me on a door-to-door appeal for money for the NDP, and seen the expressions of disbelief or amazement on the average householder's face, when I explained that I represented a party which financed itself from small individual donations you would know what I mean."^{124/}

8. The 1965 Federal General Election in Nova Scotia^{125/}

Financially, the 1965 federal election was the most successful campaign for the NDP in Nova Scotia, with approximately \$25,000 being spent at the provincial office and constituency levels. Information on receipts and expenditures at the constituency level is available for only six of the twelve constituencies. Expenditures in these six constituencies ranged from a low of \$402 to a high of \$3,278. No consistent expenditure pattern is evident. Those riding organizations which spent under \$1,500 appeared to concentrate on the cheaper advertising media while those which spent over \$3,000 used all the media in about equal proportion.

Responses to the Committee's questionnaire show that funds came from either unions or private individuals. The total financial contribution by unions to all ridings amounted to \$2,500, while one staff member from the Nova Scotia Federation of Labour worked for four weeks in the constituency of Pictou while remaining on the Federation's payroll.

The provincial office spent approximately \$5,000 in this election. About \$1,500 was remitted to the ridings in the form of deposits and assistance, the rest being used for office administration and staff salaries. The provincial office was assisted by a \$600 subsidy from the federal office as well as donations from individual members and supporters ranging from a few dollars to one hundred dollars. Interviews suggest that the other three Maritime Provinces followed the same financial pattern as in previous elections, with NDP candidates spending approximately \$10,000 obtained from local donations and federal office subsidies. ^{126/}

9. The 1965 Election: Summary

Early in the 1965 election, Mr. T.C. Douglas, national leader of the NDP, announced that for the first time in history his Party would spend \$1,000,000 in a federal election. ^{127/}

As can be seen from the analysis above, the federal office spent \$207,308. A total of approximately \$232,511 was spent at the provincial office levels. ^{128/}

In the constituencies the NDP appears to have been able to spend larger sums than in previous elections, especially in the large metropolitan urban areas. Whereas in previous elections, expenditures in constituencies ranged from the minimum \$200 candidate deposit to a little more than \$10,000, in 1965 the expenses of some candidates were in the neighbourhood of \$20,000. Of the 255 Party candidates, 175 made official declarations of expenditures totalling \$516,000^{129/} - an average of about \$3,000 per reporting candidate. Information obtained by the Committee indicates that on advertising alone the Party at all levels spent about \$300,000 (\$153,598.72 on radio and television; \$146,289 on print media).^{130/} Total expenditures in the 1965 election by the NDP at the federal, provincial, and constituency levels may well have come close to the \$1,000,000 forecast by Mr. Douglas at the outset of the campaign.

10. British Columbia

British Columbia has not been given separate consideration despite its position as one of the three strongest provincial organizations. The New Democratic Party of British Columbia has been reluctant to release information due to uncertainty concerning the legal position of trade union contributions in that Province.^{131/} What follows is based on several interviews with Party and trade union officials in that Province.^{132/}

Receipts and expenditures at the provincial office in

the three federal elections of 1962, 1963 and 1965 were between \$30,000 and \$45,000. Funds received at the provincial office came from either individual contributions, union affiliation fees and donations from unions. No details as to the amounts given by the various sources could be obtained.

Expenditures at the British Columbia provincial office paralleled those of Saskatchewan, especially for advertising and publicity. The major difference between the expenditures of the two provincial offices was on rallies. Whereas in Saskatchewan the records for the elections of 1962, 1963 and 1965 show only a small expenditure, in 1963, in British Columbia the provincial office spent a substantial sum on eight rallies.

(a). Union Involvement in NDP Federal Campaign in British Columbia:^{133/} The trade union movement in British Columbia has been closely associated with the CCF and its successor the NDP. The founders of the NDP had hoped that as the labour movement grew in British Columbia it would become a larger and larger contributor to the NDP's election funds at least in that Province. However, in 1961 the British Columbia Labour Relations Act was amended to make it illegal for parties or candidates to use the funds obtained through union "check-off". This legislation, which has become known as "Bill 42," was upheld in the Supreme Court of Canada.^{134/}

Generally, the labour movement in British Columbia has shown great resentment of Bill 42, which has had various effects on the financial support of the NDP. Some unions

found alternatives to check-off to gather regular contributions and contributions for elections. This included such efforts as "Dollars for Democracy," an organized "voluntary" payment toward the NDP's expenses. Other unions sheltered themselves under the protection of Bill 42 and refused to donate anything. Indications are that the labour movement in British Columbia probably contributed about \$20,000 toward the federal election campaigns of 1962, 1963 and 1965 in British Columbia and that the anti-check-off legislation had probably reduced NDP income by 20-25 per cent. ^{135/}

It has been pointed out that Bill 42 had some beneficial effects for the NDP. By not being permitted to use the check-off for raising money for the NDP, the unions have been forced to find other methods of contributing and probably increased the amount of "voluntary" and other election and inter-election organization work done for the NDP. ^{136/}

In the last three federal elections, the unions did not directly support NDP organizers. However, they made an indirect contribution to the NDP's federal election organization by having union employees engaged full time on electoral activities within the unions, and through a collection system called the "200 Club" whereby members of this club would contribute \$60 per year to the provincial office to provide NDP organizers for both elections and inter-election work in British Columbia. ^{137/}

During the eight weeks of the last federal campaign many union members performed organizational work in the industrial ridings of this Province. An average of 15-20 union members worked every day in the industrial ridings on a voluntary basis. On election day, it was estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 union members worked the whole day, driving cars, manning polls, etc.

Perhaps the greatest single contribution that the unions and their members have made in the past three federal elections in British Columbia was in providing the organizational "know-how" for major rallies in the Province: promotion, entertainment, distribution of leaflets and other publicity.

VI. Conclusion

Money raised at the three levels of political organization, the national or federal office, the provincial office, and the constituency association, has always come from either membership fees or donations, in the case of both the CCF and the NDP. Membership fees divide into two basic types: individual membership fees and affiliation fees of members of an organization affiliated with the Party. The amount of individual membership fees varies with the province, but a common pattern for the allocation of the fees developed during the CCF period and has been adopted by the NDP. All membership fees, irrespective of province, are split between the national or federal office, the provincial office, and the local constituency where the money was collected.

In the fifties, the Ontario CCF developed an additional source of revenue through an organization called the "Ontario 500 Club". This was a group of CCF members in Ontario who pledged a certain amount of money above their membership fees. Out of this the NDP developed the concept of sustaining memberships. Individual members may become sustaining members by paying a sum above their regular membership. The sustaining membership has proved effective only in the three Provinces with significant Party strength: British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Ontario.

The affiliated membership fees have not produced the financial support hoped for by either the CCF or the NDP. Theoretically, the affiliated membership fees could have come from many types of organizations, such as farm groups, cooperatives, and women's organizations. Practically, the sole source of affiliation fees has been the trade unions affiliated with the Party. Formally, the affiliated members of the Party give as individuals. This concept is central to the CCF-NDP ideology of individual giving. The evidence strongly suggests, however, that individuals give in amounts adequate for sustained political activity only when they are part of a cohesive, well-organized group-giving structure, such as a trade union. The lone exception to this apparent failure of grass-roots financing is Saskatchewan.

An important characteristic of the CCF/NDP operational structure has been its decentralization which has been particularly evident in regard to finance. The CCF national

office was always supported financially by the provincial organizations. Each of the provincial Parties was, in theory, to provide an amount commensurate with the size of its membership; in reality, only British Columbia, Ontario and Saskatchewan provided the funds which kept the CCF national office functioning. The CCF national office also acted as a transfer point for channelling money from the three strong Provinces to other provincial Parties. Although Ontario and British Columbia played important roles in financing the CCF both at the national level and in the weaker provinces, it was essentially Saskatchewan which provided the financial backbone of the Party at all levels from 1946 until 1961 when the Party was transformed into the NDP. Countless financial crises within the CCF were avoided by a timely cheque from Saskatchewan.

In Saskatchewan, and only in Saskatchewan, grass-roots financing became and remained a reality. A relatively large and stable amount of money was needed to fight elections in Saskatchewan and to bolster the Party elsewhere. The system of small individual contributions even allowed the establishment of a permanent election fund. Union contributions did not play an important role in financing the CCF-NDP in Saskatchewan. The Party's mass membership in Saskatchewan was based on effective constituency organizations which were able to recruit and maintain large memberships and which were also very effective in collecting money and in formulating resolutions which formed the basis of the Party's social and economic policies. These organi-

zations were coordinated and directed by an efficient and vigorous provincial office in Saskatchewan. Yet even this apparently successful embodiment of the original CCF ideology of grass-roots financing and control is not without a certain ambiguity. The highly organized and group-oriented nature of the membership and financial drives strongly suggests that the Saskatchewan member tends to be a party of a group-giving system, losing his individual identity as donor within a larger group, but at the same time retaining his right to influence policy.

In all the other provinces there was a continual effort to emulate the Saskatchewan example. In Ontario and British Columbia, the CCF was partially successful, though because of weak constituency organizations the respective provincial offices produced more centralized provincial organizations. In the other Provinces (Manitoba, Alberta, Quebec and Nova Scotia) the existence of provincial office and constituency organizations was precarious. In contrast to Ontario or Saskatchewan, where the provincial office maintained a permanent staff with at least a provincial secretary and clerical staff, the other provincial offices shifted between part-time and full time staffs. In the three key Provinces, money raised within the provincial boundaries supported the provincial office staff; whereas in the other Provinces any permanent staff were usually supported in part by money from Saskatchewan, which had been transferred to the particular province through the national office.

The case of Manitoba illustrates an important principle of the financing of federal campaigns by the CCF-NDP. All the records of receipts and expenditures for the provincial office show no sign of financial aid from the federal office. The federal office does not appear to have sent financial aid to any of the federal constituencies in Manitoba during the period 1945-65. This indicates that unless the financial situation was utterly hopeless, all funds spent were raised in the Province. Combined with the evidence that in the 1962 federal election the Manitoba provincial office had to obtain its own funds from other than "normal channels", i.e. go out itself to raise funds rather than get a quota from each constituency, it would appear that the Manitoba NDP tried to raise all funds needed for election campaigns through sources available to each respective level, and that only in rare situations do these levels appeal to a higher level for funds.

In contrast to the rural environment of Saskatchewan, where grass-roots financing has attained a great degree of stability, the urban and rural environment of Ontario has proved to be poor soil for grass-roots financing. There are strong indications that the NDP affiliated labour movement in Ontario is responsible for most of the money spent by the Party in the last three general elections. The actual proportion of union money to total expenditure may range from 50 to 80 per cent.

The experience of almost thirty years (1932-60) demonstrated the tremendous difficulties of attempting to finance the needs of the national office from provincial contributions collected on a grass-roots basis. But for Saskatchewan's effectiveness in this direction, the CCF national office may not have had a continuous existence during this period. The continually precarious nature of the national office's financial position made financial planning difficult, if not impossible. This provided the CCF with its most difficult problem during an election campaign.

Structurally grass-roots financing has produced a very decentralized party. Each provincial organization has been expected to find the money needed for both inter-election periods and election campaign expenses from sources within the respective provincial boundaries. For provinces unable to find these sources, there have been a multitude of ad hoc transfer payments. This latter point is important for if the transfer payments had become standardized the result would probably have been an increase in the centralization of party control at the national office level.

The important change in the first few years of the CCF's successor, the NDP, has been the enormous increase in money available for the federal office both during election campaigns and inter-election periods. In election campaigns, the bulk of money has come from the labour movement, where the cohesive nature of the union structure has enabled the

NDP to collect relatively large sums of money en bloc. This has provided the NDP with greater stability for the needs of its federal office than the earlier system of national grass-roots financing could provide.

At the constituency level, with the exception of Saskatchewan, the grass-roots system of financing elections did not enable the NDP to use the expensive mass media. In areas in Ontario where the NDP has been able to use the expensive media, evidence strongly suggests that the labour movement has paid most of the costs.

In conclusion then we may say that the financial structure of the NDP today presents a paradox. At the very moment when the Party finally seems to be taking its place as a major rival to the older parties in election campaigns, the means employed to bring about this successful development have drawn into serious question the original CCF ideology of mass fund raising. Grass-roots fund raising was successful in Saskatchewan, but remained such an isolated case that in fact the national CCF Party fell into a prolonged financial decline after the end of World War II. There is no question that it is the trade unions which have provided the strong new stable financial base of the NDP. While it is true that trade union contributions are different in nature from contributions from business corporations, it is also true that these differ in nature from voluntary donations made by individual citizens.

FOOTNOTES TO STUDY 5

- 1 Accounts of the emergence of the CCF as a third party in national politics are to be found in McHenry, Dean E., The Third Force in Canada: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948, University of California press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950; Lipset, Seymour Martin, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950; and McNaught, Kenneth, A Prophet in Politics, A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1951.
- 2 Interview with Hon. M.J. Coldwell, Jan. 20, 1966.
- 3 McNaught, op. cit., p. 261.
- 4 McHenry, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
- 5 CCF Records, MG 28 IV - I. Vol. 1. Public Archives of Canada.
- 6 CCF Records, Vol. 8 (P.A.C.). Constitution of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, adopted at the Annual Convention, Regina, Sask., 1933, Article 9, p.3.
- 7 CCF Records, Vol. 1 (P.A.C.). Summary Report of National Council Meeting held at Ottawa, Jan. 30 and 31 and Executive Meeting, Feb. 3, 1937.
- 8 CCF Records, Vol. 1 (P.A.C.). Summary Report of National Council Meeting held at Ottawa January 30 and 31 and Executive Meeting Feb. 3, 1937.
- 9 McHenry, op. cit., p. 43
- 10 Ibid., pp. 41 - 42.
- 11 CCF Records Vol. I (P.A.C.). Report of the National Convention 1937, p. 3.
- 12 Ibid., p. 5.
- 13 McHenry, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
- 14 Although technically CCF Members of Parliament were simply Party "members", the Party expected relatively large and consistent donations from these men, which often went beyond their financial ability.
- 15 CCF Clubs were an important source of members until about 1942. Cf. Zakuta, L., A Protest Movement Becalmed - A Study of Change in the CCF, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1964. pp. 43 - 44.

- 16 See Table 1, and McHenry, op. cit., p. 51.
- 17 Ibid., p. 47.
- 18 Lipset, op. cit., p. 119.
- 19 Lipset, op. cit., p. 119. Lipset's estimate of 100,000 is challenged by M.J. Coldwell, who maintains that the figure was closer to 80,000 (interview with Mr. M.J. Coldwell, Aug. 1966).
- 20 At its 1943 convention, the Canadian Congress of Labour had endorsed the CCF as the "Political Arm of Labour in Canada." McHenry, op. cit., p. 105.
- 21 Ibid., p. 50.
- 22 Lipset, op. cit., p. 199.
- 23 Ibid., p. 208.
- 24 For a discussion of the CCF and NDP in Quebec, see Sherwood, David H., The New Democratic Party and French Canada 1961-1965. unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1966, passim.
- 25 McHenry, op. cit., p. 90.
- 26 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
- 27 Ibid., p. 58.
- 28 CCF Records, Vol. 1 (P.A.C.). "Memo on Federal Election Central Organization", p. 1.
- 29 Report of 1946 CCF Convention, p. 14 ff.
- 30 CCF Records, Vol. 2 and 3 (P.A.C.). Reports to the Meetings of the National Council, when the annual audit statement was presented 1947-1958. The figures for 1959 and 1960 can be found in the Report of the 16th National Convention, Regina, Aug. 9-11, 1960.
- 31 CCF Records Vol. 2, p. 2. All provincial payments are included in the total shown for each year.
- 32 CCF Records, Vol. 2, (P.A.C.). Meeting of the National Executive, November 27, 1948, p. 3.
- 33 CCF Records, Vol. 2 (P.A.C.). Meeting of the National Executive, April 30 - May 1, 1949, p. 1.
- 34 CCF Records, Vol. 2 (P.A.C.). Report of the National Secretary to the National Council, January 29-30, 1949, p. 16.

- 35 CCF Records, Vol. 2 (P.A.C.). Meeting of the National Executive, July 29, 1950. Presented in an audited statement.
- 36 Interviews with Hon. M.J. Coldwell, Winter 1965-66.
- 37 Idem.
- 38 CCF Records, Vol. 63 (P.A.C.). Statement of Revenue and Expenditure for the year ended April 30, 1950, p.3. For 1945 figures see ibid.
- 39 CCF Records, Vol. 63 (P.A.C.). Federal Election Statement, June 27, 1949, p. 3.
- 40 CCF Records, Vol. 2 (P.A.C.). Memorandum on The National Three Year Expansion Programme, n.d.
- 41 Ibid., p. 3.
- 42 Loc. cit.
- 43 Loc. cit.
- 44 CCF Records, Vol. 2 (P.A.C.). Meeting of the National Executive, July 24, 1950.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Report of the 13th National Convention of the CCF, Alberta, 1964. July 28-30, p. 17.
- 47 Loc. cit.
- 48 Loc. cit.
- 49 Interview with Hon. M.J. Coldwell.
- 50 Letter from Mrs. Nellie Peterson, past secretary of Alberta CCF 1950-1959, to the Committee on Election Expenses, Jan. 30, 1966.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 CCF 15th National Convention. CCF National Office Financial Report for year ending June 30, 1957, p. 17.
- 53 Interviews with provincial president, secretary, and the assistant secretary and other Party officials. Toronto, December 15, 1965.
- 54 CCF Records (PAC), Vol. 53. "Report on the Conduct of the 1957 Federal Election Campaign in Ontario," August 6, 1957, p. 4.

- 55 Ibid., p. 4 and 9.
- 56 Ibid., p. 11.
- 57 Ibid., p. 12.
- 58 Ibid., p. 14.
- 59 Report of the 15th National Convention of the CCF, 1958, p. 20.
- 60 Loc. cit.
- 61 Most of the information on Ontario is based on CCF Records, Vol. 58 (P.A.C.). "Report on the Conduct of the 1958 Federal Election Campaign in Ontario", May 8, 1958.
- 62 Ibid., p. 4.
- 63 Ibid., p. 3.
- 64 Ibid., p. 7.
- 65 Ibid., p. 8.
- 66 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
- 67 From material supplied by Mr. Donovan Swailes, secretary-treasurer, Manitoba NDP, January 27, 1966.
- 68 Conversation with Mr. M. Iazarus, director of the Ontario Federation of Labour, January 6, 1966.
- 69 Proceedings, Second NDP Federal Convention, Regina, Aug. 6-9, 1963, pp. 28-29.
- 70 Minutes of Ontario NDP Provincial Council Meeting, Jan. 19, 1962.
- 71 Report of Election Campaign Committee to the 1962 Ontario New Democratic Party Convention.
- 72 Report to Ontario NDP Provincial Council.
- 73 Letter from Mr. L. Benjamin, provincial secretary of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, Saskatchewan section of the New Democratic Party, to Committee on Election Expenses, Feb. 20, 1966.
- 74 Sixteen candidates reported spending \$76,000.
- 75 Ibid.

- 76 Letter from Mr. D. Swailes, provincial secretary-treasurer, Manitoba NDP, Jan. 27, 1966. Operating costs of the provincial office, or the staff salaries, totalling \$6,800, are not included.
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 The table is based on an examination of candidates' declarations of expenditures to the Chief Electoral Officer (Form 61). To arrive at \$25,000 for all 17 add an average figure of about \$1,500 each for the ridings which did not report. This average figure was supplied by the provincial secretary of the Party. To get the total for 17 constituencies, \$4500 was added.
- 79 Based on information contained in letter from Mr. Notley to the Committee on Election Expenses, January 27, 1966.
- 80 Interview with Mr. Notley, January 18, 1966.
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 For a discussion of the NDP in Quebec see Sherwood, op. cit. pp. 97-98 and passim.
- 83 These figures are from a précis entitled Notes sur la Campagne elettorale federale, June 18, 1962, and an interview Jan. 19, 1966, with Mr. Marc Boulard, provincial secretary of the Quebec NDP (1965-1966). Mr. Boulard gives approximately the same figures in a memorandum to the Committee on Election Expenses (n.d.)
- 84 Boulard interview.
- 85 Notes sur la Campagne, op. cit., p. 2.
- 86 Minutes of a Meeting of Quebec NDP Provincial Executive, June 25, 1962.
- 87 Letter from Mr. Rae Gilman, to the Committee on Election Expenses, Feb. 1, 1966.
- 88 Interviews. Mr. T. Grier, Dec. 1965-Feb. 1966.
- 89 Proceedings of the Second NDP Federal Convention August 6-9 1963, pp. 29-30. The figures given in the Proceedings, ibid., vary slightly from these figures which are derived from the audited statement of the NDP dated March 31, 1964, for the sixteen months' period ending Dec. 31, 1963.
- 90 Letter from Mr. L. Benjamin to Committee on Election Expenses Feb. 20, 1966.

- 91 Ibid.
- 92 Federal Election, Statement of Receipts and Disbursements to April 19, 1963, Minute Book of the Ontario Provincial Council, NDP.
- 93 Letter to Research Staff of Committee on Election Expenses from Mr. Jim Bury, provincial secretary, Ontario NDP, January 28, 1966.
- 94 Ibid.
- 95 Federal Election 1963, Statement of Receipts and Expenditures, Minute Book, op. cit.
- 96 Mr. Ken Goldstein, Public Relations, Report on Federal Election Campaign in Ontario 1963, unpagged, Ontario Provincial Council files.
- 97 All information on this subject comes from a précis entitled "Costs of Advertising in 1962 Election".
- 98 Ibid.
- 99 Ibid.
- 100 Letter from Mr. Donovan Swailes to Research Staff, Committee on Election Expenses, January 27, 1966.
- 101 Ibid.
- 102 Letter from Mr. Grant Notley, provincial secretary of the Alberta NDP, to Committee on Election Expenses January 27, 1966, and interview, January 17, 1966.
- 103 Based on information contained in letter from Mr. Notley, ibid.,
- 104 For a discussion of the financial role of the trade unions in support of the Quebec NDP see Sherwood, op. cit., passim.
- 105 Provisional Budget provided by Mr. Marc Boulard, provincial secretary of Quebec NDP, January 19, 1966.
- 106 Letter from Mr. R. Gilman, provincial secretary, NDP of Nova Scotia, to Research Staff of the Committee on Election Expenses, February 1, 1966.
- 107 Interviews with Mr. T. Grier, December 1965 and February 1966.
- 108 Letter from Mr. Grier, to the Committee on Election Expenses, dated December 13, 1965.

- 109 Interviews with Mr. T. Grier, December 1965-February 1966.
- 110 Letter from Mr. Grier, op. cit.
- 111 Based on conversations with Party officials.
- 112 Letter from Mr. L.G. Benjamin, provincial secretary, Saskatchewan CCF-NDP to Research Staff of the Committee on Election Expenses, February 20, 1966.
- 113 Ibid.
- 114 Ibid.
- 115 Mr. Benjamin's statements were gleaned from the Gazette, Montreal, Nov. 19, 1966, p. 34; and Globe and Mail, Toronto, Nov. 18, 1966, p. 10.
- 116 This section is based on letters and interviews with Party officials (including a letter from Mr. J. Bury, provincial secretary, Ontario NDP, dated Dec. 15, 1965) and the Executive Committee Report to the Ontario Provincial Council Meeting, November 27-28, 1965.
- 117 Letter from Mr. Donovan Swailes, January 27, 1966, op. cit.
- 118 Ibid.
- 119 From information contained in replies to the Committee on Election Expenses' questionnaire. See Study 11, "Candidate Spending Patterns and Attitudes" in Part II of the Committee's Report, pp. 407-427 and Appendix 2, in Part III "Declared Election Expenses by Political Affiliation 1949-1965", pp. 469-496.
- 120 Substantiated by interviews with some of the candidates.
- 121 Based on information included in a letter from G. Notley to the Committee on Election Expenses, January 27, 1966.
- 122 Ibid.
- 123 For a discussion of the dependence of the Quebec NDP on transfers from other provinces, see Sherwood, op. cit., p. 128 ff.
- 124 Interview with Mr. Marc Boulard, January 19, 1966.
- 125 Information in this section was obtained in interviews and letters with Party officials, particularly from Mr. R. Gilman in a letter dated February 1, 1966.

- 126 Interviews with Mr. T. Grier, December 1965-January 1966.
- 127 La Presse, September 10, 1965. Also letter from Mr. T. Grier, dated Dec. 13, 1965, and a report (January 18, 1966) by him (p.8) given to the Committee on Election Expenses.
- 128 See section below on British Columbia for estimate of expenditures in that Province.
- 129 Based on analysis of figures furnished to the Committee on Election Expenses by the Chief Electoral Officer. See Appendix 2 "Declared Election Expenses by Political Affiliation 1949-1965" in Part III of the Committee's Report, pp. 469-496. See source reference in Table 1, p. 470.
- 130 See Study 10 "Political Broadcasting in Canada", pp. 359-406, and study 9 "Newspaper Advertising Expenditures and Lineage of the 1965 and 1963 Federal Elections," pp. 332-358, in Part II of the Committee's Report.
- 131 Recent legislation and court decisions have restricted the freedom of action of trade unions in support of the NDP. See Report of the Committee on Election Expenses, Part II, pp. 327-329.
- 132 Interviews with the provincial secretary of the NDP and the secretary-treasurer of the B.C. Federation of Labour, January 17, 1966.
- 133 Based on an interview with Mr. Patrick O'Neil, secretary-treasurer of the B.C. Federation of Labour, January 18, 1966.
- 134 See Report of Committee on Election Expenses, Part II, pp. 327-329.
- 135 Interview with Mr. O'Neil.
- 136 Ibid.
- 137 Ibid.

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE FINANCES
OF THE RALLIEMENT DES CRÉDITISTES

by

Michael Stein*

I. Introduction

Among the first to recognize the importance of party finance for understanding the decision-making process and articulation of political parties was the eminent French political scientist, Maurice Duverger. Central to his distinction between "cadre" and "mass" parties is the difference in their financial structures.^{1/} Very little has been done since to refine and build on this analysis.^{2/}

For Duverger, the major distinction between these two types of parties is in their structure. The "cadre" party generally includes in its membership only a restricted group of the most active people sharing the same partisan goals in a society; the "mass" party is open to all who care to join

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it. Two factors which define the distinctive systems of membership most clearly are: the method of political education of the members, and the financial organization. The "cadre" party engages in little or no political education of its own members, whereas the "mass" party generally carries out an extensive program of internal mass education. Financially, the "cadre" party relies on the contributions of a few large supporters, often from outside the movement, whereas the "mass" party is essentially based on the fees paid by its members.^{3/}

Duverger isolated a number of other major differences between these two types of parties, including class, ideological orientation, and degree of commitment. He gave most prominence, however, to those elements related directly to organizational structure.^{4/} These include the following distinctions: (1) a cadre party organizes itself around a "caucus", that is, a loose autonomous grouping of the most active members in each riding, whereas a mass party is inclined to a "branch" unit, that is, one "wider based and less exclusive", in which the political education of members supplements electoral activity, and in which there is an administrative organization with permanent officials; (2) a cadre party is "weakly articulated", that is, there is relatively weak linking and relating of the primary groups of the party, whereas a mass party is "strongly articulated"; (3) a cadre party is not very centralized, whereas a mass party is; (4) a cadre party manifests oligarchical leadership, that is, the control by a few leaders of most areas of decision making in the party, and

the mass party is even more oligarchical; (5) the total membership of a cadre party is generally small, whereas the membership of a mass party is very large; (6) the range of activity of a cadre party tends to be limited to political matters, while the mass party envelops much of the community life of the member; (7) in the cadre party, activity generally lasts only for the period of the election or special political event, whereas in the mass party, activity lasts throughout the year.

Duverger also isolated a third, more recent type of party, which he referred to as the "devotee" party. He acknowledged, however, that it was essentially an outgrowth of mass parties, and shared most of the characteristics of the other two main types. The two elements of a devotee party which differ in kind from those of the mass party are: (1) a devotee party organizes itself around a "cell" or "militia", the cell being distinguished from a branch unit by its occupational basis (i.e. it unites all party members who work at the same place^{5/}) and its smaller number of members, the militia being "a kind of private army whose members are enrolled on military lines and are subjected to the same discipline and the same training as soldiers";^{6/} (2) a devotee party has an extremist ideological direction (Communist or Fascist). In all other respects its characteristics differ from those of the mass party only in degree. It is generally more strongly articulated, more centralized, more authoritarian in leadership, somewhat smaller in member-

ship, more all-encompassing in its range of activity, of greater élan, and more doctrinaire than the mass party.^{7/}

Duverger's analysis has been criticized for an over-emphasis on "structure" and "surface forms." It has been argued that structural features of a party are largely a reflection of the pattern of the larger society, which in every case may be unique.^{8/} There is no room in such instances for generalization and comparative analysis. Recent students of parties have therefore called for greater attention to the functional attributes of each party and its consequences for the larger society.^{9/}

In this writer's opinion, the "structural" framework of Duverger, whatever may be its weaknesses, is admirably suited to a study of party finance, particularly in the case of the Ralliement des Créditistes. It is obvious, as Duverger has pointed out, that there is a close relationship between the nature of party finance and the nature of party structure and decision making, and it requires explanation. Moreover, the weaknesses in Duverger's study may not be inherent in all structural analyses of parties. Duverger has pointed out what appears to be an interesting coincidence of different structural features; he has not attempted to explain why such coincidence exists.^{10/} It will be part of our task in this study to offer some possible explanations for these common elements in structural characteristics of parties in different societies. Finally, as we shall see, Duverger's analysis is admirably suited to the study of Créditiste finance since,

in virtually every respect, the Ralliement des Cr ditistes fits his description of a mass party.^{11/}

The two elements which we shall focus on in our analysis of Cr ditiste finance are: (1) the financial structure and (2) the organizational and decision-making structure. With regard to the second, a clear distinction will be made between the "formal" organizational and decision-making structure, and the real or "efficient" structure. The emphasis will be on the output side of party decision making, that is, on the channels and methods used by the party leaders to impose their decisions upon the rank-and-file. The hypothesis is that all decisions reflect in reality the preferences of a small group of men who have captured the leadership and occupy the key posts of the party. Some attention will also be given to the role of "invisible" cliques of members who aid the party executives and leaders financially and influence them, at least in a negative way, in the articulation of their preferences and the formulation of their programs.

The general questions which we shall be exploring are: (1) In mass parties like the Ralliement des Cr ditistes, is the general pattern of party finance approximately what Duverger described it to be? and if so, why is it of this pattern? (2) What is the relationship between mass financing and party decision making? (3) In parties of a mass or grass-roots type, is the financial structure functional with the organizational and decision-making structure? (in the sense that it allows the party to operate through its "authentic"

or normal structures of decision making rather than through "invisible" structures which lie outside of the recognized channels of party decision making). (4) What explains the common features in financial and decision-making structures in different mass parties?

II. The Union des Électeurs, 1939-58

It is impossible to understand the financial and decision-making structures of the Ralliement des Créditistes without treating those of the Union des Électeurs, the first influential Créditiste organization in Quebec.^{12/} The founders and the majority of members of the Ralliement des Créditistes previously belonged to this earlier movement. Not surprisingly, therefore, the structure and methods of the Union served as a model for the Ralliement in every sphere of its activity, including finance.

The Union des Électeurs was first established in 1939 by Mr. Louis Even, a Gardenvale journalist, and Mlle Gilberte Côté, now Mme Côté-Mercier), a university-trained daughter of an affluent Montreal manufacturer, Mr. Rosaire Côté. Their declared intent was to spread the doctrine of Social Credit in Quebec by concentrating on education rather than organization.

Their policy was directly opposed to that of the old, and by then defunct Ligue du Credit Social, the original Social Credit movement (1936-39) in Quebec. It had attempted

to expand by establishing small cells and associations of affiliated members throughout the different parishes in the Province, but it lacked both the resources and the knowledge of Social Credit doctrine to do so.

A. FINANCIAL STRUCTURE

The Union des Electeurs' leaders operated almost exclusively through the journal Vers Demain, a bi-monthly publication of 6 to 8 pages, which was printed in Montreal, and sold at first for \$1 for a year's subscription. Originally the newspaper went out to former members of the Ligue; gradually it spread to new parishes and new locales. Small cells were formed by the original subscribers. These cells promoted Social Credit education and affiliation in the Province through means supplementary to the newspaper: study groups, small kitchen meetings, and larger public assemblies. But the first obligation of the members was to distribute and sell the newspaper.

Vers Demain was both a vehicle of propaganda and a major source of revenue for the movement. At its height (1948), it had over 50,000 regular subscribers. Its annual gross revenue was over \$100,000, some of which went to defray the costs of radio and newspaper publicity, normal living expenses of the editors and their full-time aides, and printing and publishing costs. The rest was retained at the parish level for organizational activities such as renting halls, paying the travelling expenses of speakers, and subsidizing delegates

to regional meetings and the annual provincial congress. By far the largest sum, however, was used to finance candidates in the various federal and provincial election campaigns from 1940 to 1949.

The major source of funds for the Union des Électeurs, then, was the individual member himself. He paid his annual contribution of \$1 or (later) \$2, and received his bi-monthly edition of Vers Demain. There was no other membership fee. Occasionally a member or a family would contribute larger sums of \$10 and \$20 and even \$100. But this was a comparatively unusual occurrence. Most of the people who subscribed to Vers Demain were people of little means: farmers, urban workers, and above all small townspeople such as shopkeepers, tradesmen, and service personnel. The doctrine appealed to them because it promised to remove conditions making for their economic deprivation, and to give them a better way of life. It purported to do so without changing their traditional mores and beliefs, and without restricting what they regarded as their freedom and opportunity for initiative. They were not, for the most part, real believers in Social Credit. As one leader of the movement admitted in a letter to Mr. Even in 1944, "they subscribe in order to please a friend, because they are constantly bothered, etc."^{13/}

The method of collecting these subscription moneys was as follows: the movement's adherents went from door to door carrying newspaper issues with subscription blanks which they

tried to convince their customer to buy. Often they received rude refusals or had doors slammed in their faces. But they were frequently successful in their endeavours as well. Thus, between 1940 and 1948 circulation rose from a few thousand in 1940 to 35,000 in 1943, to 50,000 in 1946 and to 65,000 in 1948. The money, once collected, was turned over to the parish or county association, where it was processed for provincial or local use. Part of the money was retained at the local level, and part was sent to the movement's headquarters in Montreal. The leaders also collected money on their frequent tours of the major Cr ditiste centres in the Province. The work in selling subscriptions to Vers Demain was done on a purely voluntary basis. The activists, who were generally members of the Institute for Political Action, ^{14/} devoted much of their free time, particularly on weekends, to making a door-to-door canvass of the county. They were often boarded overnight by fellow Cr ditistes free of charge, or given a free meal. Mr. R al Caouette was one of these door-to-door salesmen for over fifteen years. Some even devoted themselves full time to these activities, for which they were paid a virtual pittance. Mr. Laurent Legault, the former President and interim provincial leader of the Ralliement, was one such full-time member for a period of time before 1948.

In order to encourage members to devote their time to the active and difficult work of selling subscriptions, the movement's leaders developed a list of special titles and ranks, similar to those of a military contingent. In 1940

they established L'Institut D'Action Politique (the Institute of Political Action), composed of all those who had recruited 25 new and regular members (subscribers).^{15/}

The newspaper subscribers were known as "voltigeurs" (foot soldiers) and later as "pèlerins" (pilgrims). The activists who sold subscriptions were known as "défricheurs", (clearers). The best among the "défricheurs", those who prodded the "défricheurs", were called "animateurs" (animators). The top-ranking "animateurs" were designated "conquéranrs" (conquerors). In order to be a conqueror, one had to sell at least 150 regular subscriptions a year. Finally there were the full-time "missionnaires" (missionaries), of whom there were thirty-four at one time. Heading them all was an association of 7 Directors who formed both the governing board of the newspaper and governing body of the Institute.

As a further incentive to recruiting new members, the editors of Vers Demain published on the back page of every issue a list of the number of new subscriptions each county had sold during the previous fortnight. This put the counties in competition with each other, and encouraged a friendly rivalry among them. Counties such as Abitibi, Lac-Saint-Jean, Beauce, Sherbrooke, Portneuf, Chicoutimi, and Frontenac, which are the heartland of Créditiste voting strength and parliamentary representation today, were recognized at that time as the leading Créditiste communities. The outstanding canvasser of subscriptions was given much publicity: pictures

awards, and a new title.

In addition to this educational work the Union des Électeurs actively involved itself in election campaigning during the first decade of its existence. In the federal election of 1940 it entered two candidates, in the provincial election of 1944 it presented 11, in 1945 (federal election) 43, and finally in 1948 (provincial election) a full slate of 92 candidates. In addition, they contested a number of by-elections. Mr. Réal Caouette won the by-election in Pontiac in 1946. The Créditistes lost all the other contests, often by wide margins. They managed to amass close to 150,000 total votes in one election.^{16/} Most of the candidates, nonetheless, lost their \$200 deposits.

The costs of election participation were prohibitive. The candidates could not finance their own campaigns so that the money had to come from the Union des Électeurs' coffers. In addition to the candidates' deposits, the movement had to pay for posters, radio, and newspaper publicity, brochures and leaflets, and rental of halls. The other normal costs of campaigning, such as payment of scrutineers and other workers, were not part of the Union des Électeurs budget: the workers were all voluntary.

The campaign technique of the Union des Électeurs was described by Mr. Laurent Legault, then the organizer in chief of the movement, in a little brochure published by the Institute in 1948. It was subdivided into two parts: work to be

done, and working material or aids. Work began on the very first day after the election was called, at least 40 days before the actual vote, with preparations for the constituency convention. There followed, on successive days, such tasks as arranging public meetings, filling out cards to check against the electoral lists, having the photographs of the candidates and circulars printed up and distributed, preparing the organization of polls, collecting automobiles, painting everywhere in large letters "vote for" To carry out these tasks, it was considered necessary to recruit at least one third of all subscribers to Vers Demain in the rural areas and one fifth, in urban areas, an organizer for every 3000 electors, a lieutenant for every 300 electors, and a "défricheur" for every 60 electors. It was calculated that about \$400 would be needed for every 3,000 electors.^{17/} In order to meet these additional costs of campaigning, the leaders established a separate election fund and sent their activists out to canvass for it. The names of the contributors were listed by constituencies and printed in the back page of Vers Demain, together with the sums they had donated. This was done, according to Mr. Even, in an article entitled "Our Electoral Funds", "for the edification of everyone."^{18/} It was rationalized as a demonstration of the democratic nature of financing Créditiste election campaigns. But it served the more important purpose of encouraging greater financial support from the members.

Although the editors of Vers Demain were affiliated with western Social Credit from 1944 to 1948, they did not receive financial support from the National Association. The fundamental principle of association was complete provincial autonomy in organization, decision making and finance, in accordance with the Quebec leaders' own wishes, and the uneasy alliance operated in this manner for four years. A split between the two wings occurred in 1948 over ideological rather than financial differences.^{19/}

B. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE

The ideology, particularly in relation to Social Credit education and grass-roots finance, determined, in large part, the organizational and decision-making structure and control of the membership. The leaders of the Union were ideologically committed to Major Douglas's idea of a decentralized, grass-roots type of organization, which was based on mass education and democratic self-finance.^{20/} They desired to give education in Social Credit doctrine priority over organization and electoral competition, also in accordance with Douglas's ideas.^{21/} The subscription method of finance and the mass circulation newspaper were the obvious mechanisms for achieving their ideological objectives. What was needed was an organizational structure which would sustain and advance these objectives.

In order to canvass a community for subscriptions to Vers Demain, and to encourage discussion of Social Credit

doctrine among the readers of the newspaper, the leaders required cadres of loyal and doctrinally knowledgeable workers. Because of the vast distance between such regions as Abitibi and Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, and because of the discrepancies in regional dialects, mores and attitudes, it was considered uneconomical and impolitic to rely on a single group of itinerant workers. The solution devised by the directors was to establish a base of operations in the leading parishes of each county. There the leaders recruited members who acted both as doctrinal specialists and as leading canvassers for Vers Demain in that county. The movement then spread outward from the parish centre in a fan-like manner.

It was difficult to control such a broadly based and decentralized movement. The founders were soon faced with internal factionalism, rebellions, and challenges to their leadership. They devised a number of instruments of control which were designed to overcome these difficulties. Most important was the Institute of Political Action, which was legally incorporated as a distinct body, an adjunct to Vers Demain. It consisted of the most active Cr ditistes in each county, selected on the basis of their success in selling subscriptions, their knowledge of Social Credit doctrine, and their loyalty to the leader. The members of the Institute were expected to form a vanguard of about 3000 dedicated men of action heading "an immense army, well-equipped, well-organized, which would be ready for all campaigns and would overcome all obstacles." ^{22/} All members of this body were co-opted

onto it by the leaders. The Institute thus became the arm of the directors, through which they exercised dictatorial control over the movement. The most able and loyal of these activists were chosen by the two founders to serve with them on the directorate, the governing body of the movement, which never comprised more than 7 members.

The Institute of Political Action soon came under severe attack by dissident Cr ditistes, particularly those who failed to win favour with the directors and were overlooked as candidates in the various election campaigns. They charged that:

The Institute trains, pays and controls the organizers of the Union of Electors....

As the electors are mobilized as members of their Union, the Institute continues to exercise an absolute control over the calling of conventions and meetings, over nominations and all activities of the Union....

The Institute lays down the policy of the Union - the results being demanded by the electors....

The Institute chooses candidates to contest elections and subsequently controls their actions if elected. 23/

The charges went unanswered by the Directors. They continued to rule dictatorially through this all-important organ during the later period of the movement's decline.

Another mechanism of control was found in the regional meetings, held at various times during the year, and the annual congress, which generally took place at the end of the summer. They served as a means of conveying policy decisions to the rank-and-file. Louis Even and Gilberte C  t   generally dominated these sessions. Theoretically, all decisions were

voted upon by the members at large, who had ultimate authority. In fact, however, as one critic among the former members noted, "the delegates didn't have the opportunity in meetings to discuss the means that should be taken to attain our political objectives. Many have the impression that they are treated like school children, and not like free men."^{24/} The leaders had no difficulty controlling the delegates at these sessions. "It is easy to impose on a crowd as heterogeneous as that of 600 enthusiastic Cr ditistes a whole policy direction [ligne de conduite]. You [Even] impose your views upon them and those of Mlle C t  without permitting them to discuss [these views]. The critical mentality disappears completely in a crowd such as that one, above all when it is dominated by personalities as strong as yours and Gilberte's, because you have everybody's admiration for your numerous and admirable qualities as animators [animateurs]. A large number, because of the admiration they hold for you, and because of your sincerity, don't dare criticize your methods of action...."^{25/}

The newspaper Vers Demain served as a channel for day-to-day instructions from the leaders to their members. Policy was often laid down in the editorial page. The date, time and place of meetings were published in the back page. Announcements of speaking engagements and radio broadcasts were printed on the same page.

Finally, control was exercised through finance. The major function of each parish or county association was the

selling of subscriptions to Vers Demain. The leaders always kept a full record of the revenue collected in each county, which was submitted by members of the Institute. They were careful to appoint trustworthy people, also generally members of the Institute, to handle the money at the local level. They instilled a sense of selflessness in their workers which assured their loyalty and honesty in such matters. Even then, they could not always be certain that their control in this sphere was complete. It has been alleged that some canvassers absconded with a part of their subscription earnings. Sometimes a local association took it upon itself to finance activities of which the directorate disapproved. A prime example is the constituency of Villeneuve, which financed the radio broadcasts and the election of Mr. Caouette in the federal elections of 1957-58. Nevertheless, in general, the leaders acted through the Institute of Political Action to maintain supervision over both revenues and expenditures, and through them, over all activities of the local associations.

It has been argued by former members that independent means enabled Mlle Côté to maintain her pre-eminence over the movement for 15 years. She was able to devote herself full-time to the movement. Mr. Even relied somewhat on her financial support to maintain him in his work. Of the two, she was also the more dominant personality. This was attested to by all respondents in the course of interviews

with former members of the Union des Électeurs.^{26/}

The elections of the late forties, and in particular that of 1948, drained the Union des Électeurs' treasury. The directorate had never been overly enthusiastic themselves about such participation. In Douglas's theory, political parties and elections were supposed to be exploited by the financiers for their own corrupt purposes, and were not seen as important means for obtaining Social Credit. In their election forays the Union leaders were more concerned about selecting authentic Créditistes as candidates, and about maintaining control over these candidates, than about selecting a person of prestige who could win votes. Often their candidate was a stranger to the constituency. It is no wonder then that they fared badly at the polls. After 1949 the leaders of the Union prohibited the members from participating in elections altogether.^{27/} The pretext was that the Union was a movement and a pressure group, rather than a political party. Financial difficulties were also at the root of this decision.

When the Union des Électeurs turned away from election participation, interest in the movement began to wane in many areas, and subscriptions to Vers Demain began to decline. A split occurred in 1958 between the Union leaders and a group of second-generation Créditistes, led by Mr. Caouette, Mr. Legault and Mr. Grégoire.^{28/} It led to the formation of the Ralliement des Créditistes, in direct opposition to the Union.

The success of the Ralliement dealt the Union its final

blow. The original movement survives, but it is reduced to a few hundred members. They still make their year-round pilgrimages to the various regions, and still distribute copies of the bi-monthly newspaper Vers Demain, now limited to a readership of about 2,000. They do not participate in elections, and refuse to have anything to do with the Kalliement. They have few full-time organizers.

Curiously enough, however, they have retained a certain amount of goodwill and support even from those former members who no longer belong to the movement. They were able to finance and build a large \$40,000 house at Rougemont, Quebec, which contains three floors and about 35 beds. It is called Maison St.-Michel (House of St. Michael). The religious activities of the movement, originally of secondary importance to their economic and political activities, have now emerged as its dominant concern.

C. DUVERGER'S CATEGORIES APPLIED

Although leaders of the Union des Électeurs refused to regard the Union as a political party,^{29/} one may speak of it as a hybrid "party", "movement" and "pressure group", which, in Duverger's terms, is characterized by both "mass" and "devotee" elements. First, in each constituency, the Union was organized around the "cell" rather than the "caucus" or even the "branch".^{30/} In this sense it fits the description of the "devotee" party. The Union also engaged in the political education of its members; in fact this was regarded as its prime

task. There was no permanent administrative organ in each county, but there was a kind of permanent administrative official in the person of the member or members of the Institute of Political Action. Secondly, the movement was clearly "strongly articulated." The linkages between each of the primary groups ("noyaux") of the Party in the parishes were established by means of county, regional, and province-wide meetings, the annual provincial congress, the more itinerant door-to-door canvassers of the Union (who carried news from one parish to another), the constituency, regional and provincial political organizers, the directors themselves (who travelled widely throughout the Province), and above all, Vers Demain. There were, moreover, many social events held in common by different parish associations. Thirdly, as already indicated, leadership in the Union was highly centralized through the directorate and Institute of Political Action. Fourthly, this leadership was highly authoritarian from the beginning, and increasingly so as the movement expanded. Fifthly, the membership of the Union was very large, numbering over 50,000 at its height. Sixthly, the movement's activities were very broad in scope, and included, in addition to election, pressure group and other political activity, economic experimentation, ^{31/} social events such as picnics, bingo games, etc., and educational activity. Those who became full-time "apostles" made personal sacrifices which went well beyond the normal political and community obligations undertaken by members of a mass party or movement. Finally, the activity of the Union certainly did not follow the seasonal pattern of the

electoral cycle, but continued throughout the calendar year.

One may describe the financial structure of the Union, its method of "self-finance" by its entire membership, as also characteristic of mass parties. Moreover, as we have discovered, it was the ideological objective and financial methods of the leaders which largely determined the mass and devotee structure of the movement. The techniques of finance in this mass movement were in turn devised both to further the ideological objectives of the leaders and to maintain their dictatorial control over decision making in the movement. The chain of causation in the Union thus ran from ideological objectives to financial methods and then to the nature of the organizational structure. And if the Union des Électeurs was, as demonstrated, a typically mass or devotee structure, it is possible that the experience of the Union can suggest a more general pattern explaining the causal mechanisms of all mass and devotee parties, particularly at the time of their founding.

Before attempting to generalize, however, let us examine the important later Cr ditiste movement, the Ralliement des Cr ditistes.

III. The Ralliement des Cr ditistes, 1958-65

The Ralliement des Cr ditistes was formally launched on April 11, 1958, by a group of 11 enthusiasts, 9 of whom were former members of the Union des  lecteurs.^{32/} They immediately proclaimed their intention of participating in elections, and of

exploiting the new medium of television in doing so.

A. FINANCIAL STRUCTURE

The Ralliement was a political party rather than a movement, one whose primary goal was to elect members to the Federal Parliament. Mr. Caouette did not wait long after the March 1958 election to begin his work of expansion. In the summer of 1958 he borrowed \$30,000 from the Caisse Populaire of Rouyn. The money was used to finance a sequence of 26 bi-monthly television broadcasts over the Rouyn-Noranda station, and a series in Jonquière, which began some months later. The initial response to both was good.

In the fall of 1959 the Ralliement borrowed a further sum of money to extend its television broadcasts to the Sherbrooke and Quebec City regions, where television time was even more expensive. This decision marked an important turning point in the history of the Ralliement. Up to that time it remained a small Party of a few hundred members, drawn almost entirely from former members of the Union des Électeurs and acquaintances of the three leaders, Mr. Caouette, Mr. Legault and Mr. Grégoire. The interest and principal on the loans were paid largely by the Créditiste Association of Villeneuve (Rouyn-Noranda) from its long-established electoral and radio fund which supplemented newspaper revenues. Smaller donations also came from smaller Créditiste associations elsewhere in the Province. Extension of the television broadcasts to Quebec City and Sherbrooke in 1959 signified an expansion in

operations, which required permanent headquarters and staff. An office was rented in Quebec City. Mr. Grégoire was appointed director of a new journal, Regards, which replaced the irregular Bulletin de la Ligue du Crédit Social, that had served as the Ralliement newspaper since the Party's inception. He edited and published the newspaper from this new Quebec headquarters, which also served as an outlet in French Canada for Social Credit publications in English. The charge for the publication was \$2 per year; it was printed on a monthly basis.

Mr. Caouette, Mr. Legault and Mr. Grégoire established a system for financing Social Credit which would ensure that the television expenses would be covered at least in part by the people who were given the privilege to view the Ralliement leader.^{33/} A membership card was printed and distributed to Ralliement workers in key centres of the Province, who were urged to canvass their counties. If enough cards were sold, Mr. Caouette, already an established and popular television personality, would be brought to the area. If they were not, then the Social Credit leader would not appear on their local television station. The same applied both to counties in which the television program had already been broadcast and to those where it had not yet been seen. In the former case, the programs would have to be discontinued if the money were not forthcoming.

These two new devices, the newspaper and the membership card, acted as useful complementary techniques for expanding the membership of the Ralliement. The newspaper

contained membership blanks, and the editors urged their readers to recruit active members by circulating and filling these application forms. Those who bought the membership cards, ostensibly because they had been impressed by Mr. Caouette's performance on television, soon desired to increase their information about Social Credit and their contact with other Ralliement members. They subscribed to one obvious source, the newspaper. And they began to sell membership cards themselves.

At about the same time, the first link was made with the national Social Credit Party, which was beginning to rebuild its organization. Mr. Robert Thompson, then a national organizer, had visited Saskatchewan, Manitoba and western Ontario in an effort to revitalize the grass-roots association. He made contact with the Ralliement organization and convinced them that they should send delegates to the national convention in Ottawa, held on July 28-29, 1960. There they drafted a new constitution for the Party, which formalized its de facto decentralization. Complete autonomy was given to the provincial associations to issue membership cards, to form new constituency associations, etc. At the same time these associations were to be self-financing, and could not expect any aid from the national Party. Certain publications such as the national newspaper Focus were made available to these provincial associations, but the associations were required to pay for them. ^{34/}

Mr. Caouette and Mr. G  goire also became convinced of the need to uplift the image of the Ralliement. Thus far

it had been too closely identified with the Union des Électeurs whose former members formed over 90% of the Ralliement group. The "bérets blancs", as these people were called, ^{35/} were by them considered to be narrow, sectarian, and oddballish.

Mr. Caouette and Mr. Grégoire decided that the best way to rid the Ralliement of this image was to attract into the movement people of some stature who had not formerly belonged to the Union des Électeurs. It was during this period that Dr. Guy Marcoux of Quebec-Montmorency, Mr. Maurice Côté of Chicoutimi, Mr. Gerard Chapdelaine of Sherbrooke and Mr. Jean-Louis ^{36/} Frenette of Portneuf were persuaded to join the Ralliement.

The period from the autumn of 1960 to the spring of 1961 was one of great expansion for the Ralliement. Mr. Caouette's television programs were regularly viewed by television spectators in four major areas of the Province. Membership cards sold rapidly; membership expanded by over 400%, and reached a figure of 8,000. New associations sprang up in previously untouched areas. They were urged to send representatives to the 1961 national leadership convention, held in Ottawa in July, 1961.

The Province of Quebec sent 238 delegates to the national convention, or about 40% of the total number (587). All of them paid their own travelling expenses. After a few days spent hammering out a national program, the delegates voted Mr. Thompson national leader and Mr. Caouette deputy leader. In the provincial congress which met just after, Mr. Legault, provincial organizer in chief, outlined his "Plan of Organi-

zation" for the year 1962-63, which became the campaign strategy of the Ralliement des Créditistes for the 1962 federal election.^{37/}

The Legault plan envisaged a central role for television. From October 1961 until the following summer, Social Credit was to be promoted on French networks in all the major constituencies in the Province. This would bring within the orbit of the Party such new regions as Bas du Fleuve, the Gaspé, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal. The cost of such full coverage was estimated at \$2,000 per week, or a total of \$70,000, to which another \$20,000 was to be added for television and newspaper publicity. About \$3,000 to \$4,000 would therefore be required from each constituency. It would be collected by finding 300 people who would contribute \$14 a year to the Party: \$1 a month in membership fees and \$2 for a year's subscription to Regards. Under a new province-wide system of membership, the card was to be sent directly by the central office to the member.

The system was modelled on one which had been devised and put successfully into practice in the Quebec area and in Drummondville by the provincial treasurer, Mr. Fernand Ouellet who had joined the Ralliement after seeing Mr. Caouette on television. He struck up a partnership with Dr. Guy Marcoux, who had succeeded Mr. Grégoire as editor of Regards. The two worked to expand the Party through the dual method of membership cards and newspaper subscriptions. They made great inroads in the Quebec City area; it was Dr. Marcoux who en-

couraged Mr. Ouellet to extend his system to the entire Province.

Mr. Ouellet's system was not really very different from that which had been used for two decades previously in the Union des Électeurs. The "activists" still travelled from door to door selling subscriptions: only now it was for Regards rather than Vers Demain. An important addition, however, was the active membership card (carte de membre actif). No one could obtain such a card unless he also bought a copy of Regards. A strong inducement for buying this card was that it helped assure the appearance of the Ralliement television program. Another major difference was the method by which money was collected. Whereas in the Union the door-to-door canvasser generally collected the subscription money, in the Ralliement the new member generally sent his cheque or money order directly to the head office. This provided for a tighter control of revenue. Mr. Legault also recommended a system or organization similar to that which the Union des Électeurs had used during its early years of campaigning. The "complete" organization for every constituency consisted of an organizer in chief, section organizers for every 10 polls (1000 votes) in the district, organizers for every 100 votes (i.e. approximately one per poll), and assistant organizers. In order to build these cadres, the organizer in chief and section organizers were advised to hold two public assemblies in succession within a month's interval. The object was to expand the original core group of some 10-15 members to 100 - 150 by intensive recruitment and devolution of assignments. At the second assembly, membership cards

were sold. At a third assembly, to be held if possible at least two months before the federal election, and not later than April 1962, the members were to meet as a nominating convention to elect their constituency candidates.^{38/}

Not all of the constituencies were able to live up to the standards which Legault had set for them. The Cr ditiste television programs, which were beamed into Rimouski and Matane in addition to Jonqui re and Rouyn, had to be stopped for a while in the Quebec City and Sherbrooke areas, and were not presented as promised in Montreal, Trois-Rivi res, and New Carlisle in the Gasp . There was a shortage of funds for broadcasts in these areas, due to an insufficient number of active members.^{39/}

Nor did the national Social Credit Party come to the Ralliement's aid. Whatever little money they had for federal politics was confined to their two key Provinces of Alberta and British Columbia.

The entire "plan", then, was clearly a great gamble. Mr. Caouette and Mr. Legault took valuable time away from their businesses in order to ensure a Ralliement victory. They were not disappointed. The Cr ditistes won 26 of the 75 Quebec seats in the federal election. They obtained over 500,000 votes and they did so on a budget of less than \$70,000, or \$1,000 per constituency. It was far less than the amount spent by the major parties.

Following the 1962 victory, a struggle for leadership and control over the national Social Credit Party emerged be-

tween Thompson and Caouette. It had both external and internal manifestations, that is, between east and west wings and within the Ralliement itself. The first has been described in great detail elsewhere and need not concern us here.^{40/} Since no money was passed from west to east, the split between the two wings did not, in itself, seriously affect the financial solvency of the Ralliement.

The struggle for leadership within the Ralliement is important, however, from the financial point of view. The split occurred between two major factions within the Party, those who were referred to as "old" Cr ditistes, and a few of the most prominent new ones, known as "les nouveaux". It revolved to some extent over a financial struggle between the two wings, led by Mr. Caouette and Mr. Legault on the one hand, and Dr. Marcoux and Mr. Ouellet on the other.

To bring money into the Ralliement treasury, Mr. Ouellet had tried to tap a number of sources besides that of the individual member who bought his "carte de membre actif." He realized that the Ralliement could not expect contributions from the big companies. The Party appealed to the small businessmen and entrepreneurs. Mr. Ouellet felt that \$100 contributions might not be too burdensome for them, so he founded the "Club des Cents" ("Club of \$100 Contributors") after the 1962 election. Most of those who contributed were already active members of the Ralliement. The club was a more formal way of canvassing these more affluent members. It encouraged them to make larger contributions and it brought extra money into the Ralliement treasury.^{41/} Mr. Ouellet also

made some attempt to canvass larger companies owned by non-members. In a few cases he managed to get small donations.

Mr. Legault was careful to maintain his personal control over the party expenditures. Two members of the executive, the president and treasurer, were required to countersign all cheques written on the Ralliement account. Mr. Legault's signature was always one of these, both before and after the 1962 congress. Any expenditures charged on the Ralliement treasury that Ouellet himself made in the course of his work and travels had to be approved by Mr. Legault personally.

Shortly after the 1962 election, however, Mr. Ouellet was also appointed the national organizer for the east. He then came under the employ of the national Party. He therefore became more independent of the Ralliement and of Mr. Legault. He began to supplant Mr. Legault as the chief intermediary between the national Party and the Ralliement.

In the aftermath of the 1963 Cr ditiste election setback and the "affair of the six"^{42/} Mr. Ouellet who had been the object of frequent criticism was removed from his post and expelled from the Ralliement.^{43/} Various allegations of corruption and misappropriation of funds concerning other staff members of the Party also played a role in the split. Often they were not made openly, but merely implied; or they were believed but not enunciated. They loomed large in the attitudes and beliefs of all Cr ditistes.^{44/}

The bonds between eastern and western wings were not strong. Financially and organizationally very little was required to sever them. In early September, as a result of

decisions taken at the Granby convention, Mr. Caouette and most of his parliamentary confrères ended all remaining ties with the national association. ^{45/}

The Granby Convention was an important turning point for the Ralliement des Créditistes. It became an independent party, organized, financed, and directed by its own members. The April 1963 election campaign had left the Party in considerable debt, and rather disappointed with the results. If it intended to survive as a national party, it had to reorganize its structures and revamp its financial methods. Reforms in this direction had already been initiated by the inventive Mr. Ouellet. In addition to the \$12-a-year "active member's card", he had aided Dr. Guy Marcoux, the President of the Constitution Committee, in drafting the provisional constitution which was adopted by the Trois-Rivières Congress in the summer of 1962. This constitution defined the composition, powers, and limits of the basic organisms of the Ralliement des Créditistes which continue to serve today: the provincial executive, the provincial council, the general assembly, the constituency associations, and active members. ^{46/}

At Granby, the political events relating to the split between the Social Credit Association and the Ralliement dominated and overshadowed other organizational changes. Nevertheless a number of significant reforms were implemented: (1) The constitution was amended and adopted in its final form, in which provision was made for the eventual establishment of

95 provincial constituency associations. This was an attempt to appease those who were pressing for immediate participation of the Ralliement in provincial politics. (2) The membership card of \$12 a year was converted into 10 cards of \$1 a month, to enable recruiters to offer a variety of inducements and keep month-to-month contact with the members. (3) A committee was established to review the whole question of participation in provincial politics. (4) A correspondence course (Cours d'Orientation Politique) was approved in which the members were to pay \$5 for a series of 12 written lectures on Social Credit doctrine, organization and history. (5) It was recommended that Regards should be printed bi-monthly rather than monthly. All of these reforms were designed to encourage the expansion of the movement and the education of an informed élite of Social Credit activists.

In January 1964 a special meeting of the provincial council was held, ostensibly to discuss the report of the special committee appointed by the executive to explore the question of provincial participation. In a sounding taken of the members before the congress, it was found that 76% supported provincial action, and only 23% were opposed; nevertheless only 48% of those in favour thought that Mr. Caouette should lead the provincial campaign. The Ralliement voted to delay immediate entry into provincial politics, but to establish the organization and cadres which would permit such action on short notice.

At the same meeting the executive announced a new

method for recruiting members and financing the movement, which was given the name "Service d'Entraide Sociale" (Service of Mutual Social Aid) or S.E.S.^{47/} Mr. Lucien Richard was appointed director of a new Secretariat in Trois-Rivières which was established by the executive to administer the service. It was expected "to collect initial membership fees and renewals and distribute monthly the money thus collected according to a predetermined formula approved by the executive of the Ralliement in the name of the latter [Ralliement]"^{48/}

Service Économique et Social is essentially an attempt to centralize control of all revenues and to keep an up-to-date record of the membership. In one sense it is a culmination of the work that Mr. Ouellet had begun. New methods had to be used to expand the Ralliement, which would also enable the Party leaders to maintain close supervision over all activities. This tighter control was also provoked by the split in 1963.

The events of the previous year had revealed the weakness in a too-decentralized organization. Disloyal members had managed to infiltrate the ranks of the Ralliement, and had challenged the leadership's policies and financial methods. The leaders of the Ralliement had carried out a successful "purge." They were determined not to allow such a challenge to recur.

The administrative director of S.E.S. is chosen by the executive of the Ralliement, which is the real governing body of the Party.^{49/} He heads a secretariat which, through its

classification system, is expected "to allow the Ralliement instantaneously to know its assets in the form of active members in each constituency of the province grouped into 12 regions." ^{50/} Membership in the Ralliement is restricted only to those men and women who are at least 16 years of age. A person can become an active member by signing an application form submitted to him by a recruiter commissioned for the task; the form contains a questionnaire asking name, date of birth, complete address, telephone number, spouse, father, mother, son or daughter. Upon signing the application form, the candidate has to pay a \$12 fee. This fee is divided into two equal sums. The first sum serves the administration of the Ralliement at the provincial level as well as at the constituency level, and includes costs of propaganda such as television and other media of publicity, the journal Regards, and administrative expenses at the provincial level. The second sum is administered by S.E.S. and distributed to responsible people for the benefit of the individual members. ^{51/}

One method which S.E.S. used to redistribute money to the individual members is a kind of number system designed to appeal to their gambling instincts. When an application form reaches the secretariat in Trois-Rivières, a special card is immediately issued to each active S.E.S. member; this card contains a register number essential in a permanent classification of each constituency, region, and the entire Province. Members are able to know in this way what "rank" ^{52/} they have in their constituency, region and in the Province. The same

numbers are used by the secretariat to select winners of the draws held on the 15th day of every month. In every group of 400 active members a maximum of \$100 a month is redistributed in the form of "gifts." "The choice of members declared eligible to receive these gifts is announced on the 15th of each month, and is made in accordance with an appropriate system which permits every member, in a group of 100, to be chosen and declared eligible to receive a gift." ^{53/} A second method is to give condolence gifts to families of deceased members.

S.E.S. had been in operation now for two years. It did not prove to be a great success. The initial period of conversion from the old system of decentralized active membership proceeded more slowly than had been expected. Many former subscribers to Regards preferred to let their subscriptions lapse altogether, rather than adhere to the new formula. ^{54/} Members who had previously bought \$1-a-month membership cards were likewise reluctant to pay \$12 for a whole year's membership. The total paid-up membership in the Rallie-ment in 1965 was the lowest it had been since before the 1962 election.

In the early part of 1964 Mr. Caouette and Mr. Legault were forced to make appeals to the members through the newspaper to step up their recruiting activities. Issues of Regards were not printed for several months in 1965. Certain constituencies began to write their own membership cards in an effort to alleviate their local financial difficulties. ^{55/}

There was considerable grumbling and discontent expressed at both the provincial council meeting in late March 1955 and the summer convention at St. Jerome. The leadership tried to appease these elements by offering them a variant of the S.E.S. card in the "carte de membre sympathisant", which offered partial membership privileges at a reduced annual cost of \$2.

It was clear that at the time of the 1965 Canadian general election, the Ralliement was in some serious financial trouble. Although they budgeted for \$40,000 expenditures on television (a considerably smaller sum than in the previous two elections), it appears that they were unable to buy even that amount in actual television time. It is not surprising, then, that the Ralliement representation in Parliament was reduced from 13 to 9 members, and their total votes, from over 500,000 (before the 1963 split) to just under 350,000. In fact it is remarkable, considering the shoe-string budget on which they operated and the serious political liabilities under which they were labouring, that they managed as well as they did. ^{56/}

B. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE

The organizational perspectives of the leaders, particularly in relation to political participation, political education, and finance, once again determined the nature of the internal decision-making structure and the controls. The leaders of the Ralliement, unlike those of the Union des

Électeurs, were all committed unconditionally to electoral participation, which for many, was the Party's only rationale. Some of these leaders also advocated political education of some form or another as propounded by Major Douglas , but only as a supplement to political action.

The decision initially taken by Caouette, Legault and Grégoire was to make television the primary weapon in all their future election campaigns. They took this decision largely because they had had relative success in the Union des Électeurs with other instruments of the mass media, such as the newspaper and the radio. In the Union, both the newspaper and the radio broadcast were financed through the contributions of the mass membership. The Ralliement founders had few connections with corporations or wealthy individuals who might have financed such a risky venture. Their closest acquaintances were former members of the Union des Électeurs. The cause for which they were fighting was that of the "little man", the consumer, the worker, the small business man or the shopkeeper who was being crushed by the giant corporations. It was inevitable, then, that they should turn to these same individuals and sources of finance to support their undertaking.

The Ralliement built first upon the foundations of the Union des Électeurs. It attracted both disillusioned former Créditistes and still active partisans of the Union des Électeurs who preferred a more dynamic alternative. Thus, it recruited a few hundred individuals in former Créditiste

centres who helped the Party in its initial period of expansion. But the real thrust to the movement, after its initial success in some of these centres, came with the recruitment of a large number of "new" Cr ditistes who had never known the structures or organizational methods of the Union des  lecteurs.

Two of these members in particular, Mr. Ouellet and Dr. Marcoux, instituted important reforms in the structures and techniques of organization and finance of the Ralliement. They rationalized the chaotic system of membership affiliation, which included a variety of types of cards and contributions, into one uniform system. They centralized the collection of fees in one office. They expanded the readership of the newspaper Regards, and with it, the membership. Most important, with the all-important aid of Caouette's enormous television success, Mr. Gr goire's own appeal in the Lac-Saint-Jean area, and Mr. Legault's great talent for local organization, they transformed the Ralliement from a small, "crazy-quilt" organization into a large mass party with well-organized structures, rational financial methods, and a formal constitution defining organs and powers.

There is a "precise hierarchy" and "division of duties" ^{57/} in the Ralliement organization which is defined by the Constitution. The hierarchy from apex to base includes the provincial executive, provincial council, general assembly, constituency association and members.

At the apex of the Party pyramid is the Provincial Executive, composed of 19 members.^{58/} Until October 1966 it included the Provincial Leader, elected by the General Assembly, the Provincial President (a post not then open to a Member of Parliament) also elected by the General Assembly, five Vice-Presidents elected by the General Assembly (who were also not to be Members of Parliament), the President of Cr ditiste Youth elected by the Association of Cr ditiste Youth, the President of Cr ditiste women elected by the Association of Cr ditiste Women, a Secretary, Treasurer, Organizer, Publicist, and Delegate to the National Association, all named by the elected members of the executive, and an additional one third of the executive composed of Members of Parliament elected by the entire Parliamentary group and including the Provincial Leader, if he is a Member (generally numbering five in all). Ex-Presidents also sit as ex-officio members for two years following their resignation, but they do not have the right to vote.

The formal duties of the provincial executive include:

- (1) holding four trimestrial meetings a year, one of which must be in Quebec, and the other in Montreal; (2) convening regular and special meetings of the Provincial Council;
- (3) presiding over the formation of executive committees, such as that on Conventions (advising local nominating conventions on the choice of candidates), Publicity, and including one charged with attracting New Canadians into the Party; (4) using provincial funds in the best interests of the organization; (5) naming ex-officio members, if necessary, who do

not have a right to vote; (6) approving the travelling expenses of executive officers; and (7) establishing and directing (in the most effective manner possible) a permanent secretariat to make funds available and to assist in organizational work. Even in theory this gives the provincial executive wide latitude in directing the affairs of organization; in practice, the informal duties and activities of the provincial executive, particularly in the sphere of policy making, are still greater, as we shall see below.

The Provincial Council is the second body in the pyramid. It consists of all members of the Provincial Executive and all the Presidents of Constituency Associations, or their delegates, who should be (devra être) the vice-president of the constituencies. All members of this Council have a right to vote in its proceedings.

The formal duties of the Provincial Council include: (1) holding one annual meeting; (2) advising the Executive on all matters concerning the Ralliement; (3) preparing and presiding over the formation of committees of the General Assembly; (4) deciding the place and date of this (annual general) assembly. Special meetings of the Provincial Council are convened either by the President, the Executive or 20 members of the Council itself. In the past, these special sessions have proved to be much more important from a policy-making point of view than have the regular meetings of the Council.

The Council is clearly restricted in its formal role. In practice, it has on occasion exercised a much wider influence in the policy sphere than its defined duties would lead one to expect. This has been particularly the case in matters which reach the proportions of an internal party schism. At such times, the provincial President, who since the 1962 election has been Mr. Legault, has convened the Council in order to register support for his (and Mr. Caouette's) position on the issue. This was the case both in May 1963 at the time of the so-called "purges,"^{59/} and again in March 1965 when decisions as to the future electoral platform of the Ralliement in both federal and provincial politics had to be taken.

At the base of the pyramid is the Constituency Association and its Executive. The Constituency Association helps to achieve "unity at the base" (l'unité de base) of the Ralliement.^{60/} It is composed of all active card-carrying members residing in that constituency. It elects an executive annually to administer its affairs. This executive has jurisdiction over all matters of a general nature in the constituency, but must submit to the overseeing of (sera soumise aux droits de regard de) the Provincial Executive. The Executive convenes the constituency association at least once a year to choose a new executive, composed of a President and Vice-Presidents who in turn select a Secretary-Treasurer. The Executive also includes the constituency's Member of Parliament or Provincial Legislature, if it has one, and "any other

officer that the constituency association deems necessary."^{61/}
 The Executive is only recognized if the constituency organization is composed of active members numbering, for a period of at least three consecutive months, at least one half the total number of polls in the riding. The meeting at which the executive is elected is presided over by an official delegate of the Provincial Executive; the same holds for any constituency convention.

It is clear that the Executive of the associations and their members are completely subordinated to the Provincial Executive even in theory. This is meant to ensure that the policy and preferences of the Provincial Executive are accepted at the local level, and resistance is effectively quelled before it can spread. The constituency associations, nevertheless, are permitted to maintain a fairly wide degree of independence in matters of exclusive local concern.

An adjunct to the base of the pyramid, which, however, in theory has supreme authority in the Party, is the annual General Assembly. It is convened by the Provincial Council under the leadership of the Provincial Executive on a date and at a place which is decided well beforehand by both bodies. The Assembly is convened through the intermediary of the journal Regards. It is composed of a maximum of ten delegates or their substitutes, chosen by the constituency associations and the provincial executive in charge.

The functions of the General Assembly include hearing and voting approval of the reports of the various executive

officers, holding a forum on old and new business, asking questions and presenting resolutions, the formation of committees and reporting from them, and election of new provincial officers.

The pattern of "leadership" of the Ralliement should now be clear. It is obviously one of a "personalized" rather than an "institutionalized" type. It is Mr. Caouette's personality which gives him so much influence in party decision making, particularly at congresses and in small caucuses of leaders. Elsewhere we have described this personality, as seen by our various respondents.^{62/} None of the other spokesmen of the Ralliement possess the personal influence exercised by the leader Mr. Caouette.

C. DUVERGER'S CATEGORIES APPLIED

It is obvious from our previous discussion that the Ralliement des Cr ditistes is a political party of a mass type in Duverger's terms. In its strong articulation, its centralized leadership, the oligarchical nature of this leadership, the relatively large size of its membership, and the breadth and year-round cycle of its activities, the Ralliement fulfils all of Duverger's criteria for such mass parties. Its leaders, with some exceptions^{63/} have no hesitation in calling the Ralliement a party rather than a movement. It also qualifies as a mass party in both the educational and financial sense.

The Ralliement attempts to educate its members politically in the doctrine of Major Douglas and its application by Cr ditiste leaders. It uses for these purposes the newspaper Regards, which is supposed to appear every month, its correspondence course of twelve lectures, which is sold for \$5, its television broadcasts of 15 minutes, also held bi-monthly, and intermittent radio and public-speaking engagements. ^{64/} The annual summer congresses, designed primarily for policy making, also serve as an educational forum.

Financially the Party conforms remarkably to Duverger's description. The Party is financed by the subscriptions paid by its members for both education and support of election campaigns. It "replaces the capitalist financing of electioneering by [the] democratic financing" ^{65/} system of its "active membership cards." The words used by Duverger might easily have been used by any of the Ralliement leaders to describe his philosophy of finance:

Instead of appealing to a few big private donors, industrialists, bankers, or important merchants for funds to meet campaign expenses, which makes the candidate and the person elected dependent on them - the mass party [Ralliement] spreads the burden over the largest possible number of members, each of whom contribute a modest sum [of \$12 a year]. ^{66/}

There have been deviations from this rule. For example, donations were allegedly obtained from medium sized companies such as Quebec Power, St. Laurent Cement and Shawinigan Light, Heat and Power Company. ^{67/} A Club of \$100 Contributors was created in 1961 to encourage larger donations of \$50, \$100 or \$150 from the wealthier members. Almost one half the

total revenues for 1962-63 (\$40,392) was collected in this way.^{68/} However, after 1963 this "Club" was discontinued, and the Ralliement became solely mass-financed once more. The experimentation with other techniques of finance generally associated with cadre parties suggests that the Ralliement, despite its ideology, may be mass-financed more out of necessity than out of conviction.

In its sub-structural features the Ralliement also fits the general criteria of a mass party. Its organization, both in constitutional terms and in practice, is centered on the constituency association, which is approximately what Duverger describes as a branch-type basic unit, as opposed to the caucus of local notables found in most cadre parties. In accordance with Duverger's definition of this kind of unit, the constituency association is indeed more centralized than that of the constituency associations of the two old-line Parties in Quebec, the Liberals and the Union Nationale, which at least until recently were composed of nothing more than loose groupings of notables in each locale.^{69/} Its appeal is primarily grass roots in nature, and the local organization serves to diffuse the Party's ideology among the local citizens. In theory, it permits wide-open membership. The "rules and entrance requirements" for members, as listed in the Party's constitution, state only that "to be part of [the Ralliement], one must be an active member and have fully paid one's annual subscription. The annual subscription will be that proposed by the Executive and approved by the General Assembly of the party"^{70/} There are no other formal restrictions on membership,

and no required period or candidacy. The activity of the local associations "remains important and regular in intervals between elections."^{71/} The association meets at least once a month, in some instances twice a month, to discuss organization and finances, promote recreational activities such as bingo, picnics, and draws, and conduct study sessions.

Once again it appears that it was the political objectives and financial methods of the leaders, both before and after the internal split, which determined the mass structure of the Party. The techniques of finance were again devised to play a dual role: to further the political objectives of the leaders and to maintain their control over internal decision making. The chain of causation in the Ralliement runs from political objectives to financial methods and then to the nature of party structure and decision making. The pattern appears to be similar to that of the Union des Électeurs.

IV. Conclusions

Returning now to the questions posed in the introductory section of this study, we may summarize our findings as follows: (1) In the mass parties we have studied, the pattern of party finance is apparently what Duverger has suggested it would be. The explanation for this is that the mass method of self-finance, like the mass method of organization, is consistent with the ideological and political objectives of the leaders. Indeed, the financial structure is a kind of intervening variable between objectives and their operational

definition in the structure of political organization: it serves both as a framework upon which the party structures are built and as an instrument through which the leaders maintain their control over the party members.

(2) In the mass parties analyzed, the system of finance and the oligarchical decision-making structure are also functional: it is through financial controls, among others, that the leaders maintain their oligarchical dominance over party decision making.

(3) In the mass parties we have examined, the financial structure is functional with the decision-making structure so that these structures are "authentic" and recognized as part of the normal institutionalized channels of party decision making.

(4) We may hypothesize that the same three relationships hold for all mass parties, particularly at the time of their founding. In the case of the Union des Électeurs and of the Ralliement, the common features in financial and organizational structures are traceable to common or comparable political and ideological objectives on the part of their respective leaders; differences arise from divergences in these objectives. This suggests that in order to understand why mass parties arise altogether, one must ascertain what kinds of objectives and organizational perspectives tend to give rise to them.

In the case of the Union des Électeurs and the Ralliement, the "common elements" were to some extent defined by

the content of the ideology which the leaders of these organizations adhered to and expounded: that of "créditisme", the French Canadian adaptation and modification of the ideas of Major Douglas. Such an ideology, although it may appear to be unique, has many characteristics in common with similar ideologies elsewhere, such as "Poujadisme" in France, "Goldwaterism" in the United States, and the ideologies of radical movements in "traditional" cultures undergoing social transformation. Those who are the active adherents and espousers of such ideologies tend to have similar class, regional and occupational characteristics.

It appears, then, that an explanation for the mass nature of a party's structure lies in the social and economic content of the party's ideology as defined by its leaders, and in the socio-economic background characteristics of its leaders. 72/

FOOTNOTES TO STUDY 6

- 1 Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties, translated by Barbara and Robert North, London, Methuen, 1954; New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1954, passim.
- 2 An exception is the suggestive essay by Arnold J. Heidenheimer entitled "Comparative Party Finance: Notes on Practices and Toward a Theory", in "Comparative Political Finance", Richard Rose and Arnold J. Heidenheimer (eds.) in the Journal of Politics Vol. 25, No. 3, August 1963, pp. 790-811.
- 3 Duverger, op. cit., p. 63.
- 4 For a useful compendium of the different elements isolated by Duverger see the table presented by A. Wildavsky in Eckstein H. and D. Apter, (eds.), Comparative Politics: A Reader. London, Collier-Macmillan, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, p. 372.
- 5 Duverger, op. cit., p. 27.
- 6 Ibid., p. 36.
- 7 According to the table presented by Wildavsky in Eckstein and Apter, op. cit.
- 8 Ibid., p. 373.
- 9 Ibid., See also Neil MacDonald, The Study of Political Parties, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1955, p. 19ff.
- 10 The fact is that such structural features recur in many different societies. This suggests that there is some general factor or factors not unique for any one society which can account for such recurrence. Duverger provides some hints as to what they might be, but he never deals with the problem directly or explicitly.
- 11 See section III. C. infra.
- 12 The first fully organized Social Credit movement in Quebec was La Ligue du Crédit Social de la Province de Québec, which existed from 1936-39. It was modelled on the Alberta Social Credit organization, but it lacked sufficient élan and leadership, and therefore soon yielded to the movement launched by the editors of Vers Demain. See also infra.
- 13 Letter from Mr. Armand Turpin to Mr. Louis Even, Hull, August 29, 1944.
- 14 See infra.

- 15 See also infra.
- 16 In the 1948 election, the Union amassed 140,050 votes. Their total votes in the 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1949 elections were 10,781, 16,542, 63,310, and 80,990 respectively.
- 17 Legault, Laurent, Guide Électoral des officiers de L'I.A.P., Montreal, 1948.
- 18 Vers Demain, September 15, 1944.
- 19 For a detailed discussion of this split and its causes, see the author's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Social Credit in Quebec: Political Attitudes and Party Dynamics, Princeton University, 1966, chapter 2.
- 20 For an incisive summary of Major Douglas's political and organizational ideas, see Macpherson, C.B., Democracy in Alberta, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1953.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Vers Demain, vol. I, p. 203.
- 23 The views of the dissidents are summarized in a letter from Mr. Solon Low to Mr. Even, September 5, 1947, Low Papers. The Low Papers have been made available by the Glenbow Foundation, Calgary, Alberta.
- 24 Letter from Mr. Turpin to Mr. Even, August 24, 1944.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Interviews conducted in the summer of 1965 with members of the Ralliement in Rouyn-Noranda, Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, Chicoutimi, etc.
- 27 They made one exception: in the provincial election of 1956 they formed an alliance with the Liberals who had included a vague Social Credit plank in their platform. Four Créditistes, including Réal Caouette, ran as Liberals. All four were soundly trounced by the Union Nationale.
- 28 Mr. Grégoire, however, had never belonged to the Union.
- 29 From Vers Demain and selected correspondence, Low Papers.
- 30 These cells ("noyaux") were not, however, generally established on an occupational basis, particularly in rural centers.

- 31 The leaders of the Union attempted to establish a Social Credit economic association to enable the members to finance consumers directly in amounts up to five per cent of their purchases. It was unsuccessful. See Vers Demain, November 1, 1942.
- 32 These included, among current leaders, Mr. Caouette, Mr. Legault, and Mr. Gilbert Rondeau. Mr. Gilles Grégoire, another founder, never was a member of the Union des Electeurs, although his father, Mr. J. Ernest, was one of its leaders. Mr. Francois Even, the son of Mr. Louis Even, the Union des Electeurs leader, was also a founder of the Ralliement, but he has since become inactive in that Party.
- 33 Mr. Grégoire, rather than Mr. Caouette, appeared regularly on the Jonquière station.
- 34 They were all printed in English, therefore the Ralliement was not very interested in such materials. Its leaders did buy and distribute a limited number of the March, 1963 edition of Focus however.
- 35 They sported "white berets", one of a number of badges of distinction in the Union.
- 36 They were all professionals or civic-minded men who belonged to families of some standing in the respective communities. Most had some previous connection with the Créditistes.
- 37 Legault, Laurent, "Plan d'Organisation pour l'Année 1961-62", distributed in Hull, July 1961.
- 38 Legault, "Plan d'Organization", op. cit.
- 39 Regards, March 1962. All of these areas were later included in the 1962-63 Créditistes' drive, which culminated in the April 1963 election.
- 40 See, for example, the author's unpublished report for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, submitted in July 1966; and his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, op. cit., passim.
- 41 Each club of \$100 contributors was registered in the constituency. There were perhaps 200 of them in all. In 1962-63, they collected over \$40,000 for the Ralliement.
- 42 This was the name given to the incident in April 1963 in which six Créditistes signed a pledge to support the Liberals who emerged from the election with the largest representation in Parliament. They later withdrew their pledge.

- 43 He was formally expelled at the provincial council meeting in Quebec City, May 1963.
- 44 From interviews and newspaper accounts, e.g., see report by Mario Cardinal in Le Devoir, May 13, 1963.
- 45 The following month the Ralliement des Cr ditistes was officially recognized as Canada's fifth party to be represented in Parliament.
- 46 See Constitution Provisoire, Comit  de la Constitution, August 26, 1962, and Constitution du Ralliement des Cr ditistes, adopted with amendments at Granby, September 1, 1963.
- 47 The name was later changed to "Service  conomique et Social".
- 48 Regards, December 1964, p. 7.
- 49 See Constitution of the Ralliement des Cr ditistes, op. cit., See also infra.
- 50 Regards, December 1964, p. 7.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 The basis of rank presumably is seniority in membership.
- 53 Regards, December, 1964.
- 54 Regards, February-March, 1964, p. 2.
- 55 Regards, February 1965, letter from the president.
- 56 Examination of the available financial statements reveals that revenues and expenditures for the 1965 campaign were approximately 60% less than the amounts raised and spent for the 1963 campaign.
- 57 Duverger, op. cit., p. 23.
- 58 Constitution, p. 1. The post of delegate to the National Association has been unoccupied since the split of 1963. It has not, however, been eliminated. This description applies to the Party structure as it existed prior to the last convention of the Party held in Drummondville Oct. 8-9, 1966, at which time certain of these features were changed.
- 59 See supra, pp. 434-435.
- 60 Constitution, p. 2.
- 61 Ibid., p. 3.

- 62 For a full discussion of the impact of Mr. Caouette's personality, see the author's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Social Credit in Quebec, op.cit., Chapters 4 and 5 passim.
- 63 For example the former provincial President Mr. Laurent Legault. He tended to associate the term "party" with machines of corruption and the "caisse électorale." From interviews, 1965.
- 64 Regards has had a somewhat irregular monthly publication. Issues appear at least every 2 months, however. Meetings of study groups are even more irregular, and vary from constituency to constituency. See infra, p.451.
- 65 Duverger, op. cit., p. 63.
- 66 Loc. cit.
- 67 From confidential reports.
- 68 Bilan du 30 Août 1963 du Ralliement des Créditistes du Québec, Granby, 1963.
- 69 Dawson, R.MacGregor, The Government of Canada (4th ed.) revised by Norman Ward, University of Toronto Press, 1963-64, chapter 22.
- 70 Constitution Le Ralliement des Créditistes, op. cit., p.1.
- 71 Duverger, op. cit., p. 23.
- 72 For a more detailed discussion of this approach see the author's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Social Credit in Quebec: Political Attitudes and Party Dynamics, op. cit. chapters 7-8, in which an attempt is made to relate the organizational perspectives of party leaders both to their general orientations and socio-economic backgrounds and to the structural manifestations of the organizations they lead.

CANDIDATE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONTROL
OF ELECTION EXPENSES:
THEIR FINANCIAL AND ELECTORAL EXPERIENCES
AND OPINIONS ON THE PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL FINANCE

by

Khayyam Z. Paltiel,
Jill McCalla Vickers and Raoul P. Barbe

I. Introduction

This paper is a further extension of the analysis of the responses to a questionnaire sent by the Committee on Election Expenses to all candidates in the 1965 Canadian federal general election, some of the results of which were included in Study 11 "Candidate Spending Patterns and Attitudes" in Part II of the Committee's Report. It is hoped that this analysis of the opinions of candidates who had recently and personally experienced the often frustrating task of financing an election campaign at the constituency level may lead to a more realistic understanding of the monetary aspect of the electoral process and of the problems of campaign financing.

Little is known about how Canadian parties and candidates finance themselves; even less is known about their orientation toward the problems of political finance. Biographies and historical accounts can give some insight into the opinions of various politicians at specific periods. These sources, however, do not permit a systematic analysis of the factors influencing the opinions of those individuals most personally involved with the contemporary problems of political finance. The desire of the Committee on Election Expenses to canvass the opinions of candidates in the 1965 federal general election afforded an opportunity to illuminate this, heretofore, neglected and obscure area of Canadian political life.

The original questions were drafted for the Committee in both French and English by the Co-Secretary M. Raoul P. Barbe, and are reproduced in the Appendix to this study. Professor Khayyam Z. Paltiel adapted the questionnaire for machine tabulation and directed and supervised the subsequent study. The tabulation of the results and the basic work were carried out by Mrs. Jill McCalla Vickers.^{1/} The Committee on Election Expenses is not responsible for any of the opinions expressed in this study which are solely those of the authors.

In addition to a request for information concerning their financial experiences, the questionnaire addressed to the 1011 official candidates focused on three groups of questions. Candidates were asked what source of campaign

funds they considered most acceptable. They were asked to consider the feasibility and potential effectiveness of legislation designed to control campaign financing. Finally, they were asked to consider a series of proposals which might be advanced with a view to reducing the level of campaign expenditures.

This study presents an analysis of the opinions of the 454 candidates who responded to the Committee's questionnaire.^{2/} It is based on the assumption that the "internal attributes" of candidates such as their socio-economic backgrounds or social-psychological characteristics will be relatively unimportant in determining their opinions with respect to electoral financing. The main burden of this paper is that a candidate's orientation to electoral finance will be strongly influenced by his personal experiences in campaign financing and by the experiences of the party with which he is affiliated.

By stressing the external factors of party, constituency and electoral status,^{3/} as well as respondents' financial experiences, it was hoped that some insight might be gained into their orientations toward political financing as a function of their role as competitors for political office. The one characteristic shared by all responding candidates was the fact that each had presented himself as a competitor for office in the 1965 federal election and thereby exposed himself to the experience of trying to raise the money with which to conduct his campaign. The opinions

expressed by these respondents, therefore, must have been molded in part at least by their recent experience as electoral competitors and fund raisers. For this reason, the influence of such "external" characteristics as constituency, party affiliation and electoral status have been stressed to the exclusion of other "internal attributes."

II. A Brief Note on Methodology

The Committee's questionnaire was sent to all official candidates in the 1965 federal election. Follow-up letters were sent to candidates who had not responded early in February 1966. Out of a possible 1011 official candidates, 454 or 45 per cent returned completed questionnaires before the cut-off date of March 15, 1966.

Because a mail questionnaire was used to gather the data on which this study is based, the respondent group must be considered self-selected and does not constitute a randomly selected sample. Thus any inference about the opinions of all candidates based on the analysis of the respondent group must be made with caution. However the representativeness of the respondent group can be determined, since official records provide information concerning the distribution of the major characteristics of regional location of candidates' constituencies, political affiliation and electoral status.

Table 1

ELECTED RESPONDENTS COMPARED WITH ALL ELECTED CANDIDATES*
BREAKDOWN BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Party	All Elected Candidates		Elected Respondents	
	Number	%	Number	%
Liberal	131	49	73	51
Progressive Conservative	97	37	40	28
New Democratic Party	21	8	16	11
Social Credit	5	2	5	4
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	9	3	7	5
Independent	2	1	2	1
Total	265	100	143	100

Source: Information concerning the characteristics of all candidates obtained from Part IV of the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, published in advance of the detailed report of the General Election held Nov. 8, 1965, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966.

An examination of the response rate of elected as opposed to defeated candidates shows that, while 143 or 54 per cent of the elected candidates returned completed questionnaires, only 311 or 42 per cent of the defeated candidates responded. On the other hand, both Table 1 and Table 2 indicate very little variation between the make-up of the respondent group and that of the total number of candidates. Elected Progressive Conservatives were under-represented

Table 2

DEFEATED RESPONDENTS COMPARED WITH ALL
DEFEATED CANDIDATES
BREAKDOWN BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Party	All Defeated Candidates		Defeated Respondents	
	Number	%	Number	%
Liberal	134	18	63	20
Progressive Conserva- tive	168	22	45	15
New Democratic Party	234	31	110	35
Social Credit	81	11	32	10
Ralliement des Creditistes	68	9	35	11
Independent	23	3	12	4
Other	38	6	14	5
Total	746	100	311	100

in the respondent group; all other party groups (except the Independents) were slightly over-represented. Despite this fact, almost half of the 97 elected Conservative members responded (40 in number) and none of the other groups is over-represented by more than three per cent. Defeated Progressive Conservatives were also under-represented in the respondent group, as were defeated Social Credit candidates. With the exception of Progressive Conservatives, however, the respondents closely resemble the total group with respect to political affiliation and electoral status.

In addition, Table 3 indicates a variation of no more than two per cent with respect to the regional distribution of the respondents and the total number of candidates.

Table 3

RESPONDENTS COMPARED WITH ALL CANDIDATESBREAKDOWN BY PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Province	Respondent Group		All Candidates	
	Number	%	Number	%
British Columbia*	40	9	101	10
Alberta	36	8	71	7
Saskatchewan	30	7	64	6
Manitoba	23	5	54	5
Ontario	124	27	290	29
Quebec	158	35	327	33
New Brunswick	18	4	32	3
Nova Scotia	11	2	38	4
Prince Edward Island	4	1	12	1
Newfoundland	10	2	22	2
Total	454	100	1011	100

* Includes the Yukon and the Northwest Territories.

Any generalizations about the opinions of all candidates on the basis of the analysis presented in this paper must take into account the discrepancies between the characteristics of the respondent and total groups with respect to the three factors considered.

III. The Respondents' Financial Experiences

Almost three quarters of our respondents were united by a single grievance: they had experienced difficulties financing their campaign for the 1965 election. Only 22 per cent stated that they experienced no difficulty in raising the all-important dollars, while 72 per cent had trouble. This recent experience of difficulty or ease with respect to fund raising might well have coloured the opinions of candidates with respect to problems of electoral finance. It is, therefore, relevant to make a survey of those who had difficulty and those who found the task easy.

A. CONSTITUENCY

The location and nature of a candidate's constituency may affect his fund-raising experience. Table 4 indicates that there are differences in the degree of difficulty experienced by respondents of the different provinces. There appears to be no trend, however, which could be explained simply on the basis of regional distribution.

The highest percentage of respondents reporting financial difficulties in the 1965 campaign occurs in the British Columbia contingent, with 77.5 per cent reporting difficulty, and in the Quebec group of which 78 per cent reported experiencing difficulty. That is, respondents from two of Canada's wealthiest provinces report the highest incidence of financial difficulty. In contrast, only 65 per cent of

Table 4

LOCATION OF CONSTITUENCY AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY

Province	B.C.**	Alta.	Sask.	Man.	Ont.	Que.	N.B.	N.S.	P.E.I.	Nfld.
Response	N=40 %	N=36 %	N=30 %	N=23 %	N=124 %	N=158 %	N=18 %	N=11 %	N=4 %	N=10 %
Experienced difficulty	77.5	75	63	74	65	78	67	64	75	60
Experienced no difficulty	15	19	30	21	26	17	22	36	25	40
No answer	7.5	6	7	4	9	6	11	-	-	-
Total	100	100	100	99*	100	101*	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** Includes the Yukon and the Northwest Territories.

the Ontario respondents reported financial problems. Of the four Atlantic Provinces, the respondents from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland showed relatively small percentages experiencing difficulty, 64 per cent and 60 per cent respectively; while 75 per cent of the respondents from Prince Edward Island reported difficulty. Saskatchewan, after Newfoundland, reported the lowest percentage of complaints in this respect.

The rural/urban makeup of a constituency appears to have some effect on the ability of respondents contesting the constituency seat to raise campaign funds. On the basis of a strict rural-urban division, a slightly higher proportion of candidates contesting urban constituencies reported experiencing financial difficulty. When further broken down, however, Table 5 indicates that respondents from rural constituencies containing several small villages or towns (Rural 2) and those from entirely urban constituencies (Urban 3) reported the lowest incidence of financial difficulty, 63 per cent and 70 per cent respectively.

Notwithstanding the differences connected with constituency characteristics indicated in Tables 4 and 5, it may, on the other hand, be the provincial and rural/urban distribution of party strength which determines the patterns indicated. None of the five major parties has relatively equal strength in each province. Nor do the parties derive their strength from rural and urban areas in equal proportions. Finally, many candidates do not finance their entire

Table 5

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY AND THE RURAL/URBAN NATURE**
OF RESPONDENTS' CONSTITUENCIES

	Rural		Urban			All	All
	1	2	1	2	3	Rural	Urban
Response	N=74	N=79	N=69	N=70	N=158	N=153	N=297
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Experienced difficulty	77	63	78	76	70	70	73
Experienced no difficulty	19	30	17	19	22	25	20
No Answer	4	6	4	6	8	5	7
Total	100	99*	99*	101*	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** Constituencies were divided into a five point index on the basis of (1) the number of rural/urban polls as stated for the 1963 election by the Chief Electoral Officers Report and (2) the size and number of villages, towns, cities and metropolitan areas. The classification is, at best, crude and takes no account of changes which have occurred since 1963. In general, however, Rural 1 is 90 per cent rural with no town within its boundaries; Rural 2 is more than 50 per cent rural with no cities or parts of cities within its boundaries; Urban 1, Urban 2 and Urban 3 constituencies contain increasingly larger urban centres, with Urban 3 being 100 per cent urban.

campaigns locally but receive large sums of money from their respective provincial and/or national party headquarters. ^{4/}

B. POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Respondents affiliated with the incumbent Liberal Party tended to have less difficulty raising money for the

1965 campaign than all others except Independents.

Table 6 indicates that the proportion of respondents from the four other parties who reported difficulty in raising money for their constituency campaigns was about 10 per cent higher than for Liberal respondents. In part, this may be explained by the fact that those connected with the incumbent party tended to get more money from central party funds than did candidates affiliated with other parties.^{5/} Furthermore, raising money from local sources may have been easier for candidates whose party was in office. There was, however, little difference in this respect in the situation of Conservative respondents and as compared with that of respondents affiliated with the three minor parties which have never held power at the federal level. Of the

Table 6

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Creditistes	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Experienced difficulty	67	78	76	78	79	39
Experienced no difficulty	29	19	18	11	17	32
No answer	4	4	6	11	5	29
Total	100	101*	100	100	101*	100

* Due to rounding.

respondents in the "Independent and Other" category, including 21 independents of various hues, 5 Communists and

the 2 candidates of the New Capitalist Party, only 39 per cent reported difficulty; 29 per cent of these respondents did not answer this question. Thirty-two per cent, however, indicated that they had not experienced problems in raising the money to finance their campaigns. Respondents not affiliated with a political party may have a less "expensive" idea of the amount of money necessary for a campaign or may not enter the race at all unless fairly certain of financial support from local groups and individuals. On the other hand, respondents affiliated with a small militant party may in fact experience no financial difficulty at all since available money would be equally divided among the candidates running for office.

In general, therefore, the candidate's financial experience was closely connected with the prior electoral success of his party and closely paralleled the financial experience of the party as a whole. Candidates who raised all of their money locally were of course exceptions to this. The few candidates who reported raising more money in the constituency than they spent transferred the excess to the provincial or federal party. For the most part, however, candidates expected and received money in varying amounts from the central party and turned to local sources only when the party contribution was not enough to finance a viable campaign.

C. ELECTORAL STATUS

Just as belonging to the party in power prior to the election made the money-raising chores of Liberal respondents less difficult, being the incumbent member in a constituency appears to simplify the task of raising funds. The relative ease of the incumbent's financial position may reflect increased party support for a proven "winner." It may also reflect the fact that funds are more readily forthcoming for a sitting member with a reputation for looking after the interests of his constituency.

Table 7

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY AND INCUMBENCY

	Incumbents	Non-Incumbents
Responses	N=114	N=340
	%	%
Experienced difficulty	61	76
Experienced no difficulty	33	18
No answer	6	7
Total	100	101*

* Due to rounding

When political affiliation is held constant, incumbents reported less difficulty than non-incumbents in each party group except for Progressive Conservative respondents. In the case of Liberal, Social Credit and Cr ditiste respondents

Table 8

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY AND INCUMBENCY

Political Affiliation Held Constant*

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créditistes	
	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=23	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Experienced difficulty	53	77	78	77	69	77	50	82	40	86
Experienced no difficulty	38	22	16	21	31	17	50	6	60	9
No answer	9	1	6	2	-	6	-	12	-	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Since only one of the "Independent and Other" respondents was an incumbent, no figures have been shown on this table. See Table 6 for this group.

the difference between the experience of incumbents and non-incumbents was considerable.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, some understanding of the financial experiences of respondents can be gained. Most had difficulty financing their campaigns. Candidates who were incumbents in the constituency and those affiliated with the incumbent Liberal Party tended to have somewhat less difficulty. Independent, Communist and "Other" candidates tended to have the least difficulty either because their idea of "sufficient" money to run a campaign was more modest or because they did not venture into the electoral race without some firm assurance that financial support would be forthcoming.

Many respondents depended heavily on their provincial and/or federal party organizations for financial support, thus shifting the task of raising campaign funds to party organizers and stalwarts with productive contacts. Some respondents, especially present and past Cabinet Ministers ^{6/} were financed almost entirely from party funds thus freeing them for other campaign tasks.

IV. Opinions on the Acceptability of Various Sources of Funds

It is a curious fact that few political scientists have seriously considered the implications which the selection of one mode of political financing over another may have on the political system of a nation. ^{7/} Until quite recently

very few observers have considered the financial aspects of the democratic mode of selecting decision makers or have even examined the role of fund raising in the electoral process. Governments and political parties, however, have been more aware of the problems involved in political finance especially those concerning the sources from which electoral funds are derived. The financial experience of the respondents suggests first that in Canada, as elsewhere in the democratic world, elections are costly and that many candidates face severe problems in this regard.

Most of the respondents regardless of party felt that election expenses in Canada had reached an "exorbitant" level. ^{8/} While many candidates felt that the level of campaign spending could be lowered without seriously limiting the ability of parties or their candidates to communicate with the nation's electors, few felt that economy measures would eliminate the basic problem of acceptable sources.

The attitude of respondents affiliated with different political groups with respect to the preference for some sources over others may reflect different experiences with the fund-raising aspect of the electoral system. It may also reflect important party-derived differences with regard to the notion of what is acceptable in politics. Similarly respondents' attitudes concerning the comparative acceptability of alternative sources of funds may vary with other aspects of their experience as competitors for

political office. This experience may well make respondents who were incumbents prior to the 1965 election more satisfied with the current combination of sources available to them and to their respective parties. On the other hand, their more extensive experience may have made such individuals more aware of the difficulties of satisfactory financing under the current arrangements and thus predispose them to measures which would tap new sources of funds. Similarly, the experience of success in the 1965 electoral contest may have convinced elected respondents that the current combination of sources is satisfactory. Or, on the other hand, the experience of electoral success may make elected respondents more favourable to new modes of campaign financing because most of the respondents in this position will be faced with another electoral contest for which the necessary funds must be obtained.

The questionnaire included a series of questions dealing with the acceptability of various sources of campaign funds. An analysis of the responses to these questions can perhaps suggest the ways in which different electoral experiences affected opinions in this respect.

A. THE EFFECT OF PARTY AFFILIATION

It is likely that political affiliation will affect a respondent's conception of the types of sources which are acceptable. While Canadian political parties are less ideologically oriented than is the case in many European countries,

ideology undoubtedly plays some part in determining such opinions. The political party which has sustained severe financing difficulties under the current system may well condition its members with the idea that other, untried sources of funds are more acceptable.

Candidates were asked if they felt that "large contributors" might tend to corrupt a political party.^{2/} The question did not differentiate between "large" corporations, single individuals making "large" contributions and "large" labour unions. Most respondents, however, qualified their answers. Generally, New Democratic respondents interpreted the question as meaning the first two "possibilities." Many Liberal and Conservative respondents stated that their answer applied to all three although a few of these and several Social Credit respondents felt that the question applied only to "large" labour unions. Some Cr ditiste respondents interpreted the question as applying to "large" or English Canadian interests.

Thus political affiliation affected the interpretation of the question itself. Respondents with a socialist orientation generally viewed both large corporations and large contributions from individuals with suspicion. Respondents with a "right wing" orientation tended to view both corporations and individuals as more legitimate sources, while regarding labour unions as a potentially corrupting source. Some Cr ditiste respondents viewed any source with suspicion if it was based in English Canada.

Despite these differences, all respondents interpreted the question as referring to the legitimacy of "large" sources whose very weight might "influence" party actions and/or policies. Thus the responses of candidates affiliated with different parties can be interpreted as indicating their relative trust or distrust of the effect which large contributors might have on party actions and policies.

Table 9

WOULD LARGE CONTRIBUTORS TEND TO CORRUPT

A POLITICAL PARTY?

Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=39*	N=27*
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	51	56	95	89	90	82
No	37	38	4	11	8	7
Don't know	12	6	1	-	2	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Three Cr ditiste and one Independent response to this question were uncodable.

Independents and respondents affiliated with the three smaller parties are much more likely to be suspicious of the potential corrupting influence of large contributors. Only 51 per cent and 56 per cent of the Liberal and Conservative respondents respectively felt that corruption

was likely, while the proportion of respondents affiliated with other party groups or the unaffiliated of this opinion averaged at 92 per cent. Ideological differences apparently were of minor importance. A large proportion both of the "left wing" New Democratic respondents and the "right wing" Social Credit respondents felt that large contributors were an unacceptable source of funds. It is more likely that the financial experience of his party determines a respondents opinion in this instance. Minor parties whose experience with the so-called large sources has been relatively unsuccessful or minimal appear to be more likely to imbue their members with the idea that such sources are unacceptable. With respect to New Democratic respondents, however, both ideology and experience may be seen as reinforcing one another. Perusal of the questionnaires and accompanying letters indicates that respondents affiliated with the two major parties also seem to have been affected by the experiences of their parties. Some Liberal and Conservative respondents who were suspicious of large contributors qualified their position with the statement that, while they might view this source with suspicion, they felt it unlikely that their parties could finance themselves adequately without recourse to such sources.

Since large contributors are viewed with suspicion by many respondents, it might be well to consider the opinion of respondents toward fiscal incentives. Candidates were asked to express themselves regarding the proposal that

political contributions be made tax deductible. ^{10/} The results recorded in Table 10 indicate the fact that some respondents affiliated with the minor parties objected that such incentives would apply also to donations made by corporations. On the other hand, Liberal and Conservative respondents appear to welcome the proposal.

Table 10

SHOULD POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONSBE MADE TAX DEDUCTIBLE?Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	78	80	47	51	55	50
No	16	12	48	46	40	43
Don't know	6	8	5	3	5	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The lukewarm reception to this proposal by New Democrats may reflect their fear that such fiscal measures might weaken their party organizations by encouraging party members to substitute small sums of money for the time and service they are now expected to contribute. A similar argument has been used against the acceptance of state subsidization of election campaigns by the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Republic of West Germany.

Table 11

ATTITUDE TOWARD DIRECT STATE SUBSIDIZATION OF CAMPAIGNS

Elected Respondents Compared with Defeated: Political Affiliation Held Constant

		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.		Ind. & Other	
Lib.	El. Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73	N=63	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35	N=2	N=26
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	81	57	45	78	50	83	40	56	71	80	100
Opposed	14	40	33	18	44	13	40	31	29	14	-
Don't know	5	3	22	4	6	5	20	13	-	6	-
Total	100	100	100	100	101*	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

A widely considered alternative method of financing campaigns in recent years has been either full or partial state subsidization. ^{11/}

It is to be expected that respondents from the different political parties would view the government as a source of campaign funds in different ways, depending on their attitude to government intervention and control in general and whether their experience indicated that current sources were inadequate or unacceptable for a variety of reasons. Such experience may tend to overrule any theoretical objections respondents might otherwise raise.

While a simple majority of all respondents (both elected and defeated) in each party group favoured direct government subsidization, differences among the various party groups and between elected and defeated respondents within each group should be considered. When defeated respondents are considered, a smaller proportion of Liberals than Conservatives favoured subsidization (57 per cent and 78 per cent respectively). When elected respondents are considered, however, only 45 per cent of the Conservatives favoured subsidization while 81 per cent of the Liberal respondents indicated that they would favour the government as a source of campaign funds.

It is possible that the difference between elected Conservative and Liberal respondents is the product of a genuine division on the principle of the "proper" role of

government in such matters. Elected Liberal respondents on the other hand may have confidence in the equity of such a system since their Party currently forms the government which would administer the system. When only defeated respondents are considered, Liberals and Conservatives appear to be less deeply divided on the issue of subsidization.

There is a difference between elected and defeated Social Credit respondents similar to that noted for the Conservative group. While 56 per cent of defeated Social Crediters favoured subsidization, only 40 per cent of those elected were in favour. In general, however, Social Credit respondents were the least enamoured with the idea of the government as a source of campaign funds.

The high proportion of both elected and defeated Cr ditistes in favour of subsidization is perhaps the result of the fact that all such candidates were residents of the Province of Quebec, where a provincial scheme of direct government subsidies has been enacted into law. A generally optimistic approach to such a plan being enacted at the federal level seems to be reflected in the fact that 80 per cent of defeated Cr ditistes and 71 per cent of those elected favoured the measure.

That 79 per cent of all New Democratic respondents expressed themselves in favour of direct subsidization would appear to accord with that Party's general view of the proper roles and responsibilities of government.

Nevertheless, while 83 per cent of the defeated New Democrats were in favour, the proportion drops sharply to a bare 50 per cent when the opinions of the Party's 16 elected respondents are considered. It may be suspicion of such a scheme in the hands of other parties which prompted 44 per cent of the elected New Democrats to oppose direct subsidization. On the other hand, the differences between all respondents and those elected to office may reflect the fears of some Party members that subsidization would weaken the grass-roots basis of party organization and finance.

Among the elected respondents the Liberals show the most enthusiasm for government assistance. The elected Cr ditiste respondents are also heavily in favour of this source of campaign funds. In general, however, elected respondents affiliated with the other parties display the least support for direct subsidization.

While reactions to direct subsidies were mixed, support for an indirect subsidy in the form of either full or partial mailing subsidies was general. As Table 12 indicates, only elected Conservative respondents were not strongly in favour of such a measure.

Most respondents felt there was little danger of government control being tied to this form of indirect subsidies. This is in contrast to the many respondents, especially those affiliated with smaller parties, who may

Table 12

ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBSIDIZED MAILING FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATES

Elected Respondents Compared with Defeated

Political Affiliation Held Constant

Response	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.		Ind. & Other	
	El. N=73	Def. N=63	El. N=40	Def. N=45	El. N=16	Def. N=110	El. N=5	Def. N=32	El. N=7	Def. N=35	El. N=2	Def. N=26
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour - for some mailings	60	69	55	47	75	61	80	69	71	57	100	27
In favour - for all mailings	19	13	7	44	13	30	20	9	29	26	-	69
Opposed - no free mailings	14	17	33	7	13	7	-	22	-	9	-	-
No opinion	7	2	5	2	-	2	-	-	-	9	-	4
Total	100	101*	100	100	101*	100	100	100	100	101*	100	100
Percentage favouring partial or full mailing subsidy	79	82	62	91	88	91	100	78	100	83	100	96

* Due to rounding.

"view with alarm" direct government subsidies because of fear that such arrangements might weaken the position of opposition groups.

In general, the political affiliations of respondents seem to affect opinions concerning the acceptability of different sources of campaign funds. It is unlikely, however, that these differences are simply the result of varying political principles. Most likely, principle and the respondent's experience in the electoral process interact in such a way as to make the impact of each almost inseparable. It is evident, however, that the personal financial experiences of individual candidates often parallel the experiences of their party when it comes to fund raising.

B. THE EFFECT OF CONSTITUENCY

Some regional differences but no consistent pattern were evident in the examination of the financial experience of respondents. The effect of regional location on opinions with respect to sources reflects this trend. Ontario respondents tended to be less pessimistic concerning the potentially corrupting effects of large contributors. Quebec respondents on the other hand, were more strongly of the opinion that corruption would result. There is some evidence here that the Ottawa River forms a boundary with opinions to the West more trusting of large contributors as a source and with opinions to the East less trusting.

Nonetheless, a majority of the respondents from each answered in the affirmative.

Table 13

WOULD LARGE CONTRIBUTORS TEND TO CORRUPT A POLITICAL PARTY?

Breakdown by Region

Region	Western Provinces*	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=128**	N=124	N=156	N=42
	%	%	%	%
Yes	71	67	79	74
No	23	27	17	17
Don't know	6	6	4	9
Total	100	100	100	100

* Includes the Yukon and the Northwest Territories

** One uncodable response.

The Ottawa River again appears to be the boundary, when regional attitudes toward making political contributions tax deductible are considered. A large proportion of Western and Ontario respondents are in favour of giving a special tax status to political contributions. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents opposed to such a measure is higher in Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces.

The East/West differences noted above appear to break down when attitudes toward the state subsidization of campaigns are considered. Quebec respondents were heavily in favour (87 per cent) as might be expected since legislation implementing a similar program had recently been

Table 14

SHOULD POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BE MADE TAX DEDUCTIBLE?Breakdown By Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
Yes	68	67	60	54
No	28	28	32	37
Don't know	4	5	8	9
Total	100	100	100	100

enacted in that Province. Respondents from the West, many of them affiliated with the Progressive Conservative and Social Credit Parties (see Table 11) tended to be less enthusiastic, with a bare majority of 54 per cent in favour.

Table 15

ATTITUDE TOWARD DIRECT STATE SUBSIDIZATIONOF CAMPAIGNSBreakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
In favour	54	65	87	63
Opposed	35	28	9	23
Don't know	11	7	4	14
Total	100	100	100	100

The extreme differences between Quebec respondents and those from other provinces disappear when a partial indirect form of subsidization such as mailing privileges are considered. Approximately 83 per cent of all respondents favoured some form of subsidized mailing. A higher proportion, however, of Quebec and Atlantic respondents favoured complete mailing subsidies, with 35 per cent and 23 per cent respectively in favour.

Table 16

ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBSIDIZED MAILINGFOR FEDERAL CANDIDATESBreakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
In favour - for some mailings	66	65	56	56
In favour - for all mailings	14	16	35	23
Opposed - no free mailings	19	15	6	9
No opinion	1	4	3	12
Total	100	100	100	100
Percentage favouring partial or full mailing subsidy	80	81	91	79

Respondents from urban constituencies tend to be less fearful that large contributors will corrupt a political party. While 17 per cent of the rural respondents felt that corruption would not result, 24 per cent of those from urban constituencies were of this opinion. This difference may reflect the fact that urban candidates have themselves had more experience with large contributors and are, therefore, less likely to view this source as a corruption influence.

Table 17

WOULD LARGE CONTRIBUTORS TEND TO
CORRUPT A POLITICAL PARTY?
Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
Yes	76	71
No	17	24
Don't know	7	5
Total	100	100

Urban respondents were more favourable to making political contributions tax deductible than rural respondents. Again, this response may result from a less suspicious attitude on the part of urban candidates toward large contributors.

Table 18

SHOULD POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BE MADE TAX DEDUCTIBLE?Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
Yes	59	66
No	33	29
Don't know	8	5
Total	100	100

Urban respondents were also slightly more in favour of the state subsidization of campaigns, with 70 per cent in favour as opposed to 67 per cent of the rural candidates. The differences, however, in both of these instances are not extreme and may imply that factors other than the rural or urban nature of a respondent's constituency are more important.

Again there was little difference between rural and urban respondents regarding partial free mailing subsidies. A slightly higher percentage of rural based candidates were opposed to any free mailings: 17 per cent in contrast to 10 per cent of the urban respondents. Both groups of candidates, however, equally favoured subsidies for all mailings for federal candidates.

Table 19

ATTITUDE TOWARD DIRECT STATE SUBSIDIZATION OF CAMPAIGNSUrban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour	67	70
Opposed	26	21
Don't know	6	8
Total	99*	99*

* Due to rounding.

Table 20

ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBSIDIZED MAILING FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATESUrban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour - for some mailings	20	25
In favour - for all mailings	61	61
Opposed - no free mailings	17	10
No opinion	2	4
Total	100	100
Percentage favouring partial or full mailing subsidy	81	86

C. EFFECT OF ELECTORAL STATUS

In considering the effect of political affiliation on respondents' attitudes toward different sources of campaign funds, we have noted in passing that whether a respondent was elected or defeated at the polls appeared to influence his position on several of these questions. The other aspect of electoral status, incumbency, significantly affected the degree of financial difficulty a respondent encountered and, therefore, might be expected to influence his opinions with respect to sources. Incumbency implies that the 1965 election was not the respondents' first experience with the problems of financing a campaign and that they were more fully aware of the problems involved in election financing.

Table 21

WOULD LARGE CONTRIBUTORS TEND TO CORRUPT
A POLITICAL PARTY?

Incumbents as Compared with Non-Incumbents

	Incumbents	Non-Incumbents
Response	N=114	N=340
	%	%
Yes	59	78
No	34	17
Don't know	8	5
Total	101 *	100

* Due to rounding.

Incumbent respondents tended to be far less suspicious of "large contributors" as a source of campaign funds than were non-incumbents. It is unwise, however, on this basis alone to suggest that incumbency itself is the determining factor in this instance. As Table 9 indicated, respondents affiliated with the Liberal and Conservative Parties tended to be less suspicious of the potential corruption awaiting the party which depended on large contributions than were other respondents, but most of the incumbents among the respondents belonged to these Parties. Before reaching any conclusions about the effect of incumbency, therefore, it is necessary to re-examine the "incumbents versus the non-incumbents" with the factor of political affiliation held constant. (See Table 22)

The incumbent respondents of all parties except the Ralliement des Cr ditistes tend to be less suspicious of large contributors than non-incumbents. The difference is slight for Conservative and New Democratic respondents: 1 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. The difference between incumbents and non-incumbents is considerably greater for Liberal and Social Credit respondents: 11 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. All six of the Cr ditiste incumbents felt that dependence on large contributors might open the way for corruption, in contrast to 89 per cent of the 35 non-incumbents.

WOULD LARGE CONTRIBUTORS TEND TO CORRUPT A POLITICAL PARTY?

Incumbents as Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd. **	
	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	45	56	56	57	92	96	75	91	100	89
No	43	32	38	38	8	3	25	9	-	9
Don't know	12	12	6	5	-	1	-	-	-	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101*

* Due to rounding.

** Since there was only one Independent incumbent, no column has been included in this table for "Independent and other" respondents. See Table 9 for these respondents.

In light of this response rate it is perhaps safe to conclude that incumbency acts as a factor independent of but closely related to political affiliation.

Table 23

SHOULD POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BE MADE TAX DEDUCTIBLE?

Incumbents as Compared with Non-Incumbents

	Incumbents	Non-Incumbents
Response	N=114	N=340
	%	%
Yes	75	60
No	18	35
Don't know	7	6
Total	100	101*

* Due to rounding.

Incumbents tend to be somewhat more in favour than non-incumbents of granting a special tax status to political contributions: 75 per cent in contrast to 60 per cent respectively. As Table 24 indicates, Liberal and Cr ditiste incumbents favour such a measure more strongly than their non-incumbent counterparts. For all other party groups, however, non-incumbents tend to be more strongly in favour of making political contributions tax deductible than incumbents.

Table 24

SHOULD POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BE MADE TAX DEDUCTIBLE?

Incumbents as Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.**	
	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	84	73	78	81	46	48	50	52	67	51
No	10	21	13	11	54	47	25	48	33	43
Don't know	5	6	9	8	-	5	25	-	-	6
Total 99*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** See Table 10 for "Independent and Other" respondents.

Incumbents tended to be less strongly in favour of direct government subsidization of election campaigns. Only 65 per cent of the incumbents favoured such a measure in contrast to 71 per cent of non-incumbents. As Table 25 indicates, however, this trend applies only to Progressive Conservative, New Democratic and Social Credit respondents. Liberal incumbents viewed direct subsidies more favourably than non-incumbents, 81 per cent in contrast to 62 per cent. Similarly, 83 per cent of the Cr ditiste incumbents favoured the scheme as opposed to 77 per cent of the non-incumbents. It should be noted that as many as 25 per cent of Conservative and Social Credit incumbents gave no opinion in this instance.

Table 25

ATTITUDE TOWARD DIRECT STATE SUBSIDIZATION OF CAMPAIGNSIncumbents as Compared with Non-Incumbents

	Incumbents	Non-Incumbents
Response	N=114	N=340
	%	%
In favour	65	71
Opposed	24	23
Don't know	11	6
Total	100	100

Table 26

ATTITUDE TOWARD DIRECT STATE SUBSIDIZATION OF CAMPAIGNS

Incumbents as Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.**	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	81	62	41	75	46	82	50	55	83	77
Opposed	14	35	34	19	46	13	25	33	17	17
Don't know	5	4	25	6	8	4	25	12	-	6
Total	100	101*	100	100	100	99*	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** See Table 11 for "Independent and Other" respondents.

Non-incumbents tend to be heavily in favour of indirect subsidies in the form of either partial or full free mailing privileges; 87 per cent of them supported either full or partial mailing privileges, in contrast to 75 per cent of the incumbents. In addition, higher percentages of non-incumbents favoured each alternative, 25 per cent for full mailing subsidies in contrast to 16 per cent of the non-incumbents and 62 per cent for partial subsidies as opposed to 59 per cent.

Table 27

ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBSIDIZED MAILING FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATESIncumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents

	Incumbents	Non-Incumbents
Response	N=114	N=340
	%	%
In favour - for some mailings	16	25
In favour - for all mailings	59	62
Opposed - no free mailings	21	10
No opinion	4	3
Total	100	100
Percentage favouring partial or full mailing subsidy	75	87

Table 28

ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBSIDIZED MAILING FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATES

Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour - for some mailings	19	14	6	40	15	29	-	12	33	26
In favour - for all mailings	57	69	53	49	69	62	100	67	67	57
Opposed - no free mailings	19	13	34	9	15	7	-	21	-	9
No opinion	5	4	6	2	-	2	-	-	-	9
Total	100	100	99*	100	99*	100	100	100	100	101*
Percentage favouring par- tial or full mailing subsidy	76	83	59	89	84	91	100	79	100	83

* Due to rounding.

** See Table 12 for "Independent and Other" respondents.

Respondents who were elected to Parliament apparently view the subject of sources from a somewhat different position than those who went down to defeat. Tables 11 and 12 indicated differences between elected and defeated respondents in each party group with respect to direct and partial subsidies. One can also note briefly that regardless of political affiliation elected respondents were less likely to believe that large contributors might corrupt a political party. While 62 per cent of the elected members in the respondent group were of this opinion, 78 per cent of the defeated candidates felt that corruption might result.

Table 29

WOULD LARGE CONTRIBUTORS TEND TO CORRUPT A POLITICAL PARTY?Elected/Defeated Breakdown

	Elected	Defeated
Response	N=143	N=307*
	%	%
Yes	62	78
No	31	17
Don't know	7	5
Total	100	100

* Four uncodable responses.

Elected members tended to be more heavily in favour of making political contributions tax deductible than defeated respondents, the proportions being 76 per cent and 58 per cent respectively.

Table 30

SHOULD POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BE MADE TAX DEDUCTIBLE?

Elected/Defeated Breakdown

	Elected	Defeated
Response	N=143	N=311
	%	%
Yes	76	58
No	16	37
Don't know	8	5
Total	100	100

In contrast, Table 31 indicates that a larger proportion of defeated respondents favoured direct subsidization of election campaigns. Of the elected members, 66 per cent were in favour compared to 71 per cent of the defeated respondents. In addition, more elected members (10 per cent) chose to express no opinion or were undecided, compared to 6 per cent of the defeated respondents. (See also Table 11.)

Table 32 indicates, that defeated respondents were more in favour of some form of mailing subsidies than elected respondents, 87 per cent in contrast to 78 per cent. Approximately the same proportion of each group favoured partial

Table 31

ATTITUDE TOWARD DIRECT SUBSIDIZATION OF CAMPAIGNSElected/Defeated Breakdown

	Elected	Defeated
Response	N=143	N=311
	%	%
In favour	66	71
Opposed	24	23
No opinion	10	6
Total	100	100

mailing subsidies, 62 per cent of those elected and 61 per cent of those defeated. In contrast, only 17 per cent of those elected favoured full mailing subsidies, while 26 per cent of those defeated were in favour.

Table 32

ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBSIDIZED MAILING FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATESElected/Defeated Breakdown

	Elected	Defeated
Response	N=143	N=311
	%	%
In favour for free mailings	62	61
In favour for all mailings	16	26
Opposed - no free mailings	17	10
No opinion	5	3
Total	100	100
Percentage favouring partial or full mailing subsidy	78	87

Political affiliation appears to be the most important correlate of a respondent's orientation. Regional differences can be explained in terms of the distribution of party strength in some instances. Both aspects of electoral status must be considered in conjunction with political affiliation in order to reveal genuine differences in orientation.

V. Opinions On Various Modes Of Control

Measures designed to control election financing have been adopted in various jurisdictions. These have taken the form of legislation or voluntary agreements aimed at either setting spending limits on candidates or parties or alternatively at requiring parties and/or candidates to report various details of their financing to the government - these reports in some instances being made public for citizen scrutiny. ^{12/} Needless to say, it was impossible to question respondents regarding all of the different control formulae which have been adopted or proposed.

Candidates were asked to consider three major modes of control. They were first asked in a general way whether or not they thought control is possible at all. They were then asked to consider reporting measures which would apply to political parties, their views on the publication of candidate and party reports and, finally their opinions with respect to legislation which would impose ceilings on the amounts parties and candidates could spend during election campaigns.

A. EFFECT OF POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND ELECTORAL STATUS

Candidates were asked if they felt the control of election expenses is possible. Table 33 indicates that political affiliation did make an important difference. New Democratic respondents were the most optimistic in this instance: 87 per cent answering the question in the affirmative. Social Credit, Cr ditiste and Independent respondents also tended to be more optimistic than respondents affiliated with the two larger parties: 70 per cent of the Social Credit respondents and 67 per cent of the Cr ditistes felt that control is possible, with 68 per cent of the Independent and Other candidates also of this opinion. A bare majority of the Liberal respondents, 55 per cent, answered the question in the affirmative but only 43 per cent of the Conservatives stated that control is possible, while 38 per cent and 49 per cent respectively felt control to be impossible.

Table 33

IS IT POSSIBLE TO CONTROL ELECTION EXPENSES?Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Cred.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	55	43	87	70	67	68
No	38	49	8	16	29	25
Don't know	7	8	5	14	4	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

This picture alters somewhat when incumbents are compared to non-incumbents with political affiliation held constant. In the case of the Conservative, New Democratic and Social Credit respondents, incumbents were somewhat less optimistic about control than non-incumbents. Whereas 41 per cent of the Progressive Conservative incumbents felt that control was a possibility, a slightly higher 43 per cent of the non-incumbent respondents were of this opinion. Similarly, 85 per cent of the incumbent New Democrats answered in the affirmative in contrast to 88 per cent of the non-incumbents. There is a marked difference in the case of Social Credit respondents: only 50 per cent of the incumbents felt that control is possible as opposed to 73 per cent of the non-incumbents.

On the other hand, incumbent Liberals and Cr ditistes were more likely to consider control possible than non-incumbents affiliated with the same parties. While 62 per cent of the incumbent Liberals felt control was a possibility, only 49 per cent of the non-incumbents were of the same opinion. Similarly, 83 per cent of the incumbent Cr ditistes answered in the affirmative in contrast to 63 per cent of their non-incumbent party mates.

When elected and defeated respondents are considered separately with political affiliation again held constant, similar non-patterned differences appear. Elected Liberals, Progressive Conservatives and New Democrats tend to be more optimistic concerning control than their defeated counterparts.

Table 34

IS IT POSSIBLE TO CONTROL ELECTION EXPENSES?Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.**	
		Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.
Response	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	62	41	43	85	88	50	73	83	63
No	31	59	43	15	7	25	15	17	31
Don't know	7	-	13	-	5	25	12	-	6
Total	100	100	99*	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** There was only one incumbent independent in the "Independent and Other" group. See Table 33 for these respondents.

Table 35

IS IT POSSIBLE TO CONTROL ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Elected/Defeated: Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.**		
El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	
N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35	
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Yes	56	52	43	42	88	87	40	75	57	69
No	34	43	55	44	13	7	40	12.5	43	26
Don't know	10	5	2	13	-	6	20	12.5	-	5
Total	100	100	100	99*	101*	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 33.

On the other hand, defeated Social Credit and Cr ditiste respondents tend to be more optimistic than their elected counterparts. Here, we can only describe these differences. Explanations might well be the result of well-hidden differences of experience and/or ideology.

1. Party Reporting

At the present time, federal candidates are required by law to submit through their official agents reports detailing their campaign expenditures, receipts and the sources of same. Candidates were asked if they felt political parties should be required to submit similar reports.

With reference to a proposal which would require parties to report their campaign expenses, a very decided difference was recorded between candidates belonging to the two "old-line" parties and those affiliated with the three minor parties represented in the House. While 54 per cent of the Liberals and 57 per cent of the Conservative respondents stated that they would favour such a measure, more than 90 per cent of the New Democratic, Social Credit and Cr ditiste respondents took this position. It might also be noted that 79 per cent of the Independent and Other candidates were also on the record as being in favour of such a measure. It is possible that the further away from power a party is, the more willing its members become to submit its records to scrutiny.

Table 36

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIESTO REPORT THEIR EXPENSESBreakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	54	57	98	92	93	79
Opposed	35	29	-	3	5	14
No opinion	11	14	2	5	2	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

As Tables 37 and 38 indicate, there is a surprising degree of cohesive opinion among the incumbents and the elected members of the three minor parties. A full one hundred per cent of both the incumbent and elected respondents in each of the three party groups report themselves in favour of requiring parties to report their expenses. Incumbent Liberals and elected Liberals tend to be more heavily in favour of such a measure than their non-incumbent and defeated counterparts. In contrast, non-incumbent and defeated Progressive Conservative respondents are more strongly in favour than incumbent and elected Conservative candidates. Regardless of the various stands taken, the degree of uniformity in the incumbent/non-incumbent, elected/defeated groups for each party is surprising. It may suggest

Table 37

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIES TO REPORT THEIR EXPENSES
Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.**	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	59	50	44	64	100	98	100	91	100	91
Opposed	28	40	38	25	-	-	-	3	-	6
No opinion	14	10	19	11	-	2	-	6	-	3
Total	101*	100	101*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents.

that perhaps party policy on such an issue has been discussed in each case and has been rigorously observed by the more involved members of each party.

Not unexpectedly, respondents in all party groups (except the Independent and Other respondents) were somewhat less strongly in favour of requiring parties to report their receipts than was the case with regard to the reporting of expenses. Only the New Democratic respondents stayed at the same level, with 98 per cent favouring each type of reporting. While 92 per cent of the Social Credit and 93 per cent of the Creditiste respondents favoured requiring expenses to be reported, only 86 per cent and 83 per cent respectively were in favour when it came to reporting receipts. Similarly, 54 per cent of the Liberals and 57 per cent of the Conservatives favoured expense reporting in contrast to the 50 per cent and 49 per cent respectively who supported the reporting of receipts (see Table 36). Despite the fairly general drop in the proportions in favour, respondents affiliated with the three minor parties were still much more strongly in favour of requiring parties to report receipts than were "old-line party" respondents.

The consistency previously mentioned with respect to incumbents and elected members of the three minor parties is again evident. The groups proved to be unanimously in favour of requiring parties to report receipts, as they had been with respect to reporting expenses. Incumbent Liberals and their non-incumbent colleagues were evenly

Table 38

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIES TO REPORT THEIR EXPENSES

Elected Members Compared with Defeated Respondents:

Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.*	
El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour 63	43	40	71	100	98	100	91	100	91
Opposed 26	44	43	18	-	-	-	3	-	6
No opinion 11	13	17	11	-	2	-	6	-	3
Total 100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 36.

Table 39

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIESTO REPORT THEIR RECEIPTSBreakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=26*
	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	50	49	98	86	83	85
Opposed	39	35	-	11	10	12
No opinion	11	16	2	3	7	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Two uncodable responses.

divided in this instance, with 50 per cent in favour and the same proportion opposed. Elected Liberals, however, again tended to be more strongly in favour of the measure. Again similar to the pattern noted with respect to the reporting of expenses, non-incumbent and defeated Conservatives were more heavily in favour of this kind of reporting than elected or incumbent Conservative respondents. Again the cohesiveness of opinion within the party groups with reference to these questions is to be noted.

Table 40

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIES TO REPORT THEIR RECEIPTS

Incumbents as Compared with Non-Incumbents

Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.*	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	50	50	34	59	100	98	100	85	100	83
Opposed	34	42	47	28	-	-	-	12	-	6
No opinion	16	8	19	13	-	2	-	3	-	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 39.

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIES TO REPORT THEIR RECEIPTS

Elected Members Compared with Defeated Respondents

Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	55	44	33	64	100	98	100	84	100
Opposed	33	46	50	22	-	-	13	-	11
No opinion	12	10	18	13	2	-	3	-	9
Total	100	100	101*	99*	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 39.

Candidates were finally asked to consider a reporting proposal which would require parties' expenses, receipts and the sources of their income to be reported. Not unexpectedly, smaller proportions were recorded in favour of this proposal for all except the New Democrats and the Cr ditistes who strongly favoured complete party reporting: 98 per cent and 93 per cent respectively. Only 37 per cent of the Liberals and 39 per cent of the Conservatives reported themselves in favour, with 50 per cent and 48 per cent respectively opposed to complete reporting requirements. The Social Credit respondents varied somewhat from the earlier pattern by dropping to only 73 per cent in favour of requiring full reporting, i.e., for some Social Credit respondents the point of objection was the requirement that the sources of income be revealed.

Table 42

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIESTO REPORT THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES OF INCOMEBreakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Cr�d.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	37	39	98	73	93	75
Opposed	50	48	1	16	5	21
No opinion	13	13	1	11	2	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The incumbent and elected New Democrats and Cr ditistes were unanimously in favour of full reporting requirements for Canada's federal parties. The percentages of non-incumbent and defeated respondents from these two Parties in favour were only slightly smaller. On the other hand, only 75 per cent of the incumbent Social Crediters and 60 per cent of those elected favoured such a measure compared to 73 per cent of the non-incumbents and 75 per cent of those who went down to defeat. As might be anticipated from the earlier trends, more non-incumbent and defeated Conservatives were in favour of complete reporting, (45 per cent and 51 per cent respectively) in contrast to only 28 per cent of the incumbent and 25 per cent of the elected respondents who reported themselves in favour. Fifty-three per cent of the incumbent Conservatives and 58 per cent of those elected were opposed. Non-incumbent Liberals were also slightly more in favour of the scheme, with 37 per cent as opposed to 36 per cent of the incumbents in favour. On the other hand, 40 per cent of the elected Liberals responded favourably in contrast to 33 per cent of their defeated counterparts.

In general, we might conclude with respect to party reporting that respondents from the three minor Parties were most enthusiastic about partial or full reporting requirements for parties, with some of the Social Crediters drawing the line at forcing parties to reveal the sources of their income. There was surprising consistency of

Table 43

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRED POLITICAL PARTIES

TO REPORT THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES OF INCOME

Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.	P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
		Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	36	37	28	45	100	98	75	73	100
Opposed	47	53	53	45	-	1	25	15	-
No opinion	17	10	19	9	-	1	-	12	-
Total	100	100	100	99*	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 42.

Table 44

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIES TO REPORT THEIR EXPENSES,

RECEIPTS AND SOURCES OF INCOME

Breakdown by Elected/Defeated: Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.**	
El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	40	33	25	51	100	98	60	75	100
Opposed	45	56	58	40	-	1	40	13	-
No opinion	15	11	17	9	-	1	-	13	-
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101*	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 42.

opinion among the incumbents and elected members of these three Parties with some Social Credit drop off when the question of sources arose. Respondents affiliated with the two major Parties were not generally eager to see party reporting requirements instituted. In the overall picture, however, incumbent and elected Liberals and non-incumbent and defeated Conservatives tended to be the most strongly in favour of these reporting proposals than other respondents from these Parties.

2. The Publication of Reports

Respondents were asked if they would favour the publication of candidates' reports stating expenses and receipts, and of party reports stating expenses, receipts and the sources of their funds. The three separate trends which emerged when full party reporting was considered are also evident here. The New Democratic and Cr ditiste respondents were strongly in favour of the publication of candidate reports: 94 and 93 per cent respectively. Liberal and Conservative respondents were much less strongly in favour, although majorities of 54 and 58 per cent respectively reported in favour of such a measure. Between these two extremes rested the Social Credit respondents with 76 per cent in favour of requiring the publication of candidate reports, in this instance joined by the Independent and Other candidates of whom 71 per cent were in the affirmative category.

Table 45

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING THE PUBLICATION OF
CANDIDATES' REPORTS STATING THEIR EXPENSES AND RECEIPTS
Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	54	58	94	76	93	71
Opposed	32	33	5	22	7	25
No opinion	14	9	1	2	-	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

This three-way trend is further sustained when the two factors of electoral status are considered. Again 100 per cent of both the incumbent and elected New Democrats and Cr ditistes prove to be in favour of the measure along with slightly lower proportions of the non-incumbents and defeated respondents in these Party groups (94 per cent for each of the New Democrats and 91 per cent for each of the Cr ditistes). Seventy-five per cent of the incumbent and 76 per cent of the non-incumbent Social Crediters favoured the scheme. In contrast, 80 per cent of the elected members but only 75 per cent of those defeated in this Party group were in favour.

Table 46
ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING THE PUBLICATION OF CANDIDATES' REPORTS

STATING THEIR EXPENSES AND RECEIPTS

Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	45	60	63	55	100	94	75	76	100	91
Opposed	31	33	28	36	-	5	25	21	-	9
Don't know	24	6	9	9	-	1	-	3	-	-
Total	100	99*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 45.

Table 47

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING THE PUBLICATION OF CANDIDATES' REPORTS

STATING THEIR EXPENSES AND RECEIPTS

Breakdown by Elected/Defeated: Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.**	
El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	49	58	58	100	94	80	75	100	91
Opposed	34	33	33	-	5	20	22	-	9
No opinion	17	10	9	-	1	-	3	-	-
Total	100	101*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 45.

By way of contrast to the earlier tendency, however, incumbent and elected Liberals are less strongly in favour of requiring the publication of candidate reports: 45 and 49 per cent respectively. Sixty per cent of the non-incumbent Liberals and 59 per cent of those defeated stated that they favoured such publication. On the other hand, 63 per cent of the incumbent Conservatives favoured the scheme in contrast to 55 per cent of the non-incumbents. There was no difference between the proportions of elected and defeated Conservatives in favour in this instance.

The three-way trend noted above was modified still further when the publication of party reports stating expenses, receipts and sources was considered. Liberals and Conservatives generally disapproved of the scheme with only 38 and 35 per cent respectively in favour. At the other end of the scale, 96 per cent of the New Democrats were enthusiastic. Between these two extremes, there were the Social Credit respondents with 70 per cent and the Independent and Other candidates with 71 per cent in favour of publication. The new pattern emerges, however, since the Cr ditiste respondents are no longer closely aligned with the New Democrats; rather with 86 per cent reporting in favour of such a measure they take up a position between the New Democrats and the Social Crediters.

Table 48

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING THE PUBLICATION OF PARTY REPORTS
STATING THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES

Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	38	35	96	70	86	71
Opposed	49	52	2	19	7	25
No opinion	14	13	2	11	7	4
Total	101*	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

The incumbents and elected members of the New Democratic and Cr ditiste contingents were again unanimously in favour of the proposed control measure. Ninety-six per cent of the non-incumbent New Democrats and 95 per cent of those defeated were in favour, along with 83 per cent of both the non-incumbent and defeated Cr ditistes. Both Liberal and Conservative incumbents and elected Conservatives tended to be less enthusiastic about the publication proposal. Thirty-three per cent of the Liberal and 28 per cent of the Conservative incumbents were in favour in contrast to 41 per cent and 40 per cent of the non-incumbents respectively. Similarly, 38 per cent of the elected Liberals but only 37 per cent of those defeated were in favour. Defeated

Table 49
ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING THE PUBLICATION OF PARTY REPORTS

STATING THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES

Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.**	
Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour 33	41	28	40	100	96	75	70	100	83
Opposed 50	47	50	53	-	3	-	21	-	9
Don't know 17	12	22	8	-	1	25	9	-	9
Total 100	100	100	101*	100	100	100	100	100	101*

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 48.

Table 50

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING THE PUBLICATION OF PARTY REPORTS

STATING THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES

Elected/Defeated Breakdown: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	38	37	28	42	100	95	60	72	100	83
Opposed	48	49	55	49	-	3	20	19	-	9
No opinion	14	14	18	9	-	2	20	9	-	9
Total	100	100	101*	100	100	100	100	100	100	101*

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 48.

Conservatives tallied 42 per cent in favour in contrast to 28 per cent of those elected. The Social Credit candidates again took up a position between the major and minor party respondents. Incumbents were more in favour of the measure than were those respondents defeated at the polls. While 75 per cent of the incumbent Social Crediters were in favour, only 70 per cent of their non-incumbent party mates answered in the affirmative. In contrast, 72 per cent of those defeated but only 60 per cent of those elected expressed themselves in favour of such a measure.

The opinions of responding candidates toward reporting and publication were surprisingly uniform from question to question within each party. A fairly distinct trend was observable on these questions. First, respondents from the two "old-line" Parties tended to be rather unenthusiastic about these proposals. New Democratic and Cr ditiste respondents tended to be very strongly in favour, with Social Credit respondents somewhere in between the two groups, usually tending toward the "more enthusiastic" contingent.

3. Ceilings

Respondents were also asked to consider ceilings which could impose maximum campaign spending limits on candidates and/or parties. As Table 51 indicates, 89 per cent of the New Democrats and 81 per cent of both the Social Credit and Cr ditiste respondents favoured the establishment of a

ceiling on candidates' expenditures. Somewhat smaller majorities of the Liberals and Conservatives, 58 and 57 per cent respectively, also favoured candidate ceilings. In addition, 75 per cent of the Independent and Other respondents were in favour.

Table 51

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING CANDIDATE

CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES

Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	58	57	89	81	81	75
Opposed	32	35	9	16	14	18
Don't know	10	8	2	3	5	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Incumbent Liberals, New Democrats and Social Crediters tended to be more enthusiastic over candidate ceilings than their non-incumbent counterparts. On the other hand, only 44 per cent of the incumbent Conservatives fell into the affirmative category in contrast to 62 per cent of the non-incumbents. While 83 per cent of both the incumbent and non-incumbent Creditistes favoured candidate ceilings, 14 per cent of the non-incumbents opposed the measure.

Table 52

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING CANDIDATE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES

Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	60	54	44	62	92	88	100	79	83	83
Opposed	24	38	47	28	8	9	-	18	-	14
No opinion	16	8	9	9	-	3	-	3	17	3
Total	100	100	100	99*	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 51.

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING CANDIDATE EXPENDITURES

Elected/Defeated Breakdown: Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73 N=63	N=40 N=45	N=16 N=110	N=5 N=32	N=7 N=35				
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	60 56	40 71	94 88	80 81	72 83				
Opposed	32 33	50 22	6 9	20 16	14 14				
No opinion	7 11	10 7	- 3	- 3	14 3				
Total	99* 100	100 100	100 100	100 100	100 100				

* Due to rounding

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 51.

A slightly different pattern emerges when elected and defeated respondents are isolated. Liberal and New Democrat elected members are more strongly in favour of ceilings, 60 per cent and 94 per cent respectively, than their defeated party mates, 56 and 88 per cent respectively. Defeated Conservatives are much more strongly in favour than those elected, 71 per cent of the former and 40 per cent of the latter. Similarly defeated Social Credit and Cr ditiste respondents are slightly more enthusiastic over ceilings than their elected counterparts.

Strangely, all party groups except the Conservatives were more strongly in favour of party ceilings than of candidate ceilings. New Democrats, Social Credit and Cr ditiste respondents were more enthusiastic than candidates affiliated with the two "old-line" Parties. Despite this, 60 per cent of the Liberals and 55 per cent of the Conservatives reported themselves in favour of party ceilings. Ninety per cent of the New Democrats, 89 per cent of the Social Crediters and 86 per cent of the Cr ditistes were in favour, with 79 per cent of the Independents and "Other" respondents also in favour.

The incumbents of each party group except the Conservatives and Cr ditistes tended to be more strongly in favour of party ceilings. Non-incumbent Conservatives and Creditistes on the other hand were more enthusiastic than their incumbent counterparts. As Table 55 indicates,

there was near unanimity among New Democrats and complete unanimity among Social Crediters on this issue.

Table 54

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING PARTY CAMPAIGN EXPENSES
Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	60	55	90	89	86	79
Opposed	29	39	9	8	10	18
No opinion	11	6	1	3	4	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The trend was almost identical when elected respondents and those defeated were compared. Elected Liberals, New Democrats and Social Crediters were more enthusiastic about party ceilings than were non-incumbents from these same parties. On the other hand, defeated Conservatives and Créditistes were again more strongly in favour of the proposal. Again, there was near unanimity among elected New Democrats, with 94 per cent in favour and complete unanimity among elected Social Credit respondents.

Candidates were also asked if they thought that legislation limiting election expenses would be obeyed. None of the party groups showed wild optimism. Only 62 per cent

Table 55

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING PARTY CAMPAIGN EXPENSES

Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.*	
	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.	Inc.	Non-Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
In favour	64	56	38	66	92	89	100	88	50	83
Opposed	19	36	59	26	8	9	-	9	33	11
No opinion	17	8	3	8	-	2	-	3	17	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 54.

of the New Democrats felt that such measures would be obeyed. On the other hand, 41 per cent of the Liberals, 54 per cent of the Conservatives, and 41 per cent of the Social Crediters felt that such legislation would not be obeyed. Finally, a bare 50 per cent of the Independent and Other respondents, along with 45 per cent of the Cr ditistes were optimistic that obedience would be forthcoming.

Table 56

WOULD LEGISLATION LIMITING ELECTION EXPENSES BE OBEYED?

Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Cr�d.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	41	34	62	49	45	50
No	41	54	26	32	41	43
Don't know	19	12	12	19	14	7
Total	101*	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

Incumbent Liberals, New Democrats and Cr ditistes tended to be somewhat more optimistic than their non-incumbent counterparts. Thirty-four per cent of both incumbent and non-incumbent Conservatives answered in the affirmative, with 59 per cent of the former and 51 per cent of the latter on the pessimistic side. On the other hand, non-incumbent

Table 57

WOULD LEGISLATION LIMITING ELECTION EXPENSES BE OBEYED?Incumbents Compared with Non-Incumbents: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	50	33	34	34	69	61	25	49	50	49
No	31	47	59	51	31	26	75	36	33	37
Don't know	19	19	6	15	-	13	-	15	17	14
Total	100	99*	99*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 56.

Table 58

WOULD LEGISLATION LIMITING ELECTION EXPENSES BE OBEYED?
Elected/Defeated Breakdown: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.**	
	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	48	32	35	33	75	60	40	50	14	51
No	33	49	58	51	25	26	20	34	72	34
Don't know	19	19	7	16	-	14	40	16	14	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	99*

* Due to rounding.

** For "Independent and Other" respondents, see Table 56.

Social Crediters were considerably more optimistic, with 49 per cent in the affirmative category in contrast to 25 per cent of the incumbents.

B. THE EFFECT OF CONSTITUENCY

Ontario and Western respondents tend to be less confident that the control of election expenses is possible. On the other hand, respondents from Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces are slightly more confident. Sixty-eight per cent of the Quebec respondents and 67 per cent of these from the Atlantic Provinces stated they felt control possible in contrast to 61 and 62 per cent respectively of the Western and Ontario respondents.

Table 59

IS THE CONTROL OF ELECTION EXPENSES POSSIBLE?

Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
Yes	61	62	68	67
No	34	33	22	21
Don't know	5	5	10	12
Total	100	100	100	100

There was, however, little difference between urban and rural respondents in this instance. Sixty-five per cent of the urban respondents and 64 per cent of those from

rural constituencies stated they felt control a possibility, with 28 per cent of the former and 30 per cent of the latter indicating that they considered the control of election expenses an impossible task.

Table 60

IS THE CONTROL OF ELECTION EXPENSES POSSIBLE?

Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
Yes	64	65
No	30	28
Don't know	6	7
Total	100	100

1. Reporting

Respondents from Quebec stood out noticeably with the largest percentage in favour of requiring political parties to report their receipts. While 84 per cent of these candidates were in favour of such a requirement, only 67 per cent of respondents from the Atlantic Provinces were of the same opinion. Between these extremes, 70 per cent of Western and 72 per cent of Ontario respondents indicated that they would favour such a measure.

Table 61

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIESTO REPORT EXPENSESBreakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
In favour	70	72	84	67
Opposed	22	21	11	14
No opinion	8	7	5	19
Total	100	100	100	100

Again, there was very little difference between respondents from rural areas and those from urban constituencies. In the first instance, 74 per cent were in favour and 16 per cent opposed. In the second, a slightly higher 75 per cent were in favour with 18 per cent opposed.

Table 62

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIESTO REPORT EXPENSESUrban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour	74	75
Opposed	16	18
No opinion	10	7
Total	100	100

Quebec respondents are also more strongly in favour of requiring parties to report their receipts as well as their expenses. Only 68 per cent of both Western and Ontario respondents and 64 per cent of Atlantic respondents reported themselves in favour of such a measure. In contrast, 78 per cent of the respondents from Quebec were in favour, with only 16 per cent opposed.

Table 63

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIESTO REPORT THEIR RECEIPTSBreakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=128	N=124	N=158	N=42
	%	%	%	%
In favour	68	68	78	64
Opposed	26	24	16	14
No opinion	6	8	6	22
Total	100	100	100	100

In contrast, however, to the urban/rural differences with respect to requiring parties to report expenses (see Table 62), rural respondents were more ready to require parties to report their receipts than were those from urban constituencies. Seventy-four per cent of the former and 70 per cent of the latter indicated they favoured such a measure.

Table 64

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIES
TO REPORT THEIR RECEIPTS
Urban/Rural Breakdown

	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour	74	70
Opposed	18	22
No opinion	8	8
Total	100	100

It should be noted that the percentage of respondents in each regional group in favour of party reporting requirements declined when the emphasis was placed on receipts rather than expenses. Similarly, smaller percentages of Western, Ontario and Quebec respondents were in favour of requiring parties to report expenses, receipts and the sources of their income. Nevertheless, Quebec respondents reported a considerably higher percentage of their number in favour of this proposal than did respondents in the other three regions. While 74 per cent of the Quebec respondents were in favour, only 56 per cent of those from the West and 60 per cent of their Ontario counterparts took the same position. An equal percentage of Atlantic respondents favoured complete party reporting requirements as favoured requiring parties to report their expenses;

67 per cent of these respondents favouring each measure.

Table 65

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIES
TO REPORT THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES

Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
In favour	56	60	74	67
Opposed	35	31	20	21
No opinion	9	9	6	12
Total	100	100	100	100

Again a higher percentage of rural respondents favoured complete reporting requirements than was evidenced by urban candidates. Only 63 per cent of the latter were in favour, in contrast to 69 per cent of the former.

Table 66

ATTITUDE TOWARD REQUIRING POLITICAL PARTIES
TO REPORT THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES

Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour	69	63
Opposed	24	29
No opinion	8	8
Total	101*	100

* Due to rounding.

In general, then, rural respondents and those from the Province of Quebec showed larger percentages in favour of party reporting proposals. It should be noted that this trend continues when proposals involving the publication of candidate and party reports are considered.

2. The Publication of Reports

Seventy-nine per cent of the Quebec respondents expressed themselves in favour of requiring the publication of candidate reports. Closely parallel to this, 75 per cent of the Western respondents were of the same opinion. On the other hand, only 63 per cent of the Ontario respondents and 65 per cent of those from the Atlantic Provinces took this position, with 31 per cent of the former and 19 per cent of the latter opposed to such a measure.

Table 67

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PUBLICATION OF CANDIDATES' REPORTS STATING THEIR EXPENSES AND RECEIPTS

Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
In favour	75	63	79	65
Opposed	18	31	17	19
No opinion	7	6	4	16
Total	100	100	100	100

Seventy-six per cent of the rural respondents favoured the publication of candidate reports. In contrast, only 70 per cent of those from urban constituencies took this stand.

Table 68

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PUBLICATION OF CANDIDATES' REPORTS
STATING THEIR EXPENSES AND RECEIPTS
Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour	76	70
Opposed	18	23
No opinion	6	7
Total	100	100

When the issue of publishing party reports is considered, 73 per cent of the Quebec respondents were in favour. Those from the Western Provinces, however, while fairly heavily in favour of publishing candidate reports, were only 58 per cent in favour of publishing party reports. In addition, 63 per cent of candidates from the four Atlantic Provinces and 53 per cent of those from Ontario were in favour of requiring Party reports to be published.

The gap between rural and urban candidates narrowed even further when this issue is considered. Sixty-four per cent of candidates from rural constituencies and 62

Table 69

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PUBLICATION OF PARTY REPORTS
STATING THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES OF INCOME

Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
In favour	58	53	73	63
Opposed	33	39	20	21
No opinion	9	8	7	16
Total	100	100	100	100

per cent of those from urban areas were in favour of publishing party reports. Further, 25 per cent of the former and 30 per cent of the latter were opposed.

Table 70

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PUBLICATION OF PARTY REPORTS
STATING THEIR EXPENSES, RECEIPTS AND SOURCES OF INCOME

Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour	64	62
Opposed	25	30
No opinion	11	8
Total	100	100

3. Ceilings

It has been noted that Quebec respondents and those candidates from rural constituencies were somewhat more strongly in favour of reporting and publication requirements as modes of controlling election expenses. When another mode of control - ceilings - is considered, however, a different trend emerges. Again Quebec respondents are most strongly in favour of legislation limiting campaign expenditures. Atlantic respondents, however, also report large percentages in favour. Again, the Ottawa River becomes a boundary. In addition, while rural/urban differences are slight with respect to the question of ceilings, urban respondents do tend to be more strongly in favour of this mode of control than those from rural constituencies.

Seventy-eight per cent of Quebec respondents and 74 per cent of those from the Atlantic region favour legislation limiting candidate campaign expenditures. This is in contrast to 67 per cent of those from Ontario and 68 per cent of Western respondents of the same opinion.

Urban respondents show 72 per cent in favour of ceilings which would apply to candidates. On the other hand, 69 per cent of the candidates from rural constituencies expressed themselves in favour of such legislation.

Table 71

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING CANDIDATECAMPAIGN EXPENDITURESBreakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
In favour	68	67	78	74
Opposed	27	24	18	19
No opinion	5	9	4	7
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 72

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING CANDIDATECAMPAIGN EXPENDITURESUrban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour	69	72
Opposed	26	21
No opinion	5	7
Total	100	100

Quebec respondents are more heavily in favour of
legislation limiting party campaign expenditures than in

the case of candidate ceilings. While 78 per cent favoured candidate ceilings, 83 per cent favoured ceilings to limit party campaign expenditures. Similarly, 75 per cent of the Atlantic respondents favoured party ceilings in contrast to the 74 per cent in favour of limitation on how much candidates could spend during campaigns. There is little difference in this instance when Western and Ontario respondents are considered. Sixty-eight per cent of the former favoured candidate ceilings, with 67 per cent in favour of ceilings which would apply to parties; 67 per cent of the latter favoured candidate ceilings and 68 per cent favoured legislation limiting parties.

Table 73

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING PARTYCAMPAIGN EXPENDITURESBreakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
In favour	67	68	83	75
Opposed	29	23	15	16
No opinion	4	9	2	9
Total	100	100	100	100

Again, urban respondents showed a slightly higher percentage in favour of party ceilings, with 73 per cent in favour. Seventy-two per cent of those from rural areas

were likewise in favour. In each case, the proportion is higher than that registered for candidate ceilings.

Table 74

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEGISLATION LIMITING PARTYCAMPAIGN EXPENDITURESUrban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
In favour	72	73
Opposed	22	21
No opinion	6	6
Total	100	100

The proportion of candidates in each regional group in favour of either candidate or party ceilings was in every case higher than the proportion of respondents who felt that legislation limiting election expenses would be obeyed. In this instance, there were no stand-outs. Forty-six per cent of both Quebec and Western respondents felt that such legislation would be obeyed. Similarly, 48 per cent and 49 per cent of the respondents from Ontario and the Atlantic Provinces respectively were of this opinion. Moderate pessimism or restrained optimism was general regarding the efficacy of such legislation.

Table 75

WOULD LEGISLATION LIMITING ELECTION EXPENSESBE OBEYED?Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
Yes	46	48	46	49
No	46	41	34	26
Don't know	8	11	20	26
Total	100	100	100	101*

* Due to rounding.

A somewhat higher proportion of urban respondents were confident that legislation imposing ceilings would be obeyed, than was evidenced for rural candidates. While 43 per cent of the latter thought such legislation would be obeyed, 49 per cent of the candidates from urban constituencies were of this opinion.

VI. Opinions on Five Proposed Methods
of Reducing Election Expenses

Five questions were designed to determine the opinions of candidates with respect to measures which might be advanced to reduce election expenses. Candidates were not asked if they did or did not favour these measures. They were asked if they thought each might effectively reduce

Table 76

WOULD LEGISLATION LIMITING ELECTION EXPENSESBE OBEYED?Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
Yes	43	49
No	42	37
Don't know	15	14
Total	100	100

election expenses. Undoubtedly some of the responses obtained were also coloured by candidates' general reactions to these measures based on other grounds. Be that as it may, the specialized experience of candidates as competitors for political office and as spenders of campaign funds make their opinions with reference to these proposed "remedies" of particular interest. Candidates were asked questions they may well be best qualified to answer: "What will work?" "What will effectively reduce election expenses?"

A. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND ELECTORAL STATUS

Many students of campaign finance have argued that parties and candidates expend large sums of money telling electors simply to vote as opposed to persuading them for

whom to vote. It might, therefore, be argued that legislation which made voting compulsory for all eligible citizens would reduce election expenses. However, the reactions of candidates to this proposal may be coloured by the favour or displeasure with which they view compulsory voting as well as by their considerations of the degree to which it would reduce election expenses. Of all the party groups, only a majority of the Cr ditiste group felt that compulsory voting would reduce election expenses, and even then, it included only 55 per cent of the respondents affiliated with this Party. In every other instance, a larger proportion felt that compulsory voting would not reduce election expenses than the reverse. Only 43 per cent of the Liberals and 47 per cent of the Conservatives agreed that the proposal would reduce election expenses, while 46 and 48 per cent respectively thought a reduction would not result. At a further extreme, only 39 per cent of the New Democrats and 35 per cent of the Social Credit respondents felt that such a measure would reduce election expenses, while more than one half of the respondents from these parties felt that it would not reduce expenses. Finally, 46 per cent of the Independent and Other candidates felt that a reduction would not result, with only 43 per cent stating that it would.

Table 77

WOULD COMPULSORY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	43	47	39	35	55	43
No	46	48	52	54	40	46
Don't know	11	5	9	11	5	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The picture changes somewhat when incumbent candidates are compared with non-incumbents. In every party group but one, a larger percentage of non-incumbents than of incumbents thought that compulsory voting would reduce election expenses. A majority of the non-incumbent Conservatives (57 per cent) were of this opinion in contrast to only 31 per cent of the incumbent Conservatives. The difference is perhaps the most striking when the New Democrats are considered. Only 15 per cent of the 13 New Democratic incumbents felt that compulsory voting would reduce election expenses. A much larger 42 per cent of the non-incumbent New Democrats were of this opinion. Similarly 46 per cent of the non-incumbent Liberals compared to only 38 per cent of the incumbent Liberals, and 54 per cent of the non-incumbent Créditistes contrasted to 50 per cent

Table 78

WOULD COMPULSORY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Incumbency: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	38	46	31	57	15	42	50	33	50	54
No	53	40	63	40	61	51	50	55	50	40
Don't know	9	14	6	4	23	7	-	12	-	6
Total	100	100	100	101*	99*	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

of the incumbent Cr ditistes felt a reduction would result. The pattern varied only with the Social Credit respondents; 50 per cent of the incumbent members of this Party felt that compulsory voting would reduce election expenses, while only 33 per cent of the non-incumbents took this position.

When elected and defeated respondents were compared on this issue, it should be noted that higher percentages of elected than defeated Liberal, Conservative and New Democratic respondents thought compulsory voting would not reduce election expenses. On the other hand, defeated Conservatives and New Democrats are more strongly of the opinion that expenses would be reduced than their elected party mates; but 71 per cent of the elected Cr ditistes were of this opinion, in contrast to only 51 per cent of those defeated. Similarly, 60 per cent of the elected Social Crediters and 44 per cent of the elected Liberals favoured the proposal in comparison with only 31 per cent of the defeated Social Credit and 41 per cent of the defeated Liberal respondents.

Only 30 per cent of the elected Conservatives thought compulsory voting would lower the level of spending, as opposed to 62 per cent of those Conservatives who went down to defeat. Similarly, 43 per cent of defeated and only 13 per cent of elected New Democrats were of this opinion.

Table 79

WOULD COMPULSORY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Electoral Status: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.	
	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73	N=83	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	44	41	30	62	13	43	60	31	71	51
No	46	44	62	36	62	50	40	56	29	43
Don't know	10	14	8	2	25	7	-	13	-	6
Total	100	99*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

To explain why electoral status affected the respondents of different parties in different ways is difficult. What is interesting, however, is the fact that there is often a wide gap between party members who are elected to or have served in the House of Commons and those who have not been successful. Party unity may exist within the House itself, although the responses registered here indicate that there is perhaps less unity than has often been supposed. Once beyond the present or former members, however, opinions on questions of this type appear to vary widely. Perhaps different experiences as competitors for power, as fund raisers and fund spenders, is the determining factor. Or the fact may be that policy decisions on questions such as this are the product largely of the parliamentary party rather than of the political association as a whole.

A majority of the respondents in each group (as well as the Independents and Other respondents) thought that the establishment of a permanent voters' list would reduce election expenses. It has often been argued that the cost of determining the target of persuasive messages and literature now borne by the parties and their candidates could be reduced by such a measure. Sixty-seven per cent of Liberal and Creditiste respondents evidently agreed with this argument. Similarly 64 per cent of the New Democrats, 65 per cent of the Social Crediters and 60 per cent of the Conservatives felt a permanent list would reduce the level of expenses. Finally, one half of the 28 Independent and Other candidates took this position.

Table 80

WOULD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT VOTERS' LIST
REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	67	60	64	65	67	50
No	18	26	18	16	21	25
Don't know	15	14	18	19	12	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The picture changes somewhat when electoral status is taken into account. Among Liberal, Conservative and New Democratic respondents, non-incumbents are more likely to think that a permanent voters' list would reduce election expenses than were incumbents. Incumbent Créditistes and Social Crediters, on the other hand, were more likely to take this position than their non-incumbent counterparts. It might be noted that this is one of the few instances in which Creditiste respondents and those affiliated with the Social Credit Party came close to agreeing.

When the elected/defeated breakdown is considered, elected members in each party group except the Conservatives are more likely to think that such a measure would reduce

Table 81

WOULD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT VOTERS' LIST REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES

Breakdown by Incumbency: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	64	69	56	62	62	64	75	64	83	63
No	28	10	31	23	15	19	-	18	17	23
Don't know	9	21	13	15	23	18	25	18	-	14
Total	101	100	100	100	100	101*	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

Table 82

WOULD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT VOTERS' LIST REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?Breakdown by Electoral Status: Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.	
		El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	70	63	52	67	69	63	80	63	86
No	19	16	35	18	12	19	-	19	14
Don't know	11	21	13	16	19	18	20	19	-
Total	100	100	100	101*	100	100	100	101*	100

* Due to rounding.

election expenses than their defeated counterparts. Eighty-six per cent of the elected Cr ditistes and 80 per cent of elected Social Crediters thought a reduction would result in comparison with 63 per cent of the defeated candidates in both party groups. Similarly, 70 per cent of the elected Liberals and 69 per cent of the elected New Democrats were of this opinion, in contrast to 63 per cent of these defeated in each case. Only among Conservatives did the defeated respondents show a higher proportion in this position; 67 per cent of these candidates felt a permanent voters' list would reduce expenses, while only 52 per cent of those elected were of this opinion. If only elected respondents are considered, it should be noted that a substantial proportion felt that a permanent voters' list would reduce election expenses. Even among the elected Conservatives 52 per cent were of this opinion.

It has been argued that a shorter campaign period would reduce the level of campaign expenditures. It has also been argued that a shorter campaign period would be to the benefit of the incumbent or established parties and candidates whose identity and possession of office are already firmly established in the electorate's mind. Table 83 indicates that a majority of the candidates in each group thought a shorter campaign would reduce election expenses. As might have been expected, the largest percentage, 80 per cent, is registered by Liberal respondents. It is also noteworthy that a fairly large proportion of Conservatives,

74 per cent, are of the same opinion. The differences among party groups might suggest that respondents considered the potential experience of their respective parties in a shortened election campaign before replying. Respondents belonging to the two larger parties were more likely to think that a shorter campaign would reduce expenses than were respondents in other groups. Perhaps established parties would spend less in a reduced campaign because they could rely on a back-log of exposure and association. Respondents affiliated with other groups, however, were less sure that a shorter campaign period would mean less money spent. It may be that the smaller parties would consider it necessary to intensify the expenditure of funds in a shorter campaign period to obtain sufficient exposure and the contact with the electorate.

Table 83

WOULD A SHORTER CAMPAIGN PERIOD REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	80	74	61	54	57	54
No	14	21	32	38	33	32
Don't know	6	5	7	8	10	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 84

WOULD A SHORTER CAMPAIGN PERIOD REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?
Breakdown by Incumbency: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	81	79	91	64	69	60	75	52	100	51
No	16	13	9	28	15	34	25	39	-	37
Don't know	3	8	-	8	15	6	-	9	-	11
Total	100	100	100	100	99*	100	100	100	100	99*

* Due to rounding.

Table 85

WOULD A SHORTER CAMPAIGN PERIOD REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Electoral Status: Political Affiliation Held Constant

Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.	
El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
78	83	85	64	75	59	60	53	85	51
16	11	15	27	13	35	40	38	15	37
Don't know	6	-	9	13	6	-	9	-	12
Total	100	100	100	101*	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

In every instance recorded in Table 84, a larger proportion of incumbents than non-incumbents felt that a shorter campaign period would reduce election expenses. Similarly, the elected respondents of each party group, except the Liberals, showed a larger percentage of this opinion. The uniformity of this trend would suggest that incumbents and elected respondents who are incumbents felt less need to intensify spending for a successful campaign in a shortened election period.

Candidates were also asked if they thought that placing the candidate's political affiliation on the ballot would reduce election expenses. A majority of each group except the Conservatives and the non-affiliated Independents felt that it would. Eighty-six per cent of the Cr ditiste respondents felt that expenses would be significantly reduced if candidates and parties were relieved of the task of establishing their party identity. Sixty-three per cent of the New Democrats, 54 per cent of the Liberals and 51 per cent of the Social Credit respondents agreed. On the other hand, 53 per cent of the Conservatives felt that such a measure would not reduce the level of expenses. Finally, as might be expected, only 36 per cent of the Independent and Other candidates felt that a reduction of expenses would result.

Table 86

WOULD INDICATING THE POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF CANDIDATES
ON THE BALLOT REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	54	39	63	51	86	36
No	32	53	27	30	10	46
Don't know	14	8	10	19	4	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

A larger number of non-incumbents in every case felt that placing party names on the ballot would reduce election expenses. Again, it might be reflected that candidates were revealing their own experiences or potential experiences in their responses. The incumbent's affiliation with his party will most likely be firmly established in his constituents' minds. Furthermore, an incumbent may have established a personal following and organization whose identity and strength is separable from the vagaries in the popularity of his party and its leadership. The non-incumbent on the other hand must needs spend money advertising his affiliation if he wishes to employ his party's prestige and reputation in his bid for power.

Table 87
WOULD INDICATING THE POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF CANDIDATES ON THE BALLOT

REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES

Breakdown by Incumbency: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=3	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	52	55	22	49	62	64	50	52	83	86
No	31	33	72	42	15	28	-	33	17	9
Don't know	17	12	6	9	23	8	50	15	-	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101*

* Due to rounding.

WOULD INDICATING THE POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF CANDIDATES ON THE BALLOT REDUCE

ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Electoral Status: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.	
	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	52	56	25	51	50	65	60	50	70	89
No	33	32	70	38	19	28	-	34	30	6
Don't know	15	13	5	11	31	6	40	16	-	6
Total	100	101*	100	100	100	99*	100	100	100	101*

* Due to rounding.

It should be noted, however, that the differences between incumbents and non-incumbents in each party group were not great except in the case of Conservative respondents. In this instance, 49 per cent of the non-incumbents felt that the party name on the ballot would reduce election expenses, while only 22 per cent of the incumbents were of this opinion.

Table 88 indicates that defeated candidates like non-incumbents were more likely to feel that indicating a candidate's political affiliation on the ballot would reduce election expenses. The sole exception to this occurs among the Social Credit respondents. In this instance, 60 per cent of the elected respondents and only 50 per cent of those defeated felt that such a measure would reduce election expenses. The differences between elected and defeated respondents were somewhat more marked in each party group than those between incumbents and non-incumbents. Again, the difference is most striking when the opinions of elected and defeated Conservatives are compared on this point. While only 25 per cent of the elected Conservatives felt the party name on the ballot would reduce election expenses, 51 per cent of those defeated were of this opinion.

When only elected respondents are considered, 70 per cent of the elected Cr ditistes and 60 per cent of those Social Crediters elected felt a reduction would result while only a bare majority of Liberals and elected New

Democrats took this position. On the other hand, 70 per cent of the elected Conservatives felt that such a measure would not reduce the level of campaign spending, and only twenty-five per cent felt that it would.

The final proposal candidates were asked to consider was Sunday voting. It has been argued that since Sunday is a public holiday, more volunteer help would be available to the parties and there would be less need for parties and candidates to provide the services which are necessary on an ordinary working day. Only the Cr ditiste and Independent respondents felt strongly that establishing Sunday as the polling day would reduce election expenses. Of course, all of the Cr ditistes and many of the Independents came from Quebec where legislation to establish Sunday as voting day had recently been adopted. (See Table 100 for the regional breakdown on this question.)

In contrast to 62 per cent of the Cr ditistes and 50 per cent of the Independent and Other respondents who felt that Sunday voting would reduce election expenses, only 14 per cent of the Social Crediters were of this opinion, with 70 per cent taking the opposite position. Sixty-three per cent of the Conservatives thought a reduction in expenses would not result from the adoption of this proposal. Liberal respondents were evenly divided, with 43 per cent in the "yes" category and the same percentage taking an opposing stand. Finally, only 38 per cent of the New Democrats

thought Sunday voting would reduce election expenses and 44 per cent felt it would not.

It might be added that many candidates may have been influenced by the personal distaste of the notion of voting on the Christian Sabbath. Further, many candidates indicated that they were as yet undecided on this particular issue.

Table 89

WOULD SUNDAY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Political Affiliation

	Lib.	P.C.	N.D.P.	S.C.	Créd.	Ind. & Other
Response	N=136	N=85	N=126	N=37	N=42	N=28
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	43	30	38	14	62	50
No	43	63	44	70	31	32
Don't know	14	8	18	16	7	18
Total	100	101*	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

Respondents who were incumbents at the time of the election were less likely to favour Sunday voting as a way of reducing the level of campaign spending. The exception to this trend is the fact that 83 per cent of the incumbent Cr ditistes were of this opinion in contrast to 60 per cent of the non-incumbents. The contrast between incumbents and non-incumbents is most marked among Conservatives, New

Table 90

WOULD SUNDAY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Incumbency: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Créd.	
	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.	Inc.	Non- Inc.
Response	N=58	N=78	N=32	N=53	N=13	N=113	N=4	N=33	N=6	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	41	44	22	34	15	41	-	15	83	60
No	45	42	69	58	69	42	75	70	17	31
Don't know	14	14	9	8	15	17	25	15	-	9
Total	100	100	100	100	99*	100	100	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

Table 91

WOULD SUNDAY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Electoral Status: Political Affiliation Held Constant

	Lib.		P.C.		N.D.P.		S.C.		Cred.	
	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.	El.	Def.
Response	N=73	N=63	N=40	N=45	N=16	N=110	N=5	N=32	N=7	N=35
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	49	35	18	40	19	41	-	16	71	60
No	38	49	73	53	56	43	80	69	29	31
Don't know	13	16	10	7	25	16	20	16	-	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101*	100	100

* Due to rounding.

Democrats and Social Crediters. Twenty-two per cent of the incumbent Conservatives and 15 per cent of the incumbent New Democrats thought that establishing Sunday as federal polling day would reduce election expenses. In contrast, 34 per cent of the non-incumbent Conservatives and 41 per cent of the non-incumbent New Democratic respondents took this position. Although none of the 4 incumbent Social Crediters were of this opinion, 15 per cent of those who were not incumbents thought a reduction would result. Finally, 41 per cent of the incumbent Liberals and a slightly higher 44 per cent of the non-incumbents felt Sunday voting would effect a reduction in election expenses.

The trend is very similar when the elected/defeated breakdown in Table 91 is considered. In this instance, however, elected Liberals are more likely to think a reduction in election expenses will result than are defeated Liberals: 49 and 35 per cent respectively. Further, elected Creditistes are less likely to see a reduction in such a measure than those who were incumbents in the last election.

The religious affiliation of candidates may clearly have been a factor in determining their attitudes toward Sunday voting. Protestants may well have been less favourable to the proposal than Catholics. This may be reflected in the regional breakdown (see Table 100) but no separate breakdown of religious affiliation was attempted and any conclusions in this regard are merely conjectural.

In general, it might be concluded that the five measures proposed here as ways to reduce election expenses are often more appealing to non-incumbent and defeated respondents. Furthermore, Cr ditiste respondents generally felt much more strongly that these measures would result in a reduction in election expenses than did other respondents. Finally, it is to be noted that there is seldom a marked degree of party cohesion with respect to opinions on these measures. Rather, respondents seem to have been heavily influenced by their own experiences as competitors for office and by their projection of these experiences as they might be affected by the implementation of the measures proposed.

B. THE EFFECT OF CONSTITUENCY

Respondents from Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces were more likely to think compulsory voting would reduce election expenses than those from the rest of Canada. Again, the Ottawa River becomes the dividing line of opinion. Fifty-nine per cent of the Quebec respondents and 65 per cent of those from the Atlantic Provinces agreed with the proposition that compulsory voting would reduce election expenses. On the other hand, only 24 per cent of the Western respondents and 34 per cent of those from Ontario were of this opinion.

Rural respondents were more likely to have made up their minds on this issue than urban candidates. Forty-four per cent of the former thought compulsory voting would reduce expenses, in contrast to 42 per cent of the latter.

Table 92

WOULD COMPULSORY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
Yes	24	34	59	65
No	64	57	33	28
Don't know	12	9	8	7
Total	100	100	100	100

On the other hand, 49 per cent of the rural candidates thought a reduction would not result as opposed to 48 per cent of the urban respondents.

Table 93

WOULD COMPULSORY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
Yes	44	42
No	49	48
Don't know	6	10
Total	99*	100

* Due to rounding.

The gap between East and West is narrowed considerably when the question of a permanent voters' list is considered. Sixty-eight per cent of Quebec candidates and 65 per cent of those from the Atlantic region thought such a measure would reduce election expenses. Sixty-four per cent of the Western respondents but only 56 per cent of those from Ontario took this position.

Table 94

WOULD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT VOTERS' LIST
REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES
Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129 %	N=124 %	N=158 %	N=43 %
Yes	64	56	68	65
No	19	27	16	16
Don't know	16	17	16	19
Total	99*	100	100	100

* Due to rounding.

A larger percentage of urban than rural candidates thought that the establishment of a permanent voters' list would reduce election expenses. As Table 95 indicates, 65 per cent of the urban respondents were of this opinion in comparison to 60 per cent of those running in rural constituencies. Many candidates, however, both urban and rural, were undecided on this question.

Table 95

WOULD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT VOTERS' LIST
REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?
Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
Yes	60	65
No	22	19
Don't know	18	16
Total	100	100

There was very little regional or rural/urban differentiation on the question of a shorter campaign period. While 68 per cent of both Western and Ontario respondents thought a shorter campaign period would reduce election expenses, 67 per cent of those from Quebec and 70 per cent of those from the Maritimes took the same position. Similarly, 67 per cent of rural respondents and 68 per cent of those running in urban areas thought a reduction would result.

Quebec respondents were much more likely to think that indicating candidates' political affiliation on the ballot would reduce election expenses than candidates from other areas. Sixty-eight per cent of the Quebec respondents were of this opinion in contrast to 51 per cent of those from the Atlantic region, 50 per cent of those from Ontario and only 47 per cent of those from the Western Provinces.

Table 96

WOULD A SHORTER CAMPAIGN PERIOD REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129 %	N=124 %	N=158 %	N=43 %
Yes	68	68	67	70
No	28	27	23	21
Don't know	4	5	10	9
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 97

WOULD A SHORTER CAMPAIGN PERIOD REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156 %	N=297 %
Yes	67	68
No	26	25
Don't know	7	7
Total	100	100

Table 98

WOULD INDICATING THE POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF CANDIDATES
ON THE BALLOT REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129 %	N=124 %	N=158 %	N=43 %
Yes	47	50	68	51
No	40	38	24	35
Don't know	13	12	8	14
Total	100	100	100	100

Sixty per cent of urban respondents thought that the party name on the ballot would reduce election expenses. Only 46 per cent of the rural candidates on the other hand, took the same position. This urban/rural contrast well reflects a differing attitude toward the role and function of electoral representatives on the part of urban and rural electors. The rural Member of Parliament's relationship with his electors may well be more personal than his urban counterpart; the former may well be judged in terms of his services to constituents while the latter may be regarded more as representative of a party and a policy.

The difference between Quebec respondents and candidates from the other three regions is most marked when the question of Sunday voting is considered. As has been stated

Table 99

WOULD INDICATING THE POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF CANDIDATES
ON THE BALLOT REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156	N=297
	%	%
Yes	46	60
No	40	30
Don't know	14	10
Total	100	100

Quebec had recently adopted such legislation. Table 100 indicates that 73 per cent of the responding candidates from Quebec thought that Sunday voting would reduce election expenses. On the other hand, 26 per cent of the Atlantic and Ontario respondents and only 13 per cent of those from the Western region were of this opinion. Sixty-seven per cent of Western candidates, 63 per cent of those from Ontario and 56 per cent of those from the Atlantic Provinces thought that Sunday voting would not reduce election expenses and many of these also commented that they were opposed to such a measure on other grounds as well.

Table 100

WOULD SUNDAY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?

Breakdown by Region

	Western Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
Response	N=129	N=124	N=158	N=43
	%	%	%	%
Yes	13	26	73	26
No	67	63	18	56
Don't know	20	11	9	18
Total	100	100	100	100

Finally, it should be noted that urban respondents were considerably more ready to accept a potential reduction of election expenses by means of Sunday voting than were their rural counterparts. In fact, 44 per cent of the former and only 29 per cent of the latter took this position. Fifty-five per cent of the rural candidates, on the other hand, thought a reduction would not result in contrast to 44 per cent of the urban respondents.

In general, it should be noted that the effect of constituency seems generally less marked than the effect of political affiliation and electoral status with respect to the five proposals designed to reduce election expenses. It might be concluded, however, that Quebec respondents and those from urban areas are somewhat more likely to consider these proposals potential expense reducers.

Table 101

WOULD SUNDAY VOTING REDUCE ELECTION EXPENSES?Urban/Rural Breakdown

	Rural	Urban
Response	N=156 %	N=297 %
Yes	29	44
No	55	44
Don't know	16	12
Total	100	100

VII. Conclusions

It is both difficult and often misleading to draw conclusions on the basis of a study of this type. The descriptions of respondents' opinions, of course, can stand on their own as useful and perhaps interesting information concerning how some candidates think about the problems of election financing. In addition, the findings reported here do indicate that candidates' financial experiences as electoral competitors influence their orientations toward the questions of electoral financing. Similarly, the influence of party affiliation on a candidates' orientation may be more the product of the diffusion of the party's financial experience than the result of ideological decisions made by the party and passed down to the candidate.

On some questions, especially with respect to sources, considerable party cohesion was evident especially with regard to candidates affiliated with the three smaller parties. That is, the effect of principle cannot be entirely disregarded in favour of a more deterministic explanation based on the effect of financial experience.

Nevertheless, this study does appear to bear out the contention made at the outset, namely that the external factors of party affiliation, constituency location by province, region or rural/urban district, and electoral status in terms of incumbency and success, do have a significant influence on attitudes toward campaign finance.

APPENDIX I. QUESTIONNAIRE

Name of the candidate. _____

Electoral District. _____ Province. _____

Political Affiliation. _____

I. Financial Statement of the General Election of November 8, 1965:

1. <u>Receipts</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Number</u>
Money from Party Headquarters	\$ _____	_____
Donations:		
- From Commercial Corporations	_____	_____
- From Labour Unions	_____	_____
- From Private Individuals	_____	_____
- Other sources	_____	_____
TOTAL	=====	

2. <u>Expenses</u>	
Radio	_____
Television	_____
Newspapers	_____
Printed Matter:	
- Posters and Billboards	_____
- Pamphlets and Brochures	_____
- Postage	_____
Rental:	
- Committee Rooms	_____
- Halls	_____
Campaign Personnel	_____
Transportation	_____
Miscellaneous	_____
TOTAL	\$ =====

II. Financing the Election Campaign:

1. - Did you have any difficulty in finding money to finance your campaign?

Yes
No
No opinion

2. - Do you believe that large contributors may corrupt a political party?

Yes
No
No opinion

3. - Fiscal Incentives. - The Presidential Committee on Election Expenses in the United States has recommended incentives for political contributions by way of certain fiscal measures. Do you think that political contributions should be tax deductible?

Yes
No
No opinion

4. - Public Subsidies. - In Germany, Puerto Rico and the Province of Quebec, the State provides subsidies to finance election campaigns. Do you think that a similar formula should be adopted in Canada?

Yes
No
No opinion

5. - Mailing Privileges. - In France, Great Britain, the postal service distributes without charge all election publicity within certain limits. Do you think this system should be adopted in Canada?

For all Mailings
" some "
No free Mailings
No opinion

III. Limitation of Election Expenses

6. - Presently a candidate has no limitation regarding his election expenses. Would you wish this situation to continue?

Yes

No

No opinion

7. - Presently a political party has no limitation regarding its election expenses. Do you wish this situation to continue?

Yes

No

No opinion

8. - Do you think that election expenses are exorbitant in Canada?

Yes

No

No opinion

9. - In Great Britain, in the Province of Quebec and in certain other democratic countries, election expenses are limited. Should this solution be adopted in Canada?

Yes

No

No opinion

10. - If election expenses were limited by legislation do you think these stipulations would be adhered to?

Yes

No

No opinion

11. - If legislation limited the election expenses of a candidate during the electoral period, what amount would you recommend per elector by each candidate?

25¢

\$1.00

50¢

\$2.00

IV. Control of Election Expenses

12. - Presently the Canada Election Act (Section 63) compels the candidate to send in a return of income and expenses of his election campaign. Do you think that legislation should be adopted to compel the political parties to send in a similar report stating:
- a) their expenses?
 - Yes
 - No
 - No opinion
 - b) their receipts?
 - Yes
 - No
 - No opinion
 - c) their expenses, their receipts and the sources of such income?
 - Yes
 - No
 - No opinion
13. - Do you think that the Chief Electoral Officer should publish after each election a report indicating:
- a) Expenses and receipts of the candidates?
 - Yes
 - No
 - No opinion
 - b) Expenses, receipts as well as the sources of the latter by political parties?
 - Yes
 - No
 - No opinion
14. - Do you believe that the control of election expenses is possible?
 - Yes
 - No
 - No opinion
15. - Do you believe that it would be useful to control election expenses?
 - Yes
 - No
 - No opinion

V. Miscellaneous

16. - Compulsory Voting. In Australia and Belgium voting is compulsory. Do you think that such legislation would reduce election expenses?
- Yes
No
No opinion
17. - Permanent Voting List. In many countries the list of voters is permanent. Would this procedure reduce election expenses?
- Yes
No
No opinion
18. - Electoral Campaign Period. Would the curtailment of the electoral campaign period contribute in reducing election expenses?
- Yes
No
No opinion
19. - Sunday Voting. In many democratic countries polling day is on Sunday. Would this procedure reduce election expenses?
- Yes
No
No opinion
20. - Party Name on the Ballot. If a candidate's political affiliation was indicated on the ballot, would election expenses be curtailed?
- Yes
No
No opinion

It is understood that we welcome all information and suggestions that you may wish to adduce. The information will be held strictly confidential and carefully studied by the Committee.

We would welcome any further opinions that you may care to express relating to the subjects assigned to the consideration of our Committee.

FOOTNOTES TO STUDY 7

- 1 Mr. Howat Noble provided assistance at a crucial moment in helping to "program" the study for the computer.
- 2 An analysis in simple tabular form of the marginals only may be found in Study 11 "Candidate Spending Patterns and Attitudes" in the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses. The marginal tables have not been reported here to avoid unnecessary duplication, but the data on which the two studies are based are essentially the same.
- 3 By "electoral status" is meant whether the candidate was the incumbent in the constituency he contested and, since the questionnaire was completed after the election, whether he was elected or defeated in the 1965 contest.
- 4 Ten per cent of the respondents reported that they had received in excess of \$10,000 from these sources. A further 35 per cent received sums of between \$1,000 and \$10,000, with 17 per cent receiving less than \$1,000. Only 31 per cent reported no income from these sources. For many candidates, the money from these sources constituted more than half of the total money spent by the candidate. Naturally, the relative affluence of his party and his importance to the party would determine what proportion of the total spent, the candidate would have to raise locally.
- 5 Twenty per cent of the Liberal respondents reported receiving more than \$10,000 from the Party as opposed to 5 per cent of all respondents. Sixty-three per cent received sums of from \$1,000 to \$10,000, as compared with 23 per cent of all other respondents. Only 4 per cent received less than \$1,000 and 5 per cent received no money from this source. Twenty-three per cent of all other respondents received sums of less than \$1,000 and 43 per cent received nothing from party headquarters.
- 6 Of the 18 Cabinet Ministers or former Cabinet Ministers among the respondents, 11, or 61 per cent, received more than one half the money spent in their constituency campaigns from central party headquarters by their own report. Four of these received all of their campaign funds from this source. Of the remaining seven, three received less than one half of their money from this source and only one reported receiving no funds from his party. Three provided no information.
- 7 There have, of course, been notable exceptions. Both Alexander Heard and Theodore Eschenburg pioneered this field of theory. In addition, Herbert Alexander, Arnold Heidenheimer and James Pollock have done work in

the field of political finance and have stimulated interest in the theoretical questions involved.

- 8 See Table 22 in Study 11 Part II of the Committee's Report for marginal figures on this question, p. 421.
- 9 See Table 13 in ibid., p. 417.
- 10 The question put to candidates read as follows: "Fiscal Incentives. The Presidential Committee on Campaign Costs in the United States has recommended incentives for political contributions by way of certain fiscal measures. Do you think that political contributions should be tax deductible?"
- 11 For details of existing subsidy systems see Study 5 in Part II of the Committee's Report, "Public Subsidization of Political Parties and Candidates." In this study, the distinction is made between direct and indirect subsidies. The latter comprise subsidization in kind or by means of the government paying for certain goods and/or services. Mailing would come under this heading. Direct subsidies, on the other hand, involve the government giving sums of money directly to parties and/or candidates for their campaigns.
- 12 For more complete information concerning various modes of control see Study 1 in Part II of the Committee's Report, "Control and Limitation of Election Expenses in Modern Democracies."

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